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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Remade in Hong Kong 
How Hong Kong People Use Hong Kong Disneyland 
 
 
by 
 
 
CHOI Wing Yee Kimburley 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Recent studies of globalization provide contrasting views of the cultural and 
sociopolitical effects of such major corporations as Disney as they invest 
transnationally and circulate their offerings around the world. While some scholars 
emphasize the ubiquity of Disney’s products and its promotion of consumerism on 
a global scale, accompanied by cultural homogenization, faltering democracy, and 
diminishing state sovereignty, others highlight signs of contestation and resistance, 
questioning the various state-capitalist alliances presumed to hold in the encounter 
between a global company, a local state, and the people. 
 
The settlement process and the cultural import of Hong Kong Disneyland in Hong 
Kong complicate these studies because of the evolving post-colonial situation that 
Disney encounters in Hong Kong. While Disney specializes in “imagineering” 
dreams, Hong Kong itself is messily imagining what “Hong Kong” is and should be, 
and how it should deal with others, including transnational companies and 
Mainlanders. In this thesis, I appropriate Doreen Massey’s ideas of space-time in 
order to examine Hong Kong Disneyland not as a self-enclosed park but as itself a 
multiplicity of spaces where dynamic social relations intersect in the wider context 
of post-colonial Hong Kong. I illuminate the shifting relationship between Disney, 
Mainlanders, and the locals as this relationship develops in its discursive, 
institutional, and everyday-life aspects. Through interviews and ethnographic 
research, I study how my respondents have established and interpreted the 
meanings of Hong Kong Disneyland, and how they have made use of the park to 
support their own constructions of place, of politics, and of identity. 
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Chapter One 
HKDL: A Construction Site for Place, Identity, and Politics 
 
On 3 November 1999, many Hong Kong newspapers featured in their headlines the 
success of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government in 
signing up contracts with the Walt Disney Company in the establishment of Hong 
Kong Disneyland (HKDL).1 To celebrate the joint-venture, the popular press used 
headlines like that of Apple Daily, which read “Millennium Dream Comes True!.”2 
This millennium dream was not only about Hong Kong’s having one more theme 
park, “Hong Kong Disneyland,” but also about Hong Kong’s following in the 
footsteps of other global cities like Tokyo and Paris, which have imported the 
mega-brand Disneyland from the United States. On 12 September 2005, Hong 
Kong Disneyland officially opened on the reclaimed land of Penny’s Bay in Lantau, 
an outlying island in Hong Kong. Unexpectedly, however, Hong Kong Disneyland 
drew negative portrayals from local media through their circulation of the 
uncomplimentary views of visitors and workers. By reporting the Chinese New 
Year chaos3 that occurred on February 2006 and that resulted from HKDL’s 
ticketing system, local media replaced the “millennium dream” with the “Hong 
Kong shame”4 to describe HKDL. HKDL’s attendance rocketed shortly after the 
park’s establishment, but its first year attendance figures fell short of its target of 
5.6 million.5 
What events and themes have contributed to the drastic changes of meaning 
that have characterized “Disneyland” in Hong Kong? Are words like “millennium 
dream” and “Hong Kong shame” adequate in describing Hong Kong people’s 
views of HKDL? Who made the dream? Whom does the dream work for? What are 
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the sociopolitical effects of this particular dream? How should we reconsider this 
particular local dream under the globalization process?  
Recent globalization studies provide contrasting views of the cultural and 
sociopolitical effects of global corporations such as Disney as they invest 
transnationally and circulate their offerings around the world. In the case of Disney, 
some scholars emphasize the ubiquity of Disney’s products and its promotion of 
consumerism on a global scale, along with cultural homogenization,6 declining 
citizenship rights and faltering democracy,7 and diminishing state sovereignty.8 
However, other scholars highlight signs of contestation9 and resistance,10 
questioning the absolute alliance that is presumed to hold between the state and 
capitalists11 in the encounter between a global corporation, a local state, and the 
people.  
Because of different local sociopolitical and cultural situations, scholars 
need to study how globalization processes manifest themselves in different local 
contexts. The settlement of Disneyland in Hong Kong has become an important 
source that scholars can use to examine globalization processes and cultural 
transformation, with the focus on the interaction between, on the one hand, a US-
based company with a global operating span and, on the other hand, local actors 
including the government, media practitioners, and local people as workers or 
consumers. In the case of HKDL, it was the HKSAR government that invited 
Disney to build HKDL, and in 1999, the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney 
Company forged an alliance that promotes a particular “world city” dream12 for 
Hong Kong people to imagine. In the early period of the park’s operation, however, 
the HKSAR government characterized certain requests made by the park as 
 3  
“unacceptable”13 and “requested” the park “to make improvements.”14 How should 
we evaluate state sovereignty in this situation?  
Before the transnational joint-venture was forged between the HKSAR 
government and the Walt Disney Company in 1999, Hong Kong people recognized 
Mickey Mouse, knew Disney as a famous entertainment brand with its international 
presence, and consumed merchandise featuring Mickey Mouse and related movies. 
How should we examine Hong Kong culture and identity in relation to Hong Kong 
people’s consumption of Disney offerings? Have Hong Kong people changed their 
consumption activities since the park arrived? Since September 2005, the 
relationship between Disney and Hong Kong people has been more than a 
relationship between an entertainment provider and consumers—it has centered on 
a big business organization’s provision of job opportunities to Hong Kong workers. 
With HKDL’s emphasis on professional service quality and standards,15 have local 
workers at HKDL been transformed into apt Disney workers? Facing certain 
Disney management practices, how do media practitioners react to the circulation 
of the Disney image?  
The study of Hong Kong Disneyland is particularly challenging because 
other Disney studies generally emphasize the problem of conceptualizing local-
global relations, and the term “local” in these studies is usually construed as 
synonymous in the first instance with the “national.” However, Hong Kong is not a 
nation-state but a city, and Hong Kong’s city status was undergoing enormous 
change during the very period of the establishment of HKDL: as HKDL took shape, 
Hong Kong people themselves were experiencing—and continue to experience—
the transformation of their own civic status from that of being British colonial 
subjects to one of becoming Chinese subjects. Having been a colonial city for more 
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than one hundred and fifty years, Hong Kong became China’s “Special 
Administrative Region” starting on 1 July 1997. Scholars argue that, since the 
1960s, rapid urbanization, industrialization, increased education opportunity, the 
development of local popular culture, changing local immigration laws, and the 
implementation of the Beijing government’s closed-door policy have helped 
develop the local consciousness of the Heung Gong Yan (Hong Kong People)16. 
And it is in this unstable context that HKDL has become a site expressing and 
constituting not only the power dynamics of the local Disney project but also the 
“Hong Kong people”-“Mainlanders” relationship. Although Hong Kong people 
may see themselves as ethnic Chinese, many see themselves as different from or 
even superior to mainland Chinese and see Hong Kong city as different from or, 
again, superior to cities in China, culturally, economically, and politically. Gordon 
Mathews terms such local consciousness as “Chineseness plus,”17 which 
encompasses themes ranging from cultural taste, wealth, and rule of law to 
democratization.  
The Handover brought changes to Hong Kong society both internally and to 
its relationship with China, and in this regard, Mathews’ “Chineseness plus” may 
benefit from a reformulation. According to Alvin So, because of the Handover, the 
Hong Kong colonial government started to launch limited democratization in the 
1980s, but the emergence of the “strong Beijing-businesspeople-London alliance”18 
in the late 1980s resulted in the endorsement of Basic Law in 1990 and hampered 
Hong Kong’s democratization process. Despite political reforms undertaken by the 
last governor, Chris Patten, who reinterpreted Basic Law in the 1990s after the 
1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the pro-Beijing provisional Legislative Council 
replaced the existing elected Legislative Council on 1 July 1997 and the HKSAR 
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Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was indirectly elected by a 400-member Selection 
Committee. Hong Kong, since the Handover, seems to be a dependent polity 
controlled by Beijing authorities. Culturally and economically, the HKSAR 
government has faced challenging tasks in re-imagining, reformulating, and re-
imaging Hong Kong as a city-state and a “special administrative region” of China. 
On the one hand the HKSAR government acting as a dependent “special 
administrative region” instead of an autonomous city-state government, knew well 
that Hong Kong should experience decolonization and the re-nationalization 
process after China’s resumption of Hong Kong sovereignty. On the other hand, the 
strong local consciousness in Hong Kong suggests that any coercive attempt to 
renationalize Hong Kong people would be undesirable, especially when the 
HKSAR government would like to enhance its own political legitimacy and to 
position Hong Kong as a city that has its own particularities notably different from 
other Chinese cities; indeed, such a position might attract foreign investment, which 
countries and cities throughout Asia sought after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 
and which was a possible remedy to local economic stagnation and to increasing 
competition from other Chinese cities after the Handover. To differentiate Hong 
Kong from other Chinese cities, the HKSAR government networked with Western 
symbols, such as Disney, to demonstrate its “international” semblance without 
endangering Beijing authorities’ endorsement of the model of “restricted 
democracy,”19 which has characterized Hong Kong’s democratization since 1997.  
The economic rise of Chinese cities and the potential tourist impact of 
increasing numbers of affluent and worldly Mainlanders prompted the government 
to lure Disneyland to HK. In this way, the HKSAR government hoped to confront 
and to overcome competition from major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, and also 
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in this way, the government no doubted hoped to help legitimate its regime. As for 
Hong Kong people, many were forming at this time (as my research in subsequent 
chapters will show) a desire to become more “cosmopolitan” and, thereby, to retain 
their self-perceived competitiveness. HKDL, therefore, is not only significant as an 
economic revitalization project, or as an occasion to debate issues of cultural 
Americanization, but rather requires us to ask how different Hong Kong people 
have used HKDL to develop their personal sense of identity.  
While Disney specializes in imagineering20 dreams, Hong Kong itself is 
messily imagining what “Hong Kong” is and should be and how the Hong Kong 
people should deal with others, including global companies and Mainlanders. The 
HKDL project was announced in November 1999, around two years after Hong 
Kong’s Handover in July 1997. The project has been one of the biggest investments 
of the HKSAR government in the first post-Handover decade. As a small-sized and 
self-enclosed park, HKDL creates many opportunities in which Hong Kong people 
can experience intimate encounters with other Hong Kong people and with tourists 
from other places around the world, including the Mainland. The park has become a 
place for constituting multiple social relationships, and these encounters sometimes 
reinforce beliefs and sometimes encourage Hong Kong people to reflect upon or 
even to change their concepts of the self and of the other, including their concepts 
of Mainlanders. As a site that links up the Disney Company with the city of Hong 
Kong, HKDL brings up issues of city identity and of Hong Kong people’s cultural 
identity in relation to those global companies whose presence is rendered so 
desirable by the inter-urban competition driving the globalization processes. For 
example (as I will show in a chapter Six and Seven), Disney’s corporate practice in 
the local environment was perceived as “Americanism” by some Hong Kong media 
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figures, and the dynamic relationship between HKDL management and local media 
encouraged Hong Kong people to rethink their relationship with the “Western” 
corporate other as represented by the Disney Company.  
Certainly, these identity questions are not merely cultural: they stem from 
and can have sociopolitical effects on existing social structure and local governance. 
Our perception of the self and of the other affects both how we treat people of 
different cultures and what we want our city to become. How should the Hong 
Kong people open themselves so that they embrace different cultures? Should the 
Hong Kong people open themselves to all kinds of cultures, including corporate 
global culture, which might diminish state sovereignty and citizenship, or should 
they dare to say “no” to certain cultures? What kind of city do the Hong Kong 
people want their city to become? Do Hong Kong people want Hong Kong to be a 
city for affluent residents and tourists instead of for various populations if the city 
continues to develop as a tourism-based one? What kind of city is the HKSAR 
government promoting and constructing? Do Hong Kong people have enough 
institutional access to monitor the government’s urban planning? If part of the 
effect of globalization is to challenge citizenship, what particular kinds of 
domestication should local actors (including the government, media practitioners, 
and ordinary people) adopt to face global companies such as Disney?  
The study of HKDL as a case provides me an opportunity to analyze Hong 
Kong’s changing worldly situation after Handover. As a case study, my study is 
specific to place (the intersecting Hong Kong-Mainland and local-global spatial 
relationships) and time (the post-Handover Hong Kong facing globalization and 
regional competition). Certainly, this case study is particular in the sense that I 
studied particular individuals (HKDL workers, middle class parent consumers, 
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media practitioners) and groups (Disney Hunter and HKDL Cast Member Union); 
these views are limited in the sense that the opinions and acts expressed by these 
particular individuals cannot be generalized as a study of the whole population of 
Hong Kong society. However, it does not mean that my HKDL study does not 
involve some sense of generality. Unlike many cultural studies research whose 
focus is on a particular group of marginal people or government policy making, 
many of my respondents are common people. By forging links between Hong 
Kong’s dreams and Hong Kong’s disappointment with HKDL, I argue that the 
rigorous study of Hong Kong people’s views and uses of HKDL provides a 
substantial ground for understanding the identity formation of Hong Kong as the 
latter encounters the sociopolitical effects of a transnational private company-public 
government joint-venture in the post-colonial context of Hong Kong. At the same 
time, theoretically the study of HKDL as a global corporate import to the local soil 
gives me chance to refine theories concerning cultural globalization: as we shall see, 
there is no necessary correlation between globalization forces (such as Disney’s 
global economic and cultural power) and homogenization of local culture, between 
localization and political empowerment, and between cosmopolitanism and the 
development of pluralistic culture.       
To examine the same globalization story in three aspects (the discursive, the 
institutional, and the everyday aspects), in the following section I appropriate 
Doreen Massey’s concepts of space-time and of the connection (and the 
disconnection) of social networks in the formation of city identity. Using these 
concepts, I study how Hong Kong people use their connection with Disney, through 
the HKDL joint-venture, to reconstitute Hong Kong’s city image, politics, and 
cultural identities.  
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Space-time, place, identity, and HKDL 
Doreen Massey’s distinctive concept of space-time introduces a cultural perspective 
into the idea of space, which is traditionally seen as a passive and apolitical “setting 
for objects and their interaction”21 in a timeless context. Rather than conceptualize 
spatial relations as social relations taking a particular geographical form, Massey 
conceptualizes space and social relations as mutually constructed. And if space and 
the spatial configurations of social relations produce social effects, space and the 
spatial are implicated in the production of history (p. 254); space, therefore, cannot 
be seen as the realm of stasis. In Massey’s words, “Space is not static, nor time 
spaceless…neither [spatiality or temporality] can be conceptualized as the absence 
of the other” (p. 264). Because space is conceived in terms of social relations, and 
because social relations are dynamic and multiple, and because individuals hold not 
only different positions but consequently different experiences and interpretations 
of spatial social relations, space does not imply fixity or stasis but “a simultaneous 
multiplicity of spaces” in the “lived world” (p. 3). That is, space should be 
conceived in relation to social relations, power, symbols, and representations. 
Massey’s concept of space-time challenges the dualistic concept that frames 
time as becoming and space as being. Massey’s concept challenges, as well, the 
dualism that frames place as the local and “everywhere” as the global—a 
distinction that pits the concrete against the abstract, the particular against the 
universal. In “A Global Sense of Place,” she argues that the idea of place 
problematizes the distinction between global and local because the specificity of a 
place lies neither within the place’s identifiable borders nor within the place’s 
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proper history. In truth, a place is a site where wider cultures meet, networks take 
root, and social relationships evolve:  
 
What gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized history but 
the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of social 
relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus. If one moves 
in from the satellite towards the globe, holding all those networks of social 
relations and movements and communications in one’s head, then each 
“place” can be seen as a particular, unique, point of their intersection. It is, 
indeed, a meeting place. (p. 154)  
 
 
If a place is not constructed by an internally produced and essential past, the place’s 
identity is not singular, fixed, and unproblematic. If places are “open and porous 
networks of social relations” (p. 121), places not only develop mixtures through 
history but also bring differences together in space. It follows that places 
constructed out of “juxtaposition, the intersection, the articulation, of multiple 
social relations” are of course internally contradictory and contested, and that while 
places are necessarily shared, there will simultaneously be clashes between various 
and competing interests over what the area is, and what it ought to become (p. 137). 
To extract advantages from a set of social relations, the particular claimant groups 
lay claim to some particular position in time-space (whether through the 
establishment of heritage centers and the promotion of nationalism), so that the 
groups can establish an identity of a place, although “the past was not more static 
than is the present” (p. 169):  
 
When black-robed patriarchs organize ceremonies to celebrate a true 
national identity they are laying claim to the freezing of that identity at a 
particular moment and in a particular form—a moment and a form where 
they had a power which they can thereby justify themselves in retaking. All 
of which means, of course, that the identity of any place, including that 
place called home, is in one sense for ever open to contestation. (p. 169) 
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Besides challenging the static identity of a place, Massey challenges the necessity 
of an essentialist connection between place and cultural identities, and the idea that 
place alone is the source of a stable and coherent identity. If a place does not 
contain an “internally produced, essential past” (p. 170), the contested identity of 
place cannot be the source of a single, stable, and coherent identity; the geography 
of social relations enables individuals to recognize their interconnectedness and 
contested personal and cultural identities. Situated in different locations in relation 
to the overall complexity of social relations, various social groups read those 
relations differently and these different social relations also make the personal and 
cultural identity of these social groups distinct (p. 121). In other words, although 
identities may be constructed out of place, class, gender, and race, identities cannot 
be aligned with a place only (p. 137), because localities are about “the intersection 
of social activities and social relations and, crucially, activities and relations which 
are necessarily, by definition, dynamic, changing” (p. 136). 
Massey’s concept of space-time, her concept of place as a meeting site for 
wider cultures, her assertion that conflicts over what a place is and should be are 
inevitable, and her argument that personal identity and cultural identity are multiple 
and dynamic help me examine HKDL as not a self-enclosed park in Lantau but a 
multiplicity of spaces with dynamic social relations in the wider context of post-
colonial Hong Kong. To examine these complex social relations and multiple 
spaces, I used interviews and ethnographic research. In this way, I studied, in 
particular, how my respondents establish and interpret the meanings of Hong Kong 
Disneyland and how they make use of the park to reconstitute their own 
“constructions of place, of politics, and of identity”22 in Keith and Pile’s words. 
These local views and constructions of both the city identity of Hong Kong and the 
 12  
cultural identity of the Hong Kong people are neither stable nor unified but multiple 
and contested. Individuals, whether they are media practitioners, HKDL workers, or 
HKDL consumers, have different positions in their relationship with HKDL and use 
their own positions diversely. Indeed, their views on the same project are internally 
divergent. As we shall see, the connection between Disney culture and HKDL 
networks has transformed social relations, cultural identities, and self-other 
relations. 
I examine the sometimes dominant, sometimes negotiated relationships 
among Disney, “Mainlanders,” and the locals as these relationships develop in 
discursive, institutional, and everyday life aspects. In the discursive aspect, Hong 
Kong people were—long before the establishment of HKDL—well familiar with 
the Mouse, the Disney brand, and its offerings. The success of the joint-venture 
with public endorsement starts from the appealing representation of Disney. The 
HKSAR government allied itself with Disney and has made use of Disney’s famous 
brand name and huge symbolic value not only to revitalize Hong Kong’s economy 
but also to sell the Hong Kong people the “world city” dream. The import of HKDL 
also functions to extend Hong Kong’s existing symbolic connections to both “the 
East” (so that Mainland Chinese can consume the spectacular Western Disney park) 
and “the West” (so that business will increase its investment in Hong Kong). Some 
Hong Kong people found the HKDL project attractive insofar as they could use 
Disney as a cultural marker to distinguish Hong Kong from other Chinese cities or 
to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders; some other Hong Kong people use 
Disney as a way to achieve their cosmopolitan dream, to acquire cosmopolitan 
sensitivity and cultural capital. However, these uses do not imply that Hong Kong 
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people wholly embrace all Disney offerings, as I suggest when pointing out middle 
class parents’ selective consumption of Disney merchandise.  
In the institutional aspect, I discuss the problems and conflicts between the 
HKSAR government and the Disney alliance. Although transnational companies 
propagate their assertion that they glocalize their offerings for local uses, certain 
major company management philosophies and practices seem difficult to either 
glocalize or, for that matter, localize. These practices might also raise conflicts 
between the state and the company and between the company and the local actors. 
In the everyday life aspect, I examine how HKDL workers perform in 
response to the Disney manual and to the HKDL work environment and how their 
interaction with visitors, both locals and Mainlanders, affects their existing 
conceptualization of the Hong Kong people and of Mainlanders. I also discuss 
grass-roots populations’ organized resistance against both the Disney Company and 
HKDL. In this regard, I further examine how local consumption has localized, 
negotiated, and remade the meaning of the contextless Disney theme park, “the 
happiest place in the world.”    
Before delving into chapter details and research methodology, I would like 
to mobilize Massey’s concepts of space-time, of place as a meeting site for 
networks and wider cultures, and of dynamic identity to reread local studies on the 
emergence, in the 1960s, of the ambiguous Hong Kong identity, Heung Gong Yan. 
It is important that we first develop a rigorous understanding of the emergence of 
local identities in the colonial period if we hope to understand, with similar rigor, 
the cultural significance of HKDL inside Hong Kong society in the post-colonial 
period, a topic that I discuss in later chapters.    
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“Heung Gong Yan”: ambiguous local consciousness, changing space-time 
Hong Kong is geographically and historically linked to Mainland China, but in the 
1970s, Hong Kong’s colonial governance and modernization process, together with 
China’s closed-door policy, fostered the emergence of a sense of a Hong Kong 
identity. This identity, different from identities applicable to people in China, was 
labeled Heung Gong Yan (Hong Kong People) and arose out of economic 
development and colonial policy targeting housing, education, immigration, and 
media. In considering Hong Kong’s cultural distinctiveness in relation to space, we 
should not consider the identity difference to be a natural consequence of the 
separation of Hong Kong from the Mainland. These have not been “‘naturally’ 
discontinuous spaces” in Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson’s words but rather result 
from a “division of space” that stems from government’s efforts:   
 
Representations of space in the social sciences are remarkably dependent on 
images of break, rupture, and disjunction. The distinctiveness of societies, 
nations, and cultures is predicated on a seemingly unproblematic division of 
space, on the fact that they occupy “naturally” discontinuous spaces. The 
premise of discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize 
contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies…. Space 
itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical 
memory, and societal organization is inscribed…. This assumed 
isomorphism of space, place, and culture results in some significant 
problems.23 
 
Rather than treat cultural differences as a natural and unproblematic consequence of 
geographically discontinuous space, Gupta and Ferguson argue that in the 
production of imagined place-based communities, colonial states have significantly 
affected the “division of space”: “Colonialism…represents the displacement of one 
form of interconnection by another.”24 This point is accurate, but colonial 
governance also actively represents the discontinuous space as a matter of “natural” 
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cultural differences and emphasizes a naturalized link between place, people, and 
culture.  
We may partially apply Gupta and Ferguson’s argument on colonial-
governance displacement to the case of Hong Kong. Between 1843 and 1997, Hong 
Kong was a British colony. It was not the colonial government’s initial idea to 
disconnect Hong Kong from China spatially or culturally. Because the British used 
Hong Kong as an entrêpot to open the China market and to extract economic 
benefits therefrom, the colonial government ruled the people in Hong Kong on the 
basis of Chinese law and Chinese customs.25 Between 1946 and 1949, however, the 
Mainland experienced civil war between the Communist Party of China (CCP) and 
the Kuomintang (KMT). To prevent Hong Kong’s devolution into another 
battlefield that would harm British traders’ businesses,26 the colonial government 
restricted human flows between Hong Kong and China. In 1949, the year in which 
the CCP set up the People’s Republic of China, the colonial government issued 
identity cards and set up population controls and, in response to these actions, the 
Beijing government adopted its closed-door policy. After 1951, Chinese living in 
Hong Kong and Macau had to apply for a “China Entry Permit”27 to enter the 
Mainland, and their activities in the Mainland were under inspection. Zheng and 
Wong28 argue that the Mainland’s entry system and inspections made it difficult for 
Hong Kong people to conceive of China as a “homeland,” for they were treated as 
“foreigners” there.  
Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s restriction of human flows from the Mainland 
was tightening through the years.29 In April 1974, Hong Kong’s immigration 
control measures fell in line with the so-called “Reached Base Policy,”30 meaning 
that only those Mainland people who had been received by Hong Kong relatives or 
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friends at the China-Hong Kong border could stay in Hong Kong. Although the 
Beijing government headed by Deng Xiaoping set up, in 1976, a China Re-entry 
Visa system31 to loosen control over Hong Kong people’s return to the Mainland, 
the colonial government implemented full immigration controls in October 1980. 
People from the Mainland crossing the Hong Kong border became illegal 
immigrants and faced immediate repatriation in the Mainland.   
To disconnect Hong Kong’s cultural and political networks from China’s, 
the colonial government set up new laws. In October 1948, the colonial government 
set up a Public Ordinance to restrict activities that were associated with the spread 
of communist ideas and of nationalism in Hong Kong. In the same year, the 
government re-amended the “Education (Clause 2) Amendment Ordinance,”32 
through which the Governor and the Executive Council could close a school or sack 
a teacher in the public interest; in February 1949, one school supporting 
Communism was closed.33 According to Wong Wang Chi, particular chapters in 
Chinese history such as the Opium War of 1839-1842 and the Boxer Uprising 
(1899-1901) were de-emphasized34 because the former highlighted the role of the 
British in selling opium and the latter raised public’s nationalist sentiments. 
In 1953, the “Report of the Chinese Studies Committee” issued by the 
Education Department created the concept of “modern Chinese” for Hong Kong 
people.35 As modern Chinese, Hong Kong students must know both Chinese and 
Western thoughts and languages. Noticing that the successive governments of 
China had been trying since 192736 to popularize Putonghua as Kuoyu, the 
“national language,” the colonial government started its seven-year primary-school 
expansion program in October 195437 and specified Cantonese38 as the medium of 
instruction and English as a second language. As for secondary education, the 
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Anglo-Chinese grammar schools used English as a medium of instruction and 
Chinese was taught as a second language, while the instruction of Chinese middle 
schools was in Chinese and English was taught as a second language. The medium 
of educational instruction starting from the 1950s constructed the cultural 
differences between people in Hong Kong and those in the Mainland, for the former 
population’s cultural and language connection was with the “West.”39 The above 
immigration and education policies can be seen as separatist in nature because they 
limited human flows between the Mainland and Hong Kong and because they 
developed Hong Kong people’s cultural identity as “modern” Chinese, in contrast 
to “traditional” Chinese identity.  
As shown in the education reforms, colonial governance also created the 
Hong Kong identity in temporal terms. Because the Hong Kong population was 
dominated by ethnic Chinese, the colonial government shaped the identity of the 
Hong Kong people on the grounds of neither China-based cultural traditions nor an 
extended historical lineage but a distinctive way of life in the present.40 Such a 
perception of identity was developed through education media, collective 
experiences on specific social crisis (in particular, the 1966-67 riots) and related 
social issues,41 and the rise of an urbanized way of life.  
The official station Radio Hong Kong,42 for example, produced popular TV 
programs such as Family in Hong Kong and Below the Lion Rock43 from 1972 
onwards to be aired on commercial TV stations; these programs portrayed Hong 
Kong common people’s everyday life in concrete social situations. As the two titles 
suggest, the two programs encouraged a largely immigrant audience to treat Hong 
Kong as home. In the early 1970s, Below the Lion Rock was a series of five-minute 
to fifteen-minute “slots” featuring a family’s everyday life practices through which 
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the program commented on various social problems in housing, public transport, 
education, and the like. From 1976, Lion Rock turned into a half-hour program 
depicting life stories of different social strata.44 These programs played a role in the 
popular politics of place making by inviting Hong Kong people to deal with 
existing problems and not by promoting nostalgia over China’s past.  
The concept of mor dun (modern) was grounded in present-day ways of life 
and not in traditions and extended historical lineage. The colonial government 
promoted mor dun through “school textbooks and trade promotions, public 
information campaigns and tourist publicity.”45 It articulated mor dun on the basis 
of contested local daily practices. On the whole, mor dun constituted the Hong 
Kong people’s first distinctive sense of Hong Kong identity, and this process took 
place in the late 1960s. The concept of “modern” can be interpreted in many 
ways,46 two of which (in their Hong Kong usage) are particularly pertinent here. 
First, “modern” stands for identity based on work, that industrialization and 
economic hardship gave rise to “working daughters”47 who went out to work 
diligently for family survival even though they had completed only their primary 
school education. In this regard, to promote exports, the government agencies also 
portrayed female secretaries as smart, diligent, and efficient, and this image became 
working class women’s imaginary for social advancement.48  
Second, the concept mor dun suggests styles that appealed to youths and 
that were reflected in consumption and fashion patterns in the 1960s. For example, 
working hard to earn money, working daughters became not only breadwinners of 
the family but also consumers in the market. Evidence of this trend was observable 
in the annual Chinese Manufacturers’ Exhibition of Hong Kong Products.49 One of 
Hong Kong’s largest festivals, it was held for several weeks before Christmas 
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during the 1960s. With songs and dance, fashion shows, opera, and beauty pageants, 
the trade show promoted collective consumption as entertainment for the diligent 
working populations. Young working populations, different from their seniors, 
were concerned about fashion and mor dun and consumed these modern images 
through movies, TV, stars’ appearances, government promotion, among other 
media venues. Hong Kong youths have chased related images and identities since 
the late 1960s.  
However, the separatist and disconnected cultural and immigration policies 
and the definition of cultural identity based on present-day and modern ways of life, 
instead of on traditions, was in connection and contestation with human and 
cultural flows from the Mainland to Hong Kong and with Hong Kong people’s 
everyday practice of Chinese customs. In Massey’s words, the lived world of a 
simultaneous multiplicity of spaces implies “cross-cutting, intersecting, aligning 
with one another, or existing in relations of paradox or antagonism.”50 The 
emergence of working daughters in the late 1960s and the 1970s, for example, 
should not be seen as the mere product of industrialism; rather, it should be seen as 
the articulation between the market regime of increasing demands of workers 
during industrialization and the traditional Chinese family regime in neglecting 
daughters’ wishes (to stay in school to study, in this case) and pressing them to 
“sacrifice” for family.51 During the same period, a modern domestic ideal 
developed in the West emphasizing nuclear patterns and suggesting home-based 
careers (namely, homemaking) as the ideal female role, and this ideal also started to 
emerge in Hong Kong, but the ideal of a full-time wife, as argued by Ng Chun 
Hung,52 was unrealizable in the hostile economic climate of 1970s Hong Kong. As 
Lui Tai Lok argues, although ambiguous local consciousness emerged in Hong 
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Kong starting from the mid 1960s, it was not until the 1970s—with changing 
family structure, the rise of living standards, the dominance of localized popular 
culture, the intensification of urbanized consumption- and entertainment-based 
ways of living, and changing government-public relations53—that a quasi-
autonomous local consciousness formed in Hong Kong.54 Underneath the concept 
of Heung Gong Yan was an ostensible clash of contesting cultural elements from 
contradictory daily lived experiences, and the resulting ambiguous local 
consciousness marked the ostensible difference between the Hong Kong people and 
Mainland Chinese.  
The Hong Kong people’s inability to articulate a coherent identity for 
themselves intensified from the mid-1980s onwards. Economically and politically, 
Hong Kong people realized the impossibility of the existence of an autonomous 
Hong Kong identity. With China’s economic reforms, with the increase of Hong 
Kong-China trade, and with the British-Chinese 1984 decision55 to hand over Hong 
Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997,56 Hong Kong’s spatial connection with China 
has seemed to intensify rather than diminish. It is not surprising then to see that, 
from August 1997 onwards, successive university surveys on Hong Kong people’s 
cultural identity identify four types of cultural identity in which Hong Kong people 
describe their ambiguous cultural identity—the Hong Kong citizen, the Chinese 
Hong Kong citizen, the Hong Kong Chinese citizen, and the Chinese citizen.57 
These four types of identity illustrate the tensions that afflict Hong Kong identity, 
which is the site of an often painful balancing act between ethnicity-based identity, 
tradition-based identity, culture-based identity, and geography-based identity.  
 
Post-colonial HK identity: re-nationalization and cultural distinctions 
 21  
Since the Handover, and as the implementation of the HKSAR government’s re-
nationalization project has proceeded,58 more and more Hong Kong people have 
ethnically or nationally identified themselves as Chinese. The 1997 survey 
conducted by the University of Hong Kong indicates that almost 60% of 
respondents considered themselves to be Heung Gong Yan in a broad sense59 and 
that 38% considered themselves to be Chinese in a broad sense.60 Another survey 
conducted by the same institution in 2004, however, showed a 10% decrease in the 
number of Hong Kong people considering themselves to be Heung Gong Yan61 and 
a 14% increase in the number considering themselves to be Chinese.62  
The political Handover, the increase of Hong Kong-China networks, and the 
implementation of the re-nationalization project have prompted more Hong Kong 
people to identify themselves as Chinese instead of as Heung Gong Yan, but this 
trend does not mean that Hong Kong people believe that they are the same 
“Chinese” as the Mainland Chinese. The Hok Yau Club’s 2004 survey of 4,595 
secondary school students’ cultural identity63 showed that although there was a 
percentage increase in respondents who were identifying themselves as Chinese, the 
respondents considered the characteristics of Hong Kong people to be more 
positive than the characteristics of Mainland Chinese. Hong Kong people were 
rated as open-minded, courteous, and knowledgeable64; Chinese were seen as 
traditional and self-centered.65 In terms of politics, more than 90% of the 
respondents stated that Hong Kong people were pursuing democracy, liberty, 
equality, and a system of fairness; whereas less than half of the respondents stated 
that the Chinese were pursuing these civic values.66 The appendix of the survey 
divided respondents into two groups: students who were born in the Mainland and 
students who were born in Hong Kong67: the former’s rating of the characteristics 
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of Chinese was more positive than the latter’s rating of those characteristics. In 
other words, positive ratings of the characteristics of Chinese are even lower if we 
consider only the responses of Hong Kong-born students. In sum, although more 
and more Hong Kong young people identify themselves as Chinese since the 
Handover, these same young people believe that (1) the personalities of Hong Kong 
people are better than the personalities of Mainlanders, (2) Hong Kong people are 
more modern than (less traditional than) Mainlanders, (3) Hong Kong people are 
more open-minded to foreign culture (and thus more knowledgeable) than 
Mainlanders, (4) and Hong Kong people are more civilized in both a cultural sense 
and a political sense than Mainlanders. Since the Handover, two frameworks have 
pervaded the minds of Hong Kong’s youth: the colonial spatial definition of Hong 
Kong identity, based on foreign—especially Western—cultural connections, and 
the temporal definition of Heung Gong Yan, based on modernity and not on 
tradition.  
Gordon Mathews argues that “Chineseness plus”68 is the discourse that 
many Hong Kong people deploy in recognizing sameness and difference in relation 
to the Other, the Mainland Chinese. In general, Hong Kong people are affirmed as 
representing “Chineseness plus internationalness” (p. 144) or “Chineseness plus 
Westernness” (p. 144). In terms of politics, Hong Kong people are “Chineseness 
plus freedom/democracy/human rights/the rule of law” (p. 150); in terms of culture, 
Hong Kong people are “Chineseness plus aesthetic freedom/cosmopolitan 
taste/manners/knowledge” (pp. 145-9); and in terms of economics, Hong Kong 
people are “Chineseness plus wealth” (p. 159). These “plus” elements are largely 
elements acquired from spatial and cultural connections with the capitalist Western 
bloc. 
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Certainly, “Chineseness plus” is only an aspect of Hong Kong local 
consciousness. Although, in this thesis, I borrow from Mathews’ concept of 
“Chineseness plus” in order to understand Hong Kong people’s cultural prejudice 
against Mainlanders, I do not mean to claim that Hong Kong local consciousness 
rests only on “Chineseness.” In my perspective, Hong Kong people’s local 
consciousness derives chiefly from a sense of “Hong Kongism,” not from 
“Chineseness.” As I have suggested, the spatial and temporal disconnection of 
Hong Kong from China in colonial times helped Hong Kong people define Hong 
Kong identity in their own terms (in particular through modernity and connection 
with the West). In fact, Hong Kong people may exercise “Chineseness plus” 
consciousness when they are actively considering themselves to be “Chinese,” but 
they would also like to distinguish themselves from “Chineseness.” There are still 
many Hong Kong people who think of themselves as Heung Gong Yan instead of as 
Chinese. In the 2004 University of Hong Kong survey, 49% of respondents still 
considered themselves to be Heung Gong Yan in a broad sense.69 When expressing 
and legitimizing supremacist thoughts, Hong Kong people also interpret 
“Chineseness” as Other to themselves. Politically, economically, and even 
culturally, “Chineseness” is not the most prominent cultural bearing among Hong 
Kong people: Hong Kong’s experience of almost thirty years of “prosperity and 
stability” between 1967 and 1997 stands in stark contrast to the Mainland’s political 
and social turbulence; Hong Kong’s self-proclaimed “non-interventionist” capitalist 
economy is the opposite of the Beijing government’s interventionist socialist 
economy; Hong Kong people may practice Chinese customs, but Hong Kong 
people’s enjoyment of a relatively high degree of freedom of speech is hard to 
attain on the Mainland. 
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As Chan Koon Chung argues, Hong Kong people’s local consciousness is, 
to a large extent, based on Hong Kong people’s experiences in Hong Kong, 
particularly on Hong Kong’s rapid economic development after the late 1960s. 
Because the Hong Kong government has had a relatively efficient system, rule by 
law, and public housing, and because Hong Kong made an early entry into the 
world economy by functioning as an entrepôt and as an exporter, the Hong Kong 
economy developed rapidly, and Hong Kong people came to believe themselves to 
be brilliant, flexible, efficient, and business savvy.70 I would prefer to call this 
identity “Hong Kong supremacist,” one which proudly allows that these 
characteristics surfaced under a colonial governance that turned Hong Kong from a 
fishing port into an international financial center. “Chineseness plus” consciousness 
can be seen as one type of “Hong Kong supremacist” consciousness, but Hong 
Kong identity is not chiefly based on “Chineseness,” as Mathews’ concept of 
“Chineseness plus” implies.  
As Hong Kong fell back under Mainland China’s sovereignty in 1997, and 
as Hong Kong people experienced economic doldrums between 1997 and 2003, 
Hong Kong people started to question the superior aspect of “Hong Kong” identity. 
Hong Kong people’s status as British colonial subjects disappeared forever with the 
1997 Handover, which effectively ended the people’s “Chineseness plus.” In terms 
of politics, Hong Kong as a quasi-city state has no say in defense or foreign affairs; 
the Hong Kong people’s legal pursuit of democracy and universal suffrage must 
receive Beijing authorities’ approval, and the Beijing authorities have sovereign 
power over the common law courts of Hong Kong.71 In terms of economics, it is 
true that Hong Kong’s economy has recovered, at least somewhat, from the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-1998, the dot-com collapse of 2000, the September 11 
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attacks of 2001, and the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) of 
2003; nevertheless, the Mainland’s economy is the fastest growing region in Asia.72 
Indeed, Hong Kong’s economic rebound, after all these traumatic events, received 
most of its support from the Beijing government’s policies.73  
There can be little doubt, then, that the development of Hong Kong’s 
economic future depends significantly on the development of strong economic 
relations between Hong Kong and Mainland China. And as I mention above, in 
terms of culture, many Hong Kong young people characterize Hong Kong people 
as open-minded, courteous, and knowledgeable and characterize Chinese people as 
traditional and self-centered; however, we should bear in mind that Hong Kong 
people who frequently work on the Mainland or who live in a Mainland cabin or 
retreat during weekends may have a more complicated picture of Mainlanders. 
Between 2001 and 2003, Eric Ma conducted an ethnographic study in Dongguan, 
Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. Ma argues that, on the basis of their class, Mainlanders 
differ among one another in their view of Hong Kong culture: working class 
Mainlanders embrace the popular culture of Hong Kong and that of Taiwan, 
whereas the Mainland’s cultural elites and the Mainland’s rising middle class take 
great pride in traditional Chinese culture and have considerable disdain for Hong 
Kong culture.74 Inside a private housing estate, it is always the Mainlanders who 
occupy the most luxurious house at the center of the estate, and Hong Kong people 
may know that they “may not be superior to these Mainland Chinese in fashion, 
style of speech, and consumption acts.”75 The fragile and ambiguous differentiation 
marker that Hong Kong people may still maintain rests perhaps on the Hong Kong 
people’s hybrid culture, which derives from Hong Kong’s long-term connection 
with Western culture. As James Watson argues: 
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Hong Kong in the late 1990s constitutes one of the world’s most 
heterogeneous cultural environments. Younger people, in particular, are 
fully conversant in transnational idioms, which include language, music, 
sports, clothing, satellite television, cybercommunications, global travel, 
and…cuisine. It is no longer possible to distinguish what is local from what 
is not. In Hong Kong … the transnational is the local.76 
 
Starting in the 1960s, Hong Kong people’s hybrid consumption activities 
have influenced not only their cultural taste but also local production. Many of 
Hong Kong’s productions of television programs, movies, and songs reflect not 
merely local sources but also popular genres that prevail elsewhere and that the 
Hong Kong people have appropriated. Stephen Teo argues, for example, that 
“Contemporary Hong Kong cinema is a hybrid, a child of the two major streams, 
the Mandarin and Cantonese cinemas of the 50s, as well as Western influences.”77 
Hong Kong action movies in the 1960s were already a display of different martial 
arts and opera traditions, and increasingly borrowed from Hollywood78; Jackie 
Chan’s changing onscreen persona is often a play between Chinese nationalistic 
culture that borrows heavily from martial arts traditions and a revisionist version of 
kungfu comedies that draws on urban pragmatic and cynical values; as Steve Fore 
argues, Jackie Chan’s early screen persona was “a balancing act between dual 
manifestations of tradition and modernity in Hong Kong.”79 As for popular songs, 
Cantonese songs are a hybrid of different elements.80 In Cantonese opera, for 
example, both Chinese instruments and Western instruments accompany the 
music,81 and the way of playing these Western instruments is “Cantonized.”82 In 
terms of stylized manufactures, Hong Kong people obtain, re-make, and 
merchandize the manufactures that originate from global consumer culture. These 
remade products attract Mainland Chinese to Hong Kong for shopping excursions. 
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In 2004, 12.24 million Mainland Chinese visited Hong Kong, where they spent 
HK$23 million dollars on shopping, and this constituted 68% of their total 
expenditure in Hong Kong.83 Mainlanders come to Hong Kong and buy Hong Kong 
goods because of Hong Kong products’ hybrid nature, and Hong Kong’s hybrid 
culture comes from adapting cultural goods not only from West but also from other 
Asian cultures, particularly the Japanese. 
Scholars find that Hong Kong youth identify especially with Japanese 
popular culture. Watching television in the late 1960s and the 1970s was the most 
popular entertainment activity for the Hong Kong public,84 and Japanese TV 
programs such as Visour Sign (1970),85 Sugata Sanshiro (1970),86 G Men ’75 
(1975),87 and Oretachi no Tabi (1976)88 were popular with Hong Kong viewers.89 
Nowadays, Hong Kong people, especially youth, consume Japanese publications, 
comics, movies, video games, fashion, cultural icons, models, popular music, on-
line Japanese content, and non-cultural offerings such as electronic appliances, as 
well as Japanese television programming. Wilkins90 conducted a content analysis of 
the Cantonese spoken Jade channel of the Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB) 
that airs in Hong Kong. Wilkins found that, in 1993, of all the programs the Jade 
channel aired, 80% were its own production; 11% were imported from Japan; 5% 
from Western sources; and 4% from other Asian sources. In 2001, Delwiche 
conducted a qualitative study of twenty-four respondents who were between the 
ages of sixteen and twenty-three, and Delwiche found that “nearly every respondent 
expressed strong affection for some aspect of Japanese culture.”91 Delwiche argued 
that owing to the similarities between Hong Kong people’s body types and 
Japanese body types, between Hong Kong’s family structure and Japanese family 
structure, and between Hong Kong’s academic system and Japan’s academic 
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system, his respondents “were far more oriented toward the fashions and aspirations 
of Japanese teens than toward the fashions and aspirations of young people 
anywhere else in the world” (p. 88). Comparing Japanese teenagers with Hong 
Kong youth Delwiche’s respondents suggested that “Hong Kong people [are] 
always trailing one step behind” (p. 82). In research conducted by Jenifer Tam on 
Hong Kong youth’s consumption of cuteness-themed Japanese products and 
Japanese fashion magazines, she concludes that her respondents identified Japan 
“as a world of consumerist pleasure, cuteness, and youthfulness.”92 
Among various Japanese cultural offerings, the kawaii (cute) style is one 
popular phenomenon in Hong Kong. The word kawaii stands for affectionate 
feelings toward animals and children who are too weak to support themselves, and 
as Sharon Kinsella argues, it turns out to be a style celebrating “sweet, adorable, 
innocent, pure, simple, genuine, gentle, vulnerable, weak, and inexperienced social 
behavior and physical appearances” and has dominated Japanese popular culture 
since the 1980s.93 In relating Disney to kawaii, Shunya Yoshimi argues that 
Japanese women remake the Disneyfied European folktale: While Disneyfication is 
the transformation of a death-rebirth folktale into Disney’s Snow White and the 
Seven Dwarfs, a fantasy about a young girl who, surrounded by cute pets, yearns 
for a prince, Japanese women’s kawaii culture “produced a discourse to colonize 
strangers” through cutification—to take in things kawaii and to deny things that are 
not into their “imagined community of fantasy.”94 
Based on Yoshimi’s argument, I would further argue that while Japanese 
females use kawaii culture in order to place themselves in a warm atmosphere to 
shut out everyday problems,95 and to resist adulthood and work,96 Hong Kong 
youth use kawaii culture in order to link themselves to others, to maintain peer-
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group ties, and to maintain close family ties. According to Jenifer Tam’s study97 of 
nineteen Hong Kong youths’ consumption of Japanese cultural offerings, “More 
than half of the informants agreed that they came into contact with either Japanese 
cute products or fashion magazines from their family members, especially in the 
case of cute products, as their parents or siblings bought them cute stuff when they 
were little kids.” 
Hong Kong people not only domesticate Japanese consumption patterns 
relative to cute products but remake cute products, as well. Kinsella argues that the 
early prototype of Japanese cute products derives from the cute style in Japanese 
manga animation and from young people’s handwriting styles.98 This version of a 
cute product “is small, pastel, round, soft, loveable…dreamy, frilly and fluffy.”99 
Hong Kong people appropriate the Japanese cute style in remaking Disney 
characters and appeal to both local and Mainland customers. This can be shown 
through the increase of Hong Kong-designed Disney characters in contrast to the 
decrease of Disney Stores in Hong Kong. 
Although Disney characters were popular in Hong Kong, Mickey Mouse, 
the major icon of “Disney,” is seen as outdated and boring in the eyes of many 
Hong Kong children and, in 2003, was listed as the eighth most “not cool” cartoon 
character100; even Disney animators agreed that Mickey’s characteristics were 
indistinguishable from the characteristics of other cartoon characters.101 Hong 
Kong’s first Disney Store opened in 1994, and the number of stores grew to nine in 
the following years102 but only three were left by 2004; the only remaining 
downtown store closed its doors on 4 September 2005, a week before the official 
opening of HKDL. 103 The Hong Kong airport has two Disney stores, which target 
tourists instead of locals.104 On the other hand, in 1997, Hong Kong celebrated the 
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opening of Trendyland, a local retail shop designing and selling fancy gadgets 
decorated with cartoon characters such as Mickey Mouse. By 2006, the number of 
Trendyland stores in Hong Kong had grown to fourteen. Every year, Trendyland 
designs more than three thousand products, including home appliances, 
kitchenware, furniture, stationery, accessories, and plush dolls.105 Trendyland is 
also one of the retail stores in Hong Kong designing and modifying Disney 
characters’ appearances, which consequently acquire rounded faces, infantile body 
shapes (big heads and small bodies), pastel colors, and soft textures. Because of the 
popularity of Trendyland’s translated image, these designs influence the products 
sold inside HKDL. Like Trendyland, HKDL sells Hong Kong’s cutified Mouse and 
Duck. Trendyland thus exerts its influence on Disney in Hong Kong. This influence 
extends, as well, to the Mainland. In 2006, Trendyland had eight stores in China in 
total, with two stores in Shanghai, and one store apiece in Guangzhou, Chengdu, 
Shaoxing, Beijing, Ningbo, and Hainan. 
 
Fig. 1: Trendyland Character Design106 
 
Fig. 2: HKDL Grand Opening Pins 
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In that sense, Hong Kong’s cultural offerings are not only hybrids, but also 
consumption goods that Hong Kong people remake from versions provided by 
Disney and Japanese designers. In addition, these Hong Kong remade goods 
exercise cultural influence on the Mainland, although Hong Kong has never 
exercised political or military influence there.107 With the establishment of HKDL 
under the post-colonial context, how should we understand Hong Kong-Disney and 
Hong Kong-Chinese dynamics? How do Hong Kong people use and remake HKDL 
for their own sake? What kinds of domestication consequently surface in HKDL? 
Theoretically, how should we understand globalization and domestication in 
relation to cultural citizenship and democracy? These are the issues to be explored 
in the following chapters. 
 
Chapter outline  
As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, I see the site of HKDL as “a 
simultaneous multiplicity of spaces,”108 and, therefore, I attempt to illuminate the 
HKDL globalization story in three of its different aspects: the discursive, the 
institutional, and the everyday. To narrate the HKDL story in relation to global-
local dynamics, I examine in a bottom-up approach how Hong Kong people have 
responded to and used the established meanings of Disney both before and after 
HKDL settled in Hong Kong, and how Hong Kong people have used HKDL to 
develop their own notions of place and identity.    
Of course, Disney is a well-known global entertainment brand about which 
many Hong Kong people have pre-conceived notions, but we should note that Hong 
Kong people do not simply and passively receive these notions. Rather, Hong Kong 
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people use and re-use the Disney symbol in their everyday situations. The meaning 
of “use” in this thesis is threefold. First, based on the ideas of de Certeau, “use” 
concerns consumption. We can use bread by eating it and use paper by writing on it. 
The word “use” does not imply that “we have only a secondary relationship to 
goods.”109 Rather, “use” implies that the act, itself, changes the state of the 
consumed good. For example, when we use vegetables to make soup, we change 
those vegetables. Furthermore, just as there are “procedures of ‘consumption’,” so 
there are “ways of using.”110 It follows that, second, Hong Kong people both make 
use of the existing established cultural meanings of Disney and reappropriate these 
meanings in everyday practices to fulfill individuals’ particular goals. As we shall 
see, some respondents in my study used Disney merchandise daily as baby-sitting 
tools; some appropriated the international “aura” of Disney to achieve their own 
aims of being cosmopolitan. Third, the act of making sense is itself a kind of use. 
For example, the HKSAR government makes sense of the HKSAR-Disney joint-
venture as though it were proof of Hong Kong approaching “world city” status 
simply by working with a world class entertainment company. As HKDL opened 
its doors and presented itself to Hong Kong, the city’s residents may reconstruct 
their own meanings of Disney on the basis of established codes and lived 
experiences. While HKDL prompts Hong Kong people to complicate their 
interpretations of Disney, the meanings of local identities may change, as well.  
An important qualification is necessary here. Although I emphasize the 
ways in which Hong Kong people “use” Disney and HKDL in the senses defined 
above, and although I use a bottom-up approach to examine the globalization 
process, I do not argue in this thesis that local actors have all kinds of powers to 
tame and control a global corporation. Following de Certeau’s argument, I argue 
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that Hong Kong people can pursue their own goals precisely by using the 
established images and the established meanings of Disney, that Hong Kong people 
can subconsciously or even consciously struggle against the assimilationist effects 
of global corporations such as Disney, but that users maintain no specific base of 
operations, as Disney does.111 That is, even though users have complicated and 
changed the local meanings of Disney since HKDL’s opening, Hong Kong citizens 
have had few ways to monitor or to control Disney actions owing chiefly to the 
non-transparent contracts signed between the HKSAR government and Disney in 
1999, and to Hong Kong’s current business law. With these premisses in mind, we 
should examine users’ acts as somewhat “contingent or lateral” manifestations of 
“power and resistance”112 in Paula Saukko’s words. In this way, we can promote 
successful rigorous examinations of the specific effects of local-global negotiations 
in culture. 
 The thesis is divided into eight chapters. In chapter Two, I will review the 
extensive literature on Disney, focusing on those strands of argument which 
emphasize, respectively, materialist, symbolic, and everyday-life approaches to the 
subject. In particular, I will discuss the views of scholars who stress the social, 
political, and cultural influence that Disney corporations have, and the landscape 
changes that ensue; the utopian appeal that Disney gains in relation to its media 
monopoly, its merchandising ubiquity, and its theme park design as an antidote to 
urban problems; and the various meanings and uses that people invoked in relation 
to the Disneyland park. 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five focus on events that happened before the 
opening of HKDL in 2005. As I stated earlier, I consider the HKDL project to be a 
site where various social relations intersect. In this regard, I examine the various 
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ways in which the HKSAR government and ordinary people used the established 
cultural representations of Disney before the park’s opening. In chapter Three, I 
argue that far from being a diminishing state under the global economy, the 
HKSAR government allied with the Walt Disney Company and constructed a 
“world city” dream for Hong Kong people to imagine. On a discursive level, the 
“world city” dream not only promises Hong Kong people economic revitalization 
and employment, but also functions as an identity marker distinguishing Hong 
Kong from other Chinese cities. Certainly, the import of HKDL is for economic 
revitalization, but we should not ignore HKDL’s political effects: some Hong Kong 
people support the undemocratic and non-transparent HKDL project for a vague 
cultural and economic dream.  
In chapter Four, I shift my focus to how respondents’ views on the 
established global Disney affect their various views and uses of the HKDL project. 
Drawing on my arguments in chapter Three, I further challenge the assumption that 
culture is economized under a neo-liberal economy. Many of my respondents 
embrace the HKDL project but do not see it as an economic project. Rather, they 
see Disney as a famous global brand that helps Hong Kong prove its cosmopolitan 
city status and distinguishes Hong Kong from China. The cultural distinctions that 
reflect “Chineseness plus” and “Hong Kong supremacy” that derive from the 
colonial period are evident in the statements of some respondents. At the same time, 
some other respondents, in particular the university graduates, voiced a bigger and 
yet more individualized dream—the dream of becoming cosmopolitans. They used 
Disney as a global corporation to achieve their own cosmopolitan dream. In some 
cases, lived experiences of working in Orlando sometimes changed respondents’ 
established views on self and others.    
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The dream of being cosmopolitan is characteristic of middle class parents, 
as well as of university graduates. In chapter Five, I carefully study several parents’ 
selective uses of Disney offerings, the Disney English learning and other 
educational kits, and argue against the alleged necessary connection between the 
use of Disney merchandise and the acceptance of certain Disney values. These 
parents appropriate Disney merchandise for their own uses: locally, parents attempt 
to solidify their own children’s middle class status; seeing that Hong Kong workers 
need to be highly competitive in the increasingly regionalized and even globalized 
economy, parents train themselves and their children to be an apt international 
workforce.  
Chapters Six and Seven feature stories about respondents’ experiences of 
both HKDL’s opening and HKDL’s post-opening operations. These two chapters 
deal with multiple spaces of HKDL, namely the social relations (1) between Disney 
management and the HKSAR government, (2) between Disney public relations 
officers and local media practitioners, (3) between HKDL workers and HKDL 
management, (4) between HKDL workers and visitors, and (5) among visitors. 
These various social relations and competing social spaces construct and reshape 
the local-global and Hong Kong-Mainland dynamics.  
In chapter Six, I focus on the institutional and everyday aspect. I argue that 
Hong Kong imports not only Disney’s theme park technology and service 
philosophy but Disney’s management practices, as well. However, these 
supposedly glocalized Disneyland management practices sometimes were in 
conflict with local expectations. Conflicts then arose between Disney’s public 
affairs officers and Hong Kong reporters and between Disney management and the 
HKSAR government, in particular when HKDL securities, by maintaining Disney 
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magic, challenged health inspectors to “dress down” to enter the park. Currently, 
institutional constraints significantly limit legislators’ power to monitor the park, 
although it receives significant investments from the HKSAR government. 
Focusing on the institutional aspect themselves, media practitioners resignify the 
meaning of ‘Disney’ as “Americanism” and circulate the new meaning through 
media, thereby reshaping the global-local relationship.  
In chapter Seven, I further examine how people’s everyday dialogue about 
the park and how visitors and workers’ actual behavior inside the park have injected 
local flavor into the established meaning of Disneyland. Disappointed with certain 
Disney-management acts, workers “localized” their services rather than join labor 
unions; and facing various critical comments circulated in the media, local 
consumers disrupted Disneyland’s routine without boycotting the site. Furthermore, 
Hong Kong visitors used HKDL as a stage on which they gave body to their 
discriminatory attitudes toward Mainlanders; in contrast, some HKDL workers 
changed their pre-conceived notions of “Hong Kong people” and of “Mainlanders” 
after having everyday encounters with Mainlanders.  
In short, the globalization story in the case of HKDL is not simply about 
global homogenization of local culture or about diminishing state sovereignty or, 
for that matter, about locals who wield and exercise all kinds of power to control a 
global company. The globalization process is a long winding road, with unforeseen 
local uptakes, appropriation, and resistance in relation to globalized corporate 
offerings, and these local acts result in shifting local-global dynamics and 
contestations in various spaces of social relations. In the concluding chapter, I 
connect my empirical studies of usage with Hong Kong culture and identify the 
important roles that local laws and citizenship rights play in local communities’ 
 37  
efforts to deal with a transnational company’s management practices. Then, I raise 
the issue of cultural citizenship to discuss Hong Kong culture’s effects on the 
development of a democracy-based culture of openness and inclusiveness.  
 
Research methodology 
Following Massey’s idea that social groups’ locations in social relations differ from 
one group to the next, and that social groups’ reading of these relations differ from 
one group to the next, I argue that localities’ uses of HKDL in relation to Disney 
differ from one locality to the next. To understand these various “spaces of 
interactions,” as Massey puts it,113 I adopt a multi-sited research methodology to 
study how respondents with different socio-cultural positions use the park and 
construct their own notions of place, identity, and politics under post-colonial 
governance, whether that governance derives from local administration or business 
concerns. Except in chapter Three, where I undertake textual criticism of how the 
HKSAR government has mobilized various discourses in promoting the HKDL 
project, I use methods based on ethnographic research and attempt to tease out the 
lived experiences and the complicated and sometimes changing meanings of Disney 
among my study’s thirty-nine respondents.  
Among them, there were ten HKDL workers (one of whom was a seasonal 
part-timer); two Hong Kong-based Disney production workers; seventeen 
consumers (three as individual consumers, eight as parents who consume Disney 
offerings in a family setting, and six as children); four media practitioners (two 
journalists, one daily-news program director, one music video producer); two 
Disney merchandise licensees; one kindergarten principal; one labor union worker; 
and two social-movement activists.114 In addition, I conducted two focus-group 
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interviews with ten kindergarten students aged four to five. I engaged in numerous 
casual talks with HKDL visitors, my neighbors, and students on the topic of Disney 
and HKDL. Basically, I used semi-structured interviews115 to start my research with 
my respondents and followed some interviews with field study and participant 
observation (discussed below) recorded in the form of field notes. To protect 
confidentiality, I use pseudonyms in the thesis. To study various Disneyland parks 
in the world, I visited all Disney parks without financial support from the Walt 
Disney Company. 
As Paula Saukko argues, research is always political.116 It asks us, in 
Haraway’s words, to be aware of “what kinds of realities and beings we are creating, 
out of whom, and for whom.”117 To understand how individuals view and make use 
of Disney merchandise and the HKDL project, chapters Four and Five focus on 
individuals’ lived experiences, individuals’ behavior contributing to their lived 
world, and individuals’ interpretation of their lived world. Following Saukko,118 I 
connect these lived experiences to the larger social, economic, and political 
environment not by first researching their lived worlds and by then contrasting 
them with “real” structures or politics as envisioned by my own political agenda, 
but by practicing “dialogic research strategies” to escape from ventriloquism.119 
Believing that respondents are always aware, to different degrees, of the discourses 
in which they are embedded, I questioned respondents in order to render explicit 
their ideas and acts. Following Eric Arnould’s advice,120 I then practiced participant 
observation to observe and to identify respondents’ behavior in resonance or in 
conflict with their own ideas. Then I tracked the respondents by conducting follow-
up interviews and fieldwork that took the form of casual encounters (such as 
babysitting and casual talks through phone calls, e-mails, and home visits). I have 
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tried not to interpret respondents’ thoughts without discussing my interpretations 
with them. Shared interpretations turn into dialogues, during which complicated 
and contradictory selves often reveal themselves. Through conversations, I 
acknowledge people’s concrete concerns and experiences and also uncover my own 
political agenda. That is, as a Hong Kong person, I am concerned about Hong 
Kong’s democratization, including the development of accountable and transparent 
governance, citizen-based participatory government, and a place-based culture that 
both treasures its own values and ways of life and that develops openness toward 
other cultures besides that of global consumerism. As a cultural studies student, I 
use dialogic research method to put my belief in pluralistic culture and participatory 
democracy into research practice. I attempt to do justice to the researched, 
including their perspectives and their lived experiences, and I try not to homogenize 
respondents’ views and acts but examine them from different angles. Hopefully, by 
employing dialogic and self-reflexive ethnography, the people being studied, as 
well as the readers, gain access to my motivations and concerns.  
Dialogic research method requires that, between the researcher and the 
researched, there exist long-time contact, strong trust, and openness. The goal, 
therein, is to have the two parties recognize each other’s complicated and 
contradictory thoughts. For example, when I practiced dialogic research in my 
study of five middle class families (see chapter Five), I tried to study parents’ 
approaches to the process of parenting, particularly in relation to family 
consumption of Disney products (including movies, merchandise, and theme parks). 
Therefore, during 2002 and 2006, I conducted an ethnographic study on these five 
families by undertaking at least three rounds of semi-structured interviews, home 
visits, babysitting of their children, and casual talks through phone and e-mails. I 
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knew three of the five families before I began this research. Because of this 
knowledge and because of the long-term nature of the contact, I was able to find 
that parents’ house-rules and parenting methods have significant effects over 
children’s consumption behavior, and I also found that these middle class parents’ 
particular ways of using Disney offerings can be traced back to their childhood 
memory of watching Disney movies and using Disney merchandise, their life 
history of climbing up the social ladder through education, and their way of 
associating career difficulties with a “lack” of world exposure.  
With the Disney or HKDL staff respondents, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with two Disney production and ten HKDL employees, five of whom 
had been cultural representatives of HKDL and had worked in Orlando Disney 
parks for six months. Among the twelve Disney staff respondents, four of them 
engaged in more than three individual interviews with me. Because I knew only one 
HKDL staff respondent in 2004 (I became acquainted with all the others in 2006), I 
conducted many of the interviews comparatively late in the research process. And 
because Disney prohibits HKDL employees from talking about HKDL to 
researchers and journalists, I found it quite difficult to develop trust between me 
and the staff respondents. They worried that, by sharing information with me, they 
would reveal their identities to their employers. To lessen their worry, I promised 
them before the interviews that no local newspaper (whether in Chinese or in 
English) would publish any interview information; to protect confidentiality, I not 
only use pseudonyms in the thesis (as I mentioned earlier) but also blend different 
voices into one story and break one voice into several stories.  
I encountered other methodology problems. In the course of my research, I 
found, for example, that my attempt to apply dialogic research method to my 
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interactions with Disney-staff respondents was more difficult than my attempt to do 
so with the parents. First, with two exceptions, I had no personal relationship with 
my staff respondents prior to the start of the research project. I became acquainted 
with the latter through friends or through other Disney staff respondents. To lessen 
any tension during the interview process, I would sometimes invite my friends to 
join the interview. Second, the duration of our relationships was rather short, a fact 
that made it difficult to develop a solid and trusting relationship. Third, because I 
did not know these respondents personally and invited them to be my interviewees 
through their friends, some respondents accepted my invitation on the basis chiefly 
of their friends’ request. Knowing that they should not disclose HKDL information 
to outsiders, some of the respondents declined to be interviewed on more than one 
occasion, and one respondent preferred to do the interview through phone. Without 
a long-term relationship, dialogic research method becomes impossible to execute 
insofar as the methods emphasize the importance of self-reflexive conversation.  
The last type of difficulty that I encountered while conducting my 
ethnographic study on HKDL employees concerned their high turnover rate. 
Among the ten HKDL staff-respondents, four of them quit their HKDL job within 
the first year, one with a permanent position was planning to quit the job, one 
planned not to renew his contract, and one worked only as a seasonal part-time 
worker. Only three had worked inside the company for more than a year. Both the 
short duration of their HKDL work experiences and the short duration of our 
contact have imposed difficulties on my efforts to tease out the workers’ 
complicated and maybe changing thoughts toward HKDL. As a result, although I 
practiced dialogic research method toward my four Disney staff respondents, I 
believe that one case partially failed. From this experience, I concluded that I 
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should learn to execute dialogic research method in a more cautious way, and 
therefore note some details here. 
In 2004, I met my first HKDL staff respondent, Olivia, who signed a 
contract to become an HKDL cultural representative in Orlando’s Walt Disney 
World for six months and to return to HKDL to work for another six months. She 
agreed to be one of my respondents and, through several interviews, to tell me 
about her Disneyland work experiences. To help me understand her life in Orlando, 
she gave me access to her blog,121 where she frequently wrote about her daily life 
and feelings. When she was in Orlando, we communicated with each other by e-
mail. After her Orlando trip, we had two long face-to-face chats and many long 
phone chats, all of which centered on her work experiences in Orlando and in Hong 
Kong. I also phoned her several times to ask her some concrete questions such as 
whether or not an ambulance could drive inside HKDL, and on all these occasions, 
Olivia was helpful. Olivia had been a social worker, and given her past academic 
training at a university and her two years of social-work experience, I thought that 
by practicing dialogic ethnography, I could and I should reveal some of my anti-
Disney values (such as my opposition to Disney’s corporate practices) and discuss 
with her how she viewed these anti-Disney values and practices. But I was wrong. 
In our third and last interview, Olivia was in my home and I asked her to read a 
newspaper article reporting accusations made by Disney Hunter, an anti-Disney 
group to which I belonged. In fact, I had mentioned my affiliation herewith to 
Olivia. She made no comments on the accusations, and I was unsure whether or not 
her silence stemmed from her knowledge that I was a member of the group. I then 
told her about scholars’ criticisms of Disney’s control over workers—the scripted 
manners, the service with a smile, and other forms of emotional subjugation (indeed, 
 43  
she had once mentioned in her blog that her Disney job was not always suitable for 
her because it required employees to smile and she sometimes just could not do it). 
Immediately responding to my comments, she twice stated, “I think I am always a 
good girl. I don’t find it problematic.” Her refusal to engage in discussion reflected 
my insensitivity to her reluctance to exchange genuine but different views with me 
on this particular topic. After our interview, I recalled that Olivia had once stated in 
her blog that she would not say “in public” that Disney was bad in any sense 
because to say so would constitute proof, in her mind, that her decision to be a 
Disney employee amounted to a mistake. A couple of months later, I phoned her 
several times but she did not return my calls. Because I wanted to send her a 
Christmas present rather than conduct another interview with her, I asked one of 
our common friends to help me send her the present. She then phoned me back, and 
we made a date for dinner. On that day, she phoned me and said that, because of 
some sudden change of plans, she was not free for dinner. She promised to phone 
me back, but I received no reply from her. The present that I intend to send her is 
still in my home. Her blog, after her return Hong Kong and after successive 
negative entries on HKDL management, carried less and less information about her 
work, and one day, she deleted all her past written entries (maybe she put these 
written entries in a private section). I am not suggesting that my discussion with her 
during our interview caused her to delete this information or to block her friends 
from reading her online diary, but this experience has enabled me to sense the 
dangers of practicing dialogic research method. Practice of these methods in some 
circumstances can block, rather than foster, dialogue. 
After this experience, I become more cautious in practicing dialogic 
research. I intentionally and repeatedly told my respondents that I would like to 
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have a balanced view of my Disney research and that, to this end, I would like to 
hear about both their contentment and their discontent regarding HKDL. I did not 
hide my own participation in some anti-Disney activities, but I did not tell 
respondents about these activities right away. Critical dialogue works better with 
some people than with others. Those respondents who were willing to disclose their 
different attitudes toward Disney were able to engage me in conversations that 
yielded many critical dialogues. Josephine, for example, was the most enthusiastic 
HKDL staff member whom I met in the course of my research, and indeed, her 
colleagues commented to me on her unusually pronounced enthusiasm for HKDL. 
However, at our first meeting, she told me about both her enthusiasm for HKDL 
and her disappointment with HKDL. Moreover, she said that she would like to 
learn more different perspectives on Disney. We had two long talks in person and 
many long phone conversations, during all of which we exchanged views on 
various HKDL work and management practices. In our first meeting, Josephine 
mentioned that she had bad feelings about the union. After several talks, I told her 
over the phone that I had met the HKDL labor-union representative and that, 
according to this source, the labor union’s activities went beyond the activities 
reported in the news media. Then, rather than again voice her own distrust of the 
union, she started to pepper me with questions about the union. Her way of 
responding to my comments got me to thinking about the effects that activists’ 
characteristic mentalities may have on people’s involvement in social movements. 
For example, activists often paint a picture of the opposition that is neither vague 
nor ambiguous; in this way, the activists have a clear-cut object that they can resist. 
This tendency to discount vagueness and ambiguity may hinder people’s 
involvement in social movement, an issue that I will discuss in chapter Seven. 
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Throughout the research process, I learned that one core difficulty in 
practicing the dialogic research method actually follows from the way in which it 
asks the researcher to encourage informants to express, using their own voice, their 
own worldviews. In this way, the researcher should try to understand the informants 
through their eyes. Yet on the other hand, the dialogic research method asks the 
researcher to tease out multi-layered and sometimes contradictory meaning-making 
processes that pertain to the researched, to talk to the respondents about the findings, 
and to ask respondents to make their embedded discourse explicit. The method asks 
not only that the researched genuinely express their views but also that both the 
researched and the researcher have the courage to be self-reflexive. In short, only 
through on-going dialogue, mutual trust, and openness to differences can we create 
critical and self-reflexive ethnography. 
Other respondents in my research are local media practitioners (including 
journalists, a daily news producer, and a music-video producer), consumers 
(including Disney fans, Disneyland fans, and a kindergarten principal) and Disney 
merchandise licensees. I conducted semi-structured interviews with these 
respondents by asking them about their HKDL experiences, their views on the park, 
and their consumption practices inside the park. I also interviewed two members of 
the anti-Disney group Disney Hunter to identify both the reasons for their decision 
to join the group and their evaluations of the campaign. Because I am myself a 
group member of Disney Hunter, I used participant observation to strengthen my 
discussion about Disney Hunter’s influence on Hong Kong people’s views of 
Disney. I used participant observation, as well, to study visitors’ consumption 
practices inside HKDL.  
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Although I attempt to identify many diverse meanings and many diverse 
uses attributable to Disney in Hong Kong, my research findings are far from 
exhaustive. In its treatment of HKDL as a workplace, my study fails to collect 
information from high-ranking employees who would have a comprehensive 
understanding of the HKDL management policy. In reviewing HKDL public-
relations policy and HKDL media-relations policy, the study lacks views and 
responses from HKDL from high-ranking or policy-specific staff members, whose 
insights would have made my study more pluralistic. I sent out a formal call-for-
interviews letter to the media-relations department of HKDL but received no reply. 
Two journalists helped me ask an HKDL public-relations officer in person to accept 
my request for an interview, but she refused it. To counteract the unbalanced points 
of views from reporters or freelance producers, I interviewed three HKDL 
employees who were working in customer services and who were familiar with 
certain HKDL practices touching on both public affairs and media relations. I hope 
that these interviews remedied the aforementioned deficiency to a certain extent.   
In this thesis, I emphasize multi-sited, polyvocal research because it can 
help express the multifaceted realities of Disney. This emphasis can help 
researchers, participants, and readers alike go beyond our common conception of 
Disney as “just family entertainment” and situate Disney in a complicated 
framework of local-global dynamics, local governance, landscape changes, cultural 
identity and distinctions, and consumer politics. By interacting across these socio-
cultural and political themes, we can better recognize that a participatory civic 
society is necessary condition for the development of participatory democracy. In 
the following chapter, I will review literature on Disney in relation to these issues.  
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Chapter Two 
Disney Power, Cultural Globalization, and Local Contexts 
 
In 1928, Disney began as a small frail animated-cartoon studio that distributed 
Mickey Mouse shorts. In the eighty years since then, Disney has become one of the 
most popular brands in the world.1 As a giant global company, the Walt Disney 
Company divides itself into four major business segments: studio entertainment 
(theatrical films, home video, television, theatrical productions), parks and resorts 
(Disneyland parks, Disney Vacation Club resorts, Disney Cruise Line), media 
networks (television channels including ABC television, Touchstone television, 
cable television including ESPN and the Disney Channel), and consumer products 
(children’s and teenagers’ fashion and apparel, toys, home décor, educational kits, 
food and beverages, electronics, fine art and collectibles).2 With internet and direct 
marketing, Disney’s net income soared (in US dollars) from 0.5 million dollars in 
1952, to 3.4 million in 1959, 11 million in 1965, 26.7 million in 1971, 93.2 million 
in 1983, 173.5 million in 1985, 703.3 million in 1987, 824 million in 1990,3 1,267 
million in 2003, and 2,533 million in 2005.4 
Well aware of Disney’s popularity and power, scholars of different 
disciplines including architecture, art, anthropology, business, cultural studies, 
political economy, and urban planning pay close attention to the Disney enterprise.5 
Drawing on Disney animated cartoons, scholars from the academic left explicate 
“Disney ideology,”6 analyses of which result in books entitled From Mouse to 
Mermaid: The Politics of Film, Gender, and Culture, edited by Elizabeth Bell, 
Lynda Haas, and Laura Sells, and The Mouse that Roared: Disney and the End of 
Innocence by Henry Giroux.7 Starting in the 1990s, Disney expanded its market 
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from a chiefly Anglo-American setup to a global one by representing cultural others 
in Aladdin (1992), Pocahontas (1995), and Mulan (1998). In view of this shift, 
while some scholars such as Lee Artz8 argue that Disney’s change demonstrates 
only that Disney recognizes the enormous potential for profit in the multicultural 
market, not that Disney has a multicultural agenda; other scholars such as Janet 
Palmer9 argue that the changing Disney representations reflect pressures that 
Disney has faced from social movements.  
Disneyland, as is the case with Disney animation, cannot escape from 
scholars’ scrutiny regarding Disney’s influences on global cultural landscapes. 
Stacey Warren refers to Disneyland as “theoryland”10 because scholars always 
study Disneyland in relation to their theoretical concerns: for example, Real’s use 
of gratification theory to study respondents’ views of a Disney park in 1977,11 
Eco’s semiotic study of Anaheim Disneyland in relation to social control in 1986,12 
Baudrillard’s postmodernist study of Anaheim Disneyland and Los Angeles as 
simulacra in 1988,13 Zukin’s cultural geographic analysis of the correlation between 
Disney parks and landscapes of power in 1991,14 and Fjellman’s ethnographic and 
contextual study of Orlando’s Walt Disney World in relation to contemporary 
American society in 1992.15 Scholars argue that the attractiveness, the ugliness, or 
simply the character of a specific Disney park that they study are themes that, if 
properly understood, can help us understand a city such as Los Angeles or a 
contemporary civilization like that of the United States. 
Because of Disney’s long-developed global reach,16 scholars outside the 
United States also examine cultural Americanization in relation to Disney offerings. 
Within the context of an affirmative Third World, Ariel Dorfman and Armand 
Mattelart published Para leer al Pato Donald in Chile in 1971.17 This was the first 
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book critically examining Disney comics as American cultural products that, 
transplanted to peripheral countries, disguise cultural power as entertainment to 
promote American cultural imperialism. In 1975, the book appeared in the United 
States as How to Read Donald Duck with a new subtitle, “Imperialist Ideology in 
the Disney Comic.”  
In 2000, twenty five years after the publication of How to Read Donald 
Duck, scholars gathered at an international conference and discussed “how 
extensively and intensively Disney products are marketed, and also how local 
audiences interpret these products” in eighteen countries.18 In 2001, the book 
Dazzled by Disney was published. Wasko and Meehan, in the concluding chapter of 
the book, warn that consumers’ early contact with Disney offerings, and 
consumers’ subsequent association of Disney with childhood innocence, nostalgia, 
and family gatherings, make it difficult for audiences to question the assumptions 
behind the consumers’ Disney-related cultural experiences. In terms of cultural 
globalization, Wasko and Meehan also argue that children’s early contact with 
Disney may lead to cultural hegemony instead of cultural hybridity19; “Disney’s 
pervasiveness and symbolic ubiquity” result in the near impossibility that nations 
can “maintain identities adjacent to the identities provided in global commercial 
media.”20  
Given Disney’s increasing influence and the increasing importance of 
globalization studies in the 1990s, scholars vow to study Disney insofar as it is the 
“greatest media empire” around the globe and an “entertainment empire”21 second 
to none. Given its global ubiquity and the extension of company projects from 
movies to theme parks to urban planning,22 scholars such as Richard Foglesong,23 
Andrew Ross,24 Jane Kuenz,25 John van Maanen,26 Henry Giroux,27 and others28 
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unveil Disney’s undemocratic and non-transparent private governance over public 
domains, its application of controlling mechanisms to theme-park workers, and its 
promotion of consumerism. These scholars also warn readers that Disney’s profit-
driven, non-transparent corporate practices and largely conservative offerings 
devour democracy, social justice, and civil society. Scholars such as Michael 
Sorkin, Chris Rojek, Andrew Ross, Stacey Warren, and Alan Bryman have 
presented different terms for these practices: “Disneyzone,”29 “Disneyfication,”30 
and “Disneyization,”31 to point out Disney’s near-universality and its overwhelming 
influence over cultural and social landscapes. These terms do not merely point to 
Disney’s influence over its own projects but also suggest the devastating influence 
that Disney’s principles have on urban planning. Indeed, to achieve business 
success, other developers and companies emulate Disney-inspired business 
strategies and practices. In other words, our lived but fantasy world is going to be 
increasingly Disneyized and Disneyfied without Disney’s direct involvement. 
To rethink the above problems raised by scholars in relation to Disney, I 
must say that some speculative worries raised by scholars have already become 
hard and fast reality. However, scholars disagree with one another as to the reasons 
that underlie governments’ and the public’s support of a Disneyized landscape, and 
scholars disagree with one another as to the conclusions that are to be drawn from 
these findings: some scholars are chiefly pessimistic, seeing Disneyized landscapes 
as an inevitable postmodern phenomenon, whereas other scholars emphasize the 
negotiations and the resistance that greet Disneyized landscapes. I categorize these 
different Disney literatures into three types: the materialist, the symbolic, and the 
everyday. The materialist approach focuses on economic structuring and the 
development of a consumerist landscape; the symbolic approach emphasizes 
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Disney’s media-based and corporate-based cultural power to address and to shape 
the public’s dreams; the everyday approach highlights various spaces where various 
local actors—namely government officials, journalists, home-owners, 
environmentalists, and consumers—differ from one another in their application of 
local politics and local culture to remaking or to resisting a Disneyfied landscape. 
Because of their different approaches, the three literatures identify different 
implications and draw different conclusions regarding the relationships among 
transnational capitalism, local governance, identity politics, democratization, and 
civil-society development. One point to note is that although I discuss these three 
approaches in the order of materialist, symbolic, and everyday, I do not mean that 
these three approaches, in their manifest reality, surface one after the next; indeed, 
the approaches are not entirely distinct from one another. For example, overlap has 
occurred between the materialist approach and the symbolic approach insofar as 
some materialist scholars (such as Hannigan) who address the effects of a 
Disneyfied landscape do so on the basis of Sharon Zukin’s idea of “landscape of 
power,” which I categorize as a symbolic approach. Readers of this study, therefore, 
will note similarities between the materialist and the symbolic, especially in relation 
to Disney effects.  
 
The macro-materialist dimension: political economy and Disneyization 
In identifying the relationship between large-scale social changes and postmodern 
consumer society, scholars interested in political economy use a macro and 
materialist approach to examine Disney’s effects on societies. According to these 
scholars, contemporary urban redevelopment, because of government retrenchment 
and deregulation, aims to re-energize a city center through public-private 
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partnerships that draw the affluent middle class consumers back to the city center. 
Urban renewal, then, is synonymous with the construction of not only office towers 
but also convention centers, professional sports complexes, museums, and urban 
theme parks—all to accommodate the post-industrial service economy. With the 
great economic success of Disney theme parks, urban-development projects have 
turned to Disney-inspired principles to redevelop space.  
John Hannigan32 argues that this form of public-private partnership began to 
emerge in the 1970s with the renovation of Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston: at 
the partnership’s core was the premise that shopping and dining were the engines 
driving the commercial regeneration of downtown areas. Famously able to attract 
crowds to Disney parks by selling spectacular leisure experiences, the Walt Disney 
Company set up the Disney Development Company in 1984 and began 
incorporating theme-park experiences into urban entertainment centers. Major 
multinational entertainment companies also followed Disney’s move and 
established development teams to evaluate, plan, and initiate urban entertainment 
destinations in joint business with public redevelopment agencies (pp. 125-6).33 
Because many government officials and public agencies believe that entertainment 
destinations have almost magical powers to create employment and to raise 
government revenues, many municipalities provide entertainment companies with 
infrastructure upgrades, tax benefits, and regulatory relief. 
Hannigan argues that the shift from an industrial economy to a post-
industrial economy led to the rise of public-private partnerships and to urban 
entertainment districts. In making this argument, Hannigan shifts his own focus 
from America to the Asia-Pacific region, stating that “the leading edge of the 
   66 
American themed commercial culture coming ashore in Asia” (p. 179) is due to the 
region’s expanding economy and the rise of the region’s middle class: 
 
To a considerable extent, the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s can be 
compared to that of the affluent years of America in the 1950s. In both 
instances, you have an expanding economy, an increase in leisure time and a 
ballooning middle class with rising discretionary income…. With rising 
incomes, the new middle class is primed to spend…. Many of the 
developing leisure products and services are foreign-supplied or inspired. (p. 
177) 
 
For Hannigan, the global development of urban entertainment districts has created 
social harm instead of social good. To secure profits from these entertainment 
destinations, planners incorporate theme-park experiences into renewed urban 
spaces, such as shopertainment, eatertainment, and edutainment enclaves. These 
fantasy cities sell themes and technology, branded merchandise and spectacles. This 
development reinforces pre-existing consumer tastes and diminishes variety and 
choice. Isolated from its neighboring surroundings, the Disney-inspired renewal of 
urban space creates a space that is discriminatory for it ignores the reality of 
homelessness, unemployment, social injustice, and crime; its high-rent lifestyle 
discourages the mixing of different classes and races of people (p. 6).  
Voicing similar worries to Hannigan, Alan Bryman coined the term 
“Disneyization”34 to describe “the process by which the principles of the Disney 
theme parks are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as 
well as the rest of the world” (p.1, author’s emphasis). Bryman declares that 
Disneyization as a process is about “the spread of the principles that its theme parks 
exemplify” (p. 11). These principles consist of theming (p. 15),35 hybrid 
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consumption (p. 57),36 merchandising,37 and emotional labor.38 The goal of these 
principles is to increase consumption:  
 
Theming provides the consumer with a narrative that acts as a draw by 
providing an experience that lessens the sense of an economic transaction 
and increases the likelihood of purchasing merchandise. Hybrid 
consumption is meant to give the consumer as many opportunities as 
possible to make purchases and therefore to keep them as long as possible in 
the theme park, mall, or whatever. Emotional labor is the oil of the whole 
process in many ways: in differentiating otherwise identical goods and 
services, as an enactment of theming, and as a means for increasing the 
inclination to purchase merchandise. (p. 167) 
 
The single aim of increasing consumption, however, leads to large-scale changes 
throughout the landscape, the social structure, and the culture (particularly the 
working culture and the consumption culture). The success of Disney theme parks 
has prompted companies, architects, and governments to follow Disney’s principles 
to transform streets, shopping arcades, restaurants, and airports into a vast 
“entertainment-consumption” complex. The negative effects of this outcome 
include distortion of history and place; destruction of natural habitats; emotional 
and physical manipulation of children, consumers, and workers; and creation of 
“limited citizens” in that the consumption levels of the poor fall far below the 
consumption levels that consumer society deems appropriate and honorable.  
Similar to Hannigan, Bryman urges us to treat Disneyization as chiefly a 
global spread of a system and of principles, and to avoid prioritizing the worth of 
particular commodities such as Disney films, merchandise, and theme parks. He 
realizes that Disney theme parks around the globe have made many adaptations to 
local contexts and sensibilities, but for Bryman, as a systemscape, Disneyized 
“principles [that have] to do with the production and delivery of goods and 
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services” still proliferate (p. 165). For example, theming as a principle can rather 
easily be imported to local places and adapted to the places’ own local themes, but 
theming as a principle remains non-negotiable. As a system, Disneyization 
encourages variety and differentiation (p. 168), instead of standardization and 
homogenization (p. 167).39  
Bryman’s concept of Disneyization is significant because his emphasis on a 
system and its four main principles clarifies how Disney practices become a model 
that is supremely adaptable to various other parts of the world. However, his 
emphasis on system and principles also assumes that these automatically spread 
over the globe, that states just adapt the Disneyized system to their gentrification 
and tourism projects such as Sydney’s The Rocks (p. 37) and Finland’s Lapland as 
“Santa Claus Land” (p. 45), and that local cultures respond to Disneyization by 
adapting to it. However, theming, for example, is not necessarily successful, as 
Bryman notices in regard to the plight of themed restaurants (p. 53). Bryman states, 
also, that “emotional labor has been a particularly prominent site for resistance” (p. 
165). In fact, Bryman sees Disneyization as a process wherein “agents of 
capitalism” (p. 160) promote consumption that exhibits a “growing interpenetration 
of the economic and the cultural” (p. 173), but he provides no explanation as to 
why or how these interpenetrations happen except to say that Disneyization has 
“affinities” with “a post-Fordist world of variety and consumer choice” (p. 13). 
Elsewhere, Bryman humbly admits that he uses Disneyization “to identify large-
scale changes that are discernible in economy and culture that can be found in, and 
are symbolized by, the Disney parks”40; however, it is not correct to treat 
Disneyization as a concept that, in and of itself, explains consumerist global 
societies’ convergence with characteristics of Disney theme parks. 
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Whereas Bryman assumes that Disneyization is a process spreading 
throughout “a post-Fordist world” (p. 13, emphasis added), Hannigan assumes that 
international capitalism’s free flow of capital accounts for transnational companies’ 
growing power and states’ diminishing sovereignty. Both analyses have determinist 
economic assumptions wherein structural economic change shapes cultural change, 
and transnational capitalism affects local governance. Besides, both Hannigan’s and 
Bryman’s realist analyses ignore the fact that Disneyized landscapes are produced 
by agencies, institutions, and actors that hold various views and interests in their 
locales. Rather than focus on a model, a system, or a set of principles, Richard 
Foglesong’s realist and political analyses of the Disney-Orlando government 
relationship “emphasize the role of human beings rather than abstract forces in … 
shaping events.”41 Of chief concern to him is the process that characterizes Disney 
power in Orlando. His Married to the Mouse traces the spatial control inside the 
Walt Disney World park and then proceeds to examine the long and rocky 
relationship between the Walt Disney Company and the Orlando government.  
In the early 1960s, because of its economic power, Disney bought 27,500 
acres of land in Orange and Osceola counties in Orlando through private land 
brokers and without public involvement. Having limited financial resources, the 
Florida State Legislature designated Disney’s acres as the “Reedy Creek 
Improvement District” in 1967, with Disney promising to fund its own roads, 
sewage systems, and fire protection services, and what is most important, to build a 
model city that would bring a potential economic boom to the Greater Orlando area. 
The designation granted Disney every right to manage its land, including control 
over zoning and building codes and power to tax and issue tax-free municipal 
bonds, but Disney—unlike other developers—would bear no responsibility for 
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addressing off-site impact fees. In other words, the designation made Disney into an 
independent local-government unit that would serve its own private interests by 
both asking for public funding as a local government would and resisting public 
scrutiny as a private company would.42  
Foglesong’s telling account of Walt Disney World’s history reveals the 
untoward effects that privatization and deregulation can have on local governance. 
Whereas Hannigan highlights intercity rivalry that has left little room in which local 
political leaders can reject scarce private investment—investment that would create 
wages, profits, jobs, and tax revenues—Foglesong argues (against an economic-
determinist model) that Orlando’s dependence on Disney is due more to political, 
institutional, and cultural factors than to economic factors. In terms of institutions, 
the designation of the Reedy Creek Improvement District led the Florida legislature, 
in effect, to let Disney be its own private government, and as a government, Disney 
needs to face only its own regulations: in terms of politics, Disney has built an 
alliance with Orange County’s pro-growth and pro-business government officials, 
and the long-established cooperation makes it difficult for policymakers to act 
against Disney; in terms of culture, the popularity of Disney makes it difficult for 
dissenters to badmouth Disney and to offer alternative paths for economic 
development. 
“To put the people back in the story” (p.xii), Foglesong shows how local 
officials exercise definite power over the company. The designated Reedy Creek 
Improvement District and the many legal exemptions that Disney enjoys are built 
on a false premise: a city with citizens instead of a theme park with tourists. For 
this reason, Disney made its first concessions in 1989 regarding fees for off-site 
impact, concessions that came after three years of government-to-government 
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negotiations. In return, Orange County agreed not to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Reedy Creek charter for seven years. In early 1989, the Property Appraiser 
Bob Day decided to deny Disney’s agricultural classification on their 11,000 vacant 
acres in Osceola County. After negotiations, the county government successfully 
taxed a certain amount of the land at the commercial rate, and Disney now needs to 
release a certain amount of land from agricultural classification each year. As for 
the Celebration project, Disney was subject to a development-of-regional-impact 
review because the property had been de-annexed from Reedy Creek. These 
developments show that local government does not always adhere to a global 
company’s demands, even though Disney’s capital can be mobile. However, 
although Foglesong stresses human agency instead of abstract economic forces in 
his narrative of the Orlando-Disney relationship, “people” in his narrative are 
limited to big men, political leaders, local officials, and financial investors: ordinary 
people, Orlando citizens and consumers, are outside the circle of agency. “Local 
officials,” not common people, “had the power to tarnish their [Disney’s] public 
image” (p. 120). The “mundane” version of the Orlando-Disney story has not yet 
been narrated in Foglesong’s “people” story.  
If we examine inter-city rivalry, economic structuring, and thus the 
development of public-private ventures and of Disneyized landscapes from another 
perspective, we may find that the above-mentioned phenomenon are concrete 
events happening in different parts of the world but scholars narrativize these 
material facts in a cause-effect sequential order which interprets them in a reductive 
way. Alexander Reichl’s examination of the success of Disney’s renewal of Times 
Square differs from Hannigan’s and Bryman’s respective examinations insofar as 
Reichl demonstrates that the Times Square renewal has been driven not by 
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economic forces alone but also by a confluence of political arrangements, media 
representations, and business interests.43 Reichl places great importance on urban 
politics and popular discourse because decisions require support of the public, and 
political and public discourse help shape redevelopment in the public debate, 
political coalitions, and public support.  
According to Reichl, in the 1920s, Times Square was at its peak regarding 
its fame as a fashionable entertainment district. By the 1950s, Times Square was 
reflecting national trends involving the migration of populations, of jobs, and of 
investment dollars. And, in the 1960s, a loss of tax revenues compounded the 
problems. In the late 1970s, the reduction of federal aid made it impossible for 
many cities to address problems of poverty and unaffordable housing. The general 
view was that crime- and drug-ridden areas whose populations consisted 
increasingly of ethnic and racial minorities were driving the middle class 
populations from the city centers. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Time Squares 
epitomized this form of urban decline. Reichl argues that Mayor Ed Koch (p. 117) 
and the respectable newspaper The New York Times (p. 44) popularized the above 
discourse and that Disney’s renewal project for Times Square received popular 
support because it addressed a collective dream (that Times Square would return to 
its peak as in the 1920s through historic preservation packed with high culture) and 
tapped into racial anxiety.  
Reichl argues that under the name of historic preservation, the pro-growth 
coalition centered on a trio of interests: the business community, public officials, 
and urban arts and culture organizations and enterprises, with support from social 
service organizations (for providing jobs) and religious leaders (for sanitizing the 
area) (p. 119). The renewal project also received popular support. In 1984, the 
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redevelopment project got unanimous approval from the Board of Estimates; in 
1993, Disney’s presence on 42nd Street sanitized the district and worsened social 
segregation. Reichl’s study of Times Square shows that we cannot treat 
privatization, state deregulation, and the loss of public space as automatic 
globalized trends affecting social and cultural landscapes around the globe. I would 
further argue that scholars’ over-emphasis on economic changes leading to social 
and cultural changes is rooted in Karl Marx’s analysis of mobile capital, that Marx 
foresaw the rise of a world market and the fall of state regulations in Grundrisse:  
 
The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of 
capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.44 
 
Under international capitalism’s free flow of capital, governments try to preserve 
domestic business, attract foreign investment, and thereby secure revenue by 
reducing regulatory intervention in markets, by providing tax incentives to business, 
and by adjusting related policy. In this scheme, it is necessary to retrench the public 
economy both to ease the tax burden and to strengthen the nation’s competitiveness 
relative to international markets and to other governments’ economic policies. It 
follows that national governments have no choice but to deregulate and to surrender 
sovereignty to maintain economic performance, achieve high employment, income 
growth, and thus political legitimacy. This is a common and compelling global 
economic theory, but it also results in a “universal history” of humankind.45  
 The state may not be a neutral place for different parties with different 
economic and social interests to fight over, but we cannot then assume that the state 
must always immediately adhere to capitalists’ interests without considering other 
factors and demands. Anthony Giddens argues that although capitalists have power 
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over the state because capitalists control “allocative resources,” capital and wage-
labor are economically mutually dependent: neither one can survive without the 
other. Workers’ organized and collective demands are an important drawing card 
that enable workers to negotiate with capitalist interests and that functions as an 
impetus for change and maintenance in state policies. Because “the ruling class 
does not rule” but does business, a chasm opens up between state policies and the 
interests of the capitalist class: the state may resist specific business interests. The 
dialectic of control between capitalists and workers cannot guarantee the state’s 
absolute approval of capitalists’ demands.46   
Duane Swank’s econometric analysis of 1964-1993 data from sixteen 
nations illuminates the above argument.47 Swank argues that the dramatic post-
1960s increases in international capital mobility have few direct effects on the size 
of the public economy and that “configurations of democratic institutions 
fundamentally shape the domestic policy impacts of capital mobility” (p. 133). He 
divides the studied nations into three types: social corporatism (that possesses an 
organized and centralized labor movement) defending welfare state policies 
(Sweden and Norway); inclusive electoral institutions with broad-based forms of 
representation through the electoral and party systems (Denmark and Finland); and 
dispersion of policy-making authority with socially heterogeneous forces (Australia, 
Canada, Switzerland, and the United States).48 He finds that the increases in 
international capital mobility “vary systematically across national institutional 
contexts” (p. 154). The states of social corporatism and of inclusive electoral 
institutions can develop and defend large public economies directly or indirectly, 
whereas the heterogeneous forces in dispersed authorities tend to distrust state-
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generated policy intervention, and national policies also enhance market flexibility 
and low-wage production.  
 
The symbolic dimension: Disney’s utopian appeal 
A realist account of Disney power as the power of a global company may explain 
why Disney and other global entertainment companies acquire more and more 
power to shape contemporary social landscapes under international capitalism and 
pro-growth politics; however, a realist account does not explain whether or not 
Disney’s power is similar to the power exercised by other global companies. On 
this subject, Reichl asks, “Is Disney’s power advantage atypical?”49 The second 
group of analyses that I discuss concerns scholars’ understanding of atypical 
Disney power around the globe. There are two groups of analyses, the first 
concentrating on media analysis and the second on the utopian appeal of 
Disneyland park. More specifically, the first group is concerned with Disney’s 
media dominance and ubiquity in creating the “Disney universe” wherein audiences 
in different parts of the world tend to agree with the core concepts promoted by the 
company, while the second group focuses on how Disney, through its economic and 
cultural power, addresses and molds contemporary urban problems and desires, 
leading to the great success of its theme-park business and other urban projects. 
Because of the incorporation of Disney’s offerings into cultural rituals50 and 
because of the connection between Disney and childhood,51 Disney enjoys “relative 
immunity … from criticism”52; and because Disney stories are always based on 
widely accepted folk tales and cultural myths, Disney fantasies and narratives “are 
shielded from external critiques.”53 Disneyland’s success in addressing, resonating 
with, and shaping social desires enables Disney to win the public’s support easily in 
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the theme-park business and in urban-planning projects. Scholars’ recognition of 
Disney’s symbolic and cultural power as a kind of globalness plus happiness, plus 
fantasy, plus innocence, and plus utopia helps wins Disney considerable public 
support. Because the focus of my dissertation is on the establishment and the 
operation of Hong Kong Disneyland, I will only briefly discuss scholars’ views on 
Disney’s media imperialism and will concentrate primarily on the second group of 
analyses. 
 As previously mentioned, in 2001, Janet Wasko, Mark Phillips, and Eileen 
Meehan published the book Dazzled by Disney? The Global Disney Audiences 
Project,54 which collects scholars’ research on how Disney offerings are marketed 
and consumed in eighteen countries. The project was called “The Global Disney 
Audience project.” According to the project’s findings, respondents underestimated 
their contact with Disney because of a discrepancy between the number of products 
they reported using in unprompted conditions (4.24 products per person) and the 
corresponding number in prompted conditions (11.6 products per person).55 
Respondents also tended to agree with the core concepts promoted by the company. 
When asked to use one term to describe Disney, the most frequent mentioned word 
was “fun,” followed in descending order by “happiness,” “fantasy,” “imagination,” 
and “family” (p. 42). Respondents enjoyed Disney animation and termed it “cute, 
cozy, warm, clean, safe, friendly, heart-warming, carefree, enchanting, wonderful, 
perky, innocent, mystical, moral” (p. 49). They believed that Disney movies were 
“harmless fun,” and they described Disney as a rite of passage because they 
watched Disney movies when they were young. The reservations that respondents 
expressed about Disney concerned its business side: “unending product promotions, 
tie-ins, and advertising” (p. 49). 
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Although respondents expressed different reasons for enjoying Disney56 and 
although respondents expressed different degrees of attachment, including 
ambivalent feelings, toward Disney,57 Wasko and Meehan argue that Disney’s 
pervasiveness and symbolic ubiquity may none the less lead to a capitalist, global, 
commodified culture. First, in terms of cultural industries, “Disney’s dominance of 
children’s entertainment in many parts of the world has affected indigenous media 
and cultural production by setting Disney products as the standard by which local 
and regional productions are judged,” (p. 336) and Disney’s dominance also drains 
local economies of resources. Second, Disney’s promotion of consumer culture 
through its aggressive advertising and extensive merchandising inserts global 
consumerism into local rituals and interpersonal practices. Third, Disney offerings 
redefine local standards in media productions and contribute to cultural 
standardization. In all, Wasko and Meehan argue: “If the future holds a global 
system of distribution where production remains oligopolized and formulae remain 
rooted in the model of US commercial culture, then one has to wonder if and how 
localities, regions, and nations will maintain identities adjacent to the identities 
provided in global commercial media” (p. 339).   
 Holding similar views about Disney’s dominant cultural power, Sharon 
Zukin’s focus on “landscape”58 enables her to move between the materialist and the 
symbolic approach to examine Disney’s power in shaping its own “landscape of 
power.” Similar to the materialist approach (which has in fact been influenced by 
her), Zukin suggests that capitalism has transformed the American landscape from a 
production economy to a “symbolic economy” that emphasizes (visual) 
consumption. Different from the purely materialist approach, Zukin argues that, 
starting in the early twentieth century, Hollywood films and later broadcast 
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television domesticated audiences’ fantasies, whose precise forms have derived 
from a few media conglomerates including the Walt Disney Company. More 
important, Walt Disney shapes people’s desires through not only television or 
movies, but also a real fantasy land based on the real and collective desires of the 
powerless: 
 
While Walt Disney won fame as a founder of Hollywood’s animation 
industry, his real genius was to transform an old form of collective 
entertainment—the amusement park—into a landscape of power. All his life 
Disney wanted to create his own amusement park. But to construct this 
playground, he wanted no mere thrill rides or country fair: he wanted to 
project the vernacular of the American small town as an image of social 
harmony.59 
 
To Zukin, Disney is atypical. Because of its media power, Disney can easily impose 
its fantasy visions on audiences; and because Disneyland does not promote itself as 
an explicitly educational medium, it can selectively use and reproduce the 
American landscape and American history for entertainment and can project the 
collective desires of the powerless: namely, the desires for safety, cleanliness, 
mobility, and domesticity. Zukin’s warnings about the Disneyfied “landscape of 
power” have been taken up by Hannigan, a topic that I discussed in an earlier 
section; therefore, I will note only briefly here that Disney’s cultural vision-based 
power resonates with social desires60 but promotes privatized and centralized urban 
development, restructures landscapes around the globe, and undermines democracy. 
Many scholars studying Disney’s power to address and to shape the public’s 
utopian dream follow Zukin’s emphasis. Michael Sorkin argues that Disneyland 
addresses modern urban problems such as the undisciplined complexities of the 
city”61; Mark Gottdiener explains that Disneyland experiences are desirable because 
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Disneyland “provides people with the illusion of escaping from the demands of 
their own economy: the need to work, to budget, to save”62; emphasizing historical 
specificity, John Findlay argues that Anaheim Disneyland in the 1950s “offered a 
California-based critique” of the urban sense of unfriendliness, disorientation, and 
confusion.63 Whereas both Sorkin and Gottdiener argue that theme parks’ spatial 
control results in the commodification of public space and that Disneyland 
exemplifies the development of “homogenized, underdimensioned citizenship,”64 
Findlay emphasizes history and process in his study of Disneyland and its nearby 
area. He argues that the success of the park turned the agricultural-oriented Orange 
County into a tourism-based center that featured a stadium, a convention center, 
and shopping malls; Disneyland also brought urban problems (such as traffic 
congestion and an influx of prostitutes), from which Disneyland ironically offers 
people escape. As a result, the outside world intruded into Disneyland while the 
theme park Disneyized the outside world. 
As we shall see, Zukin, Sorkin, Gottdiener, and Findlay all argue that 
Disneyland experiences provide visitors a desirable or even a utopian substitute for 
urban malaise. In contrast, Stephen Fjellman argues that Walt Disney World is “the 
major middle-class pilgrimage center in the United States” because Disney World 
uses various marketing strategies to symbolize the idealized essence of childhood 
and because Disney World’s “utopian aspects appeal strongly to real peoples’ real 
needs in late capitalist society.”65 That is, the rides inside Disney World are densely 
packed with symbols that articulate wide-ranging ideological messages; the parks 
sells fantasy, US history, science and technology, nature, and world travel, and the 
park appeals to all the five senses as visitors play ride, eat, wait, and walk. Visitors 
of different backgrounds and ages have different dreams, but the parks fulfill most 
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of them because of the utopian experiences that Disney parks offer. Park visitors in 
general turn out to be tourists experiencing the illusion of being somewhere else (p. 
223): for example, they might engage in a ten-minute simulated safari trip “without 
mosquitoes, monsoons or misadventures” (p. 226); child visitors can indulge in 
some rides without either strife or adults (p. 276); parents (especially mothers) can 
leave their children in day-care centers and pets in kennels; the disabled find 
extensive provisions for them (p. 403). These utopian appeals are not limited to 
urban conditions but extend to the specific needs that specific persons have in 
relation to their specific location in social relations. Although Foglesong argues that 
Disney theme parks fulfill various utopian visions that visitors have, he warns that 
people can realize these visions only through consumption. To Fjellman, however, 
this is the American culture of consumerism: “we must be taught that it is good, 
reasonable, just, and natural that the means necessary for life are available only 
through the market” (p. 402). Besides, the park’s world of commodities “leaves 
minimal space in our lives for coherent critical thought about what we are doing” (p. 
15). He draws a conclusion similar to that of Wasko and Meehan: Disney promotes 
consumerism around the globe and manipulates consumers’ thinking.  
  
Cultural domination, consumerism, and citizenship 
Scholars’ worries about Disney’s consumerism-based standardization of tastes are 
epitomized by Henry Giroux’s The Mouse that Roared.66 With the subtitle “Disney 
and the End of Innocence,” the book rigorously alerts readers to Disney’s 
universality and to its annihilation of public culture. Giroux argues that Disney is a 
global company “spreading the conservative and commercial values that erode civil 
society” (p. 91). According to Giroux, Disney’s media domination and involvement 
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in public and private education control information and structure children’s 
everyday life with its own ideologies. Disney movies are conservative in nature (p. 
85) and promote consumerism as human choice and freedom. Disney’s economic 
and institutional power in land use also diminishes the public sphere available for 
participatory citizenship (pp. 87-9). In short, by forcefully presenting itself as 
innocence and moral virtue (p. 86), by involving itself in entertainment and 
education (p. 79), by regulating public land use, by blurring the line between public 
and private, and by promoting values such as consumerism, the Disney Kingdom 
diminishes civic society, participatory citizenship, and democratic culture: 
 
As market culture permeates the social order, it threatens to cancel out the 
tension between market values and those values representative of civil 
society that cannot be measured in commercial terms but that are critical to 
democracy, values such as justice, freedom, equality, health, respect, and 
the rights of citizens as equal and free human beings. (p. 162) 
 
Scholars such as Wasko, Meehan, Fjellman, and Giroux, consumerism is a 
symptom of an apolitical age because consumerism does not strengthen people’s 
political power and because consumerism provides people with a false alternative 
between choice and freedom. In short, people are free to choose consumption goods, 
and the desire that people invest in this freedom displaces their desire for political 
participation. International capitalism commodifies the globe. Consequently, people 
replace their citizenship rights with commodity desires. The above argument draws 
upon the familiar series of oppositions between production and consumption, 
capital and commodity, active and passive, use value and exchange value, 
authenticity and homogenization, reality and ideology.67 
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However, the very relationship between these “opposites” is not necessarily 
oppositional but contingent. Anthony Giddens’ life-politics provides us with 
another perspective on the role that politics plays in the context of “high-
modernity.” For Giddens, although consumption and democracy are not equivalent 
to each other, the relationship between the two may not be as polarized as critics 
have imagined. From the modern era onwards, politics has been “emancipatory”—
its function has been “to release under-privileged groups from their unhappy 
condition, or to eliminate the relative differences between them”68; once individuals 
have achieved a certain level of autonomy of action in high modernity, life politics, 
“a politics of lifestyle,”69 prevails. Others agree with Giddens that in the post-
modern consumerist society, citizens do not struggle against the market by merely 
challenging state policies; their political involvement manifests itself in the 
consumption that citizens integrate into politics.70 Green politics and consumption 
acts71 against sweatshops are two domains in which consumers connect their 
consumption acts with citizenship rights, and these local everyday mundane 
consumption acts produce globalizing effects. Consumer behavior need not stand in 
contrast to active citizenship; rather, the former can be an extension of the latter. 
The relationship between active altruistic citizenship and passive selfish 
consumership need not be polarized. 
Of course, consumer behavior does not always pair up with active 
citizenship; life politics, as Giddens argues, is only for people with secure incomes. 
In other parts of the world, people in developing countries also desire consumption 
but their desires draw them to develop another kind of politics—that of the right to 
consume. As Karl Marx wrote: 
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The ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and 
restricted consumption of the masses…72  
 
Marx wrote the above comment during the mid-nineteenth century; similar urges 
for the right to consume both public goods and private goods are common today in 
Southeast Asian cities, but the effects vary from one context to the next. John 
Clammer73 argues that there is no necessary link between demands for fair 
allocation of public goods and democratization. In Bangkok and Jakarta, there are 
large numbers of NGOs and citizens’ movements (p. 411); in Manila and other 
large Philippine cities, however, members of the middle class who used to demand 
political rights are now more likely to demand public goods (p. 411); and in 
Singapore, there are no NGOs except those controlled by the state (p. 410).  
Clammer’s study implies that the relationship between demands for the right 
to consume and democratization vary across national institutional contexts. 
Likewise, Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay’s ethnographic study of rural Bengal villagers in 
India,74 by demonstrating a link between villagers’ desire for imported Chinese 
bicycles and the villagers’ desire for democracy, argues that any rigorous 
examination of the intricate relationship between consumption and democratization 
must account for particular political and institutional contexts. The Bengal villagers 
came from a remote village to Calcutta to buy Chinese bicycles, which were much 
less expensive than the Indian ones and which the villagers referred to as gifts of 
globalization. However, the villagers failed in their objective because the 
government officials allowed the rich to purchase the bicycles before everyone else, 
and these villagers left Calcutta feeling only bitterness (p. 42). Villagers then kept 
on telling Mukhopadhyay about stories of corruption and about their dissatisfaction 
with the communist ruling state that they had voted into power in the previous 
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election. Mukhopadhyay discovered that, because the political left had transformed 
the villagers into political subjects and because the villagers considered this new 
political identity to be a gift from the communists, the villagers paid the left back 
by voting for its candidates. However, the left conferred onto the villagers the 
entitlements of citizenship, and the villagers subsequently denounced their ruling 
government and its corrupt administration. Mukhopadhyay argues that the Chinese 
bicycles should be seen as “a substitute-object for their [the villagers’] deep and 
repeatedly frustrated desire to participate in the political process as dignified right-
bearing citizens, as subjects of a welfare-state entitled to enjoy the benefits of state-
subsidized goods as a matter of right, to participate in the global marketplace as 
consumers free from the restrictions imposed by a paternalist state” (p. 52). More 
important, Mukhopadhyay avoids a simple theory linking democratization with 
people’s desire for commodities. He argues that villagers’ desire for democracy 
resulted from both the leftist pedagogy concerning the rights and entitlements of 
citizenship and villagers’ exposure to foreign goods including Chinese bicycles and 
media-disseminated US and European lifestyles. Political and institutional 
conditions, media flows, local culture, and everyday practices are all captured in 
Mukhopadhyay’s analysis. 
 
The everyday dimension: politics, culture, and everyday agency 
In studying Disney power, scholars practicing the everyday approach emphasize 
that, in addition to macro-economic trends, Disney’s media domination, and 
cultural power, it is important to study how people view these specific situations, 
appropriate or challenge them, and live through them. Rather than a narrow 
examination of people’s everyday acts, the everyday approach accounts for how 
   85 
macro-economic trends, specific local political and institutional contexts, firms’ 
strong symbolic and cultural power, and locals’ everyday practices intersect each 
other and produce various effects. Second, because the Disney landscape surfaces 
in different places whose contexts are unique, Disney power is necessarily various 
in relation to each unique context. Third, the everyday approach emphasizes the 
multi-dimensional—as opposed to the uni-dimensional—relations that arise 
between a single locality and Disney. I argue that the everyday approach can 
function as a research methodology that underscores Massey’s idea of “a 
simultaneous multiplicity of spaces” in reference to diverse local actors’ varying 
views on Disneyfication, globalization, and the local world.  
Stacey Warren75 examines various Disney-local power contestations at 
various Disney sites. In her earlier article on popular resistance toward 
Disneyfication in Seattle, Warren argues against the postmodern critique, which 
posits that “not only are individual people powerless to transform the parameters of 
their existence, but structural realities of the postmodern world ensure that true 
participatory democracy shall never be achieved.”76 Rather, by “tracking the 
activities of actual people in actual landscapes,” Warren sees Disney-Seattle power 
relations as a kind of “hegemonic give and take” (p. 85) embodying both consent 
and resistance in relation to people’s practices, understandings, and expectations; 
resistance to powerful corporations such as Disney is possible. 
The Seattle Center project was Disney’s first extensive urban planning 
project on non-Disney property. In the early 1980s, City Hall and Seattle Center 
management decided to ask Disney to be the urban planning consultant because 
Disney was “probably the best in the world” (p. 99); Disney was ultimately 
dismissed in 1989 after three years’ negotiation and friction. Soon after the 
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Imagineers arrived in Seattle, Disney declared that it would not pursue the project if 
the city insisted on an open bid; the Seattle government required that Disney solicit 
input from a local watchdog advisory board, which subsequently reported that even 
the arranging of meetings with Disney was difficult; at Disney’s public meetings, 
Disney talked and the public listened. Seattle people then circulated petitions that 
requested the dismissal of Disney, and City Hall received letters and complaints 
calling for more public involvement. Disney’s three alternative blueprint plans, 
entitled Plan A, Plan B, and Plan C, fueled a new dimension of criticism that 
stemmed from the media, citizens’ groups, and council chambers: the general 
criticism was that Disney’s designs “did little to evoke Seattle’s own culture or 
history” (p. 102). Council members favored Plan B and insisted that Disney modify 
the plan by integrating into it more local citizen input; Disney modified the plan. 
Nevertheless, Seattle residents characterized the plan as “superficial,” the work of 
“cartoonists,” and a “mini-Disneyland” (p. 102). More important, implementation 
of the Disney plan would require an admission fee. Upon encouragement and 
requests from the official advisory group, informal coalitions, and many citizens, 
the council then asked a local architectural firm to develop three new alternative 
plans, and several additional firms submitted plans, unsolicited and at their own 
expense. In 1989, the council chose five plans and the Disney plan was not among 
them. Disney’s involvement in the Seattle Civic Center came to an end. To Warren, 
the Seattle story is “a lively hegemonic dynamic” in which “the model of urban 
organization that Disney proposed engaged city residents, sometimes captivating 
their imaginations and sometimes angering them, but it never dictated a 
predetermined reality to them. Rather, the process opened up space for debate, 
participation, and resistance” (p. 104).  
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Warren’s article “Saying No to Disney” is an extension of her previous 
discussion on the power dynamics among Disney, city governance, and local 
people. This time, she discusses four contested Disney developments: the Seattle 
Civic Center, Long Beach, Anaheim, and Haymarket, Virginia. Warren argues that 
these Disney projects seemed to be guaranteed success but that they failed because 
of Disney’s “almost complete disconnection with more recent planning tropes, 
strategies, or even etiquette.”77 According to Warren, in the 1980s, there was a 
change in city governments’ attitude toward their public’s financial support of 
private development, a shift in planning roles of developers from plan makers to 
negotiators, and a shift in planning theory toward emphasizing both stimulation of 
the development environment and protection of citizens’ interests; Disney as a 
private developer, however, still sees its power as absolute and does not adapt to 
changing attitudes and situations, even in the face of resistance. In confronting 
public outcry, either the government or Disney, as the case may be, eventually 
dropped each of these four projects. In the case of the Seattle Civic Center, as 
discussed above, Disney ignored residents’ disappointment and tried to convince 
the council to waive the required Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Since 
Disney did not fulfill the EIS process, the council then called for three alternative 
plans to be reviewed (p. 242).   
In 1989, Disney acquired new properties in Anaheim and Long Beach. In 
Long Beach, Disney wanted to build a “Port Disney” including a theme park, five 
resort hotels, and shops (p. 243), while the Anaheim project was about building a 
“new themed urban resort” called WESTCOT (p. 244). In 1990, Disney issued a 
public statement that “the Walt Disney Company can only build one of these parks 
in the 1990s.” Disney then pitted the two potential locations against each other so 
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that the resulting competition would bring Disney concession packages. However, 
Disney finally dropped its plans in both of the cities because of organized local 
grassroots resistance.  
For the Long Beach project, because over half of the proposed acreage was 
underwater and needed to be filled in, the project required zoning and 
environmental approvals at both the local level and the state level. Besides, the 
California Coastal Commission required that a portion of all waterfront 
development must be accessible to the nonpaying tourist. Although the officials in 
Long Beach offered Disney US $880 million for infrastructure improvement and 
pledged to support Disney to gain waivers from environmental and rezoning 
regulations, environmental groups protested across the state. Eventually, the 
California Coastal Commission refused to allow the coastline zoning variance, and 
Disney could not build its “classic walled Disney compound” (p. 244). Disney 
promptly dropped its plan. 
For the Anaheim project WESTCOT, Disney planned to build a theme park 
with hotel and retail shops adjacent to existing Disneyland property. To ensure 
Disney’s approval of the development project, local officials offered Disney one 
billion US dollars to improve public facilities. However, home owners organized 
“pep rallies complete with marching bands, cheerleaders, and extensive coverage” 
(p. 245). In public hearings on the matter, Disney turned debate into a showcase for 
Disney, itself, just as it had in the Seattle case. Moreover, Disney dismissed serious 
planning questions concerning, for example, the provision of adequate schools for 
the families of the projected 17,500 new employees; and in response, one group of 
families sued Disney over its unwillingness to contribute to the educational 
infrastructure that would be needed if WESTCOT should be built. Although 
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officials were ready to accept Disney’s redevelopment project, Anaheim residents 
refused such a private-owned public-sphere project. Eventually, the plan was 
dramatically scaled back into a theme park called Disney’s California Adventure 
adjacent to a Disneyland park.  
The fourth failed Disney project that Warren discusses is a theme park 
based on American history, “Disney’s America,” located in Haymarket, Virginia, 
outside of Washington D.C. and less than five miles from Manassas National 
Battlefield Park, a Civil War site. Popular resistance elevated from local to national 
levels, and Disney finally dropped the plan. Much as Walt Disney had bought land 
in Orlando anonymously in the early 1960s, Disney in 1993 anonymously 
purchased an option to buy three thousand acres owned by Exxon in Haymarket. 
Because Exxon had already won zoning approval for large mixed-use development, 
Disney could proceed with its plans secretly. However, rumors leaked and Disney 
officially announced that it would build a new theme park called Disney’s America. 
According to Warren, officials and business leaders at the state, regional, and local 
levels initially supported Disney’s theme park. Despite Disney’s refusal to 
participate in routine meetings about the rezoning application, the Prince William 
County Planning Commission voted to authorize Disney to proceed the project. 
However, the well-established and well-funded environmental preservation group 
The Piedmont Environmental Council raised concerns about the loss of natural 
beauty and local histories; the newly formed Protect Historic America group 
comprising nationally known historians and media personalities argued against the 
Disneyfication of American historical narratives. To raise the debate to a national 
level, the group’s members disseminated advertisements and editorials nationally 
and threatened to launch legal action. Disney’s theme park project then came before 
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the US Senate’s Energy and Natural Resources Sub-committee on Public Lands, 
National Parks, and Forests. Facing a deadline for the land purchase, Michael 
Eisner, the Chief Executive Officer of the Walt Disney Company from 1984 to 
2005,78 announced that Disney would not pursue the Virginia historical theme park 
project.  
By illuminating four failed Disney projects on urban planning, Warren 
concludes that although the free flow of capital made communities feel a desperate 
need to attract private developers that might help the communities remain 
competitive, a number of other factors (culture, local conditions, and democratic 
traditions and actions) played crucial roles in negotiating and resisting privatization 
development. In Warren’s words, “privatization is not a monolithic cultural and 
economic expression” (p. 254); instead, these privately developed spaces need to 
emerge “within the same existing democratic structures” (p. 252). 
When Disneyland transplanted itself to France and Japan, Jean Baudrillard79 
and Fredric Jameson80 argued that Disneyfication was stifling local identity. 
Jameson argued that, in relation to Singapore and Japan, Disneyfication was a 
symbolic domination by the West of the non-West, ranging over themes from 
architecture, cultural industry, and spatial behavior to the very idea of utopia. In 
Jameson’s words, the changes resulted in:  
 
… various things, from a new urbanism to a new kind of shopping, a new 
kind of globalization, a new kind of entertainment industry, even a new kind 
of Utopia itself—that Walt invented.81 
 
Some scholars, however, argue that the seemingly cultureless Disney parks82 rest 
upon definite historical (time) and geographical (space) contexts, including local 
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contexts. These scholars argue that diversity—rather than uniformity—marks 
Disneylands, Disneyfied work cultures, and Disneyfied consumption cultures. The 
“same” park, when it transplants itself to different contexts, faces different social 
relations that intersect each other and that produce different effects. This process 
does not prevent Disney from gaining power inside and outside its parks but it does 
contest Disney’s power. 
In 1985, Disney announced its decision to build a European Disney theme 
park in Marne-la-Vallée, France. Given that the French government provided 
Disney with financing deals, tax breaks, transportation networks, and below-market 
land prices in the Euro Disneyland deal,83 Stacy Warren argues that “the Walt 
Disney Company deserves honorary colonial status.”84 According to Warren, 
Disneyland Paris85 is “Disney’s most ambitious recolonization project” (p. 110). 
Disney expresses its colonial voices by celebrating fabricated difference and by 
speaking for others; it expresses “colonial control of local ‘othered’ populations”; 
and it economically exploits the locals (pp. 112-3). Warren explores (1) the power 
dynamics between Disney and local governance, (2) the “concession” that Disney 
management made to workers regarding work conditions, and (3) visitors’ everyday 
reception of the park; on the basis of this three-pronged examination, Warren 
argues that Disney “colonization” is in fact a process of “hegemonic 
destabilization” (p. 113): 
    
If Disneyland is about the colonization of the world, Disneyland Paris is 
something else again: it is about the playful recolonization of images of 
itself, embedded within a quietly sinister recolonization of economic, 
political, and cultural relationships between corporation, nation-state, and 
locality. A close examination of Disneyland Paris’ history and everyday life 
reveals what Disney’s postmodern critics have thus far missed: the theme 
park actually is a site of twisted postcolonial cultural debate. The cultural 
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conflicts that occur within the park echo, within their safely manufactured 
confines, the conditions of postcolonial struggle in the so-called real world. 
In ways that the American parks or even Tokyo Disneyland will never 
approach, the intrusion of Disney into France has forced Disney employees, 
guests, and the general public to confront questions of “us” and “them,” 
“self” and “other,” “intelligentsia” and “subaltern,” and other tropes of 
postcolonial discourse. (p. 112) 
 
Again, we can see that employees, visitors, government, and the public not only 
participate in “hegemonic destabilization” but also sometimes can successfully 
challenge the supremacy of corporate culture. In this case, the first hegemonic 
concession occurred in relation to onstage Disneyland events,86 when patrons of the 
site insisted that Disney lift its ban on alcohol. At the workplace where the Disney 
workers called the “backstage,” staff members protested Disney’s famous smile 
culture and compelled Disney to relax this requirement at Disneyland Paris: 
instructors of new employees advised the class, “If you don’t feel like smiling, 
don’t” (p. 119-20). Owing to the media’s ridicule, to labor unions’ protests, and to a 
government labor inspector’s formal complaint against Disney, Disney relaxed its 
strict dress codes so that female workers won the right to wear red lipstick and 
black pantyhose.  
In fact, the dress-code conflict was not simply over style of dress but also 
over the power that Disney as a private American-based global company could 
wield in France. Rather than write the dress code into the employee contract, 
Disney management presented the dress code as an attachment to the employee 
contract, and it was then exempt from standard approval through government 
channels. The government labor inspector who lodged the aforementioned formal 
complaint against Disney declared that Disney’s dress code was a disciplinary code 
applicable to all Disney employees and that, under French labor law, these codes 
should be directly written into the employee contract and subject to the 
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government’s approval. The dress-code conflict entered the legal realm, and a few 
months before opening day, police started investigating the dress-code charges.87 
Disney finally backed down and voluntarily adhered to the regulations. On this 
matter, Warren quoted a Disneyland Paris employee: “I was not required to wear 
my hat, scarf, or belt, tuck in my shirt, even wear black shoes. We were asked to, 
but many did not and could not be punished for it” (p. 121). These changes suggest 
a “complex hegemonic interplay between Disney management and employees, 
colonizer and colonized, that was carried out over a period of time by various 
actors” (p. 120). These changes suggest, as well, that local government does not 
always ally with Disney and that local opposition sometimes curtails Disney’s 
control.  
The negotiations that took place over offstage Disneyland events paralleled 
protests that resulted in Disneyland Paris’ modifications of onstage spectacles. 
Officially Disneyland Paris recognizes six languages: French, German, Italian, 
English, Spanish, and Dutch; but some prominent attractions such as Phantom 
Manor were recorded in both English and French and, for this reason, received 
criticism as a cultural affront to the dominant language: French. Within five months, 
Disney replaced the recording with a French-only one (p. 121). Second, because 
most folklore that Disney uses originated from Europe, children from different 
European countries find that familiar stories undergo significant modification at 
Disneyland Paris; in these cases, parents link the Disney version to the stories that 
the parents’ young children learned back home. Only in this way can the children 
comprehend and fully enjoy the show. In other words, visitors’ different cultural 
contexts end up negotiating with and re-narrativizing Disneyfied European stories 
(p. 122).  
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Just as Europeans do not let Disney gain a stranglehold over European life, 
nor do the Japanese in Tokyo Disneyland. Scholars such as Mary Brannen,88 Aviad 
Raz,89 Shunya Yoshimi,90 and Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto91 argue that Tokyo Disneyland 
exhibits not the unilateral structure of Western hegemony but the multilateral 
negotiations between two dominant first world countries, that the Japanese people 
import American Disneyland and edit and consume it in a unique way. These 
scholars, on the one hand, discuss Japan’s cultural Americanization in history and, 
on the other hand, argue that if the export of Disneyland from the United States is 
seen as US global influence on consumer culture dating back to the 1920s, the 
culture has—since the 1970s—undergone a translation that projects an 
“ethnocentric Japanese worldview.”92 The changing meaning of America parallels 
the changing Japanese responses and uses of American offerings, including Disney. 
From a historical perspective, Shunya Yoshimi in his article “Japan: 
America in Japan/Japan in Disneyfication” (subtitled “The Disney Image and the 
Transformation of ‘America’ in Contemporary Japan”)93 demonstrates how the 
meanings of “America” and “Disney” have changed in relation to Japan’s economic 
development and how Japanese youth have used Disney images to create their own 
lived world. In analyzing cultural Americanization in Japan, Yoshimi argues that 
“Although ‘America’ was so often said to have swept over Japanese popular culture, 
the latter was not reduced to dependency on American mass-cultural products, but 
strove instead to naturalize and reinvent them” (p. 166). As an American symbol, 
the word ‘Disney’ might have meant “richness” and “newness” (p. 168) from the 
late 1940s to the 1960s. Starting in the 1970s, because of rapid economic growth 
from 1955 to 1973, the word ‘America’, as it was colored by Tokyo Disneyland, no 
longer symbolize either wealth or innovation but a “system of consumption, which 
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constructs self-identity as consumerable, or as something to be colonized” (p. 172). 
While Disney Disneyfies folk tales such as Snow White by transforming a tale 
about death and rebirth into a fantasy about a young girl surrounded by lovable but 
strange dwarfs and saved by a prince, Japanese girls cutify Disney characters 
through their kawaii culture by taking in everything kawaii and shutting out things 
that are not kawaii. Determinants of the kawaii culture include, in addition to 
cultural Americanism or Disneyfication, “a system of broad colonization [that] 
exists in contemporary Japan” whereby Japanese young people “sterilize” the 
external within themselves to colonize strangers in their everyday practices (p. 176-
7). 
The changes in Tokyo Disneyland’s onstage attractions can be seen as 
Japanese domestication of the outside world, including of America, through 
“cutification” of commodities. Yoshimoto notes that Tokyo Disneyland changes its 
spectacle Main Street U.S.A. into a new spectacle: Global Bazaar. According to 
Yoshimoto, Japanese turned the world (otherwise referred to as the “World 
Bazaar”), not just America, into a commodity that they could consume inside 
Tokyo Disneyland, now a Japanese-styled mall. For Brannen and Raz, onstage 
changes in Tokyo Disneyland omitted American-specific histories or translated 
them to accommodate Japanese culture and to project a Japanese national identity 
for consumption. The renaming of Frontierland as Westernland and Main Street 
U.S.A. as the World Bazaar functioned to omit an American nostalgia that was 
meaningless to Japanese; the park’s expansion of shopping space served the gift-
giving needs of the Japanese; the change of Sleeping Beauty’s castle into 
Cinderella’s castle complements the Japanese “rags to riches” experiences. Raz 
points out that only Tokyo Disneyland has the attraction named “Meet the World.” 
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Located on the outskirts of Tomorrowland, it is a “show on history with a look to 
the future.”94 Raz argues that the thirty-minute film “ignores Japan’s Paleolithic 
ancestors, in favor of the traditional Japanese myth of origin, which regards the 
founding ancestors as the offspring of the gods, who created the islands and came 
down to inhabit them” (p. 53). It reenacts Japanese exceptionalism and cultural 
uniqueness by suggesting that the beginning of Japanese civilization is the 
beginning of the world and that Japan later opened itself to progress and interacted 
with the rest of the world as an equal. This expression receives further voice in the 
Tokyo Disneyland guidebook, which introduces “Meet the World” as a ride on 
which visitors can “revolve on a carousel through time and relive Japan’s 
fascinating encounters with other cultures” (p. 51). Many Japanese consider these 
stories about Japan’s interactions with Chinese and Western cultures as a sign of 
Japan’s successful incorporation of other cultures. For Raz, Tokyo Disneyland is 
“not an agent of Americanization but a simulated ‘America,’ showcased by and for 
the Japanese” (p. 200). 
Rather than produce a monolithic global culture, Tokyo Disneyland enables 
Japanese visitors to enjoy the park in their own ways and in relation to their own 
lived world. Raz argues that scholars’ warning of commodification and of corporate 
solutions to problems is partial: his research shows that (1) Japanese visitors are 
rational consumers “from the aficionado to the critical, from anti-establishment to 
traditional” (p. 189); (2) that some female visitors’ infantile behavior and 
fascination over Disneyland is rebellion against adulthood; (3) that some repeat 
visitors come in groups to Tokyo Disneyland where they play the role of 
“screamers” out of a desire for disorder; and (4) that some people, such as members 
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from the International Play Association-Japan, are highly critical of Tokyo 
Disneyland for its emphasis on scripted play instead of on social play or free play. 
Analyzing backstage themes and events at Tokyo Disneyland, Raz finds that 
Disney’s strict grooming standards and strong service culture are “ordinary” in 
Japanese terms because Tokyo Disneyland part-timers are accustomed to working 
during holidays and to adhering to strict grooming standards (p. 84). Japanese also 
are less concerned than people from many other cultures about “being phony” (p. 
126) because many Japanese consider politeness a part of Japanese social life in 
general. However, workers resist Tokyo Disneyland manuals, which are translated 
versions of original English-language Disneyland manuals. Many part-timers do not 
read them because their supervisors do not ask them questions; and the section 
managers and trainers despise the numerous manuals for their symbolism of the 
“infantile” younger generation, the part-timers (p. 110).  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have studied three approaches in Disney literature: the materialist, 
the symbolic, and the everyday. Herein, I argue that Disney power disperses itself 
in various power dimensions. In a postmodern consumerist landscape, Disney 
operates as a resourceful global company that possesses a strong image 
representing not only fun and family but urban redevelopment and economic 
success, as well. For these reasons, Disney has gained certain advantages in 
negotiations with city governments: for example, Disney has received state 
subsidies and has escaped from certain local regulations and policing. However, the 
overemphasis on abstract economic forces runs the risk of reductionism. There is 
no guarantee that capitalism and democracy must have certain unchangeable 
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relations. Foglesong’s study of the long, changing, sometimes cooperative and 
sometimes difficult relationship between Orlando and Disney, and Warren’s study 
of four failed Disney urban projects show that a state-Disney alliance is not 
guaranteed.    
Culturally, Disney’s long-running media domination around the globe may 
result in audiences’ perception of Disney as innocent and fun; Disney’s ubiquity 
over the course of generations makes it easy for consumers to insert the world of 
Disney into their childhood memories and their sense of family. Nevertheless, 
Disney does not homogenize systems of meaning throughout the globe. The 
symbolic approach, unlike the materialist approach, enables researchers to 
understand Disney power as a “globalness plus,” a utopian appeal. However, the 
symbolic approach ignores the fact that local dreams concern more than the 
untoward effects that industrialization and modernization have on safety and 
cleanliness; local dreams can be various because of cities’ various political and 
institutional structures, economies, histories, and cultures.  
Although all these scholars have different theoretical concerns (whether in 
cultural geography, political economy, or media studies), they draw similarly 
pessimistic conclusions about Disney effects—the diminution of state sovereignty 
and of citizenship rights. Disney’s influence on physical space and Disney’s 
promotion of privatization and of centralized planning diminishes the power of city 
governments and the public; Disney’s promotion of a consumerist lifestyle replaces 
local identities and participatory citizenship by controlling landscape and media. In 
short, by promoting consumerism and the false alternative of choice and freedom, 
Disney creates for itself economic and cultural power, homogenizes culture, and 
weakens democracy and society. I argue that there is neither a necessary correlation 
   99 
nor a necessary opposition between international capitalism and democratization. 
Both capitalism and democracy can be expressed in different forms, as 
demonstrated by J. K. Gibson-Graham in their account of economic diversity95 and 
by Swank in his analysis of different forms of democratic government structure. By 
citing Gidden’s idea of “life politics” and the empirical studies of Clammer and 
Mukhopadhyay, I argue that the relationship between consumption and citizenship 
development needs to be examined under special national context.   
Rather than study Disney power as an abstract economic and symbolic force, 
researchers should highlight the role that local politics, culture, history, democratic 
traditions, and actors play in global-local power dynamics. As Lawrence Grossberg 
argues, the changing context (“geographical and historical, political, institutional 
and intellectual conditions”96) requires scholars to reject reductionism at all levels. 
His advocacy of the concept of “articulation” is a call to examine different forms of 
realities that have material effects on people’s real-life conditions and to study how 
people’s cultural practices appropriate and work upon circumstances through 
interpretation and action. 
Regarding the relationship between Disney’s global ubiquity and cultural 
globalization, scholars such as Warren, Brannen, Foglesong, Raz, Yoshimoto, and 
Yoshimi emphasize local uptake, negotiation, and resistance. Although Disney 
power is paramount in both economic terms and cultural terms, these scholars 
remind us that we need to examine Disney power in process—asking how different 
forces of power intersect in different contexts and periods of time. Using this 
approach, Foglesong demonstrates the changing Orlando government-Disney 
relationship, and Warren illuminates the changing city-planning discourse in 
conflict with the Disney’s static and absolutist urban-planning discourse. Also 
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using this approach, scholars examine whether the meaning of Disney changes 
among locals (take, for example, Yoshimi’s study of the changing meaning of 
“America” among Japanese) and how people use their own preferences to remake 
Disney offerings (take, for example, Japanese cutified Disney characters). 
In reviewing scholars’ studies of various local responses (Orlando, Seattle, 
New York, Anaheim, Virginia, Long Beach, Paris, Tokyo) to Disney power, I have 
argued that local acts significantly contribute to the power dynamics of various 
local Disney projects. Moreover, “locals,” as demonstrated by Warren’s studies of 
four American projects and Disneyland Paris, do not fall into one single category. 
Local government, officers, journalists, Disney employees, consumers, 
environmentalists, and home owners occupy different positions in relation to 
Disney and can hold views that clash with Disney’s agenda. In other words, as I 
discussed in chapter One, we need to study these various spaces of social relations 
to understand the multiple power dynamics of local Disney projects. 
 In my study of the establishment, the operation, and the consumption of 
Hong Kong Disneyland, I dare not say that I bear no predefined sets of political 
beliefs and concerns. Hong Kong, although affluent, has no democratic elections 
for its Chief Executive; and although significant in terms of its cultural exports in 
Asia since the sixties, Hong Kong can never characterize itself as a dominant 
cultural power comparable to France, Japan or America. Hong Kong is not even a 
nation, but a Special Administrative Region under China’s sovereignty. In addition 
to cultural globalization, then, I am also concerned about Hong Kong’s 
democratization and about Hong Kong’s transformation of public space in relation 
to HKDL.  
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In terms of politics and institutional matters, I acknowledge that Disney has 
pitted Hong Kong and Shanghai against each other to compel the HKSAR 
government both to fund Disney and to waive certain local regulations that would 
otherwise pertain to HKDL. However, I doubt the assertion that there is an absolute 
alliance between the HKSAR government and the Disney Company. Certainly, 
there is cultural Americanization in Hong Kong through Hong Kong’s import of 
Hollywood movies, hamburgers, and shopping-mall consumption system, but the 
general influence of American cultures is counterbalanced by Hong Kong people’s 
everyday practice of Chinese customs (as I discuss in chapter One), and by the 
overall development of regional cultures within global cultures.97 I also doubt that 
Disney or other transnational corporations exercise total control over every aspect 
of Hong Kong people’s lives: there is no absolute homogenization of meaning 
systems, nor is there an absolute substitution of consumerism for citizenship. 
However, I cannot deny that Hong Kong is a consumerist city; lacking democracy, 
many Hong Kong people exercise their sovereignty through consumption rather 
than through elections; living in a small city, Hong Kong people more often than 
not actively accommodate global trends rather than resist them, and do so for 
survival. 
It was, in the first place, Hong Kong legislators and media that pressed the 
HKSAR government to compel Disney to settle Disneyland in Hong Kong. On the 
surface, it seems clear that Hong Kong government officials, legislators, media, and 
even ordinary Hong Kong people, as shown by surveys,98 have submitted 
themselves to Disney owing chiefly to its economic, media, and cultural 
domination around the globe. As development progresses, conflicts arise and 
different groups, including laborers, environmental groups, student activists, 
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journalists, local popular stars, and even business partners and HKSAR government 
officials, criticize Disney actions. This criticism circulates through popular press 
and can affect the bottom line: for instance, visitors’ park attendance rocketed then 
dropped drastically, perhaps because of the circulating criticism. It comes as a 
surprise to some onlookers that the Disney “magic” failed in the consumerist Hong 
Kong cityscape. To study Hong Kong people’s Disney dream and the failed Disney 
magic, researchers can uncover a wealth of information by focusing on actors 
instead of on automatic forces, by focusing on articulation instead of on 
convergence. 
In the next chapter, following Reichl, I study how government officials in 
1999 persuaded the Hong Kong public to embrace the HKDL project, even though 
the deal was undemocratic, non-transparent, and unfair, suggesting that the HKDL 
project functioned to preserve Hong Kong’s cultural identity, as well as to 
strengthen Hong Kong’s post-1997 economic revitalization—articulating Hong 
Kong people’s desires for both economic rebound and cultural distinction after the 
Handover.  
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the boundaries between casinos, hotels, restaurants, shopping, and theme parks.  
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Chapter Three 
The HKSAR Government’s “World City” Imaginary  
 
Whenever Disney plans to expand and build a new Disney theme park in the hub of 
a region, governments bidding for the role of host often desperately try to obtain it 
by offering Disney generous setup subsidies, cheap land, low-interest-rate loans, 
transportation networks, setup infrastructure, and tax breaks. These deals are not 
just about financial support; instead, the successful government surrenders its 
management control over Disney,1 and sometimes the local Disneyland does not 
need to abide by the law2 and enjoys special consideration from the government for 
future changes in legislation.3 Surprisingly, even though the media widely publicize 
these deals, Disneyland supporters outnumber opponents in France and Hong Kong. 
 Certainly, the dream or utopia appeal that Disneyland offered the French 
and the HKSAR governments was not simply an antidote to urban malaises as it 
was in the case of Anaheim Disneyland, according to Zukin, Sorkin, Gottdiener, 
and Findlay (see chapter One). In the post-industrial global economy, both the 
French government and the HKSAR government believed that the Disneyland 
projects could provide tens of thousands of jobs, lower the unemployment rate, 
increase foreign exchange and tourist revenues, and establish new leisure and 
tourism developments.4  
However, cultural critics denounced France’s Disneyland as the “Euro 
Dismal” project, while the phrase “cultural Chernobyl” circulated in the mainstream 
press.5 Yet public opinion polls on the Île-de-France indicated 86% approval for the 
Paris Disney park,6 and two journalists—Turner and Bumbel—described it as “an 
extraordinary triumph of commerce over ideology.”7 Hong Kong’s experiences with 
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Disneyland were similar to France’s. As in France, Hong Kong had detractors of the 
HKDL project. An elected legislator in the city argued that the HKDL deal was an 
“Unequal Treaty”8 because the HKSAR government had invested HK$22.95 billion 
compared to The Walt Disney Company’s HK$2.45 billion. However, the HKSAR 
government receives 57% of the shares of the government-Disney joint venture 
company Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP) whereas Disney owns 
43%. Also in Hong Kong, local scholars and some journalists9 raised other 
reservations about the HKDL project; in particular, they criticized the deal’s lack of 
transparency10 and the deal’s ecological destruction of Lantau Island,11 the backyard 
of Hong Kong. Despite these reservations, Hong Kong people largely supported the 
HKDL project,12 and the popular press even termed the completed deal a 
“millennium dream come true.” Local scholar Joseph Chan13 drew a conclusion 
similar to that of Turner and Bumbel: according to Chan, the favorable reception 
that Hong Kong extended to the Mouse is evidence of the prevalence of Hong 
Kong’s economic logic, paves the way for cultural globalization, and weakens 
resistance voices. 
I would like to argue that, in the case of HKDL, lurking behind the 
prevalent economic logic is the HKSAR government’s use of the HKDL project to 
sell Hong Kong people another utopia—the world-city utopia. In other words, the 
HKDL project was attractive to the HKSAR government not only in economic 
terms but also in cultural and political terms. First, the HKSAR government used 
the strong sign value of Disney—that namely, “Disney” is a famous and valuable 
global brand—to brand Hong Kong itself as a “world city” and, consequently, to 
differentiate Hong Kong from other Chinese cities. Second, the HKDL-based world 
city ideal helps to divert Hong Kong people’s imagination away from 
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conceptualizing a “better” society based on a democratization process, and toward a 
Western-based reformulation of Hong Kong’s imagined “Chineseness plus” 
elements. Moreover, the “Western” influence in this instance reflects Western 
commercial culture instead of Western democratic culture. The HKSAR 
government has effectively used HKDL to re-image Hong Kong from a colonial 
city based on a symbolic “East-meets-West” economics to a post-colonial city 
based on a symbolic “East-meets-Disney” economics. This repackaging of Hong 
Kong city’s self-image has the potential to satisfy both Hong Kong people’s desires 
for cultural distinction and the Beijing government’s decolonization project 
(including the “decolonization” of the late-colonial government’s democratization 
project). Third, the popular appeal of the undemocratic and non-transparent 
HKSAR-Disney HKDL negotiations and subsequent deal has helped to consolidate 
the HKSAR government’s wider undemocratic regime and non-transparent 
institutional structure. In short, my argument about the HKSAR government’s 
construction of the world-city utopia confirms Massey’s argument that although we 
should conceptualize our lived world as a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces, “the 
world has seen the recrudescence of exclusivist claims to places—nationalist, 
regionalist and localist” since the late 1980s. These attempts aim to “fix the 
meaning of particular spaces, to enclose them, endow them with fixed identities and 
to claim them for one’s own” and for the justification of one’s power.14   
I would argue that to sell the non-transparent HKDL project to the public, 
the HKSAR government developed two existing colonial discourses on 
development and cosmopolitan identity, thereby evolving a “competition-
development” discourse and a “disappearing-world-city” discourse for its own use. 
By using these two discourses, HKSAR government hoped to persuade the public 
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that it should approve of the unequal Hong Kong-Disney deal. In this chapter, I first 
narrate how the HKDL project received support from the Legislative Council even 
though the government asked the Council to approve the funding in the absence of 
a completed environmental-impact assessment. In the second and third sections, I 
discuss the concept of the imaginary and how the government developed the 
economic-oriented “world-city” imaginary by appropriating two pairs of 
discourses—a “competition-development” discourse and a “disappearing-world 
city” discourse. I examine how newspaper reports have circulated and have 
reinforced these two pairs of political discourses in wider popular discourse. In the 
last section, by examining the HKSAR government’s tourism policy, I further 
discuss how the process of touristification functions simultaneously to accomplish 
decolonization tasks and re-nationalization tasks, and to reshape Hong Kong as a 
spectacular tourist magnet instead of a citizen-based participatory community. 
 
The unequal deal and legislators’ fait accompli assent  
In late 1998, news had it that Disney might build another park in Asia. Legislators 
demanded that the HKSAR government demonstrate sincerity and determination to 
settle Disneyland in Hong Kong in its negotiation with The Walt Disney Company. 
The legislators hoped that, in this way, Disney would choose to build Disneyland in 
Hong Kong. To facilitate these efforts, the legislators suggested that the 
establishment of Disneyland in Hong Kong should mirror the financial arrangement 
of Ocean Park, the only theme park in Hong Kong at that time. In other words, the 
HKSAR government should provide cheap land to the Walt Disney Company so 
that, at its own expense, the company could proceed with the construction of the 
theme park.15 Although press and legislators were excited about the negotiations, 
  115 
the government kept related details under wraps.16 Having no chance to examine 
the deal, legislators were dissatisfied with the government’s non-transparent 
negotiations, for the government notified the public only about the outcome. These 
critical legislators warned the government that the Legislative Council could block 
funding for the Disneyland project.17 
On 2 November 1999, the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney 
Company officially announced that the HKDL deal had reached a successful 
conclusion. As I mention in an abbreviated form above, elected Legislator Man 
Kwong Cheung18 denounced the deal as an “Unequal Treaty” by paralleling it with 
the 1842 treaty that transformed Hong Kong into a colony and that ceded it to the 
British. Because secrecy characterized the deal-making process, the Hong Kong 
people had no chance to discuss its details in public. Indeed, a public release of the 
details came only after both of the parties had officially announced the deal’s 
completion. At this time, the Commissioner for Tourism presented the details:19 
 A total of HK$13.6 billion would be spent on the reclamation and 
development of Penny’s Bay (the then Sunny Bay), the infrastructure, and the 
transportation links to HKDL. 
 A total of HK$14.1 billion would be required to pay for the park—HK$6.6 
billion for the theme park itself and HK$7.5 billion for the hotels and all the 
infrastructure supporting it. The division of HK$14.1 billion was projected as 
follows:  
 Of the equity, the government would invest HK$3.25 billion into a joint-
venture company with Disney, while Disney would invest HK$2.45 
billion therein. The name of the venture would be Hong Kong 
International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP); 
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 HK$6.1 billion in government loans including capitalized interest (prime 
minus 1.75% from drawdown to the eighth anniversary of the park’s 
opening; prime minus 0.875% for the next eight years; and prime for the 
next nine years) for 25 years; 
 The entire project would also be financed by a commercial loan of 
HK$2.3 billion including capitalized interest. 
 
The government needed to invest HK$22.95 billion in the joint venture in three 
ways: investment in infrastructure and transportation, direct injection of cash, and 
government loans to raise 57% of the Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd 
(HKITP) shares; The Walt Disney Company invested only HK$2.45 billion to get 
its 43% of the shares. The government may recover its direct investment of 
HK$3.25 billion because the agreement allows for the complete privatization of the 
joint venture, but Disney must maintain $1.9 billion in the joint venture. Besides, 
the Walt Disney Company would receive the following royalties once the park 
began operations: 10% admission, 10% participant, 5% merchandise, 5% food and 
beverage sales, 5% hotel revenue. The base management fee was 2% and variable 
management fee ranged from 2% to 8%.20 What the Hong Kong public did not 
know about the deal was whether or not the Hong Kong people would need to bear 
the HKDL-related maintenance costs for all infrastructure; nor was the Hong Kong 
public informed about the financial arrangement in case HKDL ran a deficit. 
In mid-November 1999, after the official announcement of the completed 
deal between the government and the Walt Disney Company, the government 
needed approval from the Legislative Council for the funding of HK$13.569 billion 
to complete the official contract with the Walt Disney Company. Legislators had 
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three main concerns: the ability of the park to ensure a balanced budget, the shared 
responsibility of the government and Disney if HKDL ran a deficit, and the 
government’s fast-track action in asking the Legislative Council to approve the 
funding without completing the environmental-impact assessment. The government 
responded that it had conducted a sensitivity analysis by scaling down the projected 
revenue by 20%, finding that the HKDL would still be financially viable; refused to 
disclose the exact financial arrangement but said that both sides would pour money 
into the park if HKDL ran a deficit; and warned that the finance of the project 
would suffer and that the government would have to redo the whole financial 
arrangement and assessment if the Legislative Council postponed its approval of 
the funding until the release of the report of the environmental-impact assessment.21   
Elected legislators belonging to the Democratic Party22 initially criticized 
the government for its lack of aggressiveness relative to negotiations with the Walt 
Disney Company; then, the legislators denounced the deal as unequal and criticized 
the government for violation of the spirit of the law insofar as the government 
sought fast-track Legislative Council approval of the funding even though no 
environmental-impact assessment had been completed. Nevertheless, the legislators 
in question abstained from voting on the Finance Committee; in effect, the 
legislators abdicated their voting rights despite having criticized the government. 
Furthermore, these legislators voted for the project in the Public Works 
Subcommittee. Facing a fait accompli and fervent public approval of the HKDL 
project (as shown from different public opinion polls),23 the Legislative Council 
approved the HK$22.45 billion funding for the HKDL project. In the Finance 
Committee, only three legislators, Emily Lau, Cyd Ho, and Christine Loh, opposed 
the approval of the government-Disney joint-venture funding. On 10 December 
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1999, the government and the Walt Disney Company signed five official 
agreements—on shareholders, loan, license, management, and the master project 
itself. 
 
Concepts of the “imaginary”  
Scholars provide various understandings of the concept of the “imaginary.” Jacques 
Lacan conceives of the imaginary as a basis of a misrecognized selfhood; Benedict 
Anderson couches the imaginary in political terms; Charles Taylor and Claudia 
Strauss argue that social imaginaries are a “cultural model”, that is, the common 
understandings through which people imagine their surroundings. For Lacan,24 the 
imaginary is associated with ideal, illusion, and misrecognition. According to Lacan, 
the self is a split self; the imaginary is an internalized image of an ideal whole self 
that young people, during their preverbal stages, derive from an unfragmented 
image that they have of their own selves. When an infant looks at a mirror and sees 
his or her image wholly present, the wholeness of the image establishes itself in the 
infant’s mind, where the image constitutes the infant’s ego, the concept of identity. 
In other words, this mirror image is an image of wholeness—of completeness and 
coherence—and reflects, for the infant, a complete and coherent internal self. Lacan 
argues that this line of reasoning in the infant’s mind leads to a profound 
misrecognition of what it means to be human.25 However, the mirror stage, which 
ends with a sense of the self as complete, has an important social function: by 
creating the subject (the self), the mirror stage enables the subject to recognize and 
to interact with objects (the external world). Media scholars, for example, use 
Lacan’s theory to explain how the subject identifies with screen images to fulfill his 
or her desire to achieve oneness, to replace our permanent lack with completeness. 
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Anderson interprets the meaning of the imaginary by associating it with the 
concept of “nation.” He argues that the development of print capitalism in the 
eighteenth century standardized and disseminated vernacular print languages and 
social concerns. The common language was “fixed” as the “national” language, 
through which people communicated and exchanged ideas. The common concerns 
raised by the print media also constructed an imagination of a community, the 
nation, in which people share common concerns at the same time. To Anderson, the 
community is “imagined” because nationalism encourages members of the 
community to imagine that they share not only the same language but also the same 
concerns, although “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most 
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them.”26 Anderson further 
explains: 
 
It is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as 
a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it 
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so 
much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.27 
 
Anderson argues that media play a critical role in the construction of these 
imagined communities because the widespread nature of communication processes 
help construct national identity and other forms of community.  
In contrast to Anderson, Charles Taylor argues that the social imaginary is 
not an idealized understanding of things but rather a matter of complex 
understandings in which both facts and norms play important roles. The social 
imaginary affects people’s perceptions of how things are (facts) and people’s 
perceptions of how things should be (norms):28 
  120 
 
I want to speak of social imaginary here, rather than social theory, because 
there are important—and multiple—differences between the two. I speak of 
imaginary because I’m talking about the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ 
their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms; 
it is carried in images, stories, and legends. But it is also the case that theory 
is usually the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in 
the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the 
whole society. Which leads to a third difference: the social imaginary is that 
common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely 
shared sense of legitimacy. In addition, we should note that what start off as 
theories held by a few people may come to infiltrate the social imaginary, 
first that of elites, perhaps, and then of society as a whole. The social 
imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common 
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.29 
 
Building on this theory, Claudia Strauss argues that Taylor’s social imaginary “fits 
cognitive authropologists’ conception of cultural models” 30 because cultural 
models are also widely shared and they are implicit schemas for people to interpret 
the world and their behavior. Cultural-model theorists further argue that there is 
more than one cultural model and that cultural models affect people’s behavior to 
different extents and in different ways. 
Although it seems that Lacan, Anderson, Taylor, and Strauss hold 
conceptions of the “imaginary” that differ from one another, and although the 
theorists’ use of the same word ranges from the self, to community, nation, and 
culture, there are certain similarities among these distinct conceptions. The first two 
theorists differ from one another in terms of their focus on the self and the 
community respectively, but they both argue that the imaginary is a misrecognition: 
a mind that inaccurately recognizes a complete himself or a complete herself—a 
complete self; people that inaccurately recognize a community—a cohesive group. 
Whereas Lacan treats the imaginary as a universal aspect of the human condition, 
Anderson, Taylor, and Strauss suggest that the imaginary of a community, a nation, 
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or a social surrounding, is reproduced on a regular and mundane basis. Different 
from the first two, Taylor’s and Strauss’ social-imaginary model implies a dialogic 
relationship between the elite minority and the “ordinary” majority—that social 
theory can integrate itself into the social imaginary and, also, that the social 
imaginary can derive its form and content from “below.” 
Having examined various HKSAR government officials’ public speeches 
and the news reports regarding the HKDL project, I argue that the HKSAR 
government attempted to sell the HKDL project to the public in two ways: first, the 
HKSAR government appropriated certain social imaginaries (in particular, the 
“Chineseness plus” model of cultural identity) that appealed to the majority of 
Hong Kong people and that encouraged them to imagine Hong Kong’s acquisition 
of Disneyland as the key to Hong Kong’s transformation into a “world city”; 
second, the HKDL consolidated for the Hong Kong public the imaginary according 
to which a city’s status as a “world city”31 depends on the city’s ability to 
successfully compete in the era of globalization. To highlight the assertion that 
Hong Kong’s importation of Disneyland would enable Hong Kong to become a 
world city in the twenty-first century, the HKSAR government developed two 
already available discourses—the competition-development discourse and the 
disappearing-world-city discourse. The first discourse reproduces the necessity for 
development politics in the midst of global competition; the second discourse plays 
on Hong Kong’s fears that Hong Kong, itself, was disappearing from the world 
economy and it catered to Hong Kong’s dream of being a twenty-first-century 
world city.  
In late colonial times, Hong Kong had often been seen as a cosmopolitan 
“East-meets-West” city and an emphasis on urban development was common 
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because of the colonial government’s heavy reliance on property tax32 and on the 
“success” and the wealth that Hong Kong people had attained33 under 
industrialization that started in the 1960s. Under the post-Handover context, the 
HKSAR government appropriated the colonial “East-meets-West” cosmopolitan 
image of Hong Kong and the colonial politics of development to interpret the 
economic doldrums that Hong Kong was facing in 1999. Hong Kong was seen as 
disappearing34 in both economic terms and political terms because of urban 
development in China, severe regional competition in the Asia Pacific region, and 
ironically, the “successful” Handover; Hong Kong would soon disappear if the 
Hong Kong people did not face competition positively—only with “development” 
could Hong Kong turn “from adversity to opportunity,”35 from a disappearing city 
to a world city. Hong Kong should grasp the opportunity to establish Disneyland, 
for the brand “Disney” with its huge sign value, would help Hong Kong achieve the 
world-city status.  
 Certainly, the HKSAR government’s “world city” imaginary is not 
necessarily the cultural model embraced by the “people.” Following Claudia 
Strauss in studying “the imaginaries of real people, not the imaginaries of imagined 
people,”36 here I study imaginaries on two levels. In this chapter, I study the 
HKSAR government’s attempt to characterize Disneyland as a significant import 
that would help Hong Kong achieve the “world city” imaginary; in the next chapter, 
I examine my respondents’ various social imaginations in relation to the HKDL 
project. Although the HKSAR government followed the British colonial 
government in prioritizing economic development and in offering Hong Kong 
citizens limited rights,37 and although the HKSAR government consciously and 
unconsciously constructed the ideal citizen-subject as economistic and 
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individualistic through education reform38 and welfare policies,39 various 
respondents’ uses of HKDL indicate that Hong Kong citizen-subjects are multiple 
and not merely economistic.  
 
The HKSAR government’s economic “world city” imagination  
As discussed in chapter One, after the late 1960s and during British rule, a local 
consciousness took shape among Hong Kong people. This local consciousness 
projected China as Other. In the early 1980s, Hong Kong people’s fears of the 
change of sovereignty from the capitalist British to the socialist Chinese regime 
became a critical negotiation chip for the British government in the related Sino-
British negotiations.40 The negotiations resulted in the “one country, two systems” 
policies, and the Sino-British Agreement of 1984 guaranteed that “the economic, 
legal and social system in Hong Kong and its citizens’ way of life will remain in 
force for fifty years after 1997.”41 In the mid 1980s, the colonial government, 
facing democratization demands from professionals and “pressure groups,” also 
initiated limited democratic reforms. In 1985, the Hong Kong government 
increased the number of indirectly elected Legislative Council seats from twelve to 
twenty-four. According to Alvin So,42 in late 1985, Beijing made known its 
disapproval of any further democratic reforms carried out by the Hong Kong 
government before the installation of the Basic Law, which was drafted in the 
Mainland instead of Hong Kong and determined Hong Kong’s future political 
structure. Because of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, London asked for faster 
democratization in Hong Kong and in 1992, Chris Patten became the last Governor 
of Hong Kong. Since the Basic Law was already promulgated, Patten announced 
the Legislative Reform Bill in 1993 and reinterpreted the Basic Law’s definition of 
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“functional constituencies” (occupational group) so that the election base rose from 
110,000 to virtually 2.7 million adult workers, meaning virtually every adult worker 
could vote for the 1995 Legislative Council election. 
In 1997, however, the public experienced a backlash against 
democratization. Arguing that Patten’s political reforms violated the Basic Law, on 
30 June 1997, the Beijing Authorities dissolved the Legislative Council, which had 
been elected in 1995 and would have served beyond 1997 for institutional 
continuity. The Provisional Legislative Council also repealed and amended some 
laws passed by the colonial Legislative Council and passed some new laws such as 
the Public Order Ordinance, which required police permission for demonstrations 
involving over 30 people. Furthermore, the Basic Law authorized by the Beijing 
authorities stipulated that the Chief Executive of the HKSAR government in 1997 
was to be elected by a 400-member electoral commission instead of by popular 
election.43 In short, in late colonial times, Patten tried to articulate democracy with 
Hong Kong’s “way of life”;44 in post-colonial times, the Beijing authorities slowed 
down Hong Kong’s democratization process.45  
To earn public approval, then, the new HKSAR government sought to direct 
Hong Kong people’s desires away from democratization and toward economic 
concerns. Right after the Handover, however, Hong Kong, as was the case with 
other Asian countries such as Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia, 
experienced the Asian financial crisis, which resulted in a steep decline in property 
and stock markets, in asset values, in inbound tourism, and in the local economy. To 
attain political legitimacy, the new regime has concentrated on strengthening Hong 
Kong’s economic competitiveness and on resolving Hong Kong’s socio-economic 
problems such as a bubble economy, de-industrialization, and the widening gap 
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between the rich and the poor.46 
To revitalize the economy, starting in 1998, the HKSAR government 
attempted to appropriate part of the Hong Kong people’s existing social 
imaginary—Hong Kong people’s desire for cultural distinction from other cities. 
The government used this appropriation to transform post-colonial Hong Kong into 
a “world city” and, thus, to avoid the possibility that Hong Kong would become just 
another Chinese city after the Handover. To re-negotiate its world position, 
therefore, Hong Kong needed to strengthen ties with not only the Mainland but also 
with global companies such as Disney.47  
In 1997, when Tung Chee Hwa, the Chief Executive of the HKSAR 
government, delivered his first policy address (also the HKSAR government’s first 
policy address under the People’s Republic of China), he said in his introduction 
that the Hong Kong people needed to face two aspects of “the new era”48: the 
Handover and the world economy. In view of China’s remarkable economic growth 
since the 1978 reforms, Tung stated that the Handover brought Hong Kong only 
benefits: “Our country has bright prospects from which Hong Kong is sure to 
benefit” (clause 3). However, he also warned the Hong Kong people that under the 
global economy, Hong Kong faced “open, free and borderless competition” (clause 
4) and that the city needed long-term planning to “set new courses for 
development” (clause 4). However, Tung was optimistic about global competition 
because Hong Kong was a cosmopolitan city with hybrid cultures that enabled the 
Hong Kong people to face challenges under global competition: 
 
Ours is a cosmopolitan city. Our ability to embrace the cultures of East and 
West is one of the secrets of our success, shaping a unique social culture of 
our own. (clause 111) 
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Experiencing the ailing local economy after the Asian financial turmoil, Tung in his 
1998 policy address argued that Hong Kong needed to acquire more economic 
connections and to re-position itself to become a cosmopolitan city. And the way to 
become a cosmopolitan city was to strengthen networks with China, to become the 
gateway to China, and also to become a “bridge” to the “international community”:  
 
As China passes through the different phases of modernization, Hong Kong 
will have different roles to play and new functions to perform…. We must 
now consider how to reinforce our role as the bridge between China and the 
international community…. We must … expand further our business links 
and economic co-operation with the Mainland49…. We have studied the 
roles of New York and London, which are not only the most cosmopolitan 
cities in America and Europe respectively, but are also international 
financial centers, tourist destinations, homes for the headquarters of multi-
national corporations and international communication and transportation 
centers. I believe that Hong Kong too has the potential to become, not only 
a major city within one country, but also the most cosmopolitan city in 
Asia.50 
 
Tung did not elaborate on the meaning of “cosmopolitan city” in his policy address, 
but he cited New York and London as exemplars of his ideal cosmopolitan city. By 
simply equating cosmopolitan cities to “international financial centers, tourist 
destinations, homes for the headquarters of multi-national corporations and 
international communication and transportation centers,” Tung restricted the 
meaning of “cosmopolitan city” to strictly economic terms and ignored the 
democratic and pluralistic cultural values held by these vibrant cities. Although 
“cosmopolitan city” became the HKSAR government’s objective for Hong Kong, 
China as a country and the neighboring Chinese cities were seen as support for—
instead of a hindrance to—Hong Kong’s objective.  
In the 1999 policy address, a month before the completion of the HKSAR 
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government-Disney deal, Tung re-stated the government’s determination to 
transform “Hong Kong into a prosperous, attractive and knowledge-based, world-
class city”51 on a par with New York City and London, but the urgency underlying 
this transformation concerned a fear of disappearance under fierce competition with 
other cities, especially the Chinese ones: 
 
Two decades of rapid economic growth on the Mainland have continued to 
narrow the gap between Hong Kong and the key cities there.… Unless we 
consciously improve, our lead will disappear.52 
 
A comparison of the three policy addresses reveals that, from 1997 to 1999, the 
government was modifying the idea of Hong Kong’s position in relation to the 
world. In 1997, Hong Kong was a cosmopolitan city; in 1998, Hong Kong was no 
longer a cosmopolitan city but struggling to be one. In 1997, China was an 
important supporter of Hong Kong’s future development53; in 1999, China cities 
were Hong Kong’s official competitors under the globalized economy and Hong 
Kong’s leading position was disappearing because of these competitors’ rapid 
development. 
According to the government, the fear that Hong Kong was a city 
disappearing from the global scene stemmed from the Handover, as well as from 
global and regional competition. At the media briefing session of the official 
announcement of the HKSAR government-Disney deal, Mike Rowse, the Tourism 
Commissioner, stated directly that “Hong Kong was disappearing”: 
 
We kind of faded from the spotlight a little bit since 1997 when I know 
many people just wrote us off—that was the end of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
was disappearing and would gently decline from thereon.54 
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According to this rhetoric, a “disappearing” Hong Kong would be a logical 
outcome not simply of economic trends but also of politics. Right after the 
completion of the HKSAR-Disney deal, Mike Rowse warned again that Hong Kong 
people had lost, in addition to money during the financial crisis, their peculiar 
identity after the Handover:  
 
Then came 1997 when we suffered a double blow; the Asian economic 
crisis reduced the level of regional travel; and the political transition meant 
we lost our allure as the last major historical anomaly.55   
 
By connecting with the mega-transnational brand Disney, the government 
suggested that the joint-venture between the HKSAR government and the Walt 
Disney Company endowed Hong Kong with huge transnational sign value and 
helped Hong Kong achieve both a Chinese image and a world-city image within a 
Western-dominated global system. Disney’s investment in Hong Kong reaffirmed 
the hope that Hong Kong was still “alive,” according to Mike Rowse: 
 
… what this [the Walt Disney Company] project tells the world is that Hong 
Kong is still alive and kicking and we are aiming high. We are not going to 
decline. We are going to grow from where we were and develop, and we are 
aiming to be among the world’s top cities.56 
 
The name “Disney” may elsewhere signal the sanitization process of Forty-second 
Street in New York under gentrification57 or the affluent Japanese people’s ability to 
own and manage an American Disneyland according to Japanese cultural 
precepts.58 In the case of HKDL, however, Disney’s utopian appeal for the HKSAR 
government was the possibility that Disney could help Hong Kong attain or 
maintain world-city status, an antidote to the possibility that Hong Kong was a 
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disappearing city under a globalized economy. When, on behalf of his government, 
Secretary for Economic Services Stephen Ip signed the Master Project Agreement 
with the Walt Disney Company, he said that the joint-venture represented “a happy 
marriage between a world class tourist attraction and a world class tourist 
destination.”59  
 
Media portrayal: HKSAR city status and pro-development politics    
Having examined most Hong Kong newspapers (both in Chinese and English) that 
appeared between October 1998 (when rumors started to spread that Disney might 
build a new park in Asia) and November 1999 (when the joint-venture contract was 
signed by the government and Disney), I can attest that a majority of Hong Kong 
popular newspapers and TV channels60 expressed approval of the HKSAR 
government-Disney joint-venture HKDL project, although these media 
simultaneously voiced reservations. Because the deal evolved largely in secrecy, 
most related media discussions lacked comprehensiveness and substance. The 
major reason for the media’s explicit approval of the HKDL project hinged on the 
media’s general support for urban development, especially after the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997; in their view, HKDL would bring Hong Kong people not only 
income, through park operations, but also fame, which in turn would bring Hong 
Kong society greater foreign investment and greater economic returns. In what 
follows, I discuss how news reports highlighted competition between Hong Kong 
and other Chinese cities, especially Shanghai, and how these media reports echoed 
the HKSAR government’s pair of discourses, the competition-development 
discourse and the disappearing-world-city discourse. I will show, as well, that the 
media reports couch the world-city utopia only in economic terms, without 
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considering the reinforcing effect that the HKSAR government-Disney alliance 
would have on local non-transparent and non-democratic governance.  
The HKDL project became a prominent topic in Hong Kong news reports 
after October 1998, a year before the official announcement of the project. As soon 
as there emerged the rumor that a Disneyland park might be built in Asia and that 
Disney was considering Hong Kong for the role of host, news reports highlighted 
competition between Hong Kong and other cities. In mid-October 1998, Tin Tin 
Daily, Ta Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po, Sing Tao Daily, The Standard, and Ming Pao 
Daily News reported that a Disneyland park would be built in Mainland China, 
possibly in Hong Kong or Zhuhai.61 In reporting the news, the press highlighted the 
keen competition that Hong Kong was facing for the opportunity to host the park: 
Zhuhai officials actively held talks with Disney officials in Los Angeles about the 
theme-park plan,62 but the HKSAR government declined to comment and local 
politicians clamored over the government’s lethargic attitude. A few months later, 
after news had spread that Zhuhai had withdrawn its bid, the press reported that 
Shanghai was in fact Hong Kong’s major rival. In early March 1999, Hong Kong 
people were reading almost daily news reports about a Hong Kong-Shanghai 
rivalry over the right to host Disneyland park; moreover, these reports were 
appearing in the newspapers’ main section. For example, all major newspapers 
including Apple Daily, Ming Pao Daily News, the finance-oriented Economic Times, 
and the pro-Beijing publication Ta Kung Pao reported on 6 March 1999 that, 
according to Shanghai Mayor Xu Guangdi, Shanghai and Disney had signed a letter 
of intent to conduct a feasibility study.63 After his remarks, major features reported 
that Mr. Xu had openly noted Shanghai’s comparative advantages over Hong Kong; 
that HKSAR Economic Services Secretary Stephen Ip had sent an affirmative reply 
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to the media regarding Hong Kong’s advantages in hosting Disneyland64; that, 
according to financial analysts and column writers, Hong Kong and Shanghai had 
various advantages over one another in hosting a Disney park65; and that each city 
could have a Disney park.66  
Competition among cities or countries is prominent in the Disneyland 
history, and Disney has expertly pit potential locations against each other to attain 
better deals and to escape from certain government regulations. Orlando finally 
won the right to host the Disney Kingdom over thirteen other venues in the eastern 
United States in the 1960s; while Disney originally identified 1,200 possible sites 
for the establishment of Euro Disneyland, and France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, 
Italy, and Great Britain were all competitors. France’s Paris competed severely with 
Spain’s Barcelona. Spain’s minister of tourism and transport once expressed 
personal determination to host Disneyland, “We want to obtain Disneyland at any 
price!”67 Finally, Disney opted for Paris. The Orlando case shows that cities 
compete with one another within a country, and the France-Spain contest illustrates 
competition between countries. Unlike Orlando and France, however, Hong Kong 
competed with both other countries and domestic cities; that is, with foreign Asian 
cities such as Singapore, Taipei, and Bangkok, and with domestic cities in the 
Mainland such as Hengqin Island in Zhuhai, Guilin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.68 
Describing the resulting bidding as “tussle,” “war,” and “rivalry,”69 press outlets 
such as The HK Economic Times, The Hong Kong Standard, and Ming Pao Daily 
News successively analyzed the competitive advantages that Hong Kong possessed 
over other cities, especially the Chinese ones, in hosting the Disney park.70 The 
emphasis on competition between Hong Kong and other cities produced a fear 
among Hong Kong people that many neighboring cities such as Singapore or 
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Shanghai would soon surpass Hong Kong. In evaluating Asian cities’ own 
advantages with regard to hosting a Disney theme park, local press highlighted the 
assertion that, in 1999, Singapore had replaced Hong Kong by receiving the highest 
score of the annual Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage 
Foundation,71 and the Chairman of the Bank of East Asia David Li Kwok Po said 
that Shanghai would bypass Hong Kong in the future.72  
These reports and analyses heightened Hong Kong people’s fear that their 
home, Hong Kong, was plunging into decline:  
 
Shanghai and Hong Kong compete to build Disneyland, and the competition 
reminds Hong Kong people again that this Mainland industrial and 
commercial mega-city is a more threatening competitor than Singapore … if 
Hong Kong is complacent and does not seek to make progress, it will be 
surpassed by Shanghai sooner or later…. Mainland achieved success in 
finance reform and Shanghai can be the international finance center. Once 
China opens its currency, transnational companies will certainly be attracted 
to move headquarters to Shanghai, and such acts will strengthen Shanghai 
and weaken Hong Kong, and therefore Hong Kong must prepare… 73 
 
The competition between Hong Kong and other cities concerns not only the issues 
of Disneyland but also the city’s status as an international finance center, an 
international tourism destination, and a shopping and horse-racing paradise. On this 
topic, one columnist wrote: 
 
Recently, Hong Kong people felt the clutch of fear in viewing competition 
around us: Singapore competes with us for the securities market, Shenzhen 
for consumer market, Shanghai for Disneyland, Macau for horse-racing, etc. 
The world seems to be increasingly constricted, and people increasingly not 
upholding justice.74 
 
By constantly emphasizing the severe regional and international competition 
that Hong Kong was facing, these reports and analyses in the news media tended to 
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support the secret HKSAR government-Disney deal, which promised to extract 
Hong Kong from the economic doldrums that followed the Asian financial crisis. 
News-media argued that the park would be good for Hong Kong tourism 
development, for Hong Kong’s retail industry, and for Hong Kong’s employment 
situation.75 Few local news-media outlets except Hong Kong Economic Times76 
questioned the alleged economic revitalization that Disneyland would bring to the 
Hong Kong economy. Although the press voiced reservations about the project’s 
cost-and-returns,77 about the secrecy of the deal,78 and about the ecological damage 
to Lantau Island,79 among other topics,80 these reservations were of secondary 
importance in comparison to HKDL, which so many people and institutions 
positioned as a project that could resurrect Hong Kong’s long-lost “cosmopolitan” 
status (i.e. “East-meets-West” was the clichéd phrase). The day after the official 
announcement of the HKSAR government-Disney deal on the HKDL project, 
Apple Daily devoted four full pages—entitled “Millennium Dream Comes True”—
to cover stories that declared the paper’s full support of the project81; Ming Pao 
Daily News welcomed the deal because HKDL could reinforce the image of Hong 
Kong as an international tourist center and thus could stimulate other industries82; 
pro-Mainland and pro-HKSAR government press such as Wen Wei Po repeated 
Mike Rowse’s views: many people thought that Hong Kong was disappearing from 
the international scene, but the HKDL project announced to the world that Hong 
Kong was on its way to being one of the most important cities in the world.83 Other 
reports affirmed that HKDL could boost Hong Kong’s international image, attract 
foreign investment, raise Hong Kong’s service quality, develop Hong Kong as an 
important tourist site in Asia, and change Hong Kong’s future development 
trajectory.84  
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Local news reports and comments tended to create a prevailing narrative 
according to which Hong Kong needed to accept pro-development and pro-business 
politics to reverse its ailing economy and to overcome regional competition. The 
existence of this prevailing narrative does not lead me to conclude that news actors 
colluded with government officials; rather, as Fred Chiu argues in his re-
narrativization of the Hong Kong “Handover” issue, Hong Kong media failed to 
document complicated issues and succeeded in representing them in a binary 
form.85 Chiu argues that, regarding the Handover, media neglected the many 
different groups and local social-movement agents and concentrated on only two 
groups, the official representatives of Britain and the PRC for their oppositional 
stance. Because of the binary nature of the media reports, the alternative voices of 
dissenters were lost in the framework of “prosperity” and “stability.” This simplistic 
coverage extended to and affected the Handover itself. 
In the same way, Hong Kong’s news media has used binary logic to 
narrativize problems that Hong Kong society has faced since both the Handover 
and the Asian financial crisis; consequently, the news media’s reports and 
comments on the HKDL project reflected chiefly the government’s competition-
development discourse and the government’s disappearing-world-city discourse. 
The binary nature of these two discourses (that under severe city-city competition 
in a world economy, only pro-development politics could transform Hong Kong 
from a “disappearing” city into a world city) creates a simple framework in which 
media can easily analyze the HKDL issue. Underneath the pro-growth rhetoric, 
both the government and local press suggested that there is only one world system: 
competing cities in a global economy86; there is also only one criterion by which we 
can evaluate cities—economic power. Alliances between cities that are competing 
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against one another have only one purpose: to overcome even greater competition 
from another city or from another alliance of cities; hence, the extended 
metropolitan region of the Pearl River Delta comprising Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Zhuhai counters another of the Mainland’s extended metropolitan regions, the 
Yangtze River Delta of Shanghai, southern Jiangsu Province, and northern Zhejiang 
Province. By successfully connecting with powerful transnational corporations such 
as Disney, Hong Kong could clear its international image from shrouds of gloom, 
could better compete against other cities, and could attract more foreign 
investment.87 
 
“Chinese or not Chinese, that is the question”: HKSAR tourism policy 
A significant cultural issue for the newly established HKSAR government after the 
Handover was the Hong Kong people’s unwillingness to identify as Chinese and 
their preference for an identity based on Heung Gong Yan (Hong Kong people). A 
1997 survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong found that almost 60% of 
the respondents considered themselves Hongkongese and only 38% Chinese, and 
this ethnic identification did not change in 1999.88 Decolonization and re-
nationalization become one of the major tasks of the HKSAR government after the 
Handover. Re-nationalization has been difficult to accomplish because the HKSAR 
government, on the one hand, would like to promote the idea of nation and to 
integrate the Hong Kong people into the wider populations of Mainland Chinese, 
and because, on the other hand, the HKSAR government must not harm Hong 
Kong’s international status.89 This tension of re-nationalization manifests itself in 
the government’s oscillation between nationalist integration and globalist economic 
networking—an oscillation that has resulted in the emergence of a cosmopolitan 
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business-oriented nationalism. Crystallizing this trend is the government’s civic-
education advertising campaign that began in 2004 and whose principal slogan is, 
“The heart is tied to the home country; ambition looks out on the world.”90 
Parallel to this oscillation between nationalist integration and globalized 
economic networking is the HKSAR government’s tourism policy. In tourism, the 
“identity” of the host society depends on the presence and the gaze of the tourists. 
Scholarship on the formation of self and identity generally often posits that the 
affirmation of the self depends on the gaze of the Other. Giddens, for example, 
argues that the self is conditioned through its ongoing interactions with others; 
identity is what the self conceives of itself. For the specific conditions of tourism, 
Lanfant argues that host societies often “construct an imaginary place for an Other, 
and an image of self which seduces both self and Other.”91 Accordingly, Edward 
Bruner coins the term “touristic borderzone”92 to describe an actual place where 
tourists and local performers meet and where the two perform their parts. The 
formation of identity in these accounts is not as autonomous as we imagine; 
however, this does not mean that only exogenous force contributes to the 
re/formulation of local identity and the presentation of self. In tourism, the host 
society always experiences the process of constructing its own image, and it is the 
host society that decides its own image, and by communicating with tourists, the 
host society guarantees the circulation of that image.93  
Pang and Sum94 argue respectively that the ambiguous HKSAR “East-
meets-West” tourism policy circulates two contrasting tourist discourses for two 
types of tourists. For Western tourists, there is a discourse that stages an exotic 
Oriental past and religious activities; for Chinese tourists, there is a discourse that 
represents contemporary Hong Kong life as a vast array of transnational consumer 
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products epitomizing modern, capitalist, and Western ways of life. Both discourses 
ignore colonial history and colonial culture, and both induce visitors to feel safe as 
they consume their imaginary Other. Pang further argues that although they seem to 
differ from each other, the two discourses emphasize simply fantasy—not 
heterogeneity, which is Hong Kong’s reality.95  
Contributing to these two tourism discourses is the Hong Kong Tourism 
Board, a government body whose job is “to market and promote Hong Kong as a 
destination worldwide.” Part of the board’s promotion efforts is the Discover Hong 
Kong website. The “Heritage” section of this website contains multiple references 
to Hong Kong’s colonial past, chiefly in connection with monuments’ architectural 
styles. For example, the building that houses the Legislative Council chambers 
suggests both the influence that Western colonialism has had on Hong Kong and the 
autonomy of Hong Kong’s government. Of course, this two-fold suggestion is 
implicit. The website stresses, quite explicitly, the building’s “neo-classical style.” 
Other descriptions include the “bandaged” brickwork of the Western market, 
“Baroque-Rococo look” of Helena May, the “Greek revival style” of the Former 
Central Magistracy. As du Cros96 argues, although the Hong Kong Tourism Board’s 
tourism-marketing strategy introduces colonial and Western heritage assets, it does 
not deal with these heritage assets’ role in colonial history. For example, The Peak 
was an example of racial prejudice up until the Second World War, because it was a 
European enclave where Chinese were forbidden to build. However, little of this 
history is noted in Hong Kong Tourism Board brochures. 
 In promoting cultural tourism, the Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in 1998 
declared, “We need also to look at ways of better presenting to the world our 
distinctive heritage.”97 However, the Tourism Board’s Discover Hong Kong website 
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either presents the old colonial buildings in reference merely to their architectural 
style or it characterizes long-standing Chinese customs such as feng shui, tai chi, 
and kung fu as Hong Kong’s traditions.98 As Chan, Ip, and Leung argue,  
 
The so-called “unique flavor” of Hong Kong is simply understood as “East-
meets-West culture,” a very broad term that is never clearly defined in terms 
of its essential socio-political content…. To explain how these two forms of 
culture might have met would involve a deeper understanding of colonial 
history. But this historical “meeting” would never be articulated in the form 
of the “cultural tourism” that the government intended to develop.99 
 
Chinese tourists’ spending has been the biggest contributor to total tourist spending 
in Hong Kong since 1997.100 Hong Kong is exotic and extraordinary to Mainlander 
Chinese because it was, until recently, an essentially Chinese population under 
British colonial rule. Now that Hong Kong has divorced itself from this colonial 
rule, Hong Kong must—in order to maintain its distinctiveness, its exoticism and 
extraordinariness—devise another powerful symbol to create an unusual, attractive 
touring experience. In this context, I would suggest that HKDL has become a good 
replacement for the colonial narrative insofar as HKDL, as a timeless and placeless 
spectacle, enables the HKSAR government to re-narrativize Hong Kong’s “East-
meets-West” clichés without damaging the government’s re-nationalization project. 
As a tourist product, HKDL, by replacing the colonial landscape and by conjuring 
up images of a glittering consumerist dreamscape, suppresses the legacy of late-
colonial democratization and reformulates the image of Hong Kong as a business-
oriented cosmopolitan world city. The consumerist cosmopolitan world-city image 
is also offered as a self image for Hong Kong people. HKDL solidifies Hong 
Kong’s reputation as a “shopping paradise” for tourists, and the narrative once 
again positions Hong Kong people as both enterprising and consumerist individuals 
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who are outwardly looking and upwardly aspiring: that is to say, as perfect 
apolitical cosmopolitan subjects.101 Consumption-based “ways of life” seemingly 
become the only right that Hong Kong people demand. The “West,” as represented 
by Disney in Hong Kong, entails no democracy—no one-head-one-vote election—
but, rather, non-threatening popular-cultural industries that allow and encourage 
government’s fast-track planning-and-development practices.  
HKDL boosts more than local economic development; it boosts the 
government’s political legitimacy, as well. The HKSAR government assumed office 
on 1 July 1997 and had been functioning for only two years when the HKDL 
negotiations got underway. In the immediate aftermath of colonialism, many post-
colonial populations greet their new governments with enthusiasm. In contrast to 
this trend, the Hong Kong people registered a lukewarm response to the HKSAR 
government and even questioned and challenged the government because of its 
undemocratic election procedure. Public support for the new regime initially 
showed signs of promise but gradually dropped from July 1997 to January 1999.102 
The Disneyland project did, in fact, raise the Hong Kong people’s confidence in 
their government. Research shows that the HKSAR government’s successful efforts 
to host Disneyland in Hong Kong increased the government’s popularity among the 
Hong Kong people: a survey conducted by Hong Kong Policy Research Institute 
Ltd. found that 37% of 967 respondents had more confidence in the HKSAR 
government after the success of the Disneyland deal in 1999 than they had had 
before the deal.103  
The strengthening effects that HKDL has had on the HKSAR government 
are evident internationally, as well as locally. On 23 November 1999, the HKSAR 
government launched the tourism-promotion event “Millennium Hong Kong—The 
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Dragon’s Spirit” at the Customs House in Sydney.104 At the event, Anson Chan, the 
ex-Chief Secretary, said that the HKDL project demonstrated the determined 
leadership role that the HKSAR government had played in directing Hong Kong’s 
recovery from the Asian financial crisis. The government aimed to turn Hong Kong 
away from its over-reliance on property and develop a more knowledge-based 
society through the establishment of HKDL. Through implementing the HKDL 
project, then, the HKSAR government strengthens its political legitimacy inwardly 
and outwardly.  
 
Conclusion 
In analyzing the HKSAR government’s tourism policy, Pang argues that 
Hong Kong is sold as “the city of sight”105 offering surface and spectacle “at the 
expense of any historical relevance,”106 whereas Sum describes Hong Kong as “a 
site of play”107 for selling “simulacrum-East and colonial-West identity”108 during 
the colonial period and then simulacrum-Eastern heritage and customs to the 
Westerners and simulacrum-Western ways of consumption to the Mainlanders after 
the Handover. These two writers emphasize that the commodity on sale in Hong 
Kong is a fantasy instead of a reality.  
Instead of conceiving of the simulacrum as depthless, cultureless, and 
homogeneous as Baudrillard109 and Jameson110 do, I would like to employ Gilles 
Deleuze’s account of simulacrum to highlight differences among simulacra—
differences that stem from different processes of production and “conditions of their 
reproduction.”111 In his reading of the theory of Platonic Ideas and the distinctions 
between copies and simulacra, Deleuze argues that the Platonic view defined copies 
as “well-grounded claimants” (p. 47) possessing the internal essence of the 
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foundation, a resemblance to the Idea, and that this resemblance “must not be 
understood as an external correspondence” (p. 48). The Platonic explanation of the 
simulacrum, however, is as a “groundless claim,” that is, one having a resemblance 
to the original but with the greatest degree of discernible difference from it (p. 48). 
Although a simulacrum is still recognizable as a derivation from a model, it is not 
actually a “degraded copy” or a poor copy of the original because, unlike the copy, 
the simulacrum possesses inner dynamics different from those of the original. 
Deleuze then uses the example of human beings in Christian theology to elaborate 
his argument: “God made man in His own image and to resemble Him, but through 
sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. Having lost a moral 
existence in order to enter into an aesthetic one, we have become simulacra” (p. 48).  
According to Deleuze, by inquiring into the direction of the simulacrum, 
Plato discovers that “the simulacrum is not a false copy, but that it calls into 
question the very notions of the copy … and of the model” (p. 47). Meaghan Morris 
further argues that, in this account, simulacra “throw into question the validity of 
the model/copy distinction—and thus the theory of Ideas.”112 It is because 
simulacra are copies that “have successfully broken out of the copy mold”113 by 
changing their own nature and by consequently becoming originals:  
 
... the multiplied, stylized images take on a life of their own. The thrust of 
the process is not to become an equivalent of the “model” but to turn against 
it and its world in order to open a new space for the simulacrum’s own mad 
proliferation. The simulacrum affirms its own difference. It is not an 
implosion, but a differentiation; it is an index not of absolute proximity, but 
of galactic distances.114 
 
Hence, as Deleuze argues, the simulacrum contains subversive power, “a positive 
power which negates both original and copy, both model and reproduction.”115 
  142 
Massumi also suggests that the danger of a simulacrum lies in its “masked 
difference”; instead of in its “manifest resemblance,” because the external 
resemblance is only an illusion that masks the simulacrum’s own life force. A 
simulacrum is not empty in its cultural meaning but a product of a particular 
context; the way to evaluate the simulacrum should focus on differences instead of 
sameness.116  
Disneylands, in that sense, though often characterized as timeless and 
placeless, are simulacra produced in a particular time-space, which has its own 
social significance. John Findlay argues that the first Disneyland’s success as a 
cultural landscape in Anaheim is attributable to the Disneyland’s celebration of 
southern California: that is, to the Disneyland’s role as a vehicle in which visitors 
could escape from the surrounding and confusing metropolitan area.117 In Orlando, 
Tokyo, Paris, and Hong Kong, each area’s Disneyland discarded this original 
meaning (the escape from American urban life) because of the different cultural 
processes of production. Hong Kong owns the fifth “original” Disneyland park, 
which is neither the antithesis of the congested dirty urban landscape of Los 
Angeles in the 1950s nor the remake of the American consumption system to be 
found in Tokyo,118 but rather the deployment of both a “superficial” consumerist 
popular culture and the “Disney” brand of “world-city” imagination. 
To conclude this chapter, I would like to review its chief points. Under the 
globalized economy, state power is far from diminishing. In the case of HKDL, the 
HKSAR government made use of the global brand Disney (in the form of the 
HKSAR-Disney joint-venture HKDL project) to realize four objectives. First, 
through the establishment of the HKDL project, the government successfully 
established its own legitimacy. Second, the HKSAR government used HKDL’s 
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Western identity to rewrite the “East-meets-West” mythology and distinguish Hong 
Kong from other Chinese cities on the basis not of political aspirations but of 
cultural, cosmopolitan, and consumption-based ways of life. This redefinition of 
Hong Kong identity does not challenge either Beijing authorities or its own 
undemocratic rule. Third, the HKSAR government used HKDL and its related 
tourism policy to reformulate the city’s utopian future as a business-oriented 
prosperous world city. Fourth, HKDL encourages Hong Kong people to aspire to be 
cosmopolitan entrepreneurs and consumerists who neither sacrifice their nationalist 
sentiments nor demand democratization. 
The disappearing-world-city discourse and the competition-development 
discourse regulate the public’s “frame of reference” in three ways. First, the two 
discourses encourage Hong Kong people, collectively and as a city, to seek 
economic power in a global-local framework. Second, the two discourses together 
see the extent of a city’s relative economic power as the most important criterion 
for evaluating a city’s worth. Third, the two discourses articulate Hong Kong 
people’s desires for both economic rebound and cultural distinctions. According to 
several public opinion polls, Hong Kong people fervently embraced the project, 
suggesting that the HKSAR government has, at least to some extent, successfully 
reconstituted its subjects’ frame of reference regarding local and global issues and 
has, with equal success, channeled potentially democratizing energies into the an 
apolitical cosmopolitan subjectivity. In the following chapter, I will identify and 
examine the particular dreams that Disney brought to Hong Kong people in relation 
to their fears and desires, personally and nationally. 
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Chapter Four 
Do Dreams Come True? 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that Hong Kong’s city-state power is far from 
diminishing in the globalization process. Facing Hong Kong’s change of 
sovereignty and the rise of Chinese cities, the HKSAR government established 
connections with the Walt Disney Company and imported the seemingly 
“contextless” and entertainment-based Disneyland into Hong Kong. The HKSAR 
government has used this import to paint Hong Kong’s postcolonial landscape—
that is, to renew Hong Kong’s image as a world city of Asia whose status is based 
not on democratization but on economic prowess. To win public approval of the 
government-Disney joint venture, the HKSAR government mobilized two 
discourses—the competition-development discourse and the disappearing-world-
city discourse—to highlight the assertion that HKDL would transform Hong Kong 
into a twenty-first-century world city.  
The previous chapter identifies three institutional sources of power: 
HKSAR government officials, the tourism board, and media. I have discussed how 
the HKSAR government appropriated three powerful aspects of Hong Kong culture: 
Chineseness plus elements, fear of disappearance, and pursuit of a world-city 
imaginary. We have also seen how the government narrowly defined globalization 
as world economy and measured a city’s worth on the basis merely of economic 
terms. Under the globalized economy, Hong Kong is developing its symbolic 
economy: a consumerist landscape that attracts tourists. And in this process, 
powerful cultural forces encourage Hong Kong people to become competitive, 
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enterprising cosmopolitans and, thereby, to successfully face mutating global and 
regional forces. 
Through affect1 and knowledge, the government governs us. Power, 
however, circulates around us in everyday life. In this chapter, I want to explore the 
various and selective ways in which Hong Kong people use their culture either to 
defend existing lifestyles or to create new lifestyles. Following Massey, I argue that 
the contested “identity” of a place cannot be a single and stable source for 
individuals’ personal and cultural identities. I explore this topic by examining, in 
particular, the relationship between individual Hong Kong people’s interpretations 
of the HKDL project and these people’s sense of self, their sense of place, and their 
sense of social processes (namely, globalization and the changing Hong Kong-
China dynamics). I argue that despite the strong rhetoric according to which the 
Hong Kong people are chiefly economic animals, my research on people’s HKDL-
related views reveals that respondents welcomed the HKDL project for cultural 
reasons—whether as a source of cultural distinction from Mainlanders or as a way 
to experience foreign culture. Certainly, some respondents’ cosmopolitan 
aspirations may be shaped by real or imaginary institutional and economic forces or 
by attendant changes, but it does not follow that their cosmopolitan aspirations 
should be viewed as in themselves necessarily instrumental for capital 
accumulation. Further, the intersection between instrumentalist intention for 
economic advancement and everyday cultural interaction may encourage people to 
reflect on their common-sense economic being. The effects that this reflection has 
on cultural politics may be unexpected. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section, I argue that 
several opinion polls about the HKDL project suggest that Hong Kong people’s 
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support of the project was not simply based on projected economic benefits. In the 
next two sections, I use this study’s interviews and ethnography to identify both my 
respondents’ interpretations of the HKDL project and the project’s effect on my 
respondents’ sense of self. 
 
Embracing HKDL: the economic irrationality of Hong Kong people  
Numerous studies show that tourism development is not always a result of financial 
cost-and-benefit calculations but sometimes a product of a complex web of 
economic, political, and cultural factors.2 Let’s review the economic side of the 
HKDL project: the HKSAR government presented the HKDL project as an 
economic project that would diversify and revive the Hong Kong economy; media 
presented the project as a solution to Hong Kong’s unemployment problem, to 
Hong Kong’s allegedly fading sign value, and to difficult-to-attract foreign 
investment. Various opinion polls, however, reveal that Hong Kong people did not 
conceive of the HKDL project in narrow economic terms. 
In February 1999, nine months before the official announcement of the deal, 
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) conducted a 
telephone survey3 of 878 residents and found that respondents at that time did not 
quite believe that HKDL could strengthen the Hong Kong economy; indeed, they 
worried that the establishment of HKDL would lead to the importation of Mainland 
workers and would, thus, worsen Hong Kong’s unemployment situation. Despite 
their worries, only 4.3% of respondents opposed the HKDL project and 90% of 
respondents supported it. Another survey, this one conducted by the Liberal Party4 
in July 1999, also indicated the public’s inconsistent attitudes toward the deal. Of 
one thousand Hong Kong respondents, 40% disagreed with the government’s 
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financial concession to the Disney company and about 55% criticized the HKDL 
deal’s lack of transparency, but over 80% of respondents supported the HKDL 
project.  
John Ap’s important surveys show us similar seemingly irrational attitudes 
attributable to the Hong Kong public. Ap persistently conducted surveys 
monitoring Hong Kong residents’ attitudes to the establishment of HKDL. In 2000, 
Ap conducted two surveys in March and April respectively.5 The survey in March 
was a non-random survey of 250 residents from Lantau and Peng Chau Islands, and 
the survey in April was a random telephone survey of 582 residents. The surveys 
demonstrated that respondents were not optimistic about the under-construction 
HKDL’s ability to create future benefits: 38-39% of respondents commented that 
the deal was unfair (p. 6), just over a third commented that it was acceptable (p. 5), 
24% could not decide whether HKDL benefits would outweigh HKDL costs (p. 5), 
and more than 50% of respondents stated that they “somewhat dislike” or “dislike” 
the project’s ecological effect on Lantau Island (p. 6). However, three quarters 
(76%) of them supported the development of HKDL and only 8% opposed the deal 
(p. 5). Another one of Ap’s surveys, which took place between 27 and 29 
November and 2 and 4 December 2002, showed similar dissonant results: 43% of 
respondents thought that it was not fair for the government to provide the land 
formation and infrastructure works to Disney but 85% supported the deal and only 
8% opposed the deal.6 Although more and more people found the HKSAR 
government-Disney deal unfair (from 39% in March and April 2000 to 43% in 
December 2002), more and more people supported the deal (from 76% in 2000 to 
85% in 2002). There was a 4 to 5% increase of respondents criticizing the deal as 
unfair, but there was also a 9% increase in people’s support of the deal!   
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Respondents’ support of the HKDL project shows that Hong Kong people 
are not simply economic animals whose behavior and judgments are purely 
economy-oriented. They supported the project even though they had reservations 
regarding HKDL’s possible negative economic effects on Hong Kong: the Hong 
Kong people were sure neither about whether the park’s returns could outweigh its 
costs nor about whether the park could strengthen the Hong Kong economy; they 
also realized that HKDL would have harmful environmental effects on Hong 
Kong’s natural landscape. I will argue that some respondents in my study used the 
HKDL project to distinguish Hong Kong from other cities, especially Chinese ones. 
Hong Kong’s historical specificity—its colonial governance, its protracted 
separation from China, its assumed superiority over Mainlanders, and its absorption 
of Western capitalism and of Western modernity—made the entry of HKDL into 
Hong Kong a cultural event, as well as an economic one.7  
 
Cultural distinctions and cities in counter-position  
According to the various surveys that I discussed in the first section of this chapter, 
Hong Kong people embraced the HKDL project but did not clearly understand the 
characteristics that made the HKDL project so attractive. But one thing is more 
certain, the above surveys show that Hong Kong people’s support of the project 
was not merely economic. I conducted interviews8 with people who were both from 
different walks of life and connected to Disney in various domains: the respondents 
included a news producer, Disney-product merchandisers and distributors, a public-
relations officer, a kindergarten headmaster, a film distributor, parents as consumers, 
and Disney staff members. According to my interviews, most of the respondents 
supported the project but had different degrees of enthusiasm, expectation, and 
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worry regarding HKDL, then under construction. Moreover, the expectations and 
the worries always corresponded to identity issues. Although almost all respondents 
stated that “economic revitalization” was the chief reason for their support of the 
HKDL project, I suspect that the respondents’ prioritization of this reason was a 
reflexive response to media’s agenda-setting emphasis on the project’s possible 
revitalization of the economy. Media helps shape the parameters of our experiences 
but also clashes with our experiences.9 Although most respondents answered my 
question “Why do you support the HKDL project?” by initially identifying an 
“economic” reason, the respondents would immediately qualify their previous 
statement by declaring, for instance, “I don’t know,” “maybe,” or “Actually, I know 
little about the economy.” Then, the respondents would identify various reasons. 
More important, many respondents often made vivid facial expressions while 
offering responses, some about Hong Kong and some more personal. It is my 
contention that the word ‘Disney’ strikes many respondents in various ways and 
that emotion, in addition to economic rationality, drives them to support the 
project.10  
In this section, I first discuss how my respondents’ support of HKDL related 
to their previous experiences of Disney theme parks.11 In general, when my 
respondents recounted their Disney park experiences, they always smiled and told 
me about their happy memories of a park.12 Surprisingly, there is no necessary 
connection between respondents’ excitement and their support of the HKDL project. 
Many respondents in my study supported the HKDL project but were not excited 
about it; instead, their support of the park rested on an unsteady foundation of 
worries and reservations.  
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Among my respondents, Cathy,13 an experienced administrator for film 
companies and film organizations, and Betty,14 a high school teacher, had greatly 
enjoyed their Disneyland trips. Cathy had visited Anaheim Disneyland and 
Disneyland Paris; Betty had visited Disneyland Paris and Tokyo Disneyland. Every 
time I asked them to recount their Disneyland trips, they could not help showing 
their big and cheerful smile. When I asked her what she thought about Disneyland, 
Cathy replied: 
 
Disneyland is superb! I like the parades, I like the buildings, and I like the 
place. It’s full of color! The first time I visited Anaheim Disneyland was in 
1991, and this was the first time I had a long trip in America. You know, the 
second day after I arrived in L.A., I immediately visited Disneyland. People 
just smiled there! And you just forget all your business when you are inside 
the park. I visited Disneyland and then Universal Studio the next day. I was 
so happy because it was my first time going to two theme parks on two 
successive days. 
 
Cathy and her husband and son, Fred and Adrian, visited Disneyland Paris twice in 
2001 and 2006. In Cathy’s 2001 visit, although she found the park, especially the 
attraction Peter Pan’s Flight and the Sleeping Beauty castle, to be a bit worn out, 
she enjoyed the atmosphere inside the park and she visited the park again in 2006. 
As for Betty, she had visited Disneyland Paris in 1998 with her friends. This was 
her first visit to Europe; although she did not base her decision to visit Paris on 
Disneyland Paris, Betty said that, during the entire trip to Disneyland, she had worn 
the biggest smile:  
 
The experience of spending a day, playing and laughing crazily [in 
Disneyland Paris] like kids is unforgettable. I remember queuing up for 
hours for the rides…. I like the Small World a lot, for the lovely displays 
and decorations; squeezing in for a place to view the parades was absolutely 
amazing. I wonder why we could stand the heat and the noise for that long 
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on such a hot afternoon. The most exciting part was staying in the hotel, 
which was actually a lovely little Mickey Mouse house, a very well 
furnished and equipped one, where you can see the Disney cartoon 
characters everywhere and Disney Cartoons were non-stop-showing on TV 
too. You would never want to unwrap the little piece of soap in the shape of 
Mickey’s head because you’d want to take it home to show your friends…. I 
like every place I visited in Europe, but I wore the biggest smile in every 
photo of me at Disneyland Paris. 
 
With their good memories of their Disneyland trips, it is surprising that both Cathy 
and Betty were not excited about the HKDL project. In explaining their 
reservations, the two women explained that if Hong Kong had Disneyland, the 
meaning of ‘Disneyland’ would have to change from that of a faraway fantasyland 
to that of just another local theme park. All the efforts that, in the absence of HKDL, 
go into a trip to Disneyland in Europe or the United States (a good education, a 
good job, substantial savings, detailed planning) would, in the presence of HKDL, 
become easily achievable, perhaps rendering the local Disneyland experience 
mundane. 
Different from Cathy and Betty, David,15 a TV daily-news program director, 
had visited Tokyo Disneyland, Anaheim Disneyland, and Orlando Disney parks in 
1988, 1995, and 2005 respectively. Of all the respondents, David was the one who 
embraced the HKDL project whole-heartedly. Besides, he had designed a 
presentation of the HKDL project that had appeared on one TV station’s news 
broadcast. On 2 November 1999, the HKSAR government officially announced the 
HKSAR government-Disney joint venture concerning HKDL; and for the 
announcement, David designed an animated trailer in which a castle symbolizing 
Disneyland raised from the Hong Kong map; once the castle settled, fireworks 
glittered over the whole of Hong Kong. He was very satisfied with his visual 
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representation of the deal. I asked how the idea came to him, but he immediately 
responded with a question of his own: 
 
Shouldn’t we celebrate after two years of dark ages? We’ve had no good 
news since the Handover. None. I notice that not all people embrace the 
project, but I don’t quite understand why they don’t support it. HKDL is the 
first good news we’ve had about Hong Kong in these two years. We finally 
got some good news from the government. It at least brings us hope for a 
brighter future. [My design shows that] fading Hong Kong can gleam again. 
I think the design is good and it resonates with Hong Kong people and 
[reflects] their happiness with the project.   
 
To David, HKDL saved “fading Hong Kong” from the “dark ages” and offered it a 
“brighter future.” The “two years of dark ages” is the period between the 1997 
Asian financial crisis and the November 1999 HKDL deal between the HKSAR 
government and Disney. After the Asian financial crisis, the HKDL project 
provided Hong Kong people with a dream—a dream of a “brighter future,” a dream 
of a city of excellence, and a dream of cultural distinctions. Even though David 
mentioned the economic benefits that HKDL might bring to Hong Kong, his main 
concern was about the sign value that Disneyland brought to Hong Kong:  
 
Disney’s choice of Hong Kong demonstrates that Hong Kong is still ahead 
of other Asian cities including Singapore and Shanghai; we are just behind 
Japan in Asia. We are good enough and professional enough to meet the 
Disney standard. We should be proud of ourselves.  
 
David, as a news-program director, did not reap immediate benefits (such as more 
job opportunities) from the HKDL project. He was delighted about the joint-venture 
project because he, as a Hong Kong resident, felt proud of the city status of Hong 
Kong. To him, the sign value that HKDL brought to Hong Kong was not future 
economic benefits but cultural distinctions. That is, in cultural terms, Hong Kong 
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people could make use of HKDL as a cultural marker to reaffirm their own cultural 
validity and their own cultural distinctions. According to David, the Hong Kong 
people have had many strengths: an efficient administrative system, professional 
managerial ability, adherence to a code of conduct, bilingual and tri-dialect abilities, 
and knowledge of transnational idioms. These strengths, as well as others, earned 
Hong Kong the right to host the famous brand, Disneyland park. These strengths 
have stood in contrast to other big Asian and especially Chinese cities, which—
from this point of view—come across as inferior to Hong Kong in these matters.  
Not all Hong Kong people have been as enthusiastic and optimistic as David. 
When rumors spread that another Disneyland might be built in Shanghai right after 
the official announcement of the establishment of HKDL in 1999, Hong Kong 
people’s sense of cultural superiority immediately diminished; the millennium 
dream turned into a wishful daydream. As Cathy commented: 
 
If Hong Kong has HKDL, I beg Mr Tung (i.e., the ex-Chief Executive of the 
HKSAR government) not to be so generous that he’d let Shanghai have 
their own. It is good that Hong Kong has HKDL, but why is it also good for 
Shanghai to have one? Please go eat a banana! [meaning “Please go to 
hell”]…. Lee Kwan Yew said that, even after 50 years, there is no 
difference between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. I hope not. I hope that we 
are, in some way, superior to the Mainlanders. 
 
Although Cathy stated that HKDL should be good for Hong Kong’s economy, she 
voiced concern about the park’s future operations. Rather than treat the HKDL 
project as a dream mechanism by which Hong Kong can reassert its cultural 
distinctiveness and superiority, Cathy in the 2003 interview stated that the inept 
HKSAR government, in addition to exposing Hong Kong people to the lower 
cultural level of Mainlander and Macaunese visitors, would turn HKDL into 
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international shame. As a case in point, consider the following exchange between 
Cathy and me (Kim): 
 
Cathy: I am afraid either that HKDL will be like Paris Disneyland, which 
has attracted unimpressive numbers of people, or that the HKSAR 
government can’t manage it well and the park will quickly close its doors. 
It’s shameful. A shame…. It’s really shameful that HK people can’t manage 
well…. Besides, who will come to HKDL? Most visitors would probably be 
from South East Asia, but they may choose to go to Tokyo Disneyland. 
Then people visiting HKDL would be chiefly from Macau or the Mainland, 
and that means the park will get run down quickly. They will make the 
bathrooms very dirty. This summer I went to Changzhou, where the first 
dinosaur fossils were found. We went to a dinosaur theme park there. It 
should be very beautiful, and the models are to scale. But once you go to 
bathrooms, it is just appalling. There are too many people in the Mainland, 
and the quality of people varies. The more people who come, the more 
likely it’ll be that [HKDL] gets run down.  
Kim: So you are not optimistic about HKDL’s future? 
Cathy: No, I’m not, because the quality of Mainlanders’ culture is a lot 
lower than that of people in other countries. Who goes to the US park? 
Americans. Who goes to the Paris park? Europeans. You know, China, 
though developing rapidly, is still a developing country. In 20 years maybe, 
I mean, Mainlanders’ cultural quality may be up to a certain standard after 
20 years, but there are too many people. [It is] difficult to say. 
 
Although David and Cathy differed from each other regarding their views on 
HKDL’s future, their concerns over the park in relation to Hong Kong were similar. 
Each respondent stressed both the image of Hong Kong as a city and the superiority 
of Hong Kong people’s culture to Mainlanders’ culture. And the respondents 
discussed these issues in relation not to local economic development but to global 
city competition. The Hong Kong cultural identity that rests on cultural distinctions 
originated from colonial governance and, more recently, from intensifying global 
city competition. Competition, not interaction, is the keyword for both David and 
Cathy. Since they both believe in the idea of “winner-takes-all,” this cultural idea 
affects the way they conceive neighboring cities in China as competitors of Hong 
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Kong in the globalized world. Not that these respondents detest Mainland China, 
but their concern over Hong Kong’s future is greater than their concern over other 
Chinese cities’ future, particularly under globalized city competition. 
This last point merits some emphasis. Hong Kong people’s depiction of 
Mainlanders as the Other is neither entirely denigrating nor entirely alienating; 
rather, Hong Kong people’s views on Mainlanders and on their “Chineseness” are 
entwined but contradictory. David’s self-identification as Heung Gong Yan or 
Chinese was shifting and situational; his job provided him an opportunity to 
communicate with Mainland professionals, and he enjoyed working with them. 
Cathy and Betty were proud to be Chinese; they fully agreed with the Handover and 
espoused Confucianism.16 Cathy had persuaded her son Adrian to enjoy the story of 
Sun Wukong, the Monkey King, in Journey to the West instead of Japanese 
animated cartoons because she espoused Confucianism and abhored Japanese 
militarism and the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong17; she enjoyed helping 
Mainland tourists and speaking in Putonghua in daily life. However, Cathy’s self-
identification as Chinese did not allay her suspicion that Mainlanders’ 
“Chineseness” remained far less modern than Hong Kong’s “Chineseness plus.”  
If we interpret respondents’ perspectives on Mainland Chinese in spatial and 
temporal terms, the respondents’ preferred subjectivity—the modernized subject 
who attaches importance to hygiene, public order, professionalism, and 
cosmopolitanism—is not simply a product of modern city life but a technology of 
discipline promoted by the colonial governance18 and by Western enterprises such 
as McDonald’s.19 Although respondents may identify as Chinese and embrace an 
aspect of Chinese culture, their association of development with human progress 
and self-discipline reflects a Eurocentric “modern” standard and becomes the chief 
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standard by which Hong Kong people evaluate themselves and the Other, the 
Mainlander, whom many Hong Kong people view as uncivilized or gauche.  
The entwined but contradictory social relationships between Hong Kong 
people and Mainlanders affect Hong Kong people’s spatial practices; in turn, these 
spatial practices generate new effects on social relationships. The HKSAR 
government and Disney projected that 33% of HKDL’s visitors would be 
Mainlanders. In other words, the expectation has been that HKDL will become a 
node where the unsettling Hongkongers-Mainlanders relationship will evolve and 
will articulate itself. Perhaps this expectation underlay Cathy’s ambivalent attitude 
toward the HKDL project. Some Hong Kong people are more explicit in their 
exclusionary attitude and practices toward Mainlanders. Lisa,20 a university public 
relations officer who worked as a journalist in the past, characterized her own 
reception of the HDKL project as “passive,” and she felt neither excitement nor 
hatred toward the HKDL project. Lisa had never visited any overseas Disneyland 
because, for her, visiting a theme park was a waste of time when she could stay in 
the host country only briefly. She said that if she would visit HKDL in the future, 
she would choose a weekend full of Hong Kong visitors instead of a Mainland 
holiday: in this way, she could escape from the flocking Mainland visitors. To visit 
or not to visit, and if the former, when to visit—these are emotional issues 
manifested as practical issues, but their latent content remains cultural. Consider 
Lisa’s specific remarks: 
 
When everything is settled, when everybody tries out all the rides and they 
are in order, and when the Mainland tourists do not flock to HKDL, we will 
then go. Let’s say Ocean Park. We went there during a holiday that is 
special in Hong Kong but not even celebrated in the Mainland. It’s not the 
Mainland’s Golden Week holiday. 
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These exclusionary practices are common among Hong Kong visitors to HKDL, 
and I further discuss these practices in chapter Seven, about practices inside HKDL. 
From Lisa’s comments, however, we can already see that spatial division results 
from not only institutional measures such as the regulation of immigration from the 
Mainland but also people’s everyday spatial practices. Many Hong Kong people 
cross the Hong Kong-Mainland boundary everyday,21 and Hong Kong people have 
many connections with China, for some of their relatives live there, but Pun and 
Wang’s study22 on both cross-boundary managers from Hong Kong and cross-
boundary blue-collar workers from Hong Kong states that most respondents 
resisted integrating into Mainland city life. In my interview with Sandy,23 a Hong 
Kong female boss of several Mainland factories producing Disney’s plush dolls, 
she made statements that were consistent with Pun and Wang’s study. Sandy lived 
in the Mainland most of the time and stayed in Hong Kong only during the Lunar 
New Year; she also planned to live in the Mainland after retirement. However, 
when I asked about her perception of her Mainland workers, she immediately threw 
the words out, “We Hong Kong people can never understand them.” Sandy 
employed several Mainland-born but Hong Kong-raised employees to help her 
manage the huge Mainland workforce. Living in Dongguan for more than ten years, 
Sandy’s good friends are all from Hong Kong. This example is just one of many in 
which spatial division results from everyday practices: rather than strive for 
integration, many Hong Kong people elevate themselves over the Other: the 
Mainlander.  
 
The Other and the international: the cosmopolitan dream 
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While treating Mainlanders and China as the Other, many of my respondents 
voiced little concern about the American-rooted but transnational Disney company. 
Before 2005, when HKDL became the target of a surge of negative news reports, 
five of my study’s thirty-nine respondents voiced displeasure with the HKDL 
project; and of these five, one respondent raised concerns about American cultural 
imperialism. It should be noted that, of the five respondents, two were from an anti-
Disney group Disney Hunter,24 another two were a couple,25 and the remaining 
respondent was a journalist.26 As for the thirty-four respondents who voiced no 
displeasure with the HKDL project, some (such as David) felt good about the 
project, others (such as Cathy and Betty) supported the deal but with various 
reservations, and, yet again, others (such as Lisa) voiced neutrality toward the 
project. Ap’s 2002 survey27 shows that 39% of respondents liked the “influence of 
American culture on HK society” and 40% were neutral.28 Hong Kong people did 
not pay particular attention to Disney or to American influence because American 
popular culture and Japanese popular culture had been prominent since the late 
1960s; today, the idea of American cultural imperialism is bizarre to many Hong 
Kong people. Besides, to my respondents, Disney is just one of the many cultural 
enterprises that market animated cartoons and merchandise. “Disney,” to some, was 
an import, a readymade product that Hong Kong people could use to demonstrate 
their ability to host a branded park: “Disney” was not a threatening imperialist 
forcing Hong Kong to open its market. To some others, Disneyland’s attraction lay 
in its otherness and foreignness. Many respondents who had visited a Disney park 
had enjoyed consuming the Disneyland fantasy. However, the fantasy extended 
beyond the sum of exotic Disney attractions and into the very geographical distance 
between the theme park and Hong Kong. Let us recall that Betty expressed no 
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particular enthusiasm for the HKDL project because a Disneyland trip, according to 
her, should be a means to consume an exotic and foreign fantasy; HKDL loses the 
allure of foreignness when the park is just next door. To live out their fantasies of 
foreign exoticism, some university graduates quit their jobs and worked as low-rank 
Disneyland cast members in Orlando, a strategy that applies pragmatic steps to the 
realization of the fantasy.  
In late 2004, about five hundred Hong Kong people (mostly university 
graduates in their early- or mid-twenties) became the first group of HKDL staff 
members and underwent six months of on-job training in Disney parks in Orlando. 
The new employees’ job title in Orlando was “cultural representative,” and they all 
needed to perform front-line operations instead of managerial work. I talked to ten 
HKDL workers, and five of them had worked as HKDL cultural representatives in 
Orlando before HKDL’s opening.29 All five HKDL cultural representatives had felt 
little interest in a job at Disneyland, had found the pay disappointing,30 and, for the 
most part, had never been Disney fans. Their reasons for working at Disney were 
quite similar: the global aspect of Disney. The respondents who had worked as 
cultural representatives in Orlando had treasured the chance to live in America for 
six months. While in high school, Olivia31 had visited Tokyo Disneyland with her 
family but had not found her park experiences particularly enchanting; indeed, her 
favorite cartoon character had long been Hello Kitty, a Japanese cartoon character 
created in 1974, and no Disney character. In light of these facts, I asked her why 
she had quit her relatively high-paying social work job to be a manual low-paid 
worker. She replied:  
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I hadn’t had experiences living and working in a foreign place and that’s 
why I took the job…. I had never been in any exchange program during my 
three-year university career, and thus, I found that I lacked something. I 
wanted to live with foreigners…. I didn’t like the job description, but I 
treated it as an exchange program. It was only about six months…. And I 
had graduated from the university only two year earlier, so I was still young, 
so why not go for it? … I also wanted to improve my spoken English. Mine 
is absolutely terrible. 
 
For HKDL-employee respondents who had had no chance to be cultural 
representatives, the global brand of Disney still exhibited a high sign value. 
Winnie32 was a graduate with a master’s degree. She had received several job offers, 
including one for a research-assistant position at a university, but she had opted for 
Disney. Winnie was enthusiastic about neither Disney nor America but expressed 
interest in working for a global company:  
 
If I were a fresh graduate, I think I would be happier. I am a grown up, and I 
do not have a good impression of the US, and therefore, I hesitated as to 
whether I should enter Disney, an American corporation. But since it is an 
MNC [multinational company], I took the job; and since I had studied 
media, Disney should be good.  
 
Another reason for these university graduates’ decision to work for Disney rested 
on their hope that their Disneyland work experience might give them a chance to 
change their career path. Some respondents, before working at the Disney company, 
had worked in other fields, including social work, computer sales, accounting, 
education, and tourism. Some respondents had many times applied for a job in the 
business field but had received not even an interview because of their academic 
background; some respondents had wanted to work for a famous marketing or 
advertising firm but their English-language abilities did not meet standards; some 
respondents stated that they felt bad about their previous job and that they wanted a 
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total change. Many of the respondents thought that the name recognition of 
“Disney” and that the American work experience significantly strengthened their 
curriculum vitae and significantly enhanced their cultural capital, which could 
facilitate their job-seeking prospects even further. Although they knew that their 
Disneyland job had nothing to do with managerial, marketing, or advertising work, 
some respondents hoped that they could get a transfer inside Disneyland if they 
stayed on there. These respondents’ reasons for accepting a Disneyland job can be 
seen as pragmatic, and the respondents’ cosmopolitan aspirations can be seen as 
pragmatic, too. In fact, Marx argues that cosmopolitanism is a logical move for 
bourgeoisie and a natural development in capitalism: 
 
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.33 
 
Aihwa Ong studied the “flexible citizenship”34 of the transnational middle-class 
Chinese and noted that this form of citizenship has been a response to the neoliberal 
globalized economy. It can be seen, also, as exemplifying Marx’s argument that the 
cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement induce subjects 
to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions 
(p. 6). To combine the study of everyday life and abstract political-economic forces 
together, Ong draws on Foucault’s “regime” analysis and argues two points: on the 
one hand, individuals and the state retool culture in conjunction with changing 
social and economic circumstances; on the other hand, people’s daily action is 
shaped by regulatory effects of cultural institutions, including family and state 
apparatuses, and these social conditions facilitate transnational practices. According 
to Ong, in critical studies of globalization, the most common conceptualization is 
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that they treat globalization as a totalizing abstract force that imposes itself on 
locals and constitutes cultural, social, and political changes. Ong problematizes this 
conceptualization by arguing that Chinese diasporas are the transnational agents 
who constitute the increased capital circulation in the globe. She refutes the now 
extensive literature predicating a triumphant Chinese capitalism grounded on 
essential cultural differences; rather, she emphasizes how global capital induces 
individuals to retool and reconceptualize their cultural logic to make their 
economic-based practices “thinkable, practicable, and desirable, which are 
embedded in processes of capital accumulation” (p. 5).  
Ong argues that overseas-Chinese communities have retooled both 
Confucian ideology and Chinese culture in several ways. First, the importance of 
Confucian social ethics has been replaced with the family-centered notion of 
Confucianism (p. 115); to raise the family’s class position based on capital 
accumulation, individuals (especially men) should study hard and abroad, shuttle 
around different places to gain financial prosperity without carrying emotional ties, 
allegiance, identification or commitment with any nationality defined by any states. 
Second, Ong’s rich Chinese-American respondents participated in high Western 
culture to build up cultural capital that might generate economic capital and 
legitimize their current “elite” status inside the American business hierarchy. Third, 
the elite transnational Chinese make use of Confucian ethics and guanxi (the 
prioritization of networking) to extend business opportunity (p. 116). Fourth, 
transnational Chinese selectively engage in “self-orientalism” (p. 81) to highlight 
essential Chinese values such as diligence and family-oriented values to express 
both “Confucian cultural triumphalism” (p. 135) and the “new Asian hegemony” in 
contrast to the decadent West (p. 82). Fifth, Ong’s respondents strategically use 
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states’ immigration policy to become a “nomadic subject” (p. 3) to maximize 
capital accumulation and to acquire citizenship. The changing family-based and 
economic-based instrumental Chinese culture, raised by the family regime, 
articulates (1) the market regime that encourages nomadic transnational practices 
and flexible accumulation and (2) the flexible state regime that redefines meaning 
of national citizenship in terms not of cultural homogeneity but of economic status 
to “compete more effectively in the global economy” (p. 130), all of which 
contribute to transnational capitalist formations. 
Ong attempts to problematize the essential cultural differences between 
Western and Chinese culture by placing importance on individual agency and 
everyday life practices in the globalization process. However, Southeast Asia’s 
changing state policies and transnational Chinese communities’ changing cultural 
practices (“flexible citizenship”) are a response to changing global capitalism. In 
other words, capital accumulation is still the most important goal for both 
individuals and states in Ong’s analysis. Ong assumes either market force is 
irresistible,35 or she essentializes culture as capital-driven. Both arguments identify 
capital accumulation as the primary and ultimate aim and the source of social 
transformations, and both run the risk of economic reductionism, of viewing 
cultural specificities and subjectivities as a subordinate instead of as an autonomous 
domain subsumed into economic circumstances, in this case, the globalized 
economy. 
Certainly, my HKDL cultural representative respondents who yearned to go 
abroad are significantly different from Ong’s rich Chinese diasporics. However, the 
participation and active involvement of both groups in Western culture seems to be 
based in economic practices: where Ong’s respondents used Western high culture 
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to legitimize their privileged economic position, my respondents were attempting to 
develop Western cultural sensitivity to enhance their competitiveness in the job 
market. In my study of university graduates’ decisions to work in Disney, their 
decisions appear to be pragmatic and for strategic ends (to change a career path or 
to acquire cultural capital such as cosmopolitan sensitivity and English proficiency); 
however, it is too far fetched to interpret their self-conscious acts as aiming only at 
capital accumulation. 
When I asked Winnie why she was obsessed with working for multinational 
companies, she told me that, most of her life, she had yearned to study abroad but 
that her family could not support her financially. In the past, Winnie had worked at 
Nike for a summer and had enjoyed working there because she wanted to acquire 
cosmopolitan attributes, as she herself noted:  
 
I think Hong Kong is a very small place where my views and my exposure 
are very limited. Perhaps what I can do in foreign places is insignificant, but 
at least I can see more. I want to be a cosmopolitan person. I want to see 
more and experience more; then, maybe I would settle down in a small 
place. When I was young, I would have killed to study overseas, but I had 
no money. So, working at an MNC has been my goal, and Disney is an 
MNC.  
 
Surprisingly, Winnie quit the HKDL job and became a volunteer student helper at a 
famous annual graphic-design conference held by ACM SIGGRAPH, the 
Association for Computing Machinery’s Special Interest Group on Graphics and 
Interactive Techniques, in California. Her decision to leave Disney and to accept 
the new position hinged on her strong belief that she could meet more interesting 
people at the SIGGRAPH conference than at the Disney park. After the conference, 
Winnie came back to Hong Kong for a while, but then she found another job which 
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required her to work in Holland for a research project on Hong Kong. Like Ong’s 
respondents, Winnie actively and opportunistically searched for chances to 
accumulate Western cultural capital, and Winnie similarly prioritized the 
importance of networking to achieve her dream to become a cosmopolitan. Unlike 
Ong’s respondents, however, Winnie’s pragmatic acts were not aimed at extending 
a business or developing a career opportunity but rather at broadening her views 
and experiences. 
Annie,36 another HKDL cultural representative in Orlando, studied finance 
at a university and took up the job of HKDL cultural representative after graduation. 
She provided answers similar to those of Winnie insofar as both Annie and Winnie 
stated that they found Hong Kong small and Hong Kong people short-sighted. 
Annie wanted to know and to experience what the world is. Annie participated in a 
university exchange program that enabled her to live in Hungary for a half year, and 
she applied for a position in the HKDL cultural-representative program because she 
did not like living in Hong Kong. The following exchange between Annie and me 
sheds light on her perspective: 
 
Annie: My Hungary experience is very special. I don’t like Hong Kong. I’d 
like to leave Hong Kong because it’s very small. Paris, Italy—I hope I can 
go to these places. I also find Hong Kong’s pace too fast for me. In Hungary, 
I lived with seven Taiwanese, and my Putonghua became so good. I was 
very happy when I was in Hungary. I was very excited to decorate the 
whole room. I learnt to be independent, to take care of myself, and to be 
confident. [When I left] I cried madly in the plane. I just didn’t want to 
come back. They [my friends] said I always smile after I came back.  
Kim: Why? 
Annie: Because I become more confident than before. And I have also 
found that I know more about what’s happening in the world. There’s 
distance between me and my classmates. When I was in Hungary, students 
talked about the effects that the establishment of the European Union had on 
the Italian lire, whereas Hong Kong students talk only about idols. After I 
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came back from Hungary, I found the Disney program, so I applied for it. I 
didn’t want a serious job at that time. I applied for the HKDL job because I 
didn’t know what to do after my return to HK. The life was so good there 
[in Orlando], we just earned money to go on a trip: St. Augustine, New 
York, Boston, Chicago, LA, San Diego, Las Vegas. I was very free in the 
US and the places I visited were beautiful, a hundred times more beautiful 
than HK. I’ve never thought that Orlando or the US is desolate. And 
Budapast is so convenient: subway, tram, bus, or walking. I love Europe 
more than the US...  
 
I conducted my interview with Annie in September 2006. A few days after our 
interview, Annie left Hong Kong in pursuit of her “world” dream again. She found 
a job in Canada and wanted to stay there at least for a couple of years. Annie 
participated in the Hungary exchange program and the HKDL cultural-
representative program not for capital accumulation but for self-development—she 
sought confidence, living skills, and a wider vision of her surroundings.  
Josephine,37 a committed HKDL staff member, had been a finance 
accountant for a year before she became a cultural representative in Orlando Disney 
parks. During her undergraduate years, she had joined a half-year exchange 
program to Canada. After a year of being an accountant, she grew depressed, as she 
found herself constantly in the office. She wanted to find a job working outside the 
office, meeting people of various backgrounds and facing unexpected events. She 
took up the Disney job in Orlando, for she thought that it would not create any 
adverse effect on her accountant career; which is to say, she took the Disney job as 
a short-term break from her long-term accountant career. However, after six months 
of operations work in Orlando, Josephine firmly believed that her previous career 
choice of being an accountant was the worst decision she had ever made in her life. 
I asked her what she treasured most from her work experiences in the Orlando park: 
her answer centered on neither career stability nor career advancement but the 
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opportunity to meet different people everyday. Further, Josephine’s cosmopolitan 
aspiration was not limited to Western first-world countries. Because Josephine 
enjoyed working in HKDL, I asked her whether she would work there for a long 
time. She immediately shook her head back and forth and said bluntly, “no.” She 
then expanded on her one-word answer:  
 
I am the kind of person who likes going out to see the wider world. Working 
at the same company for a long time will limit my view of the world, even 
though the company may be very big. However, I will stay on if I will be 
sent to Shanghai to help open the park, because that would give me a chance 
to work with Mainlanders and learn how they do things. 
 
Here I would like to argue that cosmopolitan aspirations need neither derive from 
an instrumentalist mindset nor constitute a pursuit of capital accumulation; even if 
the respondent held an instrumentalist mindset in which the HKDL job was a 
means to capital accumulation (including cultural capital such as the acquisition of 
fluent spoken English), the concrete living experiences in Orlando might produce 
unexpected effects.  
Olivia, as I mentioned in the beginning of this section, had been a social 
worker for almost two years before working as a Disney cultural representative in 
Orlando in 2004. She had wanted to live in a foreign country but had had no chance 
to do so during her undergraduate years. Moreover, Olivia had thought that the 
brand “Disney” had a certain market value; bearing her Disney and American work 
experience, her curriculum vitae would grow significantly stronger as an asset that 
would help her develop a business career; if she stayed on at HKDL for several 
years, she might receive a promotion to the junior managerial level.38 English 
proficiency is another type of cultural capital that she wanted to acquire: “I also 
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want to polish my spoken English. Mine is absolutely terrible.” Compared with 
Josephine and Winnie, Olivia was highly pragmatic, highly strategic, and eager to 
acquire wealth in both economic terms and cultural terms. Just consider this 
conversation between Olivia and me: 
 
Kim: Where did you find the job? 
Olivia: The Career Times. And I applied. When I read the job details, I was 
not interested in the job, frankly speaking. 
Kim: What’s it about? 
Olivia: All operations are front line. It has different sections. It’s like 
primary school allocation… 
Kim: (laughs) 
Olivia: …and you fill in your priorities, ranging from 1 to 8: merchandising, 
restaurant. It describes clearly what you do, such as cashier work, cooking, 
fastfood, and so on. One is really bad, and I gave it a number 8, custody, 
and it tells you to do the cleaning. 
… 
Olivia: One of your questions is whether I will work in Hong Kong 
Disneyland after coming back. It highly depends on what benefits it gives 
me and the nature of the job. What I demand is stability. I need my boss to 
treat me well…. I would like to develop my career in the business field, but 
my background is not that relevant, and that’s why I would like to see what 
I can get from working in Disneyland. I would also like to know what 
management is. If you ask me to work as a frontline worker for three years, 
of course I won’t do it. If it treats me very well, I don’t rule out that I may 
work at this job for the rest of my life. Therefore, it depends on Disney’s 
offer. 
 
As I have just noted, an employee’s pragmatic strategizing in their American 
Disney job can undergo unexpected cultural effects, including self reflection and 
personal transformation produced during everyday cultural interaction. In fact, 
these effects can encourage the employee to question even the initial aim of capital 
accumulation. Consider, for example, the discrepancies between the conversations 
that Olivia and I had before her Orlando experiences and the conversations that we 
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had afterward. Although Olivia treated the US trip as an exchange program, she 
placed greater emphasis on her efforts to improve her English and to change her job 
from social work to business, especially business management. After her return to 
Hong Kong, I conducted another interview with her, this time in August 2005. 
When I asked her to evaluate the US trip, she stated that the aim of the trip had 
changed:  
 
Kim: How do you evaluate your US Disney trip?  
Olivia: How do I evaluate it?…hmm…I haven’t lost anything. No loss. My 
purpose was very clear and I got what I wanted. Some people felt bad about 
joining this program because Disney doesn’t treat you well and Disney 
didn’t offer what they promised before the trip, such as rewarding your 
work experience and offering you a promotion. People are angry about it. 
That’s not my style. Instead, I appreciate the chance to play around and to 
live in the US and to get to know US lifestyles. My purpose was to try 
something I hadn’t tried before.  
Kim: You mean, you made foreign friends, and you could experience living 
in the US? 
Olivia: And I also had my US trip, I went to many US cities: L.A., St. 
Augustine, Key West, New York, and so on. I treated the Disney trip as an 
exchange, I exchanged my work for my journey, and I got what I wanted. 
 
In the above dialogue, Olivia did not mention polishing her spoken English or 
changing her career. Before going to Orlando, Olivia mentioned that she wanted to 
work in business management. After the Orlando trip, Olivia preferred working on 
a part-time basis so that she would have more time for everyday-life reflection. She 
increasingly realized that she might not be suitable for work in the business field: 
  
Kim: So, overall, you’re positive about your US trip? 
Olivia: Yes, positive. I didn’t come out of it with less that I’d had at the start. 
Even in terms of salary, I didn’t lose much. 
Kim: How much exactly did you earn each month in the US? 
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Olivia: Depends on if you worked hard. I generally could work only about 
30 hours. But I also worked about 50 hours on occasion. I could cover only 
the rent. Ha, ha … In Hong Kong, of course, my salary is lower than before, 
but the pressure of my previous job was a lot greater. Now, the job is task-
based. You know, tomorrow is another day. If you asked me to choose, I’d 
prefer staying in Orlando. I had more space for myself, more time for self-
reflection. I don’t know whether or not I am a very business-oriented or 
target-oriented person. My friends and teachers think that I am aggressive 
and am suitable for work in the business field, but I now feel that I am not 
suitable to be a strong business woman. 
Kim: Or you don’t like being a business woman? 
Olivia: Yes, you are right. I can do business: I can manage people, I can 
plan ahead, and I can be aggressive and competitive. But I don’t want to do 
these things now. In fact, I want to be a secretary. I just do what you tell me 
to do. I will do best what you tell me to do, but please don’t ask me to think 
what to do. 
 
Olivia realized that she was not the person that she had thought she was: a target-
oriented, career-oriented, and aggressive person working in the business field. The 
above conversation echoes what she wrote on her blog39 when she was in Orlando: 
 
Life is short 
Humans always chase something abstract and think it is important 
[I must] enjoy life 
[I’ve] decided after several years 
to leave the work place 
to have a long vacation 
to feel life 
to feel tranquility and the time to talk to myself 
I will remember the words I said to myself 
I don’t like the hardworking person I am in Hong Kong 
Love staying here 
This kind of life lets me have time to reflect on life 
Part-time work allows me to have more space to broaden my personal space 
No competition 
I just want stability and life  
I once believed that ambition was important to one’s life 
but I don’t like competition anymore 
I’d love to have good relationship with colleagues 
I don’t think that my change is out of laziness 
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Olivia’s changing self-awareness can be traced back to the cultural conflicts and, 
indeed, the culture shock that she experienced everyday in Orlando. It was Olivia’s 
curiosity regarding the practices of the Orlando Disney parks’ visitors that first 
triggered changes in her self-awareness, which was both critical and reflective of 
cultural discourses. She had visited Tokyo Disneyland in the past; and on that trip, 
she and her friends would first plan an itinerary so that they could participate in as 
many attractions as possible. Consequently, the trip had been hasty. However, in 
the United States, she found that the most American guests did not plan an itinerary 
and that they sometimes only strolled around. In her blog, she wrote, 
 
They [US guests] take everything in stride … they pay so much to visit the 
park, but they don’t make any plan before the visit. They just feel free. 
Compared with them, we are so calculating that we must play as many rides 
as possible. I should learn from them, learn to relax, like people all around 
here. Sometimes I thought that, once I paid for a park visit, I would have to 
play hard. But they [US guests] can really give the feeling of being on a 
vacation because of their relaxed attitude. It [consuming the park in a 
leisurely way] is worth the cost of admission.     
 
By meeting and working with people of different personalities and by experiencing 
cultural differences and conflicts, Olivia also gradually changed her own 
personality in regard to interpersonal conflict: whereas in the past, she would be 
critical of others, she would now reflect on the roles that both her own personality 
and her own cultural values played in creating these conflicts. During the first few 
weeks of her work, Olivia had found it difficult to communicate with some black 
colleagues because of their different English accent and because of their bad 
tempers; she once cried in front of her white colleagues after being scorned by two 
black colleagues. A few weeks later, she asked her black colleague to make two 
breakfasts for guests; finding him unresponsive to her request and feeling anxious 
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about the task at hand, Olivia said, “I’ll do it myself.” Her colleague then replied, 
“Calm down.” Olivia then understood that her value and practices of “efficiency” 
caused her trouble. She recounted the event and her response to it in her blog: 
 
He said he was getting ready to do it … he asked me to calm down 
That got me thinking 
Actually … I always use my own standards to judge others 
I demand of myself that I work fast and well 
To a certain extent, I demand that my colleagues approximate my work 
standards 
I have to learn not to use my own standards to judge others  
 
During her stay, Olivia also discovered that her ideas about Mainland Chinese were 
one-sided. Before her American trip, she sometimes went to Shenzhen to relax and 
shop; yet she rarely communicated with local people. She noticed an official notice 
that was posted in a Shenzhen subway and that read, “Please wait politely.” At that 
time, she commented to herself that Mainlanders should review their queuing 
behavior. Later, in Orlando, she met cultural representatives from Beijing 
University and Tsing Hua University and found these students to be brilliant and 
cultured: 
 
We then went to the home of a Hunan colleague, Emily 
Wow …….. it’s … such … a … big… house ……. 
… 
The dinner opened my eyes 
They talked about buying the house, applying for the visa, how to use gas to 
produce electricity, Chinese history, the GRE, TOEFL, etc. 
Although I could understand only 60% of their Putonghua 
I found I learned a lot 
Well …… Beijing University or Tsing Hua University students are not 
simple 
HK’s university students … couldn’t keep up with them 
This dinner has made me reflect on my views of Mainlanders 
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Olivia also changed her attitudes toward some places. Initially, Olivia did not plan 
to go on many trips while working in Orlando, but she followed others and visited 
many cities including St. Augustine, San Diego, Los Angeles, New York, and 
Washington D.C., as I mentioned earlier. Her trips changed her attitude toward Los 
Angeles, for example: 
 
I don’t quite like LA…. In the past, I thought LA is a prosperous metropolis  
but indeed it’s quite rough and backward 
There are many old buildings where nobody lives   
It’s like no one lives in the whole city 
San Diego feels more prosperous 
We even equate LA with some Mainland cities: LA is fading 
 
Her imaginary of the first-world United States underwent changes during and 
because of her short-stay in the country—the United States was not as prosperous, 
technologically advanced, safe, and health-conscious as she had once thought. On 
one occasion, she wondered whether or not the strawberries she was eating in a 
restaurant were fake!  
In summary, the experiences that Olivia underwent during her six-month 
stay in Orlando fall into one of three categories: people of different ethnicity, places, 
and herself. Olivia liked to plan everything and control the results (she took the 
Disney job to improve her English, to enhance her transnational capital, and finally 
to strengthen her prospects of finding a good business job); she had liked to 
compete with colleagues, had received attention from superiors, and had earned 
promotions—but she wanted to transform herself because she found that being 
competitive is not the only path that one must follow in a career. Her experiences in 
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Orlando critically changed her wants and her values. In place of career 
advancement (or, in Ong’s term, capital accumulation), Olivia now wanted to relax, 
to experience life, and to learn to face cultural differences. Her everyday 
experiences in Orlando—culture shock and thus self-reflection and self-
transformation—apparently clashed with her earlier instrumental intentions of 
career advancement and capital accumulation. Olivia had wanted to stay in the 
United States, and during her stay, an American colleague who knew of her desire 
to staying there offered to marry her, but she stated in her blog that she refused to 
marry the man for a green card. Perhaps, Olivia’s American colleague saw Chinese 
culture as hardworking and family-oriented, a view that conforms to Ong’s 
argument about the essentialization of Chinese culture in terms of triumphant 
Chinese capitalism. And perhaps, he also essentialized Chinese people as having an 
obsession to acquire capital, such as US residence. Is it true that, by and large, 
Chinese or transnational Chinese obsessively strive to acquire capital, and if so, 
why? In her related analysis, Ong does not give us an answer. What we are left with, 
then, is the understanding that, under capitalist economy, the cultural logic of 
transnational Chinese culture might rest on capital accumulation. And the obsession 
with capital acquisition, as Ong proposes, is like another prevalent discourse about 
Chinese in American society.  
Although culture is changing to adapt to changing social, political, and 
economic circumstances, culture is also sufficiently powerful to induce subjects to 
use it to formulate and to examine their lives under particular contexts. 
Exemplifying this process is the case of Olivia. She changed some of her 
conceptions of place, other people, and self. Here I do not mean that Olivia 
abandoned pragmatism and whole-heartedly embraced free-spiritedness. In our 
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conversation after her return from Orlando to Hong Kong, I asked her to evaluate 
her American-Disney experience, and Olivia’s first reply was, “I haven’t lost 
anything” (p. 183), and she added, “I exchanged my work for my journey, and I got 
what I wanted” (p. 183). When I asked her again if she evaluated her American trip 
as positive, Olivia gave me a similar answer: “I didn’t come out of it with less that 
I’d had at the start” (p. 183). Pragmatism still shaped Olivia’s evaluation of her 
American trip; this pragmatic mindset functioned in contestation with discourses 
emphasizing freedom, positive interpersonal relationships, and self-reflection. The 
critical point not only in Olivia’s case but indeed throughout this thesis is that a 
person’s particular action reflects the contestation of different perspectives, which 
takes place in a particular context. Whereas Ong treats diasporic Chinese 
transnational culture as an instrumental tool transformed and conditioned by global 
economic forces, I treat respondents’ pragmatic move to work both for Disney and 
in America as a produced desire and even a regulated response to the various and 
intersecting institutional practices and structure: Hong Kong as a city is too small to 
accommodate youths’ adventurous spirit; state propaganda encourages citizens to 
be cosmopolitan, nationalist, enterprising subjects40; recent university policy 
encourages students to participate in foreign exchange during their three- to four-
year undergraduate studies; and big companies prefer to employ university students 
who have foreign-living experience.  
 
Conclusion 
In analyzing Hong Kong people’s cultural identity, scholars such as Lau Siu Kai 
with his concept of “utilitarian familism”41 and Ong with her “flexible citizenship” 
reinforce the assertion that Hong Kong people are “economic animals” who are 
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interested only in costs, returns, and efficiency for family advancement. Other 
scholars who are critical of HKSAR governance, on the other hand, argue that the 
HKSAR government actively promotes this assertion by constructing Hong Kong 
people as “enterprising individuals” who are “always on the lookout for resources 
and new opportunities to enhance their income, power, life chances and quality of 
life in order to take advantage of the rapid changes of economy and society.”42 In 
the case of the HKDL project, Joseph Man Chan43 researched the media’s 
circulation of related public discourse. To this end, he examined the opinion 
columns, editorials, and letter sections of several different types of newspapers and 
magazines: namely Ming Pao, Hong Kong Economic Daily, South China Morning 
Post, Apple Daily, Oriental Daily, Next Magazine, and East Weekly as they 
appeared between 1 November 1999 and 30 November 1999. According to his 
examination, the public discourse in these publications substantively addresses 
neither cultural imperialism nor resistance to this imperialism’s destructive effects. 
The dominant patterns of the public discourse concern accounting, costs and 
benefits, feasibility and fairness, and employment. Chan coins the term 
“economization of culture” in reference to the public discourse. Except for Ming 
Pao, the newspapers neglected the resistant voices of scholars and activists. Chan 
concludes that Disneyland is a symbol of cultural globalization, that this economic 
logic prevails in the midst of Hong Kong, and that the economic logic strengthens 
cultural globalization and weakens resistance voices. In short, the globalized 
economy so fiercely economizes Hong Kong culture that Hong Kong people, first, 
evaluate culture according to its economic value and, second, preserve only 
economically viable cultural elements. 
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In his re-narrativization of the issue of Hong Kong’s Handover, Fred Chiu 
argues that by Orientalizing and domesticating China as “the master Other,” 
academic discourse creates little room in which the one-country-two-systems idea 
can operate imaginatively. Chiu argues that journalists, as well, tend to represent 
the Handover in a binary way by concentrating on official British arguments and 
official PRC arguments. Together, these two arguments, or narratives, “formed the 
master narrative hegemonizing the populace, literally mastering the entire imagery 
of ‘Hong Kong’ as a fate, a destiny. No variation or any [sic] improvisation could 
be allowed to deviate from the tune of ‘Hong Kong’s way of life!’ or ‘Tomorrow 
will be better’!”44 In examining Hong Kong Disneyland in relation to Hong Kong 
people’s cultural identity, scholars may look for more possibilities and more 
imaginative and novel ways to discuss the relationships among culture, governance, 
and global economy. In other words, scholars may distance themselves from such 
grand theories as economization of culture, which itself subsumes culture under 
economic reductionist logic.      
The above study of people’s different views (expectations and worries) and 
uses of the HKDL project argues that, first, meanings of cultural material such as 
the meanings of HKDL should be seen as plural. Respondents appropriate these 
meanings in ways that continuously change the meanings, and these changes reflect 
adaptations to varied lives. Second, Hong Kong culture should be seen as plural and 
contesting. The HKSAR government’s characterization of Hong Kong people as 
enterprising, nationalistic, transnational subjects is one among many 
characterizations on the drawing board. On the symbolic level, some respondents 
such as David used HKDL as a cultural marker, a unifying power to reaffirm Hong 
Kong as a particular city-state apart from Mainland China. For David, HKDL was 
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not chiefly an important instrument for economic revitalization. Other respondents 
such as the young upwardly mobile university graduates appropriated the HKDL 
project according to their concrete everyday practices. These respondents sought to 
make their cosmopolitan dreams come true, and these cosmopolitan dreams were 
far more complex than the academic discourse prioritizing the economy-driven and 
opportunistic characteristics of Hong Kong people. 
Hong Kong culture has been embracing both China-based cultural learning 
(especially the learning of Putonghua) and internationalization. To a certain extent, 
economic forces may account for this embrace. However, we cannot then say that 
culture as a whole changes to adapt to economic forces. My study above shows that 
some Hong Kong people, though they call themselves Chinese, embrace Chinese 
culture, and speak Putonghua fluently, distinguish themselves from Mainland 
Chinese by identifying themselves as superior to Mainland Chinese. In ironic 
contrast, respondents who had faced the non-transparent HKSAR government-
Disney HKDL deal objected hardly at all to the role that Disney had been playing 
on the local-global stage. Most respondents stated that Western countries—not 
Chinese cities—were places for cultural enlightenment. Legislator Mandy Tam 
commissioned a research company to conduct a survey in April 2007 and found 
that, of 375 respondents, 62% were unwilling to work in the Mainland and only 
12% were positively willing to work in the Mainland.45 This hierarchical cultural 
global order has stemmed not solely from economic forces but also from available 
discourses that constrain the possibility that people will consider China an 
enlightening place. Colonial education, immigration laws, and economic 
development in the past helped Hong Kong people use lifestyle culture to place 
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themselves in categories different from—and superior to—the categories in which 
Hong Kong people placed Mainlanders.  
I argue that culture as a way of life should be seen as incoherent and be 
analyzed in various levels. If we adopt this approach, we can rigorously explain 
both Hong Kong people’s self-differentiation from Mainland Chinese and Hong 
Kong people’s increasing interest in China’s cultural capital. In examining Hong 
Kong local consciousness, Ng Chun Hung46 divides Hong Kong culture into four 
levels. The first level is tone and timbre and helps describe Hong Kong people’s 
daily expressions and practices, such as speaking loudly. The second level is 
common sense and helps explain Hong Kong people’s prioritization of studies and 
networking (guanxi). These types of common sense often accumulate over the 
course of many years of experience. The third level is ideological elements. For 
example, one type of ideology is any systematic body of knowledge that governs 
the arrangement of space. Thus, Chinese feng shui and Western interior design are 
two concrete ideologies. Moreover, ideologies can overlap with one another. For 
example, Hong Kong people can furnish their home according to feng shui and to a 
Western style at the same time. The fourth level is “systematic discourse.” 
Systematic discourse encourages and inclines subjects both to review history and to 
move ahead. Ng argues that three types of systematic discourse about Hong Kong 
local consciousness were circulating in the 1990s. The first type attributes Hong 
Kong’s economic success to Hong Kong’s big market and small government 
practices; the second type emphasizes the connection between Hong Kong and 
China, asking Hong Kong people to accept political and economic reality, and to 
embrace their Chinese national identity; the third type criticizes Hong Kong’s 
heavy reliance on a market economy reproducing social injustice.  
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Experiencing both their culture’s prioritization of cosmopolitanism and the 
growing China-Hong Kong economic integration, Hong Kong people who seek 
career advancement or career survival equip themselves with new cultural tools, 
such as fluency in Putonghua, sensitivity to Mainland cultures, and cosmopolitan 
attributes: all in all, a basic life strategy that has undergone recent changes in 
emphasis. However, changes in basic life strategy do not mean that individuals 
must change their life tone, their common sense, their ideology, or their systematic 
discourse. The acquisition of a Mainland dialect and of cosmopolitan sensitivity 
functions in line with Hong Kong people’s common-sense adaptability to changing 
social circumstances. However, Hong Kong people’s ideology-based privileging of 
Hong Kong culture over “Chineseness” can stay the same or change, depending on 
individuals’ self-reflection and actions.  
In addition to analyzing culture through a multi-level analysis, we should 
examine people’s various ways of using culture and how these ways affect 
individuals’ course of action and their self-perception. In my study, some 
respondents use culture in a defensive way: they use an existing cultural resource to 
direct their action. Even though social circumstances may undergo change and even 
though the changed social circumstances may change behavior, the content of 
cultural resources may undergo little change. David and Sandy had many chances 
to work with Mainlanders and had good relationships with them, but did not 
problematize their conception of homogeneous Mainlanders. On the other hand, 
some individuals such as Olivia use culture in a reflexive manner such that the use 
changes the ideological elements of her perception of the Other (the Chinese and 
the blacks) and even of her own self.47 Therefore, it would be a rush to judgment 
and an overgeneralization to say that global economic forces or structural changes 
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(such as the Handover in the case of Hong Kong) determine cultural changes in 
general; we need to exhume, identify, and examine the cultural elements that adapt 
to changes, the cultural elements that resist changes, and the political effects that 
result from this adaptation and this resistance.  
As I argued in chapter Three, the HKSAR government used HKDL as an 
icon to disarticulate the process of democratization during late colonial times, to 
disarticulate “Hong Kong way of life,”48 and to re-articulate the linkage between 
the “Western” consumption lifestyle supported by “Disney” and the Hong Kong 
way of life. The HKSAR government also used HKDL to distinguish Hong Kong 
from other Chinese cities. My study finds that the government’s discourse 
resonated with some respondents, who used the HKDL project as a cultural marker 
to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders. Besides, only five of thirty-nine 
respondents (and three are social activists) indicated their displeasures with the 
HKDL project and two criticized, in particular, the non-transparent, undemocratic 
practices that the HKSAR government applied to the public project. I must admit 
that citizens can use “cultural distinctions” in both a progressive way and a 
reactionary way: Hong Kong citizens can use their demands for transparent 
governance as a way to distinguish Hong Kong from China, but they may also use a 
consumption-based undemocratic HKDL to make the distinctions. Both of the ways 
may also indicate the Hong Kong people’s attachment to Hong Kong but have 
different effects on the people’s acts (to embrace the project or to resist it) and on 
local governance (to continue administration-led government or to pursue 
transparent democratic governance). 
In the following chapter, I will concentrate on parents’ pragmatic use of 
Disney merchandise as a way for the parents to achieve their cosmopolitan 
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aspirations for their children. Following the current chapter’s argument, I will argue 
that parents’ persistent use of Disney merchandise is not equivalent to their 
acceptance of Disney’s conception of family, child development, or morality. We 
have to consider respondents’ behavior from various perspectives to understand the 
behavior. I also argue that parents’ selective use of Disney and their parenting 
methods reinforce local hierarchical parent-child relationships, local class disparity, 
and the imbalance in power and status between globalizing Disney media and local 
popular culture. 
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Gong Yan (Hong Kong People), instead of a natural place-bound internal 
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governance. The local consciousness, however, becomes quite an exclusive cultural 
marker that Hong Kong people can use to distinguish themselves from Mainlanders. 
Gordon Mathews coins “Chineseness plus” to describe Hong Kong people’s 
entwining relationship with Chinese: Hong Kong people are ethnically Chinese but 
our cultural identity is more than Chinese. Hong Kong people are Chineseness plus 
Westernness, democracy, human rights, freedom, cosmopolitan consumer taste and 
knowledge, and wealth.  
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 In my study, I conducted interviews with thirty-nine people, including six children. 
Whenever I mention a respondent, I will introduce him or her individually in an 
endnote. 
9
 The idea is from Laura Desfor Edles, although my emphasis is different from hers. 
I emphasize more on articulation and intersection and less “a complex blend,” as 
used by Edles. See Laura Desfor Edles, Cultural Sociology in Practice 
(Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002), p. 69. 
10
 This chapter will explore respondents’ views on the HKDL project. These 
interviews were conducted before the opening of the park, and therefore, 
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respondents had not been adversely affected by all the later negative reports on 
HKDL. 
11
 Not all respondents in my study had gone to Disney parks. Among the thirty-nine 
respondents, sixteen had gone to Tokyo Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, Anaheim 
Disneyland, or Orlando’s Walt Disney World. Among these sixteen respondents, 
four were children who, at the time of my first interviews, were between the ages of 
four and eight. I did not ask the children questions about whether they supported 
the HKDL project.     
12
 These good memories include (1) the fun that respondents had had because of the 
attractions of the park, (2) the memories concerning friends or their children, and (3) 
the available Disney merchandise. Of twelve respondents (David, Cathy, Fred, 
Betty, Agnes, Katie, Ada, Judy, Ms Leung, Susanna, Olivia, and Winnie, not 
counting children) who had visited a Disney theme park, six respondents (David, 
Cathy, Fred, Betty, Agnes, and Katie) had visited more than one Disney park. 
Among these twelve respondents, six (David, Cathy, Betty, Agnes, Katie, and 
Susanna) expressed to me the excitement that they had felt during their first park 
visit, two (Fred and Ada) said that they had not chosen to visit Disneyland 
themselves but that they had visited for their wife (Cathy) and daughter (Angel) 
respectively. They had enjoyed their experiences in the park because their wife or 
daughter had enjoyed the park experiences. And the other four respondents (Judy, 
Winnie, Olivia, and Ms Leung) had not found Disney park particularly exciting, 
although they all said that the design and the color of the park had made them 
comfortable. Of twelve respondents, Judy was the only one visiting Tokyo 
Disneyland for business; she had worked as a reporter of a children’s magazine and 
had gone to Tokyo Disneyland to write a report on the park. 
13
 In 2002, I began conducting an ethnographic study of five middle class families 
with the aim of studying two topics: first, the parents’ approaches to the process of 
parenting, particularly in relation to family consumption of Disney products 
(including movies, merchandise, and theme parks), and second, their views on the 
HKDL project. I invited Cathy to be my respondent in 2003, because both she and 
her husband Fred worked in the film industry and because I thought that they might 
evaluate Disney movies differently from other parent respondents. Between 2003 
and 2006, I conducted four formal interviews and several phone talks about Disney 
with Cathy, Fred, and their son Adrian, who was age six in 2003. The first 
interview that I conducted in 2003 took place in a McDonald’s restaurant near her 
apartment. I asked Cathy, Fred, and Adrian for their views on Disney movies and 
characters. I held the second interview in Cathy’s home, and she showed me Disney 
merchandise that her family owns. I also witnessed what methods Cathy used to 
persuade Adrian not to watch television. In the second interview, Cathy told me 
about her ambivalent views on the HKDL project. I conducted a third interview 
with Cathy in a Chinese restaurant in 2004, about her parenting methods and what 
movies and television programs she allowed or did not allow her son to watch. In 
2006, I conducted a fourth interview with her in a restaurant near her office. This 
time, I asked her opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland after its first year in operation.  
14
 I conducted three interviews with Betty between 2005 and 2006. The first 
interview took place in May 2005. I had not known Betty before the interview. A 
common friend had introduced Betty to me. I invited Betty to be my respondent 
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because I realized that the middle class parents whom I interviewed were all first-
generation middle class members, that they all came from a relatively humble 
background. Because I wanted to examine whether there were differences between 
parents’ views on Disney because of their class background, I intentionally 
searched for second generation middle class parents who would be my respondents. 
However, the search was difficult because my acquaintances who were second-
generation middle class members had not raised children; those parents whom I 
knew and who had children between the ages of five and ten were first-generation 
middle class. Betty’s father had come to Hong Kong from Shanghai in the 1950s 
and had worked as an accountant in Hong Kong. She had lived in Happy Valley, a 
place for affluent Hong Kong people, before she had married; at the time of the 
interview, she lived in Shatin. Betty was a high school teacher teaching English in a 
famous girls school on Hong Kong Island. She therefore was concerned with her 
son Henry’s English. I will discuss this issue in chapter Five, which concerns 
family consumption of Disney offerings. 
15
 In 1994, I worked as a daily-news production assistant at a local TV station, and 
David was a senior program director there who was responsible for operating live 
newscast, preparing news presentations, and working with the graphic department 
in designing visuals presented in the newscast. Before starting my PhD thesis, in 
1999, we had casual chats on the HKDL project, and I remember the excitement on 
his face as he described his design for a story about the completion of the HKSAR 
government-Disney joint venture. After I started my PhD study in October 2001, I 
invited David to be one of my respondents, and he kindly accepted my offer. 
Between 2001 and 2006, I held three formal interviews with him: one in his 
apartment, one in a restaurant, and one in my apartment in December 2002, 
December 2005, and December 2006 respectively. In the first interview, I focused 
on his exposure to Disney offerings and his views on the joint venture; the second 
interview was about his four Disneyland trips and his views on the negative news 
coverage of HKDL during the early period of the park’s operation; the third 
interview focused on his views on Hong Kong Disneyland after the park had been 
open for a year and on his comparison of various Disneyland parks—the Magic 
Kingdom in Orlando, Tokyo Disneyland, and Hong Kong Disneyland.      
16
 Cathy espoused Confucianism because it asks people not to be too radical but to 
take a middle-of-the-road stance, whereas Betty embraced Confucianism for its 
emphasis on propriety, righteousness, trustworthiness, and benevolence.  
17
 The period of Japanese occupation has often been represented as the dark ages of 
Hong Kong history. The Hong Kong Museum of History has eight permanent 
galleries narrating “The Hong Kong Story”; gallery 7 is about Japanese occupation. 
See Hong Kong Museum of History, unknown, “‘The Hong Kong Story’ 
Exhibition Materials,” Hong Kong Museum of History, 
http://www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/Museum/History/download/the_hk_story_exhibition_m
aterials_e.pdf (accessed 17 September 2006), p. 71.  
18
 Starting in 1948, the colonial government launched the campaign “Keep Hong 
Kong Clean.” In the beginning, the campaign was a two-week clean-up operation 
carried out across the territory each year. In the 1970s, the campaign extended its 
strategies from the distributing of poster and leaflets to the broadcasting of 
programs on television and radio, the use of mega posters on public transportation 
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and on the exterior of buildings, and the use of popular stars and artists such as Sam 
Hui, Josephine Siao, and Lydia Shum Din Ha for promotion. See Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Government, “Clean Hong Kong History,” Food 
and Environmental Hygiene Department, 
http://www.fehd.gov.hk/pleasant_environment/chk/index.html (accessed 16 May 
2005). 
19
 James Watson argues that McDonald’s socializes people of different parts of the 
world to develop consumer discipline. In Hong Kong, queuing for services was not 
a common practice until the mid seventies and McDonald’s has the distinction of 
introducing the queue to Hong Kong customers. In Moscow, McDonald’s 
employees distributed information sheets to teach customers the process of ordering 
food, including the custom of standing in line. See James Watson, “Introduction: 
Transnationalism, localization, and fast foods in East Asia,” in Golden Arches East: 
McDonald’s in East Asia, edited by Watson (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 27-9.  
20
 Lisa worked as an English-language journalist and later changed careers to be a 
communication officer at a university. I conducted formal interviews with Lisa four 
times between 2005 and 2006. The first interview took place in a restaurant near 
Lisa’s office. I interviewed her about her exposure to Disney offerings in the past 
and about her views on the HKDL project. I conducted the second interview in 
Lisa’s home. I interviewed her views on Disney and Disney merchandise and her 
parenting methods. I also talked to her two daughters, Dorothy and Stephanie, 
about their likes and dislikes of Disney characters. Because Stephanie was only 
three years old in 2005, I talked more to Dorothy. In the first interview, because 
Lisa did not want her daughters disrupting our interview, she showed them The 
Lion King and I had a chance to observe how the two young girls watched The Lion 
King together. During the second interview, Lisa also demonstrated how she used 
Disney’s World of English every night, which will be discussed in chapter Five. I 
conducted the other two interviews in a restaurant near Lisa’s office. The third 
interview took place in early 2006 because she had visited HKDL in Christmas 
2005 and had enjoyed the park experience. After one year’s operation of HKDL, I 
interviewed Lisa again about her views on the negative portrayal of HKDL in the 
press. 
21
 According to the Planning Department survey “Cross-boundary Travel Survey 
2001,” Cross-boundary passenger trips have risen sharply from 36.9 million in 
1990 to 116.6 million in 2001; on average, there are some 333,000 daily trips 
(whether departures or arrivals). See Planning Department (HKSAR), 2001, 
“Cross-boundary Travel Survey 2001,” Planning Department (HKSAR), 
http://www.pland.gov.hk/p_study/comp_s/travel01/xbts_e.htm (accessed 19 
September 2006), 1. introduction and 2.1 daily flows. 
22
 潘毅 and 黃洪, “跨境空間：在中國大陸工作的香港人的階級政治和身份認
同,” in 香港．文化．研究, edited by 吳俊雄, 馬傑偉, and 呂大樂 (香港: 香港大
學出版社, 2006), pp. 233-55. 
23
 I did not know Sandy personally before my interview with her. Sandy was 
introduced to me by my friend who told me that Sandy owned a factory producing 
Disney character plush dolls. I conducted an interview with her in February 2006. 
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At that time, HKDL had already been open for five months, and I asked her for her 
views on HKDL and on her working relationship with the Disney company. Sandy 
had not visited any Disney parks, including HKDL. In the interview, I asked Sandy 
whether or not she had supported the HKDL project in 1999, and she replied that 
she certainly had supported the project and that, in 1999, she had believed that 
HKDL could bring her more business. However, she found her assessment was 
wrong because after HKDL opened in 2005, Disney characters in Hong Kong did 
not become more popular and her licensee did not request that her company 
produce more products. 
24
 I interviewed Susanna and Billy in February 2006 individually. Before joining 
the local anti-Disney group Disney Hunter established in June 2005, Susanna was 
the executive member of Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students in the past 
and an active member in a university labor concern group. Billy was a chairperson 
of the Hong Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee and university 
student union representative in 2006. I interviewed Susanna and Billy because both 
love Disney characters; Susanna likes Belle in Beauty and the Beast and Winnie the 
Pooh, and Billy has been loving Mickey since he was about five. With permission, I 
use their real names instead of pseudonyms in the thesis. I will further discuss their 
views on Disney in chapter Seven. 
25
 This couple is Judy and Jacob. In the interview in 2002, it was Jacob raising the 
issue of American cultural imperialism. They have a boy Leo who was seven years 
old in 2002. I met Judy in 22 March 1994 in a protest fighting for the amendment of 
the New Territories Ordinance, which restricted women having inheritance right. 
Judy is a freelance writer. She has published a book about everyday practices of a 
nurse (her husband) in an emergency room in public hospital. She now writes for 
in-flight magazine in a regular basis and works as a part-time research assistant in 
university. I had my first interview with Judy, Jacob, and Leo respectively in their 
home in 2002 and I asked their views on Disney movies, merchandise, and their 
views on the HKDL project. After the first interview, I conducted two formal 
interviews, one with Judy, and another with Judy and Jacob about their parenting 
methods in 2004, and the last formal interview was held in 2006 about Judy’s views 
on HKDL after it opened in September 2005. I also did baby-sitting for Judy so that 
I had several chances to watch movies with Leo, to talk to him in a shopping mall 
and in his school, seeing how he interacts with his classmates.   
26
 I did not know Sammie personally before I interviewed her. After reading a news 
reportage by Sammie, I asked my journalist friend to invite Sammie to be my 
respondent and she kindly accepted my invitation. I interviewed Sammie in October 
2006 and with several follow-up phone talks. In the interview, I asked her questions, 
most of which concerned one of four main issues: (1) how she had developed the 
news story, (2) how her encounter with Disney staff members had affected the 
story’s content, (3) her perception of Disney and HKDL, and (4) whether or not the 
relationship between reporters and HKDL public relations was improving. On 
another occasion, this time in April 2007, I asked Edith to share her Orlando 
experiences with my students; she again kindly accepted my invitation. Sammie 
told me that while she was studying journalism in university, she also took a few 
courses concerning the power of global companies. Although she did not 
particularly abhor the Walt Disney Company, she was concerned about Disney’s 
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power in the globe. Because Sammie’s company prohibited unauthorized 
interviews with staff members, the name ‘Sammie’ is a pseudonym. To protect 
confidentiality, I also withhold the name of the media company for which Sammie 
worked.    
27
 John Ap, “Residents’ Opinions of Hong Kong Disneyland” (HK, press embargo: 
2002), 20 December 2002, p. 2. 
28
 Interestingly, in my study, two respondents’ first experience of a Disney park 
was Japan’s instead of America’s because they had visited only Tokyo Disneyland. 
29
 These five cultural representatives are Josephine, Olivia, Richard, Pat, and Annie. 
These people, before becoming HKDL cultural representatives, worked in diverse 
fields or had just finished their university or college studies. Olivia had been a 
social worker for two years; Josephine had worked as a finance accountant for a 
year; Richard had been a computer salesperson; Pat had been a tourist guide; and 
Annie was a fresh graduate from a university’s finance-studies program.  
30
 The minimum working hours for a cultural representative is thirty hours per week 
and the hourly pay is US$6.70. Cultural representatives can work ten additional 
hours to get overtime pay, which is 1.5 times the normal hourly pay. They live in 
same-sex dormitories where strict rules govern behavior. For example, visitors of 
the opposite sex can visit only during a certain period of time and the dormitory 
closes at midnight.  
31
 I had known Olivia since December 2004; that is, before she went to Orlando to 
become an HKDL cultural representative. Before working at HKDL, Olivia had 
been a social worker for two years. I conducted three formal interviews with Olivia, 
the first one took place in a restaurant in January 2005 and concerned her exposure 
to Disney offerings and her role as an HKDL cultural representative in Orlando. 
Before HKDL officially opened in September 2005, I conducted the second formal 
interview at my home and asked her about her experiences in Orlando. Because 
there was dissatisfaction among cultural representatives and some cultural 
representatives had written criticisms on on-line forums, I asked Olivia to evaluate 
these criticisms. The third interview took place again in my home in December 
2005. I asked her to compare the similarities and the differences between working 
at Disneyland in Orlando and working at Disneyland in Hong Kong, and I also 
asked her to evaluate critical comments made by scholars and activities held by an 
anti-Disney group, Disney Hunter. 
32
 I conducted one interview with Winnie in May 2005. At the time, she had already 
quit her HKDL job and was waiting to go to a San Francisco conference, at which 
she would work as a student helper. In the interview, I asked her about her interest 
in the HKDL job, about her training, and about her decision to quit the job. 
33
 Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, the Revolutions of 1848: Political 
Writings, Vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 71, emphasis added.  
34
 Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999). Further references are in parentheses 
in the text. 
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35
 In Ong’s words, “Despite the claims of some American scholars and policy 
makers that the emergence of the Pacific Rim powers heralds an irreducible cultural 
division between East and West, these parallel narratives, I argue, disguise common 
civilizational references in a world where the market is absolutely transcendental.” 
Ong, Flexible Citizenship, p. 7. 
36
 Annie is another cultural representative whom I met in September 2006. I made 
her acquaintance about six months after Annie had quit the HKDL job. The 
snowballing method enabled me to make Annie’s acquaintance; that is, another 
HKDL employee introduced Annie to me for an interview. After the interview, 
Annie left Hong Kong, and we wrote each other through e-mail to keep in touch. 
37
 I conducted my first formal interview with Josephine in June 2006 at a restaurant. 
In the first interview, Josephine shared with me her reasons for taking the job of 
cultural representative, her work experiences in both Orlando and Hong Kong, and 
HKDL’s changing media policy. After that, I conducted three interviews with her 
over the phone in October and December 2006 and in February 2007 respectively. 
The second interview concerned the management culture and the relationships 
among workers inside HKDL; the third interview concerned the details of the work 
environment (such as the size of the break room) in HKDL; the fourth interview 
concerned her recent HKDL work experiences. In August 2006, I visited the park, 
where I observed how she worked.  
38
 This was a promise that Olivia got from HKDL management at the opening 
reception. Here, ‘managerial level’ means supervisory role. 
39
 As I mentioned in the introduction chapter, Olivia had a habit of writing in a blog 
to express her feelings toward daily life. She gave me her blog address so that I 
could gain some insight into her thoughts about her life in Orlando. In her blog, 
Olivia usually did not write in paragraph form and seldom used punctuation marks, 
except ellipses. If the ellipsis is used within a paragraph, it is used by Olivia and it 
does not mean that I have abridged her writing. If I abridge her writing, I open a 
new paragraph and use the ellipsis to indicate that I cut some parts of the content 
from her blog. 
40
 As I mentioned in chapter Three, starting from 2004, the government launched a 
series of civic-education advertising campaigns that appeared throughout Hong 
Kong and that bore the title “The heart is tied to the home country; ambition looks 
out on the world.” The quote is an embellished translation from Chinese, “心繫家
國, 志在四方.”  
41
 Lau Siu Kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1982), pp. 72-4. 
42
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Kong,” in Remaking Citizenship in Hong Kong: Community, Nation and the Global 
City, edited by Ku and Pun (London, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 1. 
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 Joseph Chan Man, “Economizing Culture: the discourse on HK Disneyland,” a 
seminar held at Y7544, City University of Hong Kong on 29 March 2004. 
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Chapter Five  
Pragmatist Cosmopolitanism: Parents’ Use of Disney Merchandise 
  
In the previous chapter, I argue that the attractiveness of the HKDL project is not 
merely economic but also cultural. The “world city” or “cosmopolitan city” image 
offered by Disneyland promises my respondents various dreams. First, it makes 
available a “dream” in which they can re-enact their presumed “Chineseness plus” 
cultural identity (an identity through which some “Hong Kong people” may 
distinguish themselves from other Chinese).1 Second, it offers a way to reconfirm 
some of their “Hong Kong supremacist” belief that Hong Kong is a city of 
excellence surpassing other Asian cities, and that Hong Kong people are competent 
and “professional” (up to world standard) enough to host a world-class 
entertainment complex. Third, the American-based global Disney company 
significantly provides some people (most of whom are recent local-university 
graduates) with opportunities to live and work in the United States, to strengthen 
their curriculum vitae, to change career paths, to encounter cultural differences, and 
to broaden their own cultural orientation. Because Disney is a household name with 
which Hong Kong has long been in contact, in this chapter, I focus on the middle 
class family consumption of Disney offerings, including movies and merchandise. I 
ask how Disney texts connect to Hong Kong families’ lived experiences and to the 
families’ larger social, economic, and political environment; in particular, I examine 
how Hong Kong middle class parents appropriate Disney products for their own 
uses while simultaneously being subjected to various discourses that shape the 
parents’ lived sense of themselves and their child-rearing practices. In this chapter, I 
also discuss middle class struggles and the micropolitics that the middle class 
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exercises to maintain its privileged position. 
It is evident that Disney, through its various merchandise and through its 
gigantic photogenic sets in malls, manages to insert itself into different Hong Kong 
families. In 2002, I began conducting an ethnographic study of five middle class 
families. My aim was to study parents’ approaches to parenting, particularly in 
relation to family consumption of Disney products (comprising chiefly movies, 
merchandise, and theme parks). All these five families had various Disney 
merchandise, including DVDs, clothes, and household appliances. Although Disney 
merchandise is ubiquitous both in Hong Kong generally and, at least at the time of 
my study, in my respondents’ homes, my respondents as parents felt ambivalent 
toward the Mouse. 
I conducted an ethnographic study of several families only, and I chose to 
concentrate on middle class families.2 There are two reasons for the choice. First, 
Disneyland has been recognized as a site that is accessible to the middle class, that 
suggests the desire of the American middle class to safely and predictably consume 
“exotic” landscapes,3 and that promotes American middle class values such as 
individualism.4 Second, scholars differ about role played by the middle class in 
political transformation.5 In the context of this chapter’s concerns, I discuss 
whether middle class parents’ consumption behavior, in general, and Disney 
merchandise, in particular, materializes the middle class “self-help” culture and 
local family power dynamics within both the market and the existing global order 
as it affects Hong Kong. I also ask whether this consumption behavior fits the 
authoritarian, administration-led management practices of the HKSAR government.   
All eight parents in my study were between the ages of thirty-five and fifty. 
During their childhood, they all had had contact with Disney offerings; one parent 
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had joined the Hong Kong Disney Club as a child, and another parent had delighted 
in classic Disney animated cartoons. Of the eight parents, however, six were 
reserved in their opinion of Disney animated-cartoon values and consciously 
resisted the consumerist culture that Disney had promoted. Nevertheless, Disney 
merchandise surrounded the children’s rooms and the families’ TV cabinets. In 
these parent-respondents’ eyes, Disney was no longer just about entertainment but 
about their children’s formal, effective, and entertaining education. My middle class 
family respondents all had two or more Disney learning products such as bilingual 
Disney picture-story books or English-language-instruction VCDs, in addition to 
the respondents’ Disney plush dolls, action figures, computer games, costumes, tee-
shirts, and DVDs. It is the parents who selected Disney merchandise, produced 
certain Disney meanings, and thus helped mold their children into certain types of 
cultural beings. 
This chapter’s respondents—middle class parents—were more pragmatic 
than the previous chapter’s respondents, who were (for my study’s purposes) 
university-graduated HKDL workers. The middle class parents emphasized formal 
education, and their pragmatic use of Disney merchandise as edutainment can be 
linked with two important factors: first, their own lived experiences of upward class 
mobility (due to their attainment of education qualifications); and second, their 
recent declining career-advancement opportunities (due to, in their view, their lack 
of cosmopolitan cultural capital). Living through the Britain-to-China shift of 
power, riding the property-price wave from crest to trough, facing the Asian 
financial crisis, and coping with—among other things—severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS), economic restructuring, and a shrinking employment market, 
both my middle class respondents and I, being a Hong Kong resident myself, have 
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considered ourselves the “crippled” privileged: we have reflected on our “lack” 
instead of on our “gains” in the global economy. At the same time, respondents’ use 
and interpretation of Disney can also be attached to other more general discourses, 
such as the culture of market individualism, which rewards individual material 
success and condemns personal failure. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines 
Disney’s synergistic marketing strategy, whereby Disney has inserted itself into 
Hong Kong families’ everyday life through ubiquitous products and family-oriented 
celebrations. The second section and the third section discuss these parents’ 
perception patterns and consumption patterns relative to Disney movies and 
merchandise. Parents in my study perceived Disney-based moral values, and some 
parents, as I just noted, were reserved toward, or even resistant toward, some of 
these perceived values. This latter group of parents were willing to act as cultural 
gatekeepers to scan out values that they did not want their children to inhabit, in 
particular, values concerning violence and consumerism. In the fourth section, I 
examine families’ consumption of Disney educational kits, especially the English-
language learning kits. I discuss how parents’ behavior connected with their own 
lived experiences and discourses and how their acts (1) sustained their middle class 
privileges, (2) reinforced the local hierarchical parent-child relationship, (3) 
reproduced local pragmatist and flexible economic-based cultural practices, (4) 
reproduced the cultural ideal of American “success,” (5) affirmed the importance 
for their children of the emerging China-based regional economy, and (6) decreased 
their children’s encounters in the domestic sphere with local popular culture, 
thereby reducing the potential means for them to relate their pop cultural affect with 
a local identity and a place-based sense of community. In fact, the complexity of 
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these parents’ consumption behaviors in relation to their lived world demonstrates 
the value of Massey’s argument against making an essentialist connection between 
place and culture. 
  
Hong Kong: city of Disney consumption6 
Hong Kong is famous as a big shopping mall; the International Herald Tribune 
calls the Central District the “Fifth Avenue of the Far East.”7 In “revitalizing Hong 
Kong’s economy and strengthening community cohesiveness following the SARS 
outbreak” in 2003, different trade organizations of the tourism, retail and catering 
industries launched a three-month “community self-help” campaign, “We Love 
HK,” to “call upon the Hong Kong public to ‘go out and spend’ and help the ailing 
economy.”8 In contrast to many South Koreans,9 for example, Hong Kong people 
reportedly feel little guilt over their consumption of American or Japanese 
imports.10 Living in a big mall landscape, Hong Kong people’s shopping culture is 
incorporated into their daily spatial practices. Whether Hong Kong residents live in 
public housing or on a private estate, there are malls nearby that the residents can 
walk past, peer into, and buy from. In 2005, over one third of the housing estates 
managed by the Hong Kong Housing Authority had shopping malls.11 A ride to any 
district center will reveal another mega-mall. The most successful district mall is 
the New Town Plaza in Shatin (one of Hong Kong’s eighteen districts).12 With 
200,000 square meters comprising three internal mega-malls, New Town Plaza is 
one of the largest shopping centers in Hong Kong.13  
In November 1999, the HKSAR government officially announced that the 
government and the Disney Company would initiate HKDL, and ever since then, 
Disney has undertaken a “synergistic”14 marketing strategy to boost its local and 
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civic image in Hong Kong. This strategy has included extensive promotion of 
Disney movies, the refurbishment of local Disney Stores15 in 2001, frequent public-
library retellings of Disney stories, and regular Disney-related activities held for 
children and high school students.16 Disney’s largest marketing functions took place 
during the 2001 and 2002 Christmas seasons. 
The 2001 Disney Christmas function “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” 
was held in the center of New Town Plaza on 24 November 2001 and 1 January 
2002 (figure 1). The site was decorated as a mini-Disney park, at the center of 
which stood a castle. Surrounded by tall trees, the outside environment was blocked 
and the site maintained a self-enclosed narrative. Inside this medieval edifice, 
visitors walked through a dark corridor featuring a Walt Disney biography and a 
production history of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937); played with an 
interactive magic mirror in which the Queen would appear when visitors stepped on 
a particular part of the floor; visited the Seven Dwarfs’ house; watched a Snow 
White promo; played computer games; and bought Disney merchandise. The flow 
of visitors to “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” was controlled so that visitors 
could walk only in one direction: visitors needed to pass through the written 
introductions about both Walt Disney’s Disney-authorized biography and the Snow 
White production history; after making it through this “rite of passage” (the 
corridor), visitors could engage in various types of physical entertainment and, in 
particular, consumption activities. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” in 2001 
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The visitors were well under Disney’s control. The site structured visitors’ 
spatial practices in an enclosed space. However, we should not then conclude that 
the Disneyfied Snow White Christmas site exercised total control over visitors’ 
behavior. During my visit, most visitors would stay at the site for ten to fifteen 
minutes. They carried a camera (i.e., not a cellular phone but a digital camera, 
which means the visitors knew well beforehand that they would like to take 
pictures there) and immediately took pictures of the site. With their “functional” 
goal achieved, very few of the visitors bothered to read either the authorized 
biography of Walt Disney or the Snow White production notes, although the 
information was located at the entrance of the castle through which visitors had to 
pass. I stayed at the entrance for half an hour and found out only two out of fifty 
people that I observed bothered to read the history. These two people were in their 
twenties. Whereas the other visitors quickly filed through, the two visitors in 
question stayed at the entrance for several minutes and only thereafter did they 
proceed into the site to take photos. In general, adult visitors busily snapped photos, 
and no parents tried to explain the Snow White story to their children, who seemed 
oblivious to the written information. To see the Queen appear, older children kept 
on stepping on the part of the floor that activated the magic mirror. Visitors clearly 
subordinated the Snow White story and Walt Disney biography to their snap-taking 
and play. As a result, the “Snow White” function may have successfully promoted 
neither Walt Disney’s biography nor the Snow White name; however, the function 
successfully became a platform for family gathering, aroused certain pleasant and 
felicitous experiences, and encouraged families to associate Disney with local 
family festival celebrations.  
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To create in people’s minds a link between Disney and Hong Kong family 
rituals, the Walt Disney Company (Asia Pacific) Limited and the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority (HKHA) co-produced “Disney’s Magical Moments” in 2002 
(figure 2). Running from 21 December 2002 to 5 January 2003, this event remains 
the largest function ever held by the HKHA.17 Networking 131 of the HKHA’s 
shopping centers, the event issued souvenirs to those customers who purchased 
over HK$200 worth of Disney products. Four shopping malls, Stanley Plaza, Tsz 
Wan Shan Shopping Centre, Lok Fu Shopping Centre, and Lei Yue Mun Plaza, 
 
Stanley Plaza Lei Yue Mun Plaza 
Lok Fu Shopping Centre 
Fig. 2: “Disney’s Magical Moments” in 2002 
Tsz Wan Shan Shopping Centre 
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were lavishly decorated with gigantic sets and models that served as stages for 
Cinderella, Belle, Snow White, and the Little Mermaid. Disney merchandise 
occupied every corner of these malls and their department stores. Disney perhaps 
had learned from “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” that families privilege 
picture-taking over reading in the Disney landscape, and Disney made onstage 
adaptations to local needs. Different from “Snow White’s Magical Christmas” in 
2001, “Disney’s Magical Moments” did not ask visitors to familiarize themselves 
with Walt’s biography or with Disney movies’ production histories but rather to 
memorize the huge, exotic Disney caricatures by taking a snapshot of their happy 
Disney moment. These Disney caricatures and visitors’ photos with Disney icons 
signified both the omni-presence of Disney characters and the particular types of 
pleasant experiences that stem from a visit to the Disney landscape. Not long after 
this grandiose event, Disney icons appeared in all major local festival celebrations: 
the Mickey Mouse Garden featured in the 2003 Hong Kong Flower Show, the big 
lantern of Sleeping Beauty Castle took part in the 2003 mid-Autumn festival in 
Victoria Park (figure 3), and since 2001, the Hong Kong Disneyland float has 
graced the Chinese New Year parade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: 2003 HK mid-Autumn Festival, 
Victoria Park 
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The opening of Hong Kong Disneyland gave rise to a Mickey Mouse craze, 
elevating the cartoon rodent from modest to high fashion, emblazoning the icon on 
everything from tee-shirts to jewellery, and generating a market even for counterfeit 
Mickey Mouse-themed goods; indeed, the International Herald Tribune describes 
the ubiquitous appearance of the Mickey icon in Hong Kong as “a Disney mania.”18 
Disney merchandising also includes character-themed candies and grooming 
products in pharmacies and in beauty chains such as Mannings and in local 
supermarkets like Park N’ Shop; Disney-related toys, computer games, and books 
in Toys ‘R’ Us; similar household products, soft toys, and gifts in thirteen 
Trendyland chain stores19; inexpensive youth fashion in ‘It’s Mickey’ chain stores 
and eighty-six Giordano fashion shops20; uptown high-fashion in Moiselle chain 
stores; jewellery in forty-five Chow Sang Sang shops; and Disney merchandise in 
over two hundred McDonald’s restaurants in Hong Kong. Other merchandise 
featuring Disney characters that Hong Kong has imported from Japan can also be 
found in trendy youth shops inside MTR stations, Japanese department stores, and 
small shopping malls in every corner of the metropolis. Counterfeit Disney 
merchandise can be found in small stationery stores in every public-housing estate, 
in the famous Ladies Market in Mong Kok, and in markets in Causeway Bay, Wan 
Chai, North Point, Sham Shui Po, and so on.   
Disney’s commercial success is due largely to its synergistic approach, 
whereby the company first produces movies treated as merchandise advertisements; 
then it makes TV series, comics, soundtracks, and musicals and sells a range of 
movie-character merchandise in Disney Stores, theme parks, and local stores. 
Throughout the process, Disney operates an extensive and penetrating series of 
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marketing and promotional activities. As the biggest licensor in the world, Disney 
exercises control over a host of instantly recognizable characters, each of which 
corresponds to hundreds of kinds of products; therefore, it is no surprise that cross-
media marketing helps Disney turn great profits. Mickey Mouse’s face sells US$4.5 
billion worth of merchandise every year21; The Lion King grossed US$756 million 
at the box office worldwide, but its soundtrack, live stage shows, cartoons on the 
Disney Channel, a Toontown attraction at Disneyland, a vast array of merchandise, 
and home video and DVD sales raked in more than US$1 billion22; the production 
cost of Toy Story (1995) was about US$75-100 million,23 and the film grossed 
US$356.8 million at the worldwide box office24 and, subsequently, grossed over 
US$3 billion25 during ten years of further profits, including ancillary earnings. 
It is evident that Disney—because of its differentiated merchandise, its 
shifting aesthetic sense, and its adaptive application of contradictory popular 
discourses to local needs and desires—has managed to successfully insert itself into 
different Hong Kong families’ lives. On the one hand, the American-based firm 
links up the brand “Disney” with Hong Kong’s local festivals and family rituals and, 
on the other hand, the firm advertises its characters by presenting them in various 
promotional activities, movie screenings, and product sales in every corner of Hong 
Kong. The commercial operation is massive. However, if the core aim of 
Disneyization26 is to sell successfully and to ask consumers to consume happily and 
thoughtlessly, then a Disneyized culture is hard to find in Hong Kong; instead, 
Disney merchandise becomes a vehicle by which parents can mold their children 
into a certain type of cultural being. Moreover, as we shall see, parents’ uses of 
Disney products reproduce the existing power order, including local class 
differences and a cultural ideal of American superiority at success.  
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Hong Kong parents: the cultural gatekeepers 
Hong Kong people generally regard family as the most important component of 
human life27; in particular, both having children and child-centeredness in a family 
setting are norms in Hong Kong culture.28 Children’s status in Hong Kong society, 
as Ng Chun Hung argues, has changed over time, “from a beginning of neglect, 
then to alarm and protection, and, since the 1970s to a view of children as the pillar 
of the future society and hence an asset to be invested in.”29 Such shifts as the one 
from child-neglect to child-centeredness have become possible both under the 
changing state policies30 and amidst the proliferation of TV programs, games and 
toys, clothing, and other products—a proliferation that treats children as consumers 
who have their own tastes and wants. 
Living inside this “Shopping Paradise,” Hong Kong parents may refrain 
from shopping for themselves so that they can save for their children’s future.31 
Also, parents frequently disagree with and reject the consumerist attitude promoted 
by children’s TV programs and the mega-mall landscape of Hong Kong, although 
they allow their children to have their own tastes to different degrees; as I will show 
later, the parents encourage their children to consume particular edutainment 
products, and even provide an “environment” for them to do so. Thinking of 
children as passive, vulnerable, and dependent, parents also frequently state the 
importance of “environment” in children’s development. In discussing their child-
rearing methods, parents presume that they should provide their children with an 
environment conducive to a “healthy” childhood and should protect their children 
against environments that affect the innocence of children “negatively.” Commonly 
listed among these environments are Hong Kong shopping malls and especially 
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Disney’s consumerist landscape, viewed as containing mainly “low cultural capital” 
commodities.  
Cathy32 and Lisa33 are two mothers who consciously act against malling 
behavior; that is, these mothers oppose parent-child visits to and wanderings 
through shops inside malls, visits that can last for hours and result in a bevy of 
purchases. Because of the economic doldrums that seized Hong Kong after the 
Handover, Cathy consciously changed her consumption practices into a pragmatist 
approach.34 For example, to save money her family dropped the Sunday family 
ritual of having dim sum in a Chinese restaurant; she also consciously refrained 
from shopping for “unnecessary” goods (such as clothes) or services (having 
beauty treatments or joining a gym). As full-time working mothers, both Cathy and 
Lisa expressed concern over their lack of child-centered time. To develop parent-
child intimacy, the two mothers planned activities such as outings and storybook 
readings, as well as casual activities such as sandwich making, and the two 
considered these activities to be more valuable than malling. As Cathy, for example, 
stated: 
 
I’m not in the habit of taking him [her son] shopping because he can’t quite 
control himself.… It’s a waste of time, since we don’t have much time to be 
together … I have to go to work on alternate Saturdays. On Sunday, we 
wake up at about ten and eleven. After lunch, he has to study, since we just 
do it once a week. After studying, it’s about three. What can we do? At most, 
we go to the park or to the public library. After a while, it’s time to have 
dinner. It is a waste of time if we also go shopping at the mall and play 
stupid things in Jumpin Gym U.S.A.35.… Now I know some of his 
classmates’ parents, and we go to the park together. Those parents also think 
like me. Going out to the park is better than spending time in the mall. 
 
Given her intention to spend less money in everyday life, it is easy to understand 
why Cathy rarely goes to the Disney Store to shop for her son Adrian. In 2003, I 
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visited Cathy’s home, where she showed me her Disney merchandise and 
commented that Disney merchandise is not worth the expense:  
 
You see the Buzz notebook. Once, his classmate’s mother brought me to the 
Disney Store. It was on sale and I bought it. But actually not everything is 
cheap. Only some stuff. And Disney clothes are still more expensive than 
clothes at the market. The one he [Adrian] wears now costs only twelve 
dollars in Po Ling Street. He doesn’t have to dress up at home, right?  A tee-
shirt around forty dollars is good enough for going out, and you can’t buy 
Disney clothes for about forty dollars, right? 
  
In my casual talks with Cathy, we seldom talked about consumption activities. In 
contrast, my talks with my single, childless girlfriends often concern consumption-
related topics. Important to Cathy were Adrian and her work life, which she 
mentioned during every one of our talks. Family and work occupied Cathy’s life, 
and consumption became a rare and marginal daily-life practice. Adrian has some 
Disney clothes, but many are gifts36 from relatives and friends. Cathy had bought 
some Disney movies in the VCD medium, such as Toy Story, Snow White, Peter 
Pan, and The Lion King. Cathy carefully chose these VCDs: she would buy them 
only if she had concluded that the movie would be good enough to re-play many 
times. And even though Cathy, her husband Fred, and Adrian visited Disneyland 
Paris in 2001 and 2006, the family did not change into big spenders. In 2001, for 
example, they bought only a balloon. That is, they successfully resisted the park’s 
design, which encourages visitors to play happily and to shop “naturally” and 
extravagantly.   
Seeing children as innocents who need to be constrained with discipline, 
parents discipline their own lifestyle. Fighting against ideas of consumerism and 
materialism, Lisa and her husband Tom seldom went to a mega-mall. When they 
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did go shopping, they tried their best to go alone, that is, to avoid bringing their 
daughters along; this strategy reflected the parents’ effort to prevent their children 
from developing the desire to shop. Since the birth of their first daughter, Dorothy, 
the family would eat dinner at home except during festivals. As did Cathy, Lisa 
refused to treat shopping in malls on weekends as a family ritual. Lisa and Tom told 
me separately and together on three separate occasions that “we never buy products 
based on characters.” In Lisa’s words, “We absolutely do not buy products because 
of the characters. They [the children] know the rule and therefore they don’t whine 
to buy things with a character.” All products that Lisa and Tom purchase are based 
on the products’ usefulness, instead of on appearance.  
Consequently, Dorothy and Stephanie, the two daughters of Lisa and Tom, 
seldom went to a mall, even though their residence in Shatin is less than a ten-
minute drive from New Town Plaza. Dorothy was a bit different from the other 
children discussed in the study and from ten kindergarteners whom I talked to in a 
nursery school,37 for she recognized Disney characters but had no special 
preference for any particular character. She exhibited no strong desire to own a 
product with a character image. There were Winnie the Pooh plastic plates in Lisa’s 
home, but these were gifts from friends. 
Judy and Jacob,38 another couple, enjoyed dining out with their son, Leo, 
and three of them frequently visited malls. Aside from the members of the anti-
Disney group, Judy and Jacob were the two interviewees who most worried about 
the HKDL project’s contribution to American cultural imperialism. Compared with 
Cathy and Lisa, Judy and Jacob were more liberal in the sense that they allowed 
their child to visit malls and his favorite shops, but at the same time they were more 
explicit in criticizing Disney’s promotion of child-centered consumerist behavior. 
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Characterizing Disney as an institution that is “dredging money from children by 
tantalizing them,” they practiced the  “no buy” policy. Consider the following 
conversation that we had: 
 
Kim: You bring Leo to the Disney Store. Does he ask you to buy him things? 
Judy: Yes, he does. We just say, “We won’t buy it. No buy.” (Judy smiles.) 
Jacob: He is not fond of those things. 
Judy (smiling): Sometimes he is. After seeing the movie, he wanted to have 
a toy, such as Buzz Lightyear…. Every time he goes there [Disney Store], 
he touches them. We keep on saying, “We won’t buy it because it is 
expensive and we don’t need it. You can come but only to look at them.”   
 
Leo accepts his parents’ teachings and puts them into practice. After watching Lilo 
& Stitch (2002), Leo and I visited a Disney Store. When he saw the Stitch plush 
dolls, he ran to that counter and played with the dolls. His fondness for Stitch 
instilled in him a powerful desire to own a Stitch plush doll, but he decided not to 
buy it finally because “mother likes it least.” Again on this topic, I conversed with 
Leo:   
 
Kim: Do you like Stitch? 
Leo: Yes. 
Kim: Why? 
Leo: Because it is cute. 
Kim: Do you want to have a Stitch soft toy?  
Leo: Yes, but mother said we have soft toys at home. We don’t need to have 
more soft toys. But the fact is, my home doesn’t have a Stitch soft toy. 
Kim: If you had money, would you buy a Stitch soft toy?   
Leo: No, because mother likes it least of all.  
 
Leo displayed the “look but don’t buy” behavior again when we stepped outside the 
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Disney Store and back into the mall, where a temporary counter was selling Bossini 
casual wear featuring images of Stitch and Lilo. Leo asked me to accompany him to 
the counter to have a look. When we arrived, he said, “Actually, I don’t really like 
short-sleeved shirts. I have a lot at home. I don’t need any more.” His desire to own 
the tee-shirt was suppressed by his rational evaluation of needs. 
With regard to Disney offerings, Betty39 was less ambivalent and more 
positive than other mothers. To Betty, Disney movies are good for both parents and 
children: “After watching Finding Nemo, parents should learn that we shouldn’t be 
too strict to children and children should also know that they should listen to 
parents’ advice.” As the only second-generation middle class parent in my study, 
Betty had joined Hong Kong’s Mickey Mouse Club when she was a child and she 
was the only respondent in my study to voice the belief that “It [Disney] belongs to 
my generation”—although her fondness for Japanese cartoon characters was 
greater than her fondness for Disney ones.40 Perhaps because of her relatively 
affluent background, Betty was also the only parent who did not insist on training 
her son, Henry, to refrain from consumption activities. When I first visited Betty 
and Henry, I was stunned by the huge number of Disney videos in their home: 
above the TV set, there were many Disney DVDs, including The Lion King and its 
sequels, Lilo & Stitch and its sequel, Dumbo, Toy Story I and II, A Bug’s Life, 
Finding Nemo, The Incredibles, some sing-along English learning videotapes, and 
some “It’s Mickey” short animated cartoon videotapes; on the left, there were two 
big boxes with the big words “Disney’s World of English” and many Disney 
storybooks. Besides, there were three Pixar/Disney action figures (Buzz Lightyear, 
Emperor Zurg, and Mr. Incredible), a Buzz toothbrush, and a Shrek sofa. Betty 
explained that Henry liked watching the same movies repeatedly and that the cost 
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of going to the movie theater was more than the cost of buying a DVD; deciding to 
forego the movie-theater experience, she opted to wait for the release of a film on 
DVD. As an English teacher at a famous girls’ school, Betty was lenient toward 
Henry’s Disney-watching practices because she found that Henry improved his 
English by imitating simple dialogue in the movies.  
 
Hard-working workshop: stickers collection  
Though attractive, Disney’s countless pieces of merchandise are not many parents’ 
objects of desire; in fact, some parent-respondents in my study tried their best to 
guard their children against the desire both to shop and to own these vast arrays of 
goods. Although it may not be easy for them, children still can get what they want 
by requesting a particular product as their birthday gift or by behaving well in 
return for a reward. To instill in children the understanding that “there is no free 
lunch in the world,” mothers Ada41 and Cathy presented their children with an 
alternative way to get rewards: sticker collecting. If their kids collected a certain 
number of stickers, they got a reward. 
Ada: “Do your homework and have your dinner quickly!” 
Ada: “Be careful in working on assignments!” 
Ada: “Read test questions carefully!” 
Angel: “Stop your temper!” 
Fig.4: Ada’s home 
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Like many parents, Ada was concerned with Angel’s academic standing. 
Angel sometimes received physical punishment because she would not concentrate 
on doing assignments or because she was careless in her test-taking (figure 4). To 
ensure Angel’s academic standing, Ada spent most of her time in line with Angel’s 
tightly crammed school schedule and bought books and educational kits for Angel. 
Ada noted that she gave Angel ten dollars of pocket money each week and that 
Angel could spend her money according to her wants. If she did not want to use her 
allowance, Angel could behave well to get star stickers. After collecting a certain 
number of star stickers, Angel would earn a gift such as stationery. If her conduct 
fell below expectations, stars would be deducted and she would have to behave 
better to earn the stickers back. 
Ada used sticker collecting to encourage Angel to be docile and to do well 
in school, whereas Cathy saw it as a practice-based reflection of the  “winner-take-
all” world in which we live. Cathy and I spoke about the matter: 
 
Kim: What kinds of gifts do you give him [Adrian] on his birthday? 
Cathy: They vary from year to year. Last year, it was a plant. I wanted to 
train him to have patience. Sometimes I give him a gift that he longs to have, 
such as computer games. Kids are never satisfied. They are accustomed to 
receiving lots of gifts, but they still feel that they don’t have enough. 
Recently, I’ve intentionally bought him fewer things. Lots of these [Disney 
products] were bought by others…. Adrian has to collect 100 stickers for a 
Digimon game.42 He tries his best to be the best. He has to be the best in 
school. And if he doesn’t behave well that day, he will ask, “How many 
stickers can I get today?” He is aggressive in this respect. He has to win. If 
he loses, he will cry. But it’s OK, since everybody experiences failure while 
growing up. 
Kim: You want to train Adrian to be aggressive? 
Cathy: I want him to know that there is no free lunch in the world, that you 
have to work hard for your dreams.    
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In the consumerist world, children are seen as full-fledged consumers who have 
their own tastes and who deserve some freedom of choice. The Hong Kong parents 
whom I interviewed for this study strove to protect their children from such a 
consumerist attitude by limiting their exposure to shopping-mall environments and, 
therefore, to the ubiquitous Disney products. Although nine Disney Stores were 
located in major Hong Kong shopping malls by 2004, these parents seldom 
shopped there, for they found that Disney merchandise did not live up to its 
billing.43 According to the sum of their views, children who desire something need 
to act well, a dictum that runs parallel to the “work hard, play hard, spend hard” 
mentality of these Hong Kong parent respondents. 
 
No killings, no disobedience, no laziness: failed Disney movies and stories 
Shopping and watching TV are two interrelated daily behaviors—the more 
exposure children have to TV, the more consumer power children will demand.44 
Parents whom I interviewed try their best not only to obstruct children’s 
introduction to the consumerist world but to keep them away from the television set, 
as well. Many Hong Kong parents consider television viewing a negative influence 
on children’s development: it takes away from children’s homework time, promotes 
consumption, and broadcasts explicit depictions of sex and violence.45   
In the family, it is the mothers who perform “the mediating role of 
‘gatekeepers’ in creating a reception context”46 and who thus rule over children’s 
media use. Choi and Lee argue that women—both at-home workers and 
marketplace workers—are more responsible than men in Hong Kong for 
childrearing and for domestic work.47 In one of my own studies,48 I further argue 
that mothers control what children can and cannot watch; mothers talk to the 
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children about what they should or should not learn from television and movie 
characters; and mothers even change their own watching habits to cater to their 
children’s development.49 The increase of families’ VCR ownership,50 the rise of 
home-rental markets for videos in the 1980s, and the subsequent rise of VCD and 
DVD markets have greatly helped parents select particular programs for children to 
watch. As the world’s largest provider of child-oriented content, Disney releases 
movies that, most recently in the VCD and the DVD mediums, have impressed both 
parents and children in Hong Kong, especially when these parents consider local 
movies and TV soaps to be mind-numbingly pointless but consider Disney movies, 
presenting little sex or horror, to be safer for children.51 For example, Cathy liked 
Snow White and Peter Pan a lot, and therefore, Adrian had watched these two 
Disney classics many times. As a film buff and film-company administrator, Cathy 
liked the elegant depiction and cinematic style of Snow White. She cited the death 
scene as an example:   
 
When he [Adrian] was two or three years old, we watched Snow White [the 
movie] many times, and I saw every detail. Snow White does not show 
Snow eating the apple, and you just see the apple dropping from her hand. It 
is very elegant. It is different from today’s movies, where you see a knife 
lodged inside the corpse. The film is worth many viewings. There is a little 
turtle in the movie. At one point, Snow raises her hand and the turtle crawls 
down. It is funny, and the song is so beautiful. You cannot find another film 
better than this film. 
 
As I mentioned, Judy and Jacob had bad impressions of Disney animation because 
they feared American cultural imperialism. Judy argued, also, that Disney animated 
cartoons emphasize a binary way of reading goodness and badness, heroism and 
cowardice, all of which simplify children’s views of the world. However, compared 
with other characters such as Bionicle,52 whom Leo liked, Disney’s characters 
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sometimes held a greater appeal for Judy and Jacob. For example, Judy and Jacob 
recounted an incident in which one of Leo’s classmates had hit him twice: the first 
time, hitting Leo in his stomach and testicles in the classroom; the second time, 
hitting Leo in the testicles in the restroom. During one of our conversations, both 
Jacob and Judy linked this incident to their concern over media’s promotion of 
violence: 
 
Jacob: The main problem is why the child was being so violent. Because 
things around us are so violent. Media images are so problematic. Media 
just keep on showing fighting and fighting, and children just copy, just 
imitate. They may know it is wrong, but they still imitate.  
Kim: Then how do you face the fact that Leo likes watching Buzz Lightyear 
and Bionicle, characters that have the right to conquer?  
Judy: We tell him directly our attitude toward these characters. But he can 
love these characters. I told him “your Bionicle looks very ugly. It is about 
biological warfare. If humans have to face this situation, it will be very bad. 
Jacob: Disney basically is very American. Even Buzz Lightyear is an idol, a 
so-called hero to protect and to save human beings. In Toy Story, Buzz is 
there to save other toys. But it’s better than Bionicle. There is also another 
side to Toy Story, it also talks about the relationship between him [Buzz] 
and Woody. But I still think that it is a very big corporation making these 
animations. But it is not totally bad… [emphasis mine] 
 
Although Jacob did not quite like the character Buzz Lightyear because it 
legitimises violence based on self-defense, Jacob found that other productions, such 
as Bionicle, can be worse. By frequently using the disjunction ‘but’ to describe his 
views on Toy Story, the above dialogue reveals Jacob’s disjointed, ambivalent 
attitude toward Disney movies. Both Judy and Jacob emphasized liberal parenting 
and open discussion instead of traditional parenting and rule-giving; consequently, 
Leo, unlike other children in this study, had chances to watch his favorite television 
programs, which Judy and Jacob perhaps frowned upon personally as “bad.”53  
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It should be noted, however, that while establishing a family-entertainment 
market in which the whole family can enjoy a movie together, Disney movies fail 
to deal with local family agendas in detail; the Hong Kong parents in this study 
expressed concern that Disney’s feature-length animated cartoons are too long for 
children’s healthy viewing and that the movies’ romance and revenge themes and 
some of the characterizations work against Hong Kong parents’ idea of children’s 
entertainment. To protect children from the harm that might arise from their 
exposure to fear, confusion, anger, and disgust, parents establish household rules 
about screen-media use. For instance, although Lisa enjoyed songs from The Lion 
King and although her daughters liked the film, Lisa had reservations about this big 
Disney hit. She declared that it contains “too many killings”: 
 
… in The Lion King, the two brothers kill each other. I watch the film with 
the children and I have to explain why this or that happens; but I can’t 
explain why the two brothers need to kill each other …     
 
Except for Judy and Jacob, other parents in this study carried with them a sense of 
Chinese traditionalism.54 To them, parents are superior to children and should teach 
their children the difference between right and wrong; children are innocent and 
should receive an education and an upbringing based on talks, controls, rewards, 
and punishment, which can be physical. Because of this traditionalism, children’s 
entertainment in parents’ eyes should teach children to be polite, docile, honest, 
gentle, cultivated, and hardworking, instead of naughty, wild, deceitful, violent, 
uncouth, and lazy. Some Disney characters such as Tinker Bell are famous and 
popular for their mischief,55 and Hong Kong parents do not view such characters as 
positively as do parents in a Western context, which might be more likely to exhibit 
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relatively liberal child-rearing practices. Cathy, the administrator of a local movie 
company and a fan of Snow White, disliked Pinocchio (1940) because “Pinocchio is 
not a good kid and I don’t like a bad kid,” and she abhorred Lilo & Stitch for 
Stitch’s disruptive behavior:  
 
I really don’t like the film. It’s unacceptable. The first whole hour is about 
how that thing [Stitch] destroys things. Children should not watch the film. 
This cartoon animation is made for children. However, he [Stitch] is so 
naughty. Is it that you [Disney] want the children to be as naughty as Stitch? 
I really wanted to leave the theater. I will be picky in choosing Disney 
movies in the future. 
 
Afraid that her child would imitate inappropriate behavior, Cathy argued that 
Disney had failed in recent years to produce “good-children” movies and that she 
had become suspicious of Disney productions altogether. Judy and Betty, as did 
some other parents, raised concerns about Stitch’s naughtiness, but did not prohibit 
their boys, Leo and Henry, from watching the movie; instead, these mothers talked 
to the children and directed them to interpret the movie. As I mention above, Leo 
followed Judy and Jacob’s “no buy” policy because he knew that his mother did not 
like Stitch. In fact, Lilo & Stitch was not well received at the Hong Kong box office.  
Before the release of Lilo & Stitch, Disney launched an aggressive 
advertising campaign to promote this film: TV advertisements on both Cantonese 
channels and English channels,56 continual reports in popular lifestyle magazines 
such as East Touch57 and Milk ,58 family-oriented magazines such as TVB Weekly ,59 
and children’s magazines such as Ming Po Children Weekly 60 and X-kids Express 
Weekly.61 Disney also had tie-in toys and tie-in activities available through 
McDonald’s restaurants, Kjeldsens cookies, and local popular fashion brand 
Bossini.62 In conjunction, shopping malls and Disney held promotional activities63 
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wherein shoppers who spent a certain amount of money on purchases would 
receive Stitch merchandise. Outside trendy movie theaters in Causeway Bay, 
passers-by would see a giant-sized Stitch plush doll. Disney also invited one 
popular Taiwan group, F4, to sing one song for the movie. Despite an avalanche of 
promotional activities and the golden movie-release time of the summer holidays, 
Lilo & Stitch reached a disappointing 29th place at the local box office in 2002, 
grossing a mere HK$8.64 million. That same year, the second-highest-grossing film 
was Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets (HK$38.26 million), and rounding 
out the top-five highest-grossing films was Monsters, Inc. (HK$25.77 million).64 
The merchandise of Lilo & Stitch was not well received either. Lilo & Stitch 
was in Hong Kong theaters from 11 July to 21 August 2002. In June and July 2002, 
I conducted my fieldwork on all nine local Disney Stores 65 (Tsim Sha Tsui, Shatin, 
Festival Walk, Tai Koo Shing, Whampoa, Diamond Hill, Causeway Bay, Tsuen 
Wan, and one in an airport). I made a total of twenty-four separate visits to these 
stores during the two-month period. In each visit, I spent about one hour to see 
whether or not different populations came to Disney stores at different times and 
behaved differently. During this period of intensive fieldwork, Lilo & Stitch 
merchandise was on prominent display in the stores: Stitch plush toys, bean dolls, 
interactive dolls, music dolls, figure sets, computer games, glass globes, stationery, 
school bags, card holders, drawing kits, candies, clothes, dress-up costumes, 
canteens, tumblers, plastic cups, and activity kits. My observations strongly 
suggested that customers either did not recognize the two characters, Lilo and 
Stitch, or were not very keen on Stitch: 
 
A teenage girl about twelve years old talked to her mother, commenting that 
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Stitch was “cute” and that “it only costs $145.”  Her mom replied, “What is 
it?  It isn’t a koala, nor is it a monster.” The mother walked away while 
continuing with her comments, and the girl followed. (Shatin, 23 June 2002, 
Sunday) 
 
Two teenage girls looked at the Lilo & Stitch glass globe, one asked the 
other, “Oh, this one, this is the new one, what is it called?” The queried girl 
replied, “What? New?  I don’t know. It’s so ugly!” (Kowloon Tong, 29 June 
2002, Saturday) 
 
After the film appeared on the big screen, more customers recognized the 
characters Lilo and Stitch. However, few customers stayed at the Stitch corner of 
the stores for more than 10 seconds; instead, they looked for clothing on sale66; 
many customers clustered around the Pooh corner, where some newly arrived 
Winnie the Pooh soft toys could be found.67 Few people actually purchased the Lilo 
& Stitch merchandise. During my visits, there were only three purchases of Stitch 
merchandise and no purchases of Lilo merchandise. Aggressive promotion 
activities might strengthen the recognisability of new Disney characters, but ensure 
neither positive public reception of the characters nor desirable sales of related 
merchandise. From my observations, the advertising did little to offset the 
decidedly mixed perceptions of Stitch’s cuteness factor:  
 
A girl about ten commented that Stitch was “cute” as she was holding the 
plush doll, and she kept on saying “It’s very soft” while touching it. Her 
mother commented, “It’s so ugly!” They, then walked away. (Kowloon Tong, 
10 July 2002, Wednesday) 
 
With his sharp teeth, pronounced nostrils, fins, and four weapon-like hands, Stitch 
is a cross between an adorable koala and a terrifying alien: the concept of “cute” 
encounters the concept of “ugly,” good and evil. One parent who had also worked 
in a film marketing organization commented that the unpopularity of the film was 
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due largely to parents’ disapproval of the characterization of Stitch, a mischievous 
alien. The film had a sequel but skipped a theatrical release and went straight to 
DVD.  
Stitch and other Disney characters display a good deal of violence and 
mischief, to which my respondent Lisa objected. As a mother who worked outside 
the home and as a firm believer in meritocracy, Lisa objected, as well, to Disney’s 
princess stories because, she argued, they teach girls to think about only romantic 
affairs and marriage. In a conversation with me, Lisa argued that girls who 
daydream of romance and marriage are naughty and lazy: 
 
Kim: What do you like or dislike about Disney stories? 
Lisa: Too many love stories and too many killings. For example, in The 
Lion King, the two brothers kill each other … You asked me if Disney is 
American. Well, these nonsense love stories are very American. And this 
thick book on Disney classics—the stories just ask girls to get married. 
What is the point of these stories? Isn’t it sick to ask small girls to daydream 
about getting married as soon as possible? I don’t know how to tell them the 
stories when I find that I can’t educate them through these stories. Therefore, 
I don’t use them anymore.… We try to find stories that are more educational, 
and we are afraid of popularizing certain ideas, you know, materialism and 
violence.… That’s why I stopped telling them these stories. 
 
Disney’s princess stories ran counter to Lisa’s “work hard” mentality and the ideal 
that she projected onto her two daughters—an ideal that substitutes a marketable 
career woman for a non-marketable married wife. As a result, traditionalism (which 
emphasizes hierarchical parent-child relationships based on children’s obedience) 
and a middle class mentality (which emphasizes self-made success based on hard 
work) encourage parents to restrict their children’s exposure to some Disney 
movies because these movies purportedly have negative effects (disobedience, 
laziness) on children. 
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Parents are aware of and feel uneasy with some Disney values and the 
consumerist discourse in general. Surrounded by this threat, the parents resist it by 
negotiating with it: the families watch and buy some—but not any—Disney movies 
and products. Underlying this strategy, however, is not only an actively local 
negotiation with global discourses but also the abrasion of local cultural formation 
by transnationally circulating values—in this case, either parental authority in Hong 
Kong’s “traditional” family practices relative to a more recently adopted child-
centeredness and the emphasis on egalitarian family relationships based on the 
“modern” domestic ideal, or frugality and hard work as family virtues relative to 
market-based consumption as a child’s right. In the next section, I will demonstrate 
that parents’ active consumption shapes their own middle class ideas on parenting 
and, at the same time, reproduces the privileged status of those ideas by instituting 
a “good environment” (or, as in Bourdieu’s terms, a good habitus68) for their 
children. 
 
Hong Kong parents: the “good English-learning environment” providers 
It is quite common for affluent families to have Disney movies at home. It is also a 
widespread practice for parents in Western countries to set rules limiting children’s 
media use.69 However, what distinguishes Disney merchandising in Asia from 
Disney merchandising elsewhere is the greater market presence (relative to 
English-speaking countries) of Disney educational products in Asia.70 This 
presence earns Disney a privileged status for many Hong Kong families. 
Coming from the intermediate and the lower classes, most present-day 
Hong Kong parents have attained an education, worked hard, and climbed the 
social ladder. It is these parents who dominate the first generation of Hong Kong’s 
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current middle class: administrators, managers, and professionals in related fields. 
Without inherited economic capital, these parents are deeply concerned over their 
children’s social identity and make a concerted effort to maintain their children’s 
middle class status by acquiring capital of both the economic kind and the cultural 
kind: the core of their sense of attainment centers on their children’s language skills, 
and an important supplement to this core concerns the nurturing of their children’s 
competence in high culture. Parents in my study believe that if they provide a good 
learning environment for their children, their children will have a greater chance of 
developing the competence and cultural capital needed for their future careers.71 
Parents attach great importance to their children’s adeptness in oral and 
written English because it signifies that these children can enter a better school and, 
later in life, find a better job. Furthermore, since the Handover in 1997, many Hong 
Kong parents see Putonghua as increasingly important, particularly given the 
emergence of China as a power to reckon with in the global economy. Not far 
behind language on the importance scale is “cultivation” in high culture, which 
children are expected to possess if they are to gain entrance to prestigious schools. 
As a result, all five families that I worked with were paying for piano lessons for 
their children, and four for private English lessons, and three of the five had 
enrolled their children, starting at the age of five, in Putonghua classes. The 
extreme case was Angel, Ada’s daughter. When she was in Primary one (which is a 
grade for students who are about six years old), Angel not only spent a full day at 
school but also managed to take nine additional classes every week: piano on 
Monday, English on Tuesday and Wednesday, ballet on Thursday, mathematics and 
English on Friday, and Putonghua, English pronunciation, and ballet on Saturday. 
Of the nine private lessons, four involved English, and one was in Putonghua. 
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Because Angel’s family was Catholic, Angel attended church and did not need to 
have additional classes on Sunday, but normally she swam with her father for an 
hour to strengthen her body. 
Because these parents were pragmatic consumers, they consumed products 
that could heighten their children’s learning initiative and abilities. Hong Kong 
parents will not use a Disney movie as a babysitter, but they do treat Disney 
educational kits as babysitters. All the families in my study had Disney educational 
products: Judy had bought Leo Winnie the Pooh 123’s and Winnie the Pooh ABC’s 
so that her son could learn counting and letter recognition when he was three years 
old; Cathy had bought bilingual Disney storybooks and Disney’s Read Along CD-
and-storybook series to help Adrian learn both English and written Chinese; and 
Ada had bought Disney’s Sing Along Songs and several of Disney’s English-
language storybooks for Angel to learn English.72 Parents bought Disney 
edutainment kits because, even before the purchase, both the parents and their 
children were familiar with the characters. People’s familiarity with Disney 
characters because of long-time encounters and because of the omni-presence of 
the Disney image, as discussed in a previous section, encourages parents to 
purchase the Disney brand instead of other edutainment products. Betty discussed 
this very topic:  
 
It [Disney] belongs to my generation.… These characters are attractive to us. 
We watched Disney when we were growing up. The BBC also has a set of 
teaching-English materials. Its main character is an owl and it’s cheaper, I 
should say a lot cheaper. But as a mother, I think what attracts me can 
attract my son. Perhaps this is the wrong idea. Perhaps the owl also attracts 
him. But who buys the set? The mother, not the son. They [Disney 
characters] are attractive to me, and therefore, I bought this set.  
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Disney’s World of English is my focus here because the first set, which is for 
children aged three to six, recommends daily use over the course of three years. 
Consisting of twelve English learning books and many vocabulary cards, the set 
costs HK$14,000, which is slightly below Hong Kong’s average household 
monthly income of HK$15,50073 and which is about ten times the cost of another 
brand’s English learning VCD set. Among the five families I have studied, Lisa and 
Betty used the first set and Betty had paid the full price for it. 
Disney’s World of English is not developed by the Walt Disney Company 
itself but by a licensee, World Family Ltd. The English kit emphasizes children’s 
ability to learn American English as their mother tongue through “listening, 
absorbing and copying.” The kit asserts that its approach to learning is not complex; 
the claim is that children aged three to six who play it everyday for three years can 
learn to speak English as their mother tongue and can do so easily because the kit 
successfully creates an English-language learning environment. It was first 
introduced in 1980 in Japan and has served over 100,000 families across Japan and 
Taiwan.74 Introduced to Hong Kong in the late 1990s, it soon became popular with 
middle class families.  
Attracted to the concept of an English learning environment, both Betty and 
Lisa bought Disney’s World of English. Each had a Filipina maid who took care of 
their children and who communicated with them in English, but Betty and Lisa 
remained unsure of the maid’s English-language teaching skills and, therefore, 
bought the Disney set and asked the maid to play the disc and sing the songs with 
the children in the morning. At night, the mothers read to them from the same 
books. Betty commented on the topic and responded to one of my follow-up 
questions:   
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Betty: This is the pack for learning English. We can sing all songs taught by 
the kit. We use them rarely now, but we played them every morning when 
Henry was young. He did not have much to do at home and we needed to go 
to work. The maid did not know what to do with him, but with this 
[Disney’s World of English], the maid played the disc and sang with him. 
Grace [Betty’s ex-maid] can sing all the wake-up songs and bedtime songs. 
Kim: How long can it be used? 
Betty: It can be used until [the child is] six years old. There are vocabulary 
cards and these words keep repeating in all the songs and stories. The whole 
idea of the learning set is to recycle these words continuously so that 
children can learn all these words. I know this method works. For example, 
children don’t know what ‘acrobat’ means. But there’s a book called the 
circus show. And it contains acrobat songs. The child watches it and then 
knows who the acrobat is and what a circus is. The words they teach can be 
used in daily life. We had already taken him to a circus.  
 
The parents were suspicious of the content of Disney movies but were not 
suspicious of the content of the Disney English-languge learning kit. Mickey, 
Minnie, Donald, Goofy, and Pluto become an important entry point through which 
two-year-old and three-year-old children begin their English-language learning. In 
my study, the parents allowed their children to watch the same disc, day after day 
and week after week, until the children memorized all the linguistic details of each 
speaker. Lisa tried out book Eight in front of me (the following dialogue was in 
English unless indicated): 
 
Lisa: The second section is about acrobats. “… can we do that?” 
Dorothy: Of course I can. I am an acrobat. 
Lisa: I can hang by one knee. 
Dorothy: I can stand on one hand. 
Lisa: I can swing and …  
Dorothy and Stephanie: … and so can she. 
Lisa: I can fly in the sky, and … 
Dorothy: … and so can I. 
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Lisa and Dorothy: We are the acrobats. 
Lisa: Can you lift a hundred pounds? 
Stephanie (lowering her voice to imitate a man’s voice): Of course I can.  
Lisa: I am a … 
Stephanie (lowers her voice): … a strong man.  
Lisa: I can lift … 
Dorothy and Stephanie: … a hundred pounds. 
(Then Dorothy and Stephanie speak themselves.) 
Dorothy: Can you lift two hundred pounds? 
Stephanie (lowers her voice): Of course I can. I am a strong man.  
Dorothy: Can you lift three hundred pounds? 
Stephanie lowers her voice: Of course I can. I am a strong man.  
Dorothy: Can you lift four hundred pounds? 
Stephanie (lowers her voice): Of course I can. I am a strong man.  
Lisa (to Kim, in Cantonese): Every night is like that. I want to finish it as 
soon as possible and then I can go to sleep. 
Lisa: five hundred, six hundred … 
Dorothy (in Cantonese): No, only the last three are like that, not now! 
(Lisa then follows the book and talks.) 
Dorothy (in Cantonese): No, it’s not like that. You should ask a question, 
not just talk to yourself. 
(Stephanie sings an English song after awhile.)  
Lisa (in Cantonese): She is singing a song from another book. 
Dorothy (in Cantonese): It’s in book Six.  
Lisa (in Cantonese): And she learns the word hippopotamus. 
 
From Lisa’s perspective, the “pure entertainment” of Disney movies contains 
gender stereotypes that would encourage her daughters to think only of marriage; 
the Disney English-language kits, in contrast, are educational and the cultural 
concerns are of secondary importance. On this point, Lisa fielded several of my 
questions: 
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Kim: When I played back the Disney kit’s tape that you tried in front of me, 
I was a bit scared because the children learn not only the pronunciation but 
also what it means to be a man—you know, “I am a strong man.” Have you 
thought about it? 
Lisa: You mean gender stereotypes? No, I have not thought about this 
before. 
Kim: Have you ever worried about this? 
Lisa: For pronunciation, they also watch other English-language learning 
programs, and I hope that they won’t just believe in one system of phonetics. 
As for stereotypes, I always tell them about alternative ways of thinking. 
For example, regarding men, I told them that they just need to find a good 
man to marry and that daddy is a good man. Being a good man means so 
many things: a rich man, a handsome man, or a strong man does not 
necessarily make a good man. 
 
Language acquisition is more important here than cultural issues. While cultural 
critics have criticized the post-Handover use of Putonghua as the medium of 
instruction in Hong Kong schools and have attributed this use to the Mainland’s 
cultural imperialism, Lisa accepted such changes because she considered them 
pragmatic: “What’s the problem? They speak Cantonese at home. Their English and 
Putonghua must be better than ours so that they can earn a living.” We should note 
here that neither were Lisa’s actions the direct result of unconscious acts nor was 
she thoughtlessly adopting other parents’ behaviors. Rather, she understood clearly 
the “lack” that characterized her and her husband; because of their lack of “world 
exposure,” and because of their sub-standard English (the two factors were closely 
related in her eyes), the career choices available to Lisa and her husband were not 
as broad as those choices available to “better” counterparts in society. We spoke 
about this issue: 
 
Lisa: The most ideal case for me is that … they can get a scholarship to 
study overseas. In the globalized world, they should have world exposure. 
Their parents do not have it, and we feel bad about this.  
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… 
Kim: How about Putonghua? 
Lisa: She has not started learning Putonghua, but we found one school for 
her … We accept the idea that Putonghua is the medium of instruction in 
school. What’s the problem? They speak Cantonese at home. Their English 
and their Putonghua must be better than ours so that they can earn a living. 
Kim: Do you think that you can’t earn a living? 
Lisa: Of course I don’t.  
Kim (expressing astonishment at the answer): What do you mean by having 
the ability to “earn a living” then? After all, you know that speaking good 
English and good Putonghua can’t guarantee you a good job. 
Lisa: I don’t know. Let’s say, if my oral Putonghua is as good as a native 
speaker’s, then I can work for Phoenix TV,75 and I won’t need to work for 
TVB Jade, ATV, or Cable. I get more chances. If my English is very good, I 
get more opportunities.… You know, HK’s media. Of eleven Chinese 
newspapers and two English newspapers, only one English newspaper is ok, 
but how come I can’t be one of those top reporters? English is the barrier. I 
am in grade C but they are in grade A. I mean, only grade-A people can 
work at Reuters: I can’t … Actually, if I tell you I’m not a pushy parent, it’s 
a lie. I would very much like them to do something I can’t do. 
Kim: Such as acquiring better English than you and I have? 
Lisa: Yes, because we both know so clearly the limitations of people living 
in Hong Kong. You must have professional skills to survive in this 
globalized world.… For me, children need to leave Hong Kong because, 
you know, [the job market of] Hong Kong will get saturated after twenty 
years. If they don’t have the ability to go outside Hong Kong, their 
development will be more limited than ours. 
Kim: But where does one go? 
Lisa: At least a condition for leaving Hong Kong is language, right? Other 
skills should also be acquired, but the most important thing should be 
language. 
 
The parents in my study attributed their successful ascent on the social ladder to 
academic achievement, but they qualified this success as “partial” and were 
conscious of their “lack,” which hindered their further success in, for example, the 
job market. They also knew that the globalized economy does not empower all 
people; the process empowers a few but dispowers many, depending on whether 
the subjects can be flexible enough to adapt to the globalized environment; for 
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example, flexible enough to speak foreign languages fluently. In our conversations, 
Lisa lamented several times her “sub-standard” English. Lisa had graduated from 
her university thirteen years earlier and had never stopped studying since. After 
earning her bachelor’s degree in history, she completed her law degree and a 
master’s degree in journalism. The former degree reflected Lisa’s interest in the 
field, whereas the latter degree reflected her pragmatic efforts to tune up her 
English.  
Lisa worked as a reporter for two local English newspapers, The Standard 
and The South China Morning Post. After several years, when opportunities for 
promotion at the newspapers grew rare, she changed jobs and became a public 
relations officer. It was in this job that Lisa was working while I was conducting 
my fieldwork on her. Lisa saw herself sometimes as a successful market player and 
sometimes as a failed market player. Whatever the case, it was through her work 
experiences that she continually reinforced her self-reliance ethic, which was the 
key to class advancement or just to “survival.” She had grown to believe that 
Western education, especially English-language acquisition, was a necessary 
condition for “earning a living.”76 Lisa’s workplace experiences had become a 
significant part of the cultural schemas from which she framed her sense of the 
global and the local and from which, therefore, she selected her “strategies of 
action”77 toward her two little daughters. Lisa’s comments on her own lack shed 
light on her intention to build a material and social environment that would shape 
her children’s habits and (language) skills in a way that would successfully prepare 
them for careers in the increasingly competitive labor markets of the transnational 
economy.  
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From Lisa’s perspective, being local is an impediment. For instance, a Hong 
Kong person whose native dialect is Cantonese and who refuses to master English 
or Putonghua will lack the cultural capital necessary for economic viability. 
Bombarded by talk of a dominant global arena and of struggling local arenas, Lisa 
made every effort to shape her two little children into “cosmopolitans” who, rather 
than remain in the “saturated” locale of Hong Kong, could go to and stay in the 
English-speaking world or the Putonghua-speaking world. If being local cannot 
strengthen one’s career options, then such cultural identity loses its importance. 
Convinced that local pop culture is mind-numbing and that Cantonese has no 
economic value, many Hong Kong parents rid their domestic spheres of local pop 
culture and urge children to learn foreign languages (English and Putonghua) 
diligently. 
 
Conclusion 
According to Baudrillard, consumption is based on lack. This may be questionable 
as a general model, and theories of desire as a positive force have much to offer.78 
However, living in a small city, facing an ailing economy, and acknowledging the 
growth in regional and international competition, the parents in my study strongly 
sensed a lack that continues to induce Hong Kong’s high consumption of 
economically valuable cultural goods, including language kits like Disney’s. The 
consumption patterns of middle class families indicate that consumption is not just 
about leisure and lifestyle in symbolic and material terms but also about fulfilling 
the changing and adaptive local cultural imaginary, which accords preference to the 
cosmopolitan figure who uses global cultural capital to navigate the world.  
It is evident that these parents do not accept Disney values as a total cultural 
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package and that they are partially successful in negotiating and resisting certain 
cultural meanings offered by Disney. In the “cultural supermarket,”79 it seems that 
parents can select their favorite cultural products for their child-rearing practices. 
However, consumer power is not absolute. Because a few transnational 
conglomerates dominate the media market and because parents cannot access with 
equal ease the offerings of all cultures, parents will find it much easier to “choose” 
which particular Disney merchandise to consume than not to consume any Disney 
products at all; because parents’ consumption of a particular culture is determined 
largely by the culture’s market value, they have greater agency to decide to use or 
not to use Disney learning kits than they do to choose not to teach children English 
or Putonghua. Consumer agency, in this sense, is constrained by both the media 
and cultural domination of Disney and the global order. At the same time, parents’ 
consumption behavior reinforces cultural hegemony in a specific way. As the 
economic viability of local identity (being Heung Gong Yan) decreases, Hong 
Kong’s middle class parents actively and reflexively purchase those glocalized 
products that address their cosmopolitan desires, that amplify their economic and 
social needs, and that forge meaningful and distinguishable social identities and 
relations. As a way for these parents to maintain their privileged but insecure local 
class positioning, such local actions not only maintain local class disparity but 
reproduce a relatively low level of local cultural and media consumption in relation 
to the intensive use of global commercial media products.  
In this sense, the relations between the local and the global are more 
dynamic and more complicated than we might expect. In order to understand these 
parents’ consumption practices in terms of cultural globalization, we need to 
consider them from four perspectives. First, there is always the consumerist, fun-
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seeking element in Disney—no cultural imperialism writ large, but part of a range 
of such diversionary practices churned out by global culture today. The parents in 
my study occasionally purchased expensive, globally sourced diversions, and in 
this, the parents’ behavior was not resistant.  
Second, I suspect that the Disneyfied consumerist landscapes such as 
shopping malls, merchandising, and Disney animation are a contested site for a 
more mundane moral project of passing on moral guidelines and of teaching and 
learning how to be a human being. Here, parents’ resistance to Disney’s promotion 
of consumerist behavior and their locally inspired family standards regarding 
screen violence, mischief, and morals might offer some resistance to globalized 
consumption on the one hand, and a reassertion of local mundane morality on the 
other.  
Third, the parents in my study used cultural goods self-consciously to 
achieve class distinction; their aspiration to become modern and cosmopolitan was, 
like the process itself, laden with the local class context and the parents’ lived sense 
of their experiences of upward mobility. Parents’ use of Disney (and other) products 
is a way in which parents solidify their distinctive position in a newly proclaimed 
global order. Uptake is not equal to resistance.80 When a local university graduate 
cannot get a job in a prestigious local hotel because of his or her lack of non-local 
experiences and non-local ideas, then the local culture and the local identity must—
precisely in order to be successful—give way to a particular kind of 
“cosmopolitan” under the real and perceived imperatives of a globalized 
economy.81 At this point, some members of the local community actively and 
consciously begin to acquire globalizing cultural capital (such as proficiency in 
certain languages) and these “local” actions develop a distinctively pragmatist 
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cosmopolitanism devoted to the accumulation of economically viable cultural 
capital.  
Fourth, this cultural consumption is also a local identity project involving 
two facets; the government’s re-deployment of cultural symbols and ordinary 
people’s own local use of these. The parents in my study fit the HKSAR 
government’s imagineering project in that they try their best to become the modern, 
competitive, cosmopolitan beings promoted by the government after the Handover.  
Parents are turning their children into cosmopolitans who can “earn a 
living” in the world’s near-future workforce. In this sense, the conscious 
acquisition of “foreign” languages through consuming Disney and other education 
kits reconstitutes the deterritorialized hybridity of local Hong Kong culture and 
heightens Hong Kong’s  “cosmopolitan” ways of life. Unfortunately, such ways of 
life are not the ways of life that many scholars attribute to cosmopolitanism, if by 
this we mean that people consider themselves world citizens, concern themselves 
with all humanity, and respect cultural pluralism based on democracy.82 Language 
is the core of a culture, but one’s knowledge of a language does not transform one 
into a proud bearer of the language’s corresponding culture; language acquisition 
does not equal cultural competence. Parents who ask their children to excel in 
English do not want their children to excel in individualism and democracy; instead, 
these parents’ child-rearing methods emphasize hierarchical parent-child relations 
in which the child embodies obedience.   
I suspect that the hierarchical parenting method works in tandem with 
government’s authoritarian regime, and parents’ currency-based evaluation of local 
culture also coincides with the government’s city planning of Hong Kong, whereby 
Hong Kong should develop as a world city based on consumption instead of civil 
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citizenship. As Ku argues, the postcolonial HKSAR government reinterprets Hong 
Kong history as an economic success story.83 To maintain this economic miracle, 
the HKSAR government strives to develop Hong Kong into a world-class city 
comparable to London and New York, and such a city must provide “soft and hard 
infrastructure” and an improved business environment84 for “multinational 
companies and Mainland enterprises.”85 Therefore, the task at hand for Hong Kong 
is to establish rule of law, efficient administration, political stability, and language 
proficiency in English and Putonghua. The interests of transnational corporations 
are protected by low tax rates, minimal government control, minimal disclosure 
requirements on businesses, and discouragement of union membership. Hong Kong 
will be an optimal space in which transnational corporations can do business. 
Nothing serious is said, however, about the desirability of a local community whose 
values stray outside the laws of supply and demand. 
HKDL was built under such circumstances. Putting the deal together in 
secrecy, the government, without public consultation, withdrew HK$22.95 billion 
from the public coffers to sign the deal with the Walt Disney Company, financing 
10% in return for a 43% stake. After the Asian financial crisis, the HKSAR 
government admitted that Hong Kong’s bubble economy had burst. Trying to 
recoup from the downturn, the government promised (1) to restructure Hong 
Kong’s economy, on the basis of consumerism, from a reliance on the property 
market to tourism development and (2) to commodify the city into a dreamscape 
for “touristic voyeurism.”86 Through the Disneyland project, the government 
successfully but temporarily builds its own legitimacy and redefines Hong Kong’s 
distinction from China in terms based not on political aspirations but on cultural, 
cosmopolitan and consumption-based ways of life. 
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Agency in regulating Hong Kong’s cultural consumption does not equate to 
democracy; self-assertion in commodity culture is not the same as human rights. 
Consumption of certain Disney products in a certain way is an acceptance, a 
resistance, or an uptake, depending on which perspective we emphasize, but it 
cannot be equated to political resistance. Many consumption studies have deployed 
the concept of agency, but as I have tried to suggest, it is not a useful concept when 
it is predicated on a continuum that lacks built-in gradations and conditions. The 
consumption of Disney goods, like that of any good, can be a site of both liberation 
and domination, depending on what aspects of power the researcher addresses. 
Hong Kong families’ consumption of Disney goods does not necessarily reflect a 
love for Disney’s conception of family, child development, and morality; but Hong 
Kong parents’ consumption of certain Disney products does forge a link to their 
aspiration to realize a particular type of “good life” with cultural and political 
effects.  
Parents hope to mold their children into the type of pragmatist cosmopolitan 
who has little contact with local popular culture (the relatively low-cultural-capital 
world of cheap commodities targeted at child consumers) but who can access the 
relatively high-cultural-capital world of expensive commodities (piano lessons, 
fluency in English and in Putonghua) that all but determine where one lives, what 
one eats, what one listens to, and so on. I must admit that this pragmatist 
cosmopolitanism has little to do with not only citizenship rights, but also belonging, 
commitment, and the passion of a community. As Turner asks, 
 
What is HK ‘life-style’? A taste for fashion, gossip magazines and karaoke? 
A paradise for consumers and polluters? Or does life-style suggest 
something deeper, perhaps the subjective texture of identity? Is life-style 
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like citizenship, the rights of association and forms of representation that 
underlie civil society, and make it possible for citizens to shape policies of 
common concern? Or is life-style like fashion, changing from moment to 
moment?87  
 
When a community believes in authoritarian parenting, and has relatively little 
agency, commitment, and passion to protest against corporatism, against “expert 
system”88 solutions, and against dictatorial planning for tourism development,89 it is 
hard to imagine how parents’ ambivalent attitudes and consumption practices 
toward Disney products (sometimes acceptance, sometimes resistance, and 
sometimes appropriation) might target the corporate transformation of the 
community into a dreamscape. We have the right to choose neither which 
companies and which experts plan our city, nor which type of government and 
which representatives decide our community’s present and future. Our right to 
choose is limited to consumer products. In democracy’s cities, citizens may fall into 
the habit of thinking that consumers should make choices on the basis of 
professional advice, rather than be active producers of knowledge.90 In Hong Kong, 
the public does not have the right to choose between political parties, and no 
cultural supermarket can provide products that compensate for a lack of both 
formal democratic citizenship rights and passion for community. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
                                                
1
 Gordon Mathews, Global Culture / Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the 
Cultural Supermarket (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 144. 
2
 Scholars differ over who belongs to the middle class and over middle class 
characteristics. According to Lui Tai Lok and Jimmy Wong Chi Tsing, although 
  
248 
                                                                                                                                   
scholars use different theoretical frameworks when defining the middle class (some 
subscribe chiefly to Marxism whereas others prefer Weber’s theories), their 
research subjects are similar: namely, the “new class” members emerging in 
contemporary capitalist society—in particular, people working in administrative, 
managerial, or other professional capacities. Lui and Wong argue that middle class 
members are not the classical bourgeoisie, whom we would now call “capitalists,” 
those who played an important role in the transitional period from feudal society to 
capitalist society; nor are “middle class” members now the petite bourgeoisie, the 
self-employed who exist in both traditional and modern society. They list three 
characteristics of the members of the middle class: first, they do not own capital or 
the means of production, nor do they control the whole work process; second, 
nowadays, many of the middle class rely on their own academic or professional 
qualifications, or on their accumulated work experiences, to achieve better 
employment conditions (such as the opportunity to participate in company 
decision-making, a relatively high level of autonomy in their work, a high salary, 
better welfare, and more job security); third, the so-called “middle” position of the 
middle class derives from its middling status between capitalists and employees in 
general, such that their employment conditions and living standards are better than 
those of employees in general. In this thesis, I adopt Lui and Wong’s framework to 
select my middle class. respondents. See 呂大樂, 王志錚, 香港中產階級處境觀察 
(香港: 三聯書店 (香港) 有限公司, 2003), pp. 3-5.   
3
 John Hannigan, Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis 
(London, NY: Routledge, 1998), p. 185, 190. 
4
 Michael Eisner, “Planetized Entertainment,” New Perspectives Quarterly 12, issue 
4  (1995), p. 8, quoted from Henry A. Giroux, The Mouse That Roared: Disney and 
the End of Innocence (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 29; Ma Sheng-mei, 
The Deathly Embrace: Orientalism and Asian American Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 133. Disney icon Mickey Mouse and 
Disney animated movies provide ample examples of the company’s support of 
individualism. Michael Eisner, the ex-Chief Executive Officer of the Walt Disney 
Company said Mickey Mouse imparts a “diversity of individual opportunity, 
individual choice and individual expression, [and that] for viewers around the 
world, America is the place where the individual has a chance to make a better life 
and to have political and economic freedom.” Ma Sheng-mei argues that many 
Disney animated-cartoon heroines in the 1990s, including Belle, Little Mermaid, 
Jasmine, Pocahontas, and Mulan, are from different racial backgrounds but that 
they all desire autonomy and contribute no substantive cultural differences to the 
corresponding film.  
5
 Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, “The New Rich in Asia: Economic 
Development, Social Status and Political Consciousness,” in The New Rich in Asia: 
Mobile Phones, McDonald’s and Middle-Class Revolution, edited by Robison and 
Goodman (London, NY: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-18; 呂大樂, 王志錚, 香港中產階
級處境觀察 (香港: 三聯書店 (香港) 有限公司, 2003); 陳昭偉 and others, 七一的
中產論述 (香港: 基層大學, 2003); SynergyNet website, 
http://www.synergynet.org.hk/en_main.htm (accessed 16 February 2007). Richard 
Robison and David S. G. Goodman argue that the Asian middle class plays a 
  
249 
                                                                                                                                   
decisive role in political transformation. Local scholars have different views on the 
role that middle class members play in political transformation. Lui Tai Lok and Ng 
Chun Hung argue that Hong Kong’s democratic movement is doomed to failure if 
it relies on middle class populations, whether conservative or otherwise; whereas 
Anthony Cheung views the reliance as a positive strategy. He established 
SynergyNet and argues for “better governance reforms.”  
6
 The Trade Development Council, starting in 2003, has aimed to transform Hong 
Kong into the “Consumption City of China.” Here I appropriate the term while 
adding the word ‘Disney’. “Hong Kong: China’s Consumption City,” 1 October 
2003, from Economic Forum, Hong Kong Trade Development Council website: 
http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/bea/bea031001.htm (accessed 16 February 
2007). 
7
 Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), “HK a Magnet for 
Luxury Retailers,” press release on 1 December 2004, 
http://news.gov.hk/en/category/ontherecord/041201/html/041201en11001.htm 
(accessed 16 February 2007). 
8
 “‘We Love HK’ Campaign Ends with a Great Success,” 2003, 
http://www.welovehongkong.com/success.asp?lang=EN (accessed 16 February 
2007); “We Love HK,” 6 May 2003, http://www.bar.org.hk/news.htm (accessed 5 
July 2005).  
9
 Sangmee Bak, “McDonald’s in Seoul: Food Choices, Identity, and Nationalism,” 
in Golden Arches East: McDonald’s in East Asia, edited by Watson (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 150-151. 
10
 Chua Beng-Huat, “Consuming Asians: Ideas and Issues,” in Consumption in Asia: 
Lifestyles and Identities, edited by Chua (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), pp. 11-3. 
11
 In 2005, there were 133 shopping malls managed by the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority among 177 public housing estates and 192 subsidized housing estates. 
Hong Kong Housing Department, “Residential Properties,” 
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/en/residential (accessed 19 September 2005). 
12
 Shatin’s population increased from 30,000 residents in the 1970s to about 
640,000 according to the 2001 census. 
13
 In 2005, New Town Plaza contained sixty restaurants, one hundred and twenty-
four fashion stores, forty-four beauty parlors and pharmacy stores, twenty-six gift 
shops and bookshops, four department stores, fifteen electrical appliance stores, 
thirty-one jewelry shops, twenty-nine home furnishings, thirteen travel agencies, 
and twenty-three banks and mobile service shops. Because of its sheer size, the 
mall is able to hold exhibitions, performances, and even car shows inside its walls. 
14
 Synergy can be understood as a combined action among individual units. It is 
Disney’s key strategy. The Disney brand derives from Disney’s movies and 
merchandise. In 1955, Disney established Disneyland and based the park’s 
attractions on Disney’s own created characters and brands. The introduction of 
Disneyland on American Broadcasting Company (ABC) further promoted the 
Disney brand. 
15
 The first Disney Store opened in Glendale Galleria in Glendale, California in 
  
250 
                                                                                                                                   
1987. About 535 Disney Stores have opened in eleven countries. See Judy Chung 
Chuihua, “Disney Space,” in Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping, edited by 
Chung and others (TASCHEN: Koln, 2001), p. 292. 
16
 Activities include cooperation with the Agricultural and Fisheries Department in 
holding a survival camp for children and various competitions for primary and high 
school students. Disney “volunteer” activities can be found on its website, 
http://corporate.hongkongdisneyland.com/discover/community.html (accessed 18 
July 2005).  
17
 This was the first time that the Housing Authority (HKHA) organized a function 
for 131 malls. Mr. K. F. Cheung, General Manager of Commercial Properties, 
HKHA, said in Financial Report (22 December 2002, TVB Jade, Hong Kong) that 
the Christmas functions cost over HK$1 million. The HKHA would like more 
people to visit their malls and to increase shop sales. Cheung said that the HKHA 
held similar functions at fifty malls during Easter 2002 and that these activities, 
together, resulted in a 50% to 70% rise in the number of participants. Some areas 
even increased by about 100%. Cheung predicted in Financial Report (22 
December 2002, TVB Jade, Hong Kong) that the people flows would increase by 
one hundred percent on the next occasion because it would be the largest such 
event to date. 
18
 Alexandra A. Seno, “A Craze for Disney Chic Sweeps Hong Kong,” 15 
September 2005, International Herald Tribune, 
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/09/14/opinion/rdisney.p
hp (accessed 16 February 2007). 
19
 Intellectual Property Department (HKSAR government), 
http://www.ipd.gov.hk/eng/promotion_edu/no_fakes/nfretailer/Toys&Gifts.pdf 
(accessed 7 July 2005). 
20
 Giordano has more than 1,500 shops operating in thirty-one territories worldwide, 
http://www.giordano.com.hk/web/HK/ourCompany.html (accessed 15 April 2006).  
21
 Mike Schneider, “Disney Icon Mickey Mouse Turns 75,” 18 November 2003, AP 
Entertainment, http://www.newsday.com/entertainment/news/wire/sns-ap-mickey-
at-75,0,116499.story?coll=sns-ap-entertainment-headlines (accessed 17 February 
2007).  
22
 Jonathan Weber, “The Ever-expanding, Profit-maximizing, Cultural-imperialist, 
Wonder World of Disney: the Serious Business of Selling All-American Fun,” 
Wired, issue 10.02 (February 2002), p. 75. 
23
 “With Digital Technology, There Is Room for Small Players Too,” 19 November 
1998, Economist.com, 
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=176659 (accessed 
14 July 2005). Steve Jobs, the Chairman and the CEO of Pixar Animation Studios, 
claimed that Pixar’s computer-animated techniques reduced the movie’s production 
costs greatly. With traditional techniques, the film would have cost between 
US$100m and US$125m, but with Pixar techniques, the cost was between US$75m 
and US$100m.  
  
251 
                                                                                                                                   
24
 Box Office Mojo website: 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=toystory.htm (accessed 17 February 
2007). 
25
 C. W. Nevius, “Pixar Tells Story Behind Toy Story,” 23 August 2005, San 
Francisco Chronicle, http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/08/23/BAGDKEBPAB1.DTL (accessed 7 February 
2007). 
26
 Alan Bryman, The Disneyization of Society (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
2004), p. 157.  
27
 According to Mitchell’s findings, 80% of respondents in the 1960s identified 
their spouse as their major source of emotional support; and Chan and Lee 
confirmed Mitchell’s argument in the mid 1990s; Lui’s survey in 1992 found that 
around 60% of respondents viewed “family” as the most important area in life. See 
Robert E. Mitchell, Family Life in Urban Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Survey 
Research Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1969); Chan Hoi Man and 
Rance P.L. Lee, “Hong Kong Families: At the Crossroads of Modernism and 
Traditionalism,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 26, issue 1 (1995), pp. 83-
99; Lui Tai Lok, “Work and Work Values,” in Indicators of Social Development: 
Hong Kong 1990, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992), p. 112.  
28
 Lee Ming Kwan found that although fewer Hong Kong people feel the need and 
the obligation to have children than in the past, and that although people widely 
shared doubts about having children and sacrificing for them, most still endorse the 
belief that “marriage without children is not fully complete.” Lee Ming Kwan, “The 
Family Way,” in Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1993, edited by 
Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995), p. 4.  
29
 Ng Chun Hung, “New Directions in Cultural Studies,” in Culture and Society in 
Hong Kong, edited by Sinn (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 1995), p. 15. 
30
 State policies reflect an increasing concern for the shielding of children from 
abuse in the workplace and at home: for instance, the instigation of six-year free 
and compulsory primary education in 1971, the nine-year compulsory education in 
1980, and the establishment of the Charter for Youth in 1993. See Ng Chun Hung, 
“New Directions in Cultural Studies,” p. 15. 
31
 Ng found that regardless of class differences, 77.6% of respondents agreed with 
the idea that “parents should plan for children’s futures and should be frugal in their 
own entertainment and consumption.” See Ng Chun Hung, “Consumption and 
Hong Kong Way of Life,” in Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1993, 
edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: HK Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995), p. 349. 
32
 As mentioned in Chapter Four’s endnote, I invited Cathy to be my interviewee in 
2003, and between 2003 and 2006, I conducted four formal interviews with her. In 
these interviews, I asked her opinion on Hong Kong Disneyland, Disney movies 
and merchandise, parenting methods, and house rules. For details, see endnote 13 in 
chapter Four. 
  
252 
                                                                                                                                   
33
 As I mentioned in chapter Four, between 2005 and 2006, I conducted four formal 
interviews with Lisa. In the interviews, I asked her about her views on Disney, 
Hong Kong Disneyland, Disney merchandise, Disney’s World of English, and her 
parenting methods. For details, see endnote 20 in chapter Four.  
34
 Annie Chan Hau Nung, “Middle-class Formation and Consumption in Hong 
Kong,” in Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities, edited by Chua (London, 
NY: Routledge, 2000), pp. 98-134. The term pragmatist refers to people who hold 
a more practical attitude toward consumption. It is borrowed from Chan, p. 108. 
35
 Jumpin Gym U.S.A. first launched their “family entertainment center” (FEC) in 
June 1994. It is the largest operator of an FEC business in Hong Kong. There are 
more than fifty shops in Hong Kong, and the firm plans to other countries. Because 
Jumpin Gym U.S.A. provides games for adults and children, and because the better 
you play, the more stamps you can collect to exchange for products, Jumpin Gym 
U.S.A. is popular among families. However, parents in my study do not like 
bringing their children to Jumpin Gym U.S.A. because they find the costs 
prohibitive and the environment too noisy for children’s well being. See “Company 
Profile,” http://www.jumpingym.com/eng/index_cp.htm (accessed 2 June 2007). 
36
 See Annamma Joy, “Gift Giving in Hong Kong and the Continuum of Social 
Ties,” Journal of Consumer Research 28, issue 2 (2001) pp. 239-56; Joseph Bosco, 
“The McDonald’s Snoopy Craze in Hong Kong,” in Consuming Hong Kong, edited 
by Mathews and Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp. 263-86. 
Hong Kong people practice a gift-giving custom, and gift giving in Hong Kong 
typically involves parents and adults who give gifts not to each other but to children 
(Joy 2001). It is common that if my friend or relative has a child, I would buy gifts 
for the child instead of for the adult, because children do not have money to spend 
on their favorite products. In my study, it was also found that many Disney 
products are purchased not by parents themselves but by their friends or relatives.  
37
 To enrich my study’s conclusiveness, I conducted two group interviews with 
nursery students, aged four to five, in a nursery school in June 2005. These students 
were from various class backgrounds: half of these students lived in private or 
home-ownership housing estates and half received, directly or indirectly, financial 
subsidies from the government. Among the mothers of children taking subsidies, 
some were not permanent Hong Kong citizens and carried a double-permit entry to 
enter Hong Kong to take care of their children. I found that all ten children with 
whom I talked recognized and had their favorite Disney characters, such as Mickey, 
Minnie, Winnie the Pooh, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, Snow White, and Little 
Mermaid. Most of them also noticed the upcoming opening of Hong Kong 
Disneyland in September 2005. They even could identify rides inside the park 
because their teachers, who reviewed with the students important local news once a 
week, had once told them about HKDL’s opening and about the park’s facilities. In 
two focus-group interviews, I made a particularly interesting finding: when I asked 
these children why they loved certain Disney characters, many did not answer my 
question but told me immediately what merchandise they had. 
38
 As I mentioned in an endnote of chapter Four, Judy was a feminist freelance 
writer. Born in the early 1960s and coming from a humble background, Judy had 
few chances to go to movies when she was small. Disney characters such as 
  
253 
                                                                                                                                   
Mickey and Donald Duck were not her favorites. As social activists, Judy and 
Jacob expressed to me their anger over the wide gap between rich and poor and 
their abhorrence of big companies’ profit-making practices. For details, see endnote 
25 in chapter Four.  
39
 As I mentioned in an endnote of chapter Four, I conducted three interviews with 
Betty between 2005 and 2006. In the interviews, I asked her about her opinion on 
Disney movies, Disney’s World of English, and HKDL. For details, see endnote 14 
in chapter Four. 
40
 When I visited Betty’s home the first time, what surprised me upon my first 
glimpse of her apartment was not the vast array of Disney merchandise placed in 
the living room, but the many Hello Kitty and Little Twin Stars ornaments placed 
inside a big cupboard at the very entrance. Betty said she loved Japanese cartoon 
characters more than Disney characters.    
41
 Born in the early 1960s, Ada was also from a humble background. She seldom 
watched Disney cartoons; however, when a small child, she was an ardent fan of 
TV’s Popeye the Sailorman. After high school graduation, Ada studied social 
welfare at the polytechnic and worked as a social welfare worker and as an inbound 
and outbound tourist guide before getting married. After getting married, Ada 
worked as a homemaker. Her husband Andy worked as a senior-ranking engineer 
in a Japan-based transnational consumer-products company in Hong Kong. Quite 
demanding, his work sometimes required that he fly to Japan. Ada then bore the 
sole responsibility of the everyday child-rearing practices. Between 2002 and 2006, 
I had three formal interviews with Ada. In late 2002, I first interviewed Ada and 
her daughter Angel in a McDonald’s restaurant. At that time, Angel was seven 
years old and was studying in Primary two. In late 2003, I visited Ada, Angel, and 
Andy in their home and looked at lots of Angel’s photos, some of which were of 
Tokyo Disneyland in 2000. The third interview took place in a restaurant nearby 
Angel’s school in early 2006, and Ada and Angel shared with me their HKDL 
experiences.  
42
 Digimon is a Japanese TV animated cartoon series. Adrian liked Digimon, 
whereas Catherine disapproved of Adrian’s exposure to the series because of its 
Japanese militarist mentality. There are four TV series of Digimon 01, namely 
Digimon (2001), Digimon Zero Two (2002), Digimon Tamers (2003), and Digimon 
Frontier (2004).  
43
 Many Disney Stores were closed, and the last one, the flagship store located in 
Tsim Sha Tsui, finally closed its doors on 4 September 2005. See 羅羽庭, “迪士尼
店結業 半價清貨,” 2 September 2005, Hong Kong Economic Times, A16. 
44
 Stephen Kline, Out of the Garden: Toys, TV, and Children’s Culture in the Age of 
Marketing (London: Verso, 1993). 
45
 Over half of the local respondents in a 1990 survey agreed that the government 
should exercise tighter control over the content of television. See Joseph Chan Man 
and Paul S.N. Lee, “Mass Communication: Consumption and Evaluation,” in 
Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990, edited by Lau and others 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, 1992), pp. 91-2. 
  
254 
                                                                                                                                   
46
 Stuart Cunningham and Elizabeth Jacka, “Neighbourly Relations? Cross-cultural 
Reception Analysis and Australian Soaps in Britain,” in Media in Global Context: 
A Reader, edited by Sreberny-Mohammadi and others (London, NY: Arnold, 1997), 
p. 308. 
47
 Choi Po King and Lee Ching Kwan, “The Hidden Abode of Domestic Labour: 
The Case of Hong Kong,” in Engendering Hong Kong Society: A Gender 
Perspective of Women’s Status, edited by Cheung (Hong Kong: Chinese University 
Press, 1997), pp. 157-99. 
48
 蔡穎儀, “看與不看—媽媽為何不再與我看恐怖片？” in 差異與平等: 香港婦
女運動的新挑戰, edited by 陳錦華, 黃結梅, 梁麗清, 李偉儀, 何芝君 (香港: 新婦
女協進會, 香港理工大學應用社會科學系社會政策研究中心, 2001), pp. 211-6.  
49
 甘翠萍, 馮幸玲, “從廣告看母親角色與婦女自主、解放的衝突” in 差異與平
等: 香港婦女運動的新挑戰, edited by 陳錦華, 黃結梅, 梁麗清, 李偉儀, 何芝君 
(香港: 新婦女協進會, 香港理工大學應用社會科學系社會政策研究中心, 2001), 
p. 206. Gan and Xing found that women respondents always suppressed their 
individual preferences to their mothering roles. When they were asked what they 
thought about the media’s portrayal of women, they immediately declared that 
some images are obscene and have a bad influence on children. Even though they 
found some advertisements attractive, they would worry about the susceptibility of 
their children’s subconscious to negative influences therein. As a result, the women 
acted as gatekeepers and suppressed their own sexual desires.  
50
 Joseph Chan Man and Paul S.N. Lee, “Mass Communication: Consumption and 
Evaluation,” in Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990, edited by Lau 
and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, 1992), p. 96. Chan and Lee found that over 70% of 
Hong Kong households possessed a VCR in the eighties.  
51
 There are exceptions: The Lion King (1994) and The Little Mermaid (1989) were 
accused of presenting gratuitously sexual images.  
52
 Bionicle is an adventure story created by Lego. A place called Mata Nui was once 
a paradise but then becomes a place of darkness and fear. The six heroes need to 
gather Masks of Power to challenge Makuta, the ruler. As does Disney, Bionicle 
contains movies, toys, books, and comics. For details, please see 
http://www.lego.com/eng/bionicle/default.asp (accessed 12 July 2005).  
53
 Besides Disney movies, Jacob encouraged Leo to watch Miyazaki’s Japanese 
animated movies, such as Spirited Away (2001), Nausicaä of the Valley of Wind 
(1984), and Castle in the Sky (1986), and the local production McMug. Once we 
three brought Leo and another child to watch an African animated cartoon shown at 
the Hong Kong International Film Festival. 
54
 I borrow the term “Chinese traditionalism” from Chan Hoi Man and Rance P. L. 
Lee. They argue that although Hong Kong people can no longer abide by 
Confucianism, its ethical tenets have become part of the social norms in everyday 
life in Hong Kong society. See Chan Hoi Man and Rance P. L. Lee, “Hong Kong 
Families: At the Crossroads of Modernism and Traditionalism,” Journal of 
Comparative Family Studies 26, issue 1 (1995), p. 83.  
  
255 
                                                                                                                                   
55
 As described by the official Disney website, “Disney Insider,” Tinker Bell has 
become a Disney icon second only to Mickey Mouse himself, 
http://disney.go.com/inside/issues/stories/v050920.html (accessed 17 February 
2007). 
56
 For example, on 12 July 2002, there was a TV promo about Lilo & Stitch on 
TVB-Pearl at night. The promo focused on five attractive qualities of the film Lilo 
& Stitch: first its realistic portrayal of “foreign culture tradition” such as Hawaii’s 
spiritual culture, dance style, surfing, and energy; second the Disney values of 
“love prevails” in our world; third the rhythmic voice and music; fourth the 
refreshing and nostalgic drawing style that, harkening back to early Disney, has no 
straight lines and a water-color background; fifth the 100% original Disney 
character creation.  
57
 East Touch magazine: vol. 362 (9 May, 2002); vol. 371 (11 July 2002); vol. 372 
(18 July 2002). 
58
 Milk magazine: vol. 49 (27 June 2002); vol. 50 (4 July 2002); vol. 51 (11 July 
2002). 
59
 TVB Weekly: vol. 266 (25 June 2002); vol. 267 (2 July 2002). 
60
 Ming Po Children Weekly: vol. 614 (28 June 2002). 
61
 X-kids Express Weekly: vol. 378 (28 June 2002). 
62
 There were over twenty one designs of the Lilo & Stitch tee-shirt in the Times 
Square Bossini shop in June and July 2002. 
63
 During 20 June and 14 July 2002, in the mall Silvercord in Tsim Sha Tsui, a 
purchase of over HK$300 dollars was awarded a Stitch cushion; a purchase of over 
HK$500 dollars was awarded a Stitch cushion and one movie ticket. 
64
 Motion Picture Industry Association website: 
http://www.mpia.org.hk/mpia/indexc.htm (accessed 15 July 2006). 
65
 There were nine Disney Stores in 2002 but one after another closed its doors. 
One new Disney Store opened in the Chep Lap Kok airport and only three (Tsim 
Sha Tsui and two in an airport) remained open by 2004. The store underwent a 
name change, from “Disney Store” to “The Magic of Hong Kong Disneyland.” 
66
 This fieldwork took place at the Times Square Disney Store, Causeway Bay, 
during lunchtime on 14 July 2002. 
67
 This fieldwork took place at Hollywood Plaza Disney Store, Diamond Hill, about 
6 p.m. on 15 July 2002. 
68
 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977). According to Bourdieu, habitus is a set of “durable 
dispositions” (p. 85) which generates “schemes of perception, conception, and 
action common to all members of the same group” (p. 86), and thus “produces 
individual and collective practices, and hence history” (p. 82). Since habitus is 
acquired through family, school experiences (p. 87), and interpersonal relations (p. 
81), it is a class-oriented and collective phenomenon. In my study of the five 
middle class families, all eight parents emphasize the importance of providing a 
  
256 
                                                                                                                                   
good “environment” for their children. The good environment includes: good 
family relationship; healthy food provision (all five families usually have their 
dinner at home, and in the extreme case of Lisa’s family they only go out for dining 
during festivals); good manners (all the families practice a “no rough language” 
policy at home); good schooling (all the children go to good schools and four study 
in traditional famous schools); and a regular wake-up, study, and sleeping schedule. 
However, there are also internal differences among these five families. As feminists, 
Judy and Jacob emphasize egalitarian parent-child relationships whereas the other 
four families emphasize hierarchical parent-child relationship. In this chapter, I 
have space only to focus on the parents’ provision of a good English-learning 
environment.    
69
 University of Western Sydney and Australian Broadcasting Authority, Children’s 
Views about Media Harm. Monograph 10 (New South Wales: Australian 
Broadcasting Authority, 2000). 
70
 This edutainment merchandise includes numerous Disney videos that teach 
counting and letters to infants (Winnie the Pooh 123’s: Discovering Numbers and 
Counting and Winnie the Pooh ABC’s: Discovering Letters and Words), interactive 
learning kit in a CD-ROM format (Disney Learning Kindergarten), activity books 
for small children (Tarzan Multi-activity Book and The Prince of Egypt Sticker 
Adventure Book), storybooks with DVDs (Disney’s Sing Along Songs series with 
different characters such as Pooh, the Lion King, princesses, Mickey, Brother Bear, 
and Peter Pan), the CD Read Along with bilingual storybooks (Monsters, Inc., Toy 
Story, Beauty and the Beast, etc.), and the widely advertised, expensive, and 
popular Disney’s World of English set, which contains storybook sets, CDs, DVDs, 
a scanner for word-card scanning, and games. 
71
 Oliver Chan Wing Sang, Intra-Familial Resources Allocation and Leisure 
Pursuits among Married Couples in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University, 1999). Chan’s qualitative research on the views of leisure 
among the twenty-five married individuals across different classes and family life-
cycle stages found that the families with children would save money for their 
children’s living environment and education, and that the low income couples with 
dependent children were reluctant to spend money on themselves but willing to 
spend money on children’s unnecessary items such as music.  
72
 Ada chose to use not Disney’s World of English but Longman’s English learning 
kit because Disney’s set is far more expensive than Longman’s: the former costs 
around HK$40,000 whereas the latter less than HK$2,000. Because Angel likes 
reading, her room is full of books, some in English and some in Chinese, and from 
different publishers including Disney. 
73
 In 2003, the median monthly household income in Hong Kong was HK$15,500. 
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 2004 
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 2004), p. 40.  
74
 World Family Shopping website, 
http://shopping.worldfamily.com.tw/wfshop/about.asp (accessed 8 July 2005). 
75
  In Hong Kong, there are four free TV channels: TVB-Jade (in Cantonese), ATV 
(in Cantonese), TVB-Pearl (in English), and ATV-World (in English). Starting in 
  
257 
                                                                                                                                   
the 1990s, different pay-TV channels became available, such as Star TV and 
Phoenix TV: the former is an English channel whereas the latter, a Putonghua 
channel. 
76
 See Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 95; Johanna Waters, “Flexible 
Citizens? Transnationalism and Citizenship amongst Economic Immigrants in 
Vancouver,” The Canadian Geographer 47, issue 3 (2003), p. 227. Both Ong’s 
study and Waters’ study argue that Chinese immigrants consider the command of 
English to be crucial capital in the quest for “cosmopolitan” being.   
77
 Ann Swidler, Talk of Love: How Culture Matters (Chicago, London: University 
of Chicago, 2001), p. 82. I borrow the term “strategies of action” from Ann Swidler. 
The meaning of “strategies of action” concerns the patterns of behavior that emerge 
when “actors routinely go about attaining their goals.”  
78
 Elizabeth Grosz, Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 179. Elizabeth Grosz argues that desire has often 
been considered a lack, from Plato to Freud and Lacan; in contrast, some 
philosophers since Spinoza have considered desire a production. In her words, 
“Desire is the force of positive production, the action that creates things, makes 
alliances, and forges interactions.”  
79
 The term “cultural supermarket” is from Gordon Mathews, “Cultural Identity and 
Consumption in Post-colonial Hong Kong,” in Consuming Hong Kong, edited by 
Mathews and Lui (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp. 287-318.  
80
 On the concept of uptake, see Anne Freadman, “Anyone for Tennis?” in Genre 
and the New Rhetoric, edited by Freedman and Medway (London, Bristol: Taylor 
& Francis, 1994), pp. 43-66; “Uptake,” in The Rhetoric and Ideology of Genre: 
Strategies for Stability and Change, edited by Coe, Lingard, and Teslenko 
(Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, 2002), pp. 39-53. 
81
 According to William Mackay, Regional Vice President and General Manager of 
Four Seasons Hotel Hong Kong, 90% of the hotel’s 850 employees are Hong Kong 
residents who share a similar background; these employees have studied or lived in 
foreign countries in the past and can both speak the local dialect (Cantonese) and 
draw on their exposure to foreign cultures. See 喬菁華, “國際化學生,” 24 August 
2005, Ming Pao Daily News, D07. 
82
 On whether cosmopolitanism can help develop democracy and “moral economy” 
if cosmopolitanism means a lack of social solidarity, commitment, and belonging, 
see Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism,” in Nationalism and Its 
Future, edited by Özkirimli (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 93-126.  
83
 Agnes Ku Shuk Mei, “Postcolonial Cultural Trends in Hong Kong: Imagining 
the Local, the National, and the Global,” in Crisis and Transformation in China’s 
Hong Kong, edited by Chang and So (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 
343-62. 
84
 Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), Policy Address 2001, 
phrase 31, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa01/e29.htm (accessed 16 February 
2007).  
  
258 
                                                                                                                                   
85
 Government Information Centre (HKSAR government), Policy Address 2001, 
phrase 82, http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa01/e82.htm (accessed 16 February 
2007). 
86
 Sharon Zukin, Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991), p. 51. 
87
 Matthew Turner, “60’s / 90’s: Dissolving the People,” in Hong Kong Sixties: 
Designing Identity, edited by Turner and Ngan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts 
Centre, 1995), p. 39.  
88
 Giddens argues that money and the expert system are two disembedding 
mechanisms in the development of modern social institutions and that these two 
mechanisms depend on “trust” in “abstract capacities.” Anthony Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).  
89
 Colin Michael Hall, Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power, and Place (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1994).  
90
 Engin F. Isin, “Global City-regions and Citizenship,” in Local Places in the Age 
of the Global City, edited by Keil, Wekerle, and Bell (Montreal, NY: Black Rose 
Books, 1996), pp. 21-36. 
  259 
Chapter Six 
Disney Management: Fairy Tales of Cultural Globalization 
 
In chapters Four and Five, I argued that respondents consume the HKDL project 
and Disney offerings in various ways: some appropriate the HKDL project as 
symbolic cultural marker, whereas others make use of HKDL or Disney 
merchandise to help construct cosmopolitan selves for themselves or their children. 
However, since the official opening of HKDL on 12 September 2005, it has proved 
far from successful in fulfilling Hong Kong people’s dreams of cultural distinctions 
through cosmopolitan realization and economic revitalization. For the first few 
months after HKDL’s Rehearsal Days,1 the commentary from various press sources 
(ranging from scholars2 and local stars3 to common people4) characterized the park 
as too small,5 the park operations as chaotic,6 the management as highhanded,7 as 
disrespectful of local legislation,8 and even as Americanism.9 Some press sources 
stated that HKDL was turning from Hong Kong’s “millennium dream”10 into a 
“Hong Kong shame.”11 
Hong Kong did not, in fact, undergo Disneyfication. Rather, a variety of 
local actors actively resisted various Disney corporate practices. These local actors 
ranged from the press, popular celebrities, and pop-culture producers to anti-Disney 
groups and to ordinary HKDL workers and consumers. In the following two 
chapters, I discuss these acts in detail. The unfolding dialectical relationship 
between Disney and various local actors narrated in these two chapters also 
confirms Massey’s argument against the dualistic conception that “place” is local 
while “everywhere” is global. Rather, place is where various cultures meet and 
multiple social relations articulate and intersect. In this chapter, I focus on HKDL 
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media practices and local media actors’ reactions to a particular Disney 
“philosophy”—“Disney Realism”—and to Disney’s accompanying management 
practices of scientific management. HKDL management’s hierarchical and 
bureaucratic system effectively renders a strategy of localization difficult to 
implement in HKDL. I further show how Disney values and practices were caught 
up in conflicts with local production values and practices, and how local critics 
interpreted HKDL’s various acts as Americanism. Among these critics were 
members of the local press, local scholars, local celebrities, and even local Disney 
production staff. Their chief complaint concerned HKDL’s adherence to Disney’s 
management practices. Then in chapter Seven, I go on to discuss how both HKDL 
staff and HKDL visitors practice various uptakes inside HKDL, and I examine 
Disney management’s difficulties in “Disneyfying” local staff and local patrons.  
Because chapter Six and chapter Seven work as a pair, the chapter titles are 
similar: I use “fairy tales” and “pixie tricks” to describe cultural globalization in the 
case of HKDL. “Fairy tales” can be read in two ways: first, it suggests a magical 
and extremely happy story; second, it can be interpreted as an imaginary story for 
children only. As I discuss in chapters Three and Four, the joint venture between 
the HKSAR government and the Walt Disney Company was seen by the 
government as “a happy marriage between a world class tourist attraction and a 
world class tourist destination”12 and was seen by Hong Kong people as a cultural 
marker by which they could both distinguish themselves from Mainlanders and 
attain cosmopolitanism. The opening of the park in 2005, however, has turned the 
fairy tale into a comedy of errors. Furthermore, Hong Kong people interpret Disney 
management practices as Americanism and resist certain Disney acts. “Pixie tricks” 
refers to mischievous fairies who deceive people. Here, I reverse the dynamics that 
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usually characterize the relationship between Disney and Hong Kong people. For 
me, HKDL workers and consumers are fairies who play tricks on Disney’s 
scientific management practices.  
In these two chapters, I argue against scholars’ emphasis on Disney’s 
alleged overarching influence over local cultural landscapes. Then, I narrate many 
local stories that my interviewees provided to me or that I experienced by myself to 
identify the dialectical local-global relationship that has been unfolding in various 
social spaces. On the one hand, these stories tell us that Disney brings Hong Kong 
not only a physical park but also its non-transparent values and scientific 
management practices. And under current local laws, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to demand that HKDL disclose some of its company information that 
locals may consider important to Hong Kong’s monitoring of tax-based 
expenditures. On the other hand, these same stories demonstrate that local people, 
including media actors and government officials, are not simply “receivers” who 
read Disney values and practices in preferred, negotiated, or oppositional ways.13 
Rather, these actors produce and circulate the changed local meanings of “Disney” 
as “arrogant” and “highhanded,” and contribute to the ongoing remaking of local 
identities and culture; meanwhile, some other actors, such as HKDL workers and 
visitors, work and consume the park in a mischievously “local” way that 
Disneyland management finds difficult to control.  
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I discuss 
Disney’s management philosophy, Disney Realism. To maintain Disneyland’s 
status as a dreamland, HKDL management exercises different skills to control 
publicly circulating information. I argue that under current Hong Kong law, the 
Hong Kong people have no right to monitor the HKDL financial situation although 
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the HKSAR government is the biggest shareholder of the park. I then focus on how 
local journalists and local pop stars viewed and resisted Disney Realism, Disney’s 
character-centered production values, and its administration practices. In the second 
section, I discuss the contribution that HKDL’s bureaucratic work system made to 
the slow media response to HKDL’s problems. I discuss, also, local media’s 
semantic transformation of “Disney” from a “millennium dream” (which dominated 
the semantic field during the project’s planning stage) into a “Hong Kong shame” 
(which dominated the semantic field during the project’s operational stage). In the 
third section, I interview Disney production staff and HKDL staff and reveal that 
although Disney has tried to “glocalize” its products, to make them pertinent to 
“local” concerns, Disney’s bureaucratic work practice, transnational work-force, 
and division and subdivision of labor make localization difficult. Disney’s weak 
adaptation to the local environment then created chaos and turned off visitors (both 
Hong Kong people and Mainlanders), journalists, and government officials. I also 
argue that the HKSAR government, compared with the Oriental Land Company, 
which owns Tokyo Disneyland, has little institutional power in either the master-
planning or the operating of HKDL and, thus, has little power either to cater to 
local flavors or to change unpopular HKDL management practices. 
 
Joint-venture HKDL: from Disney Realism to HKDL “kingdom” 
“What we create is a ‘Disney Realism’, sort of Utopian in nature,  
where we carefully program out all the negative, unwanted elements  
and program in the positive elements,”  
said Disney designer and artist John Hench.14 
 
There are various kinds of “realism” advocated by film scholars and critics, 
including Siegfried Kracauer’s cinematic realism, André Bazin’s photographic 
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realism, and Georg Lukács’s critical realism. Kracauer argues that an aesthetic 
medium must build from its basic “properties.”15 The basic property of film is its 
capacity for “recording” (p. 41) and “revealing” (p. 46) physical reality. However, 
reality and human experiences are fragmented. Therefore, cinema should represent 
the indeterminate nature of reality; that is, cinema should represent the natural 
world as “unstaged reality,” “chance,” “the fortuitous,” “the indeterminate,” the 
“flow of life,” and “endlessness” (pp. 60-74). Similar to Kracauer, André Bazin’s 
photographic realism argues that cinema’s essence is in recording and revealing 
“the ambiguity of reality.”16 Bazin argued that the development of long-take and 
deep-focus photography from 1940 to 1950 highlighted the spatiotemporal 
continuity and integrity of perceptual experience and that this photography marked 
“a decisive step forward of the language of the film” (p. 38) because filmmakers 
can be explorers and observers who integrate “ambiguity into the structure of the 
image” (p. 36). Bazin expects that viewers of realist films, by using their own 
freedom of thought and of action, can link a film’s complex structure with the 
film’s dense content and that the viewers, thus, can achieve a degree of self 
realization (p. 36). Different from Kracauer and Bazin, Lukács argues that realism 
must represent a historically specific, multi-layered, and concrete social reality. By 
employing exemplary situations and typical characters, the dialectic in Lukacs’ 
critical realism pits the person as individual against the person as social being.17 By 
making a connection between particular events (for example, an individual person’s 
action or thought) and general contexts (namely, a historically rooted society), 
realist films encourage readers to be aware of their own place within a complex, 
interactive web of society-based relationships. Despite their different emphases, 
Kracauer, Bazin, and Lukács are similar in their view that reality is complex 
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(empirical richness, undetermined nature, and complex relations between individual 
events and social structure) and that realism in film should represent reality’s 
complex nature and unpredictability.  
Film scholars and filmmakers know well that, even with the mechanical 
reproduction of photography, “truth” and “reality” in films are constructs because 
frame composition, mise-en-scène, and editing—among other factors—manipulate 
any authentic mirror of the world around us, if indeed any such mirror is possible. 
Some documentary filmmakers choose to practice cinéma vérité to reveal the 
process of filmmaking (how the director shoots the film and what to do with what 
was filmed) and to highlight the authorship of the director. These directors reveal 
that the presented reality is not a pure and objective reality but a particular truth 
socially constructed by—or perhaps through—the filmmaker. Classic Hollywood 
cinema, however, preferred coherent characters, controlled the mise-en-scène, 
practiced the 180-degree rule in cinematography, practiced eyeline matching, and 
edited for continuity. The resulting narrative would present reality as causality that 
unfolds in a continuous temporal-spatial, albeit fictional, world. Film scholars such 
as Stephen Heath18 and Bill Nichols19 argue that the self-containment of the 
narrative and the manipulative style of classic cinema obscure the constructedness 
of cinema and represent cinema as transparent. Classic cinema’s self-contained 
narrative also explains away real contradictions. Rather than refer to classical 
cinema as “realism,” early-cinema scholar Tom Gunning refers to it as “realistic 
illusions of the cinema.”20 
“Disney Realism,” to a certain extent, is a phrase that invokes many of the 
meanings attributable to realism in classic cinema, but Walt Disney pushed 
“illusionism” to an extreme in the establishment of Disneyland. According to 
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Disney’s official publication Imagineering, Walt Disney’s idea of Disneyland 
stemmed from his desire to build a park where visitors could feel that they were in a 
magical world: 
 
Driven by the desire to take his passion for storytelling far beyond the 
confines of two-dimensions, he [Walt Disney] landed on the idea that 
visitors who stepped into this new park should feel as though they stepped 
into a movie. Every inch of the place should be part of a story, as in a movie 
or television show.21 
 
To persuade visitors that they are like Alice stepping through the Looking Glass 
and entering another world, the design of Disneyland employs such cinematic 
techniques as powerful images from movies, familiar movie plots, cinematographic 
techniques, scale manipulation, and forced perspectives, all of which are built into 
the environment and all of which integrate visitors into a “seamless, apparently 
logical, whole.”22 However, this magic world must look realistic, or so declared 
Walt Disney: “what we’re selling is a belief in fantasy and storytelling, and if the 
background [i]sn’t believable, people wouldn’t buy it.”23 To construct its “reality 
effects,”24 Disneyland features concrete details that secure its authenticity. As is the 
case with classic realist films, Disneyland effaces all traces of the work to 
naturalize the fantasy world. It is worth noting again that the park is divided into an 
onstage area and a backstage area and that patrons can visit only the onstage area; 
in other words, Disney prohibits the visitors from visiting the backstage area, where 
magic is produced. Rather than reveal reality’s richness and its contradictory and 
complex nature, Disney Realism is a style that conforms to Disney’s own standard 
of “utopia”: Disneyland as “a magical escape” where “families everywhere, 
regardless of boundaries or culture” can experience “a world of fantasy and 
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imagination,”25 and where “the guest walks through an atmosphere of order and 
cleanliness and comes away feeling that things must be all right, after all.”26 
Therefore, Disney Realism is a style that helps produce the image of Disneyland as 
utopia. It is thus not surprising that applications of Disney Realism “program in” 
positive elements (i.e. elements favorable to the Disney image as “fantasyland” and 
“the happiest place in the world”) and “program out” negative elements (which 
have adverse effects on the Disney image). Furthermore, the “embellishment” and 
the “modification” of “reality” include manipulating and sanitizing history or, in 
Michael Wallace’s words, “to vacuum clean the past.”27 The park area “Main Street 
USA” exemplifies “sanitized, good-spirited and inaccurate nostalgia” regarding the 
nineteenth-century American small town.28  
To construct the brand “Disney” according to the idea of “fantasy,” Disney 
Realism affects not only park design but also the company’s everyday management 
practices. Reviewing the history of the Walt Disney World in Orlando, Foglesong29 
warns readers that based on Disney Realism, Disney shows only a positive 
surface—that Disney obstructs the public’s view of negative elements (as Hench 
freely admits in the quotation above). Disney has considerable power to impose 
“Disney Realism”: Disney is tantamount to a private government controlling the 
autonomous political district of Orlando’s Reedy Creek Improvement District, and 
Orlando’s citizens have limited ways to monitor Disney. Foglesong, in Married to 
the Mouse,30 warned the readers that Disney, to uphold both its favorite image and 
the widespread belief that Disneyland is a safe dreamland, may try to prohibit the 
dissemination of negative information pertaining to Disney. According to 
Foglesong, on 10 July 1985, The Orlando Sentinel published an editorial entitled 
“Magic Kingdom of Aloof” both criticizing Disney executives’ requirement that 
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visitors stay inside Disney hotels and urging the executives to be more involved in 
county boards and commissions. On the morning the editorial appeared, a Disney 
employee removed Sentinel newsracks from Disney property and a Sentinel 
delivery truck was refused entrance onto Disney property (p. 111). Disney also 
improperly used its private security guards, the “cast members,” to perform police 
functions involving serious crimes such as burglary, rape, and robbery without 
reporting the findings to any government law-enforcement agency because Disney 
has had no inherent obligation to release such records (pp. 141-4).  
Unlike Orlando, HKDL is not an autonomous political district and should be 
subjected to Hong Kong laws. Nevertheless, at least eight local newspapers  
denounced “Disney highhandedness” on 10 September 2005,31 two days before the 
official opening of HKDL. This unified criticism occurred when Rhonda Lo, 
assistant director of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD), 
confirmed on a radio program32 on 9 September 2005 that, on 30 August 2005, 
HKDL security had forced two FEHD health inspectors to “dress down” (to take 
off their caps and epaulettes) before they could enter the park to investigate reports 
of food poisoning. Disney’s efforts to preserve the park’s magic and to program out 
negative elements were, in this case, seen as manipulative and drew fire from 
government officials, legislators, and scholars: Lo said that the park’s request was 
“unacceptable”;33 Secretary for Security Ambrose Lee said, “Disneyland does not 
stand above the law of Hong Kong”;34 Legislator Fred Li was astonished35 by 
HKDL’s “out of line”36 behavior, while scholars commented that Disney’s 
American management practices treated Disney as an “independent kingdom” and 
had certainly violated citizens’ rights.37 When I asked my reporter respondents38 
why, in their news stories, they had highlighted HKDL’s violation of Hong Kong 
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law instead of HKDL’s apologies to the FEHD, one reporter admitted that she had 
been astonished and enraged by the news, whereas the other reporter said that the 
interview process of questioning “relevant” and “legitimate” interviewees 
(government officials, legislators, scholars, and HKDL) created an imbalance that 
favored critics of HKDL, who outnumbered spokespersons for HKDL management. 
He denied that media had painstakingly produced the idea of Disney 
highhandedness; reporters had just reported and circulated criticism about HKDL 
actions.  
The nature of HKDL and the nature of the HKSAR government-Disney 
joint venture made it difficult for Disney to implement Disney Realism in Hong 
Kong without facing criticism. Hong Kong Disneyland is the only Disney park to 
enlist a government as a shareholder.39 Because of the HKSAR government’s huge 
investment in the park, many legislators and members of the press have viewed 
HKDL as a quasi-public business, which, in their view, means that the public has 
the right and the responsibility to monitor the government’s tax-based investment in 
HKDL. The public’s right-to-know demands contradict Disney Realism’s emphasis 
on non-transparent management practices. Keith,40 a local news reporter, said,  
 
If HKDL received all its investment from the Disney company, HKDL 
would be a private investment and its returns, whether good or bad, would 
be none of our business. However, because the park received a huge 
investment from the HKSAR government, media—though this may sound 
hackneyed—has the responsibility to monitor the government’s investment, 
to confirm that it isn’t wasting public money. This is why we’re worried 
about, not merely interested in, the park’s attendance figures, its image, and 
its returns.    
 
By 1999, the park had consumed HK$22.95 billion of tax-payer money; however, 
ownership of HKDL has been the responsibility of a private company named Hong 
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Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP), in which the HKSAR government is 
the largest shareholder. Because it is a private company, under Hong Kong 
company law, it has no obligation to disclose things that it views as sensitive 
information, including those facts that the public views as necessary information: 
attendance figures and the park’s revenue. In December 2005, for example, when 
Margaret Ng, a member of the Legislative Council, asked whether or not HKITP 
would publish all the directors’ reports and audited financial statements of HKITP, 
the Secretary for Economic Development and Labour, Mr Stephen Ip, clearly 
spelled out the impossibility of such a request: 
 
HKITP is a private company, there is no requirement under the Companies 
Ordinance for a private company to publish its directors’ reports and audited 
financial accounts. Although TWDC [the Walt Disney Company] invests 
jointly with the Government in HKITP, the Government has to respect the 
company’s interests, and its operation under commercial principles will not 
be compromised due to the disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information. As an international financial and business centre, we have to 
respect the right of a private company to protect its commercially sensitive 
information.41 
 
In 1999, while persuading the public of the benefits of a future HKDL, the HKSAR 
government claimed that HKDL would attract millions of tourists to the park and 
get HK$148 billion in “net economic benefit,” a 25% net economic return, and a 
benefit-cost ratio of 8:1 over forty years of operation.42 However, without the 
audited financial accounts, the public has had no way to verify whether or not the 
economic promise has come to fruition.43 While HKDL enjoys the right of 
protecting its “commercially sensitive information,” it also enjoys right to use 
public funds for expansion of a government-Disney joint venture.  
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In addition to tension between the Hong Kong public’s right to know and 
the Disney Realism strategy of revealing only information that is beneficial to the 
company, tension between Disney and journalists has accumulated through 
journalists’ everyday mundane reportage practices. When the idea of Disney 
Realism is translated into everyday management practice, the realism becomes a 
series of manipulative acts controlling what can and cannot be seen or narrated, an 
approach that has triggered enormous criticism from the park’s communication 
“partners,” the reporters—especially from those upholding the idea of freedom of 
the press. As would occur with “a landowner of a kingdom” (in the words of Keith), 
HKDL initially required that reporters receive permission before they cover events 
inside HKDL. If reporters wanted to interview HKDL staff, Disney would select 
particular staff members to conduct the interviews while other staff members were 
prohibited from answering any reporters’ questions. Throughout the whole 
interview process, a public relations officer had to accompany and monitor the 
reporter. A prominent example was HKDL’s three-day celebratory opening 
activities during 10 and 12 September 2005, during which one thousand and two 
hundred reporters from around the world came to HKDL, and HKDL appointed to 
each news agency three Disney “media hosts” to arrange activities for journalists. If 
these media hosts did not see the journalist around, they would phone the journalist 
and ask where she or he was.44   
The journalist Sammie45 recounted a vivid story about her efforts to cover 
HKDL before its opening in September 2005. In April 2005, HKDL invited several 
media companies to report on HKDL cultural representatives who had been 
working in Orlando since late 2004 and who would come back to work in HKDL 
for at least six months. Sammie’s company accepted the offer. Before the trip, 
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Sammie had had meetings with Edith, a representative of HKDL public affairs.46 
They discussed the arrangements of the trip. In the meeting, Sammie and Edith 
agreed, without written confirmation, that Sammie would interview one or two 
individual cultural representatives as a way to explore their lives in Orlando in 
depth.  
According to Sammie, tension between Sammie and Edith arose with the 
first interview in Orlando. Sammie interviewed a female HKDL cultural 
representative in her room. On Sammie’s account, she asked the interviewee to sit 
on her bed so that they could have a casual interview, but Edith requested the 
interviewee to sit on the sofa and adopt a formal pose. Again according to Sammie, 
Edith’s numerous interruptions and prohibitions marred the three-day interview 
period. On one occasion, Sammie says, she asked the Magic Kingdom manager his 
views on the small size of HKDL relative to the Magic Kingdom. When the 
manager started to answer, Edith allegedly stopped the camera filming and 
requested that the manager not answer any question involving comparisons between 
Disney parks.47 Another situation occurred at Disney University. During recess, a 
male cultural representative, after learning that Sammie was a reporter from Hong 
Kong, commented (according to Sammie): “We cannot say anything here. It’s 
horrible.” Sammie recalled that while the man was talking to her, Edith was talking 
to another reporter and, for that reason, could not hear the man’s remark. However, 
once Edith noticed that the young man was talking to Sammie, Edith immediately 
came over to them and asked the man to return to the classroom. According to 
Sammie, Disney even prohibits normal conversations between staff and reporters 
who have no recording devices in hand. On this occasion, Sammie then wrote her 
phone number on a piece of paper and told Edith that she needed to return to the 
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classroom herself because she had left a camera there. To ensure the success of her 
plan, she asked the other reporter to divert Edith’s attention by talking to her. Upon 
entering the classroom, Sammie quickly gave her phone number to this young man. 
Disney controls not only particular questions or dialogues but also the 
structure of the news story. Although Sammie wanted to base an in-depth story on 
the working lives of one or two Disney park cultural representatives, Edith (says 
Sammie) was not willing to allow “deep” interviewing to take place. Edith and 
Sammie argued over the latter, and Edith reduced the next day’s number of 
interviewees from three to two. Sammie described the first young man she met as a 
“robot” (in fact, when describing this man to Edith, Sammie rather daringly used 
the same words). The young man stated matter-of-factly, “Hello. I have had great 
fun and am happy everyday here. Thank you.” Sammie refused to conduct an 
interview with this man and asked Edith to arrange for her (Sammie) to interview 
another male cultural representative, James, whom Sammie had met in the park. 
According to Sammie, Edith’s first reply to the request was, “James is not on my 
checklist.” At the end of that day, Edith claimed that James had taken a sick leave 
and was, in fact, too sick to participate in an interview. On the third day, refusing to 
interview “robots,” Sammie told Edith that, as matters stood, she (Sammie) could 
not develop a successful story, would leave Orlando one day early, and would write 
no news story about HKDL cultural representatives. After Sammie’s veiled threat, 
Edith arranged for James to come. However, James’ statements were not unlike 
those of the “robot,” and Sammie suspected that James’ responses had been 
scripted.  
Efforts to record these kinds of interviews create obstacles that are no more 
problematic than the obstacles that arise when outsiders try to film Disney parks 
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themselves. Inside the park, to protect “character integrity,”48 Orlando staff told 
Sammie that she could neither photograph nor film Disney characters. She could 
not even film a music band’s performance because Disney, as a media company, 
wanted to ensure that all of Disney’s publicly displayed images were in conformity 
with the Disney Realism image, that is, an image that contributes to the conception 
of Disneyland as a “fantasyland.” In the Orlando park, Sammie and her colleagues 
found surrounding them not only Edith and her assistant, but also a public relations 
representative from Orlando Walt Disney World, a manager from Orlando Magic 
Kingdom, a staff member of the Disney International Program, and a local crew 
filming the behavior of Sammie and her colleagues. Furthermore, they found that 
their behavior was under the surveillance of the park’s security service in civilian 
dress. On another occasion, Sammie was watching a BBC television documentary 
on North Korea, and in the documentary, a BBC reporter stated that it was terribly 
difficult to interview and to film inside North Korea. Drawing a surprising parallel 
between the BBC reporters’ efforts and her own recent efforts, Sammie commented 
that her experience of Orlando Disney parks’ controls was similar to the BBC 
reporters’ experience of controls in the militarized dictatorship of North Korea. 
 Standardization is a pervasive Disney practice. In Hong Kong, Disney’s 
production standards are published as manuals, and any action that strays from the 
checklist is prohibited. In every Disneyland park, every cast member has to meet a 
Disney-appearance standard, which is published in a handbook entitled The Disney 
Look; guest service has guidelines and cast members need to follow seven steps 
governing the members’ interaction with guests; operation guidelines and a 
corresponding detailed checklist govern every ride inside a Disney park. None of 
these facts seem unusual or even objectionable. After all, standardization can 
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strengthen efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. But surface appearances can be 
deceptive. Standardization can over-indulge itself and can, in this way, have 
harmful consequences. Take, for example, the way in which Disney not only 
controls its workers and standardizes Disney characters’ movements but it also 
obligates its staff (including Disney show producers, entertainment operations staff, 
public relations personnel, and even marketing and sales staff) to “uphold” the 
Disney standard against other parties’ “misrepresentation” of Disney Realism. 
These Disney workers control the way directors film Disney characters and the way 
journalists introduce Disney characters. In her story about Disney, Sammie 
mentioned that the public relations management had an exclusive interviewee 
checklist and that names outside the checklist were normally unavailable for 
interview. In Sammie’s story, Edith prefers the “robot” staff and prevents James 
from being interviewed by Sammie. Such acts could potentially discriminate 
against people on the basis of some manager’s personal bias. Besides, Disney’s 
control and manipulation of Disney Realism extends beyond its Kingdom to other 
domains such as news media, presumed to highlight objectivity and the presentation 
of truth. In upholding Disney Realism, Disney not only controls news media in 
representing Disney, but masks a more complicated reality, potentially censoring 
the contested truth.  
It seems that the tighter the control that Disney exerted over journalists’ 
behavior, the greater the resistance that journalists exhibited. To strike a balance 
between the Disney approvers and the Disney disapprovers, my reporter 
respondents conducted either undercover interviews with visitors and workers who 
were inside HKDL or open interviews with opponents of Disney. Sammie initially 
centered her news story only on cultural representatives’ experiences, but because 
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of her experience in Orlando and the problematic responses of the HKDL public 
relations officers, Sammie packaged the news story in two parts. She first discussed 
HKDL cultural representatives’ lives in Orlando and then discussed her interview 
with local scholar Iam Chong Ip, who had edited a Chinese book, Disney Is Not a 
Happy Park,49 and members of a local anti-Disney group, Disney Hunter.50 In this 
way, Sammie hoped to portray the different faces of Disney. 
HKDL has faced criticisms not only from reporters but from local 
celebrities, as well. The relation between Disney and celebrities should be 
reciprocally beneficial so that, while the celebrities bolster their fame, Disney can 
use this fame to promote HKDL. However, a month before the park opened, local 
film actor Daniel Wu wrote, in his blog, an entry advocating that people “Boycott 
Disneyland!” He issued the statement because his band, Alive, had helped to 
celebrate HKDL’s opening but had received no payment—only a “rude and 
impolite” reception from “Disney staff specifically the ones from America.”51 
Another local and Mainland China superstar, Kelly Chan, followed Wu’s example 
and, in a radio program, disparaged HKDL’s disrespect of local stars.52 According 
to her, HKDL had invited her to make a music video inside the park but several of 
Disney’s higher-ranking officers from America were rude to her when they oversaw 
her music-video shoot. They reproved their local co-workers for having let Chan 
and her crewmembers use—without official permission—a hotel room; the officers 
also argued that Chan had broadcast her song too loudly although there were no 
guests in the park. Kelly Chan found her Disney dream shattered, and she pledged 
that she would never again promote the American Disney company.  
After facing resistance from journalists who described HKDL as 
“highhanded” and “Americanism,”53 HKDL management attempted to improve its 
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relations with local media by implementing Disney Realism in a more lenient way. 
As I mentioned above, when HKDL first opened in September 2005, journalists had 
to get permission from HKDL before entering the park to do an interview, and a 
HKDL worker had to accompany a journalist during his or her trip. Both my 
journalist respondent and an HKDL staff respondent told me that HKDL had 
changed some media policies around ten months after HKDL’s opening in 
September 2005.54 Henceforward, if HKDL holds a press conference inside the 
park, reporters after the conference can stay in the park to go on rides without being 
followed by an HKDL worker, and reporters can interview HKDL guests if these 
guests are willing to be interviewed. On normal days, if an HKDL staff member 
finds a reporter conducting interviews unauthorized by HKDL, the staff member 
should simply note a few facts about the reporter and report these facts to the 
manager or public relations staff rather than immediately stop the reporter’s 
interview. If the interview that the reporter is conducting is simple and if guests are 
willing to be interviewed, HKDL staff should not obstruct the interview. Staff may 
provide the reporter with a room for the interview to minimize disturbance to other 
guests. HKDL also hired experienced local journalists such as Lee Chan Wing to 
teach staff ways to deal with journalists. Now, when HKDL holds a press 
conference, it is held in a restaurant with air-conditioning instead of in a temporary 
tent without air-conditioning, as was the case during the opening of the park in 
2005.  
It is true that HKDL’s hospitality has improved: HKDL has a more 
comfortable center for news media, sends premiums55 and videos to reporters, and 
attempts to be generally more open toward reporters. Nevertheless, Disney Realism 
as a work philosophy easily fosters resistance on the part of journalists because of 
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its manipulative practices. Some reporters have voiced their grievances in public. In 
her newspaper column, one female anchor criticized HKDL public relations for 
treating reporters as advertising agents.56 She wrote in September 2006 that HKDL 
had once invited reporters to cover HKDL backstage stories (about HKDL’s new 
developments) but that, on accepting the invitation, the reporters had gained access 
only to a few Disney staff members’ scripted introductions to cartoon characters in 
the backstage area. As soon as a reporter had begun to film the cartoon characters, 
an HKDL public relations officer had stopped the shoot, requesting that the reporter 
use the expression “Disney friends” rather than the expression “cartoon character” 
to describe the cartoon characters. The officer had then emphasized the assertion 
that these Disney “friends” are not in costume but actually born as they appear. In 
her newspaper column, the anchor summarized the event thus: 
 
It is acceptable to ask reporters to introduce Disney cartoon characters as 
“Disney friends,” but it is truly intolerable to demand reporters to distort 
facts and to instill ideas that cartoon characters are real creatures. As a result, 
that reporter gave up reporting and the park lost a chance for promotion…. 
If public relations people demand an unreasonable request or restriction, it is 
an interference with freedom of the press.57   
 
Facing HKDL’s “bad show,”58 reporters sometimes boycott interviews or actively 
report HKDL’s inconsiderate acts as experienced by the reporters. On 11 
September 2005, a day before HKDL’s official opening, a foreign security guard 
behaved rudely and stated that only journalists with huge, professional cameras and 
video cameras might conduct interviews about the opening ceremony. Journalists 
boycotted the interview, and the guard was compelled to apologize; nevertheless, 
newspapers reported the whole event.59 On 12 September 2006, a year after the 
opening of HKDL, the HKDL management insisted on holding a press conference 
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outdoors, and reporters and their recording equipment were drenched in the pouring 
rain; the recording equipment stopped working and twenty reporters from ten 
organizations boycotted the interview session for an hour. Following this boycott, 
HKDL moved the press-conference venue indoors; HKDL indemnified reporters’ 
losses and issued a press statement in apology. However, these actions did not stop 
journalists from writing about HKDL’s inconsiderate media arrangement, the 
reporters’ losses, and the boycott.60  
Besides direct confrontations, journalists can construct a relatively negative 
image of HKDL by playing with rhetoric. News media commonly compare the 
management of HKDL with that of another popular Hong Kong theme park, Ocean 
Park.61 The former came to be known as “highhanded park” whereas the latter 
began to figure as the “people’s park.”62 Press frequently compare the two parks in 
terms of their provision of facilities for disabled visitors,63 their pricing,64 the 
quality and the number of their attractions,65 and their attendance figures.66 
Attendance figures constitute one of journalists’ major concerns because of the 
HKSAR government-Disney HKDL joint venture. When reporting HKDL’s annual 
attendance figures on 5 September 2006, fourteen out of the eighteen local 
newspapers stated that HKDL fell short of the first-year target of 5.6 million and 
only four press outlets said that HKDL had received over five million visitors or 
that the HKDL attendance figures were close to meeting the visitor target in the 
first year of operation.67 HKDL’s failure to meet its target has encouraged 
journalists to search for and report on the limited benefits that HKDL has had for 
Hong Kong’s transport industry, hotel industry, and economy in general.68  
 
HKDL tension and chaos: Disney bureaucratic and scientific management  
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“The management of the modern office  
is based on written documents (‘the files’),  
which are preserved in their original or draught form.” Max Weber69 
 
I once asked Andrew,70 a staff member working in the Hong Kong Disney 
production office,71 to identify the most important lesson that he had learned during 
his four years of work at Disney. He replied without hesitation: writing e-mails. His 
boss had spent two months teaching him about effective e-mail composition 
because the first rule of working or surviving successfully in Disney is to manage 
everything in written form; the boss had also prohibited the deletion of any business 
e-mails concerning Andrew because they might serve as evidence in case of some 
related dispute years down the road. Because Disney production practices division 
and sub-division of labor, a local low-ranking staff member can receive more than 
two hundred e-mails in three days, even if she or he is not directly involved in any 
of the projects. Andrew said that he needed to spend every morning replying to and 
writing e-mails. He knew that the e-mail-writing practice was a way to protect 
himself from troubles, but he also found it time-consuming and to a certain degree 
useless, because it is not a local customary practice to invite—by e-mail—
celebrities to help Disney promote itself. To simplify the process and to accomplish 
the task, he normally sent e-mails to agents when the topic involved negotiations 
and decisions. 
Disney treats written documents seriously, because written documents can 
always be used as evidence against chicanery. Thus, my journalist respondent, 
Sammie, failed to secure an official letter confirming that HKDL had invited her to 
interview Disney’s cultural representatives in Orlando. In contrast, to protect its 
own rights, Disney asks its partners to sign many legal documents, and this 
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bureaucratic management practice annoys many local celebrities and producers. 
Andrew told me that a Mainland superstar wanted to visit HKDL and stay in the 
HKDL hotel for a night, a series of events that supposedly would be excellent 
publicity for HKDL. This Mainland star agreed to greet the media inside the park, 
but then the park management asked the star to sign many contracts. As a result, the 
star refused to sign the contracts and to visit the park. 
Disney’s e-mail-writing protocol applies to HKDL. Julia,72 a HKDL 
customer-services staff member, said that her supervisor would type all phone 
inquiries and complaints that were not immediately executable and would e-mail 
them to the public relations department or to other departments. Afterward, the 
concerned department would respond to the supervisor via e-mails. At HKDL, 
phone conversations are strongly discouraged. When I asked her what “Disney 
magic” is, she said that she had neither created nor tasted Disney magic (the 
Disneyland service philosophy of bringing unexpected happiness to guests) because 
she did not think that HKDL workers wholeheartedly tried to help guests solve their 
problems. She related to me a pertinent story: on several occasions, public relations 
officers had criticized an employee for telephoning them in search of an answer to 
some guests’ inquiries. To Julia, “Disney magic” expressed her puzzlement at the 
disappearance of administrators, whom she found extremely difficult to find when 
she needed an answer to inquiries from customers. In other words, unless inquiries 
or requests are easily executable (such as an enquiry regarding the time of the 
HKDL firework display), HKDL’s replies are not quick. For serious matters, 
HKDL public relations will ask for advice from its consultancy firm and even from 
the US Disney headquarters, and these protracted communications further slow 
down the response time. My reporter respondent Keith mentioned that the slow 
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response attributable to Disney’s bureaucracy has a secondary effect: the slow 
responses to handling and managing crises creates a pool of disgruntled visitors and 
staffers where reporters can go trolling for grievances73 and can dig out a cover 
story.  
The HKDL management marked 4 September 2005 as a trial-run day to test 
the capacity and the operation of the theme park. All revenues from the day’s 
events were to go to charity, and a thronging mass of about 30,000 people—a 
number that the management insisted HKDL’s efficiency and capacity could 
handle—swamped the park for a hot humid intermittently rainy and sunny rehearsal 
day.74 Queues were everywhere—at MTR station,75 at the entrance,76 at rides,77 in 
front of restaurants,78 and outside restrooms.79 Without adequate measures to 
manage crowds and visitors’ complaints efficiently, disgruntled guests complained 
about HKDL in front of the press and voiced grievances on radio programs. 
Visitors resented the discomfort because they had paid full price but were treated 
merely as herded cattle in Disney’s rehearsal “stress test.”80 They compared 
queuing inside the park unfavorably to the famously stressful queuing for “peaceful 
rice”81 (an annual free public hand-out gift of lucky rice), which had, only a few 
days earlier, resulted in the accidental crushing of an old woman. Promotions that 
had hailed a fantastic park experience ceded place to visitors’ complaints. However, 
because Disney’s bureaucratic practices encourage neither formal apologies nor 
written documents such as apologetic press releases, HKDL president Don 
Robinson neither apologized for the situation nor explained it in public. It was 
rather the HKSAR government, in the person of Financial Secretary Henry Tang, 
that explained the chaos in public,82 the day after the Charity Day chaos. Moreover, 
it was also the HKSAR government that issued a press release, stating that the 
  282 
HKSAR Financial Secretary was having “an extensive discussion” with HKDL 
management that afternoon about improvements of and adjustments to “the theme 
park capacity, entry arrangements, queue management, food and beverage facilities, 
seating area, car parking arrangements, etc.”83  
The slow and reluctant HKDL response and HKDL’s lack of crisis-
management measures also encouraged people to raise sensitive cultural issues such 
as Americanism. HKDL’s 2006 Lunar New Year chaos is a prominent example of 
this process. To increase ticketing flexibility and to boost visitor numbers, HKDL 
was the first Disney theme park to offer two-tier pricing, which distinguishes 
normal calendar days (with flexible tickets that could be used any time within six 
months after, on this occasion, 1-3 February 200684) from holidays and peak days 
(marked by date-specific tickets) such as Hong Kong public holidays, the Christmas 
holidays, and the Mainland Golden Week (1-7 May and 1-7 October every year).85 
Flexible tickets allow but do not guarantee entry on any particular day; only date-
specific tickets guarantee entry on that specified date. On the basis of “the October 
2005 Golden Week experience,”86 Hong Kong International Theme Park 
Company87 designated as special days only the period ranging from 28 to 31 
January 2006 (i.e., the eve and the first, second, and third days of the Lunar New 
Year, these four days being Hong Kong public holidays). In contrast, HKDL 
designated as regular days the period ranging from 1 to 3 February 2006—even 
though these three extra days are still Golden New Year holidays for Mainlanders 
(but not in Hong Kong).  
Because HKDL did not designate the dates 1 and 2 February as Special Days, 
guests using Regular Day tickets could gain admission to the park on those days. 
HKDL overbooked visitors, chiefly because of the many Mainlanders still 
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holidaying in Hong Kong; in consequence, HKDL refused entry to more than (in 
total) two thousand people holding valid entry tickets for these two consecutive 
days. Gates were locked at 11:30 a.m. on 1 February 2006 and again at 10:30 a.m. 
on 2 February 2006,88 and the temporary closure of the park elicited angry outbursts 
from the disappointed crowd. Most of the local press reported the HKDL chaos in 
detail on 2 February 2006: some disgruntled visitors refused to leave and clamored 
outside the park while others rocked the main gates, climbed over the iron gates, 
and helped children to get over. And police officers were called in for help to 
maintain order. However, at this stage, only several press outlets presented the story 
as headline news.89 But HKDL management did not apologize; indeed, a Disney 
spokesperson said only that HKDL’s policy was in line with the policy of other 
Disney parks around the world and that visitors to HKDL should arrive early if they 
want to visit the park.90 Nor did HKDL provide appropriate measures to prevent the 
chaos. So, when similar chaos occurred a second time on the following day, an 
increasing number of papers made headlines out of the HKDL chaos.91 Reports 
harshly criticized HKDL-management practices on 3 and 4 February for causing a 
“Hong Kong shame,”92 and these reports also raised international concern about the 
chaos at HKDL.93  
HKDL was slow to issue a formal apology. The executive vice-president 
and the managing director of the theme park Bill Ernest’s formal press statement 
expressing apologies released only on 3 February 2006,94 two days after the chaos 
had begun. In contrast, the HKSAR government intervened in HKDL’s difficulties 
in a quick and high-profile manner. The government sent out a press release on 2 
February 2006,95 in which the government expressed concerns about the chaos, 
admitted that the sales arrangement had “caused a lot of inconvenience to guests,” 
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and “requested them (i.e. the senior management of HKDL) to make 
improvements.” Press reports discussed Financial Secretary Henry Tang’s deep 
dissatisfaction with the reluctance of HKDL’s senior management to listen to 
advice inside the Board of Hong Kong International Theme Park Ltd (HKITP).96 
These reports, in addition to HKDL’s widely reported slow response to the whole 
affair, prompted the press to begin reporting overtly that the HKDL chaos was the 
result of the HKDL senior management’s ignorance,97 highhandedness,98 reluctance 
to admit faults,99 and even Americanism.100  
To equate both HKDL’s inefficiency in tackling problems and a two-day 
crowd crisis with Americanism seems to be an exaggeration. Disney as a US-rooted 
company practices organizational hierarchy and bureaucratic management whereas 
another US mega-brand, Hewlett-Packard, practices “networked teams” 
organization, which makes decision-making and communication efficient.101 
However, the New Year ticketing chaos, to a certain extent, reveals that the HKDL 
senior management was concerned more with data and statistics than with local and 
cultural knowledge when making important decisions. As revealed by the 
Economic Development and Labour Bureau in the Legislative Council Panel on 
Economic Services on 27 February 2006, HKDL’s sales arrangement of 
designating 1 to 3 February 2006 not as date-specific tickets but as regular tickets 
was “based on the October 2005 Golden Week experience at HKD [Hong Kong 
Disneyland].”102 The senior management had full knowledge that these three days 
were Mainlanders’ Golden New Year holiday, but the management chose to 
calculate the sales arrangement on the basis of previous HKDL-visitor figures and 
to ignore both government warnings and their own local cultural knowledge in this 
regard. However, HKDL’s scientific data had not made explicit the difference 
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between October Golden Week and Lunar New Year Golden Week, for the latter 
one is the only Mainland golden week holiday that occurs at the same time as 
Mainland students’ public holiday. As a famous family entertainment provider, 
HKDL was highly likely to operate at capacity in these circumstances.103 The 
HKDL management’s reliance on contextless quantitative data instead of on local 
knowledge caused the overbooking chaos; it seems that it is not that Disney 
management was culturally ignorant but that Disney’s “scientific” management 
practices culturally blinded the management when there was a conflict between 
HKDL’s quantitative models and local cultural knowledge. 
 
A transnational system’s destabilization of onstage localization 
After offending the French by refusing to sell wine at Euro Disney when it first 
opened, Disney Imagineers claimed that, at HKDL, they worked hard to tweak the 
park design, including food and facilities, on the basis of local food and local usage. 
Localization is the park’s highlight: the shape of the Mickey and whale fountain 
outside the entrance is like bauhinia, a flower representing Hong Kong; one 
Chinese restaurant in the Disney hotel was designed according to the concept of the 
five elements (of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth) used in ancient Chinese 
cosmology; only after consulting with masters of feng shui did HKDL set the park 
design in general and the opening date and time of the park. Hong Kong is rainy, 
humid, and hot. This weather pattern differs from most weather patterns at Disney 
parks in the United States and in other places; therefore, concrete—rather than 
stone—was the preferred building material for the classic village inside 
Fantasyland.104  Because HKDL’s target demographic is Hong Kong people, 
Mainlanders, and guests from South East Asia, the ride Jungle River Cruise is 
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performed in three languages: Cantonese, Putonghua, and English; English 
performances of The Lion King are translated into Chinese and broadcast with 
Chinese subtitles. To accommodate Mainland tourists’ personal hygiene habits, 
HKDL even built a certain number of squat toilets inside the park. As for cuisine, 
the park has three restaurants and five fast-food diners providing more than three 
hundred cuisines, the widest variety of food at any of the company’s parks.105 
Besides hamburgers, most dishes that HKDL provides are Asian and include 
Cantonese noodles, Shanghaiese dumplings, Sichuanese dan dan noodles, Japanese 
sushi, and Indian Kashmiri chicken curry. HKDL also provides Hong Kong-style 
egg custard tarts and invented some Hong Kong-Western snacks and fast foods 
such as char siew pork-burger with rice in Tomorrowland’s Starliner Diner. 
Because Hong Kong people and Mainlanders like eating Chinese-style roast meat, 
congee, noodles, and rice, the park’s upscale Victorian-style building Plaza Inn 
serves classic Cantonese cuisine. Disney Imagineers even studied street hawkers in 
Mong Kok and, accordingly, dressed cast members up as these vendors and 
instructed them to sell sanitized local snacks, such as fish balls, from carts—all 
within HKDL. 
Onstage localization is significant to Disney’s transnational business, but its 
US-based transnational workforce, the Disney Imagineers and producers, may not 
be adept at accommodating local environments and needs so quickly when they 
design and produce attractions at HKDL, especially when HKDL is operated and 
managed by the Disney Company, instead of by locals (as is the case with Tokyo 
Disneyland Park).106 Let us note, again, that HKDL has specialized and divided its 
management and has refused to entrust power to local senior management and 
production officials. These actions have made it difficult for HKDL to identify, 
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consider, and implement local suggestions. In this section, I discuss two new 
attractions, Stitch Encounter and Autopia, built inside HKDL and available since 13 
July 2006, to illustrate how HKDL attractions, after almost one year’s operation, 
still encounter problems of localization because of HKDL’s management system 
and power hierarchy, both of which reflect trends at the US headquarters. I then 
compare two Winnie the Pooh attractions—one at HKDL and the other at Tokyo 
Disneyland—in order to argue that the localization problems that HKDL is facing 
are due largely to the HKSAR government’s lack of institutional power—a rather 
startling admission insofar as the HKSAR government is the park’s largest 
shareholder of the park. 
Stitch Encounter is an indoor interactive cartoon show, where the on-screen 
character Stitch from Disney’s animated cartoon Lilo & Stitch (2002) appears on a 
large rear-projection video screen and, for the twelve-minute show, converses with 
the audience in real-time. A cast member, hidden backstage, performs Stitch’s 
voice; the action of the on-screen Stitch derives from a computer that tracks the 
backstage performer’s movements on a real-time basis. For these two reasons, the 
show enables the character Stitch to perform differently in every show: Stitch’s 
dialogues are not totally scripted and Stitch’s actions differ from one show to the 
next. The show is offered in English, Cantonese, and Putonghua, and audiences 
need to check for the show time that is in their preferred language. Although the 
Magic Kingdom in Orlando offers an attraction with the same name Stitch 
Encounter, the two shows are quite different in that Orlando’s Stitch is an audio-
animatronic one and the Orlando show is not interactive.107    
Stitch Encounter has encountered problems of localization. Although Stitch 
Encounter has been offered in three languages, the show’s three most important 
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contributors—the transnational-Disney-show producer, the Walt Disney 
Imagineering (WDI) director-scriptwriter, and the WDI technical director—could 
not understand Cantonese or Putonghua. According to my Disney production-staff 
respondent Rebecca,108 the show’s producer asked the local Hong Kong Disney 
production office to suggest possible script translators, but finally did not employ 
people from the list provided; rather, she used two film directors and scriptwriters, 
Alfred Cheung and Wong Chun Chun, to translate the English script into Cantonese 
and into Putonghua respectively. According to Rebecca, the latter’s Putonghua was 
not fluid enough for the task of writing an adequate Putonghua script. Whether true 
or not in detail, that this story could circulate at all suggests that despite HKDL’s 
onstage localization, the process is only partly successful at best.109 
The localization problem that plagued Stitch Encounter has plagued the 
efforts of many local Disney production staff to domesticate Disney movies for 
release in Hong Kong. Local staff can give suggestions relative to these matters but 
cannot, in the end, determine whose voice will speak which Cantonese lines of 
dialogue; as stated by Andrew and Rebecca, two staffers working for Disney 
movies in Hong Kong, it is senior officers at Disney’s US headquarters—not staff 
members in the Hong Kong regional office—who make these critical decisions. 
Andrew’s and Rebecca’s experiences110 led them to apply “Americanism” to 
Disney’s hierarchical organizational culture and to Disney’s production process. 
Stitch Encounter and Disney movies may be localized for local consumers, but the 
hierarchy and the production process are not always regionalized, much less 
localized. Atop the hierarchy and governing the process is the American 
headquarters. 
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HKDL’s Autopia faces a similar localization problem. Although Autopia “is 
based on the original Autopia ride that opened at California Disney in 1955,”111 
Disney Imagineers, according to my HKDL worker-respondents, differentiated 
HKDL’s Autopia from other Autopia rides, for it is the first Autopia powered by 
electricity instead of gasoline. By using electricity, each car then needs to re-charge 
its store of electricity for one minute at the boarding area of the racetrack although 
the ride lasts only about four minutes. Local Disney production staff objected to the 
suggested use of electricity because Hong Kong’s hot and wet weather is not 
suitable for electricity-powered racing cars. Nevertheless, the US-based Disney 
Imagineers insisted on the new Autopia. Successful tests of Autopia were to take 
place in June, but the cars experienced severe recharging problems. Consequently, 
Autopia could not begin operations on HKDL’s scheduled opening date, which was 
moved forward from 1 July to 13 July 2006. To compound the problem, HKDL 
failed to notify the HKSAR Tourism Board, whose booklet Hong Kong Shopping 
Festival Activities Guide announced that three attractions would open on 1 July 
2006 , information that proved to be wrong because of the aforementioned delay.112 
It is understandable that this kind of scenario would play out: Disney Imagineering 
creates groundbreaking designs; therefore, Disney perhaps does not prioritize 
pragmatic operational considerations. And yet, it is as obvious as it is 
understandable that, because of the Autopia cars’ need for lengthy recharging at the 
boarding area, very long queues would inevitably result, especially insofar as 
HKDL has the fewest rides of all Disneyland parks in the world.113  
If Disneyland aims to provide patrons an escape from the existing world, 
HKDL’s small size may illustrate that the California-based Disney Imagineers have 
failed to grasp locals’ need for a larger park in which they might effectively escape 
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Hong Kong’s usual crowded spatial experiences. HKDL was modeled primarily on 
Walt Disney’s original plan for a Disney park. As I learned from my HKDL staff 
respondents who manage characters’ parades, the footprint of HKDL (visitors’ 
walking path inside HKDL) follows that of Anaheim’s Disneyland Park. Supporters 
of the Anaheim park have praised its lesson-teaching potential: cities might “be 
saved by a mouse”114 because the park’s walkable streets and pleasing public 
spaces aim to enhance people’s communication and nurture people’s better angels, 
as it were. Findley115 argued that the Anaheim park had been constructed as a 
Southern California-based suburban enclave, an antidote to the eastern metropolises 
of American civilization. However, when HKDL has imitated Anaheim Disneyland, 
problems have occurred. The approximately fifteen hectares of HKDL116 can hardly 
be imagined as an antidote to or a substitute for the high-density, hot and humid 
Hong Kong urban space. In contrast to Tokyo Disneyland, which changed “Main 
Street” to “World Bazaar” and protected it from rain under a glass canopy,117 the 
uncovered pedestrian-used areas of HKDL make it difficult for locals to believe 
that HKDL is an escape from the hot rainy Hong Kong summers, let alone a 
plethora of fantasy worlds.118 In place of visitors’ better angels, HKDL’s crammed 
and chaotic space lends strength to visitors’ unpleasant natures, triggering daily 
quarrels inside HKDL. This turn of events constitutes an infamous irony in that 
Disney parks have won fame for their order, hygiene, and safety. 
 I do not mean to suggest that localization never happens successfully in 
HKDL. At the operational level, HKDL has adapted to local culture and to visitors’ 
behavior. For example, local visitors like taking photos and, to take them, would 
sometimes disrupt the rides by disembarking from their individual carriages; in 
response, the park installed additional scenic spots for snapping photos; and a 
  291 
stationary “cup” was placed in the Mad Hatter Tea Cups ride so that passengers 
could take photos before going for a spin.119 Another factor that contributes to 
HKDL’s local adaptability is the HKDL operation manual. According to my HKDL 
worker-respondents, every three months, this confidential and important asset to 
HKDL’s success updates adaptations to local needs. Each attraction has one 
operation manual; if the update is immediate, a notice will be published to override 
a particular point in the manual. For example, the theater entrance door of Mickey’s 
PhilharMagic, a 3-D animated cartoon attraction, was initially automatic. Because 
local patrons do not leave the theater immediately and because some want to stay to 
watch the show once again, the automatic entrance created chaos by automatically 
opening itself for a new group of incoming guests when some previous guests still 
had not exited the theater. After noting the chaos and identifying its source, HKDL 
changed the theater door from an automatic one to a manual one. These kinds of 
changes can be made by more than one or two people. HKDL staff, including cast-
member trainers,120 Lead (a supervisor and a peer coach of hosts),121 and guest 
service managers can, with the approval of the operation-development staff, change 
the operation manual. However, the decision to make any onstage change that 
creates an adaptation to local circumstances is, to a large extent, limited to 
operations personnel.  
 Although the Walt Disney creative-development vice president Tom Morris 
said that HKDL “benefits a lot from its new technology,”122 my HKDL staff 
respondents, especially those who worked in park operations, understood and 
experienced the so-called “cheap” construction that characterizes HKDL’s onstage 
attractions. A particular twist to the theming accounts for this construction. In 2001, 
the Hong Kong Tourist Association held a two-day conference entitled “Preparing 
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for Disneyland,” and Paul Pressler, chairman of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, 
said that research in Hong Kong and the mainland showed a strong desire there for 
classic Disney characters and themes.123 To build HKDL with the “original” 
American flavor, the Walt Disney Imagineers tried to recreate the “original” 
version of Walt Disney’s Disneyland in HKDL. Many onstage details of the 
attractions derive from technologies in use in 1955, although the technology at 
work behind these attractions may be contemporary. The Many Adventures of 
Winnie the Pooh at HKDL, for example, is most similar to the first version of the 
Pooh attraction in Orlando’s Magic Kingdom in June 1999. To build a 1955 park at 
the turn of the millennium, however, the Disney Imagineers built a mechanical 
turnstile for HKDL’s Pooh attraction. Because the turnstile was mechanical, staff, 
themselves, had to collect attendance figures every hour, whereas other Pooh 
attractions and all turnstiles elsewhere have been computerized so that the computer 
can generate an hourly or daily attendance report.  
Of all the Pooh attractions, Tokyo Disneyland’s (TDL) Pooh’s Hunny 
Hunt124 is seen as the epitome of the “new generation” of dark rides. The name of 
the Pooh attraction in Tokyo Disneyland differs from the names of other Disney 
parks’ Pooh attractions; the technology used in TDL’s Pooh’s Hunny Hunt, which 
premiered in September 2000, also differs from—and is, indeed, far more advanced 
and sophisticated than—other Pooh attractions, including HKDL’s The Many 
Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, which premiered in September 2005. Disneylands’ 
other indoor dark rides are built on tracks and move at a constant speed; in contrast, 
TDL’s Pooh’s Hunny Hunt has no rail track or bus line, and the audience has no 
way to know or even to guess whether the “free ranging” honey-pot-ride vehicle 
will move, move or pause, move straight and then swerve or spin, simply go 
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forward, or bounce. Because of the different speeds of the movement and the 
sudden pauses, Pooh’s Hunny Hunt tells the Pooh adventure story with rhythm and 
generates unexpected spellbinding excitement. At the boarding area, three honey-
pot cars move together, but then, each one moves on its own. This is possible 
because all of the attraction’s grounds correspond to an electric map, and thereby, a 
positioning system detects each vehicle’s movement and location. The Pooh rides 
in HKDL, Anaheim Disneyland, Orlando Magic Kingdom, and Paris Disneyland 
are the same traditional ride: vehicles with tracks. Many visitors would argue that 
none can compete with the interest and the excitement that TDL’s Pooh’s Hunny 
Hunt generates.  
However, although Walt Disney Imagineering designed and produced both 
Pooh’s Hunny Hunt and The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, the Oriental 
Land Company (OLC) has total operational control of Tokyo Disneyland and 
enjoys rights to master-plan the park and to develop attractions with the 
Imagineering staff. Pooh’s Hunny Hunt is an outcome of both requests by OLC125 
and concepts by Imagineering. OLC, with its master-planning right, was eager to 
invest more money into the development of new attractions and to renew existing 
Disneyland attractions, the goal being to attract audiences; at the same time, 
HKSAR government’s negotiating power regarding such issues as park 
development, management, and operations is far more restricted than that enjoyed 
by OLC. This state of affairs remains the case even though the funding for HKDL’s 
attractions comes from HKITP, in which the HKSAR government has a 57% share. 
Imagineers knew as early as December 2002 that HKDL’s attractions would consist 
“mostly of what Imagineers call ‘direct lifts’—copies of attractions built for other 
Disney parks.”126 As a result, although the cost of Tokyo Disneyland’s Pooh’s 
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Hunny Hunt was nine times more expensive than HKDL’s The Many Adventures of 
Winnie the Pooh,127 the former has been the most popular attraction in Tokyo 
Disneyland, whereas Disneyland Paris’s The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh 
disappeared from that park in 2006.128 In short, OLC has a greater degree of 
decision-making power than the HKSAR government in designing, budgeting, and 
producing rides to meet local needs and standards. Even when local HKDL 
operation staff commented that their own Pooh attraction was “cheap” and that the 
HKSAR government should be willing to pay for an expensive attraction when it 
was willing to invest HK$22.95 billion for the reclamation and the building of 
HKDL, the irreducible fact was that the HKSAR government as the biggest 
shareholder of HKDL has had a definite say in neither the development nor the 
operation of their park.  
  
 
Conclusion 
Scholars emphasize Disney’s global reach: Disney’s ability to dominate global 
media, to homogenize global culture129 (e.g., the organization of meanings of 
difference),130 to constitute popular discourses in favor of its own image and 
business131 (e.g., commodification promotion),132 and to transform public spaces 
into privately controlled entertainment and consumption spaces.133 The operation of 
HKDL demonstrates that Hong Kong imports not only Disney images and 
technologies but also Disney corporate culture, Disney Realism, and Disney 
management practices. Hong Kong Company Law does not require Disney to 
disclose any financial statements at the Companies Registry, and so HKDL can 
continue its non-transparent corporate-management practices. Although the 
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HKSAR government is the biggest shareholder of HKDL, bounded by the 
contractual terms, the former has no definite say in HKDL’s design, development, 
and operation. In this chapter, I have also discussed how Disney’s hierarchical 
corporate culture inhibits localization despite its transnational workforce; it limits 
localization of transnational cultural forms—in this case, HKDL onstage 
attractions—to the operational level. 
Owning vast transnational power and arrays of global media networks, 
Disney possesses power that is not absolute; there is interplay among sites of power. 
Significant interplay takes place between Disney and local media actors, as they 
struggle with each other for the power to interpret, organize, and circulate the 
meaning of “Disney.” I have shown in this chapter that local media actors have 
worked to change HKDL’s transnational corporate image by interpreting Hong 
Kong’s import of Disneyland not as a “millennium dream” but as “Americanism” 
and as a “Hong Kong shame.” This interpretation illustrates that Disney’s control 
over the organization of both the meaning of “Disney” and the meaning of 
“Disneyland” is far from total. The “local” remains crucial in shaping both local 
cultural meanings and the image of the global corporate giant. The Hong Kong 
press has criticized HKDL as cramped, parsimonious, and unresponsive to Hong 
Kong people’s needs and dreams for a spectacular and extravagant HKDL. Also, 
the press has pointed out that HKDL’s response to crises has been slow, 
highhanded, and reminiscent of Americanism. The press treatment of HKDL can be 
seen, in this light, as local resistance to Disney Realism, to Disney’s manipulation 
of media, and to Disney’s failure to satisfy Hong Kong people’s desire to 
distinguish themselves from other cities and from non-Hong Kong people, as I 
discussed in chapter Three.  
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By criticizing certain Disney management practices as manipulative 
corporate practices and as Americanism, local media actors not only have 
problematized and demythicized Disney innocence but also have contributed to a 
continuous reshaping of local culture and identity. Alongside the press has been the 
HKSAR government, which has criticized the HKDL chaos. Government officials 
characterized HKDL security’s actions as “unacceptable” after the 2005 dress-down 
incident,134 and following the Lunar New Year chaos of February 2006, the 
government issued a statement of concern and then made an official “request” to 
HKDL regarding the need for improvements.135 The HKSAR government’s actions 
have helped reconstitute Hong Kong identity as one capable of rejecting a totally 
subsumed role in preference to a role that creates criticism of Disneyized 
management culture. A case in point concerns comments that the host of a popular 
local radio program made in her newspaper column. In reference to HKDL’s first 
anniversary in September 2006, she wrote, 
 
Last year Disney experienced a magical year, in that it received a barrage of 
negative comments but still earned two to three hundred million dollars, 
whereas the HKSAR government has run up deficits. However, the Hong 
Kong people should not feel stupid: we should thank Disney. Disney 
reinforces the Hong Kong people’s international image. Now, the whole 
world knows that Americanism does not work in Hong Kong; Hong Kong 
people do not blindly adore American culture. We have independent 
thoughts and are astute consumers…. Each of us spends three thousand 
dollars [to build HKDL], and we can defeat an international brand…. [the 
expenditure] exceeds our billings!136  
 
Certainly the above remarks exaggerate the setbacks that Disney had faced in 
handling the Hong Kong people’s views of HKDL management practices and of the 
international position and image of Hong Kong, but the remarks reconstitute Hong 
Kong’s imagined communities and identities: they are not inferior and subsumed to 
  297 
global or transnational corporate forces, in particular Disney regulations. It is local 
actors, including government, journalists, scholars, stars, and local production staff, 
who have requested that Disney management adapt its corporate culture to the 
Hong Kong context, especially insofar as HKDL is a joint-venture company and 
insofar as defects, chaos, and lower-than-expected attendance figures have 
characterized the park since its first year of operation.  
 I do not think that our reaction to local actors’ resistance should be joyous. 
In the wake of HKDL’s opening, media have widely circulated comment about a 
side of Disney with which many media consumers were unfamiliar; and since the 
opening, Hong Kong people have developed a more complicated reading of what 
“Disney” is. Nevertheless, media’s and even local scholars’ comments on Disney, 
as I have shown, complicate the meanings of Disney but rarely rise to a higher, 
more penetrating level, one that would promote important discussions about local 
laws’ ineffectual monitoring of companies’ acts. Hong Kong has yet to demand, in 
a unified voice, that HKDL practice greater transparency, that the HKSAR 
government better monitor HKDL management practices, and that, in place of over-
generalized anti-Americanism rhetoric, there be open and thoughtful discussions. 
Let us discuss—as a community—the relationship between non-transparent local 
governance and HKDL’s privatized practices, and let us discuss—as a 
community—the effect that this relationship has on Hong Kong people’s 
citizenship rights.  
In the following chapter, I continue to examine local work culture and local 
consumption practices inside HKDL. “Labor exploitation” was one of the popular 
HKDL topics publicized in news media,137 but few HKDL workers have joined the 
HKDL labor union. Dissatisfied with the job owing to various reasons, HKDL 
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workers have developed their own practices, some with resistance potential. On the 
whole, these worker-developed practices enable the workers to remain in HKDL’s 
employ but to fall short of Disney’s service standards, quite a feat given Disney’s 
all-encompassing work checklists. Consumers, on the other hand, constitute the 
other, less-recognized party performing on the Disneyland stage. Cultural tensions 
between Hong Kong people and Mainlanders are pronounced in HKDL, and the 
two demographic groups’ different cultural scripts make it difficult for HKDL to 
become the “happiest place in the world.” Enthusiastic consumers may disrupt the 
orderly and safe atmosphere of Disneyland unexpectedly, while sophisticated 
consumers may find HKDL inferior to other Disneyland parks around the world 
and may, as a result, seldom or never visit the park. 
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Chapter Seven 
Work and Consumption: Pixie Tricks of Cultural Globalization 
 
I discuss in chapter Six how Disney management practices—namely, Disney 
Realism, Disney’s bureaucratic system, and Disney’s transnational but US-based 
hierarchical power distribution— turn localization into a fairy tale; local media 
actors (such as local journalists, stars, and production workers), on the other hand, 
publicly characterize “Disney” as arrogant, highhanded, and Americanism. In this 
way, the local media actors try to counter certain HKDL business practices. In this 
chapter, I turn to the perspectives of HKDL workers and consumers.  
Few HKDL staff respondents characterized the park as Americanized. Some 
HKDL workers, especially those who had worked in Orlando Disney parks before 
HKDL opened in September 2005, felt disappointed with the local park’s loss of 
the American flavor. To them, HKDL’s middle management was one major factor 
leading to the un-Disneyfied park, while local consumption acts constituted another 
major factor. After working at HKDL, some acknowledged their “mistaken” views 
on a “famous” “big company”: they believed that such a “big company” as Disney 
should possess—but, in fact, lacked—a good and fair system that provides workers 
with good working conditions. Facing a toilsome job every day and sometimes 
unfair treatment from management, some HKDL workers joined the HKDL labor 
union, voiced their grievances to the media, and demanded better treatment from 
the company, but many other workers remained silent and stayed out of the labor 
union. However, workers’ reluctance to join the union does not mean that the 
HKDL management exercised full control over its workers; on the contrary, 
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workers turned their smiling faces into sullen faces and appropriated Disney’s 
scripted spiel to air grievances to the visitors.  
Disneyland sells happiness, but happiness needs cooperation from 
customers to make the sale work. Visitors’ behavior is the most difficult park-
related aspect for HKDL management to tame and control. As with other Disney 
parks, the space of HKDL derives from a rational design (by Disney Imagineers) 
and functions to encourage HKDL visitors to consume. However, customers 
unpredictably disrupt both the orderly, other-worldly, consumerist Kingdom and 
HKDL workers’ “show” by taking photos in the “onstage” space, by queue jumping, 
and by engaging in other caviling and thrifty behavior. Enthusiastic mass 
consumption unexpectedly ruins mass entertainment, Disney’s Hong Kong Magic 
Kingdom. 
This chapter divides into two large sections—one on work inside HKDL, 
and the other on consumption activities inside HKDL. In the first section, I examine 
the orientation training in which HKDL forges high-quality performers, and I then 
discuss the ways in which frontline workers consciously or unconsciously resist 
being “Disneyfied” and thus affect HKDL’s service standards. In the second section, 
I first examine the ways in which different local and transnational social campaigns 
challenge HKDL’s wholesome and innocent image. Then, I examine the limitations 
of a local anti-Disney group’s efforts to attract collective support in a local context. 
Finally, I then go back to examine how local mass-consumption activities disrupt 
the Disney magic inside the Disney park. 
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Semi-Disneyfied HKDL work system and management practices  
“You can dream, create, design and build 
the most wonderful place in the world… 
but it requires people to make the dream a reality,” said Walt Disney.1  
 
Disney has won fame as the “epitome of excellent customer service,”2 and this 
praise gave rise to the 1986 establishment of the Disney Institute, which provides 
courses about the Disney service-management approach to leadership development, 
quality service, customer loyalty, people management, organizational creativity, 
and teambuilding.3 In an ex-Disney manager’s view,4 Disney’s reputation for 
service that exceeds visitors’ expectations rests on several factors. Two of those 
factors are managers’ well-stated mission to communicate with workers and the 
cultivation of a positive team-spirit work environment. For many scholars, however, 
Disney’s mobilization of workers who adhere to the Disney way of service5 may 
rather be due to strong organizational discourse developed in staff training, 
scientific management practices targeting the part-timers,6 peer pressure, and strong 
supervision and surveillance7 from supervisors over frontline workers’ interactions 
with visitors.  
 My interviews with ten HKDL staff respondents show that HKDL workers’ 
possession of a common Disney language and a strong organization discourse 
stems partly from training and the manual.8 All HKDL workers must receive 
orientation training before they can work in a specific division; and all HKDL 
workers, during orientation training, must read the manual Disney Traditions, 
which contains information on topics such as corporate values, traditions, behaviors, 
and Walt Disney history. Given the importance of this manual in the all-important 
orientation training, I compare three versions of Disney Traditions: the HKDL 
 318 
version, the Orlando Disney parks’ version, and the Walt Disney World College 
Program version.9 My objective is to identify any similarities and any differences 
pertaining to Disneyland work philosophy as it operates outside Hong Kong and as 
it operates in Hong Kong.  
The teaching content and the format of the three versions of Disney 
Traditions are largely the same.10 Trainees need to fill in important points to 
remember the model answer. For example, the “common goal” for the three 
versions is the same: “We create happiness by providing the finest entertainment 
for people of all ages everywhere.”11 All three versions introduce “4 keys to Disney 
quality standards,” also known as the SCSE codes: safety, courtesy, show, 
efficiency.12 In the section on courtesy, for example, Disney training emphasizes 
that every visitor is a “guest” and a “VIP”: a very important person. Regarding 
“show,” the Orlando manual is blank, but the HKDL manual teaches trainees the 
meaning of “show,” that workers are not workers but “cast members” dressing in 
“costume” in the “onstage” space—the area where visitors visit. Cast members 
should perform a “good show,” meaning that they have “to deliver flawless and 
professional presentations everyday, for every guest, and to maintain a clean, neat, 
and organized work location.” The manual also states that a good show needs 
“cleanliness,” “the Disney look,” and “character integrity.” Regarding “efficiency,” 
the manual emphasizes team work and team spirit by asking workers to remember 
two words: reliability and communication. The three versions also have “7 service 
guidelines for guest service”13: “Make eye contact and smile,” “Greet and welcome 
each guest,” “Seek out interaction with guests,” “Provide immediate service 
recovery,” “Display a sincere and friendly tone of voice and body language,”14 
“Preserve the integrity of the ‘magical’ guest experience,” and “Sincerely thank 
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each and every guest.” The “7 service guidelines for guest service” are so important 
that they were printed in a pocket booklet for the rehearsal days of HKDL between 
16 August and 8 September 2005.  
The difference among these three versions of the Disney Traditions manual 
lies in HKDL’s relative neglect of workers’ safety and rights. The two Orlando 
versions devote three pages respectively to the meanings of and the official 
responses to sexual harassment,15 equal employment opportunities,16 and general 
complaints,17 but the HKDL manual mentions not one of these three issues. The 
HKDL manual’s neglect of workers’ rights suggests that HKDL management may 
be comparatively unaware of two important managerial functions: to listen to staff 
members’ demands and to provide staff members with a good working environment.  
 Aviad E. Raz18 argues that the manual is important to Disney’s strong 
organizational culture. In the case of Tokyo Disneyland, the service manual is 
integral to the organization, which comprises enormous numbers of part-timers, for 
the service manual reminds workers of the service standards. In the case of HKDL, 
HKDL orientation training helped my ten HKDL staff respondents correctly 
identify the common goal of Disneyland workers (to create happiness). In our 
conversations, many respondents always used Disney words such as ‘CM’ (cast 
members, meaning HKDL workers), ‘guests’ (visitors), ‘good show’, ‘LOB’ (line 
of business), and ‘GSM’ (guest service manager) to describe their work. Many also 
remembered, in varying sequences, the “4 keys to Disney quality standards” (safety, 
courtesy, show, efficiency). One respondent could even articulate the “7 service 
guidelines for guest service,” and other respondents mentioned two to four 
guidelines (one respondent explained that the “7 service guidelines” facilitate the 
annual appraisals of HKDL staff members’ work performance). Disney orientation 
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helped my respondents, so they stated, to grasp certain corporate values and 
standards, but the respondents’ knowledge did not necessarily translate into their 
wholehearted adherence to the guest-service guidelines.  
 Of all my ten HKDL staff respondents, two enjoyed working at HKDL,19 
but all respondents, to different degrees, criticized the park, and four of the ten 
respondents had quit the HKDL job, one planned to quit the job for studies, one 
planned not to renew his contract with HKDL, and one worked as a seasonal 
worker at HKDL during the peak season. Of the remaining three HKDL staff 
respondents, all three had worked as HKDL cultural representatives in Orlando, 
two had been promoted to Lead, and one had been promoted to Host 1. Among 
these three same respondents, two enjoyed working at HKDL and one had tried—
but failed—to find another job and thought that her lack of a bachelor’s degree 
explained the failure. In short, of the ten respondents, seven had already quit or 
planned to quit, and only two enjoyed working at HKDL. Respondents’ criticisms 
of work conditions fall into one of three categories, two of which concern culture: 
physical hardship, dissatisfaction with the “un-Disneyfied” management system 
and practices, and dissatisfaction with the “un-Disneyfied” HKDL visitors. 
Physical hardship seems to be universal in every Disney park.20 My 
respondents, especially those who worked or had worked in the park’s operations 
division, commented that HKDL during the early operations period had had an 
inadequate workforce. Workers’ long shifts (ten to twelve hours) and infrequent 
short breaks21 (workers had access only to undersized, overcrowded break rooms22) 
caused physical problems for some HKDL workers. For example, workers whose 
job was to endlessly repeat spiels or to stand for hours at a time experienced throat 
problems or joint and muscle aches and pains respectively.23 Only a few days after 
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the official opening of the park, the non-government organization the Hong Kong 
Confederation of Trade Unions received one hundred and forty HKDL workers’ 
inquiries and complaints about long shifts and chaotic shift duties.24  
Regarding HKDL management, the interviewed staff members’ criticisms 
fall into two categories: management-system issues and management-practices 
issues. Respondents found that the management contradicted the Disney-
management philosophy, according to which the management should maintain 
meritocratic, participatory, and good working conditions for junior staff. To provide 
good working conditions, a staff booklet introducing HKDL states: “we provide 
opportunities for all Cast Members to … quickly progress to senior positions.”25 In 
general, the internal promotion system and senior management’s success stories 
help workers believe that HKDL provides a meritocratic work system; indeed, the 
system articulates Hong Kong people’s general belief in the overall meritocracy of 
the Hong Kong class structure. People “may not have believed in the complete 
equality of chances, openness and fairness of their society ... but they believe it to 
be the case to such a degree that they will strive hard to better themselves and their 
families.”26 In HKDL, the organizational hierarchy (from least important to most 
important) comprises “Host” (which can be divided into Host 2 and Host 1, and 
Host 2 is the junior staff member, and most HKDL employees inside the park are 
Host 2), Lead (supervisor), Guest Service Manager (GSM), Operations Manager, 
and executives.27 After working inside the park, some workers realize that HKDL’s 
internal promotions are not as plentiful as they expected and HKDL’s pay policy 
and promotion policy may be based not on meritocracy but on seniority and on 
friendships with managers; workers who spend their two-year vocational training in 
food and beverages work inside the kitchen and receive a lower salary than do 
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frontline workers, who attained only high school (form five) qualifications; hosts 
speaking three languages (English, Cantonese, and Putonghua) receive the same 
salary as do those who speak only Cantonese; character performers playing the 
same characters as show performers receive lower salaries.28  
Another criticism that my respondents raised concerned the “un-
Disneyized” management practices of the local mid-level managers (GSMs). Inside 
the team “Park Operation,” each “land”—namely, Fantasyland, Adventureland, and 
Tomorrowland plus Main Street U.S.A.—has about eighty-five Host 2s, five or six 
Host 1s, eight Leads,29 four GSMs, and one Operations Manager, a list that reflects 
the positions’ relative importance, from least to greatest, in the management 
hierarchy. HKDL managers do not receive these positions through internal 
promotions; rather, HKDL employs the managers from outside HKDL. Many of the 
managers had previously worked for government departments such as the Hospital 
Authority or for big companies such as MTR Corporation, Cathay Pacific Airways, 
and the Airport Authority. By June 2006, according to my HKDL worker-
respondents, only three out of twenty GSMs30 trained in Orlando. Some disgruntled 
HKDL workers who had trained with Disney in Orlando alleged that these GSMs 
knew but neither believed in nor performed Disney values. HKDL requires, as do 
other US Disney parks, that once a month managers dress and perform as Hosts so 
that the managers can experience junior workers’ problems. However, these 
managers initially opposed the idea; when their opposition failed, they resisted by 
performing as Hosts for only a few hours instead of for a full day’s shift.  
According to my respondents, some managers would ask junior workers to 
perform the “7 guest service guidelines” but would not perform the guidelines 
themselves: the managers would request that junior workers keep the onstage area 
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clean but would not even clean tables; they would ask junior workers to create 
magic—unexpected happiness for guests—but could not or would not do so 
themselves. In dealing with industrial relations, because HKDL provides no clear 
specification as to what mistakes lead to what disciplinary actions, each team can 
develop its own disciplinary system, and different managers exercise disciplinary 
action differently; consequently, junior workers suffer unfair disciplinary actions.31 
In October 2005, some HKDL “divisions” managers listed ten workers who had 
applied for the most sick leaves in their divisions on the division’s own notice 
board. It is possible that such action violated the Disability Discrimination 
Ordinance.32 In short, some hosts were dissatisfied with contradictions between 
HKDL’s relatively open organizational structure emphasizing communication (such 
as the Cast Advisory Council and the Cast Forum where junior staffers voice 
suggestions and criticisms) and HKDL’s strong GSM-developed hierarchical 
organizational culture.33  
 My respondents also recounted to me stories about some grossly 
unsatisfactory workplace conditions. Because of the inadequate workforce during 
the park’s early days, managers prohibited some of my respondents from using the 
restroom and one respondent waited for forty-five minutes and another for two 
hours to relieve themselves. Annie,34 who worked as a log raft and boat skipper for 
two attractions, Tarzan Island and Jungle River Cruise in Adventureland, 
commented, “We all hate the environment a lot. There are so many mosquitoes, and 
you got no way to escape from the sun. It burns us.” Annie, together with her 
colleagues, had asked their managers to request a parasol for them but one manager 
immediately refused their request because a parasol would not suit the theme of 
Adventureland. When the park was still under construction, Annie was employed as 
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a test-and-adjust (T & A) operator. She needed to ride the log raft for contractors 
between the main dock and the island dock to construct Tarzan’s Treehouse, the 
artificial tree covered in vines and moss. One day, it rained heavily. All contractors 
received raincoats but no junior staff had one. Annie asked her manager to provide 
raincoats for her and her colleagues. Upon request, the managers sent her three 
raincoats although there were more than ten junior workers working on the site. 
Once, Annie’s colleagues demanded a greater number of short breaks because boat 
skippers in Jungle River Cruise needed to deliver spiels and, consequently, 
developed throat irritation, but according to her, the manager said, “You always go 
to sing karaoke and have no throat problems, so why do you have problems now?” 
Annie was disappointed with the manager’s inconsiderate refusal and eventually 
left the company although she loved the Orlando Disney workplace life.    
The third major problem that HKDL workers face is the varying client 
profile. If Disneyland has stages on which its characters and cast members perform 
in front of and, indeed, among guests, the guests are also performers on the stage. 
To provide and sell happiness to guests, HKDL hosts need to follow their guest-
service guidelines—to smile, to greet, to interact with guests, and to thank them 
profusely. However, the service guidelines, as James Watson argues in the case of 
McDonald’s restaurants,35 assume that customers have been educated and 
disciplined, as it were—that they, as guests, know the proper scripts and the 
grateful behavior expected of them. But if customers deliver off-script 
performances, and if hosts do not receive “appropriate” responses from guests (for 
example, no “you’re welcome” smiles or statements), these hosts can hardly see 
their service guidelines through to completion. In other words, both hosts and 
guests need to know and to follow their scripts well in order to have a “good 
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show”—in order to generate Disneyland happiness.36 HKDL’s major clients are 
Hong Kong people and Mainland Chinese, and some of these guests may be 
unfamiliar with the Disneyland culture. In these cases, problems often occur. Many 
of these local customers differ from local Orlando customers insofar as the former 
are unaccustomed, in particular, to the culture of “service with a smile.” My 
respondents said that when hosts make eye contact and smile at local customers, 
customers may feel suspicious of the smile and some even feel intimidated and 
reply, “What are you laughing at?” Others may feel nervous and go away.  
To create an entertainment park that makes movie magic a reality, HKDL 
workers need to encourage visitors to immerse themselves in the fairy-world 
atmosphere. If rides are out of order, HKDL staff should not tell visitors the truth 
but make up a story (a practice that is taught in training) so as not to break the 
magic spell. During the early days of HKDL, HKDL staff said “Buzz Lightyear 
suddenly feels uncomfortable and he needs to have a rest. He will lead visitors to 
journey to infinity” if the ride Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters was out of order; for 
another popular ride, The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, HKDL staff would 
say, “Winnie the Pooh has broken the honey pot and he is cleaning up the place” if 
the ride was out of order. As stated by my respondents, Orlando visitors, after 
hearing the spiel, may just keep compliantly waiting in line; in HKDL, however, 
visitors criticized HKDL management by declaring that it had lied to cover up 
management’s faults. For the ride Jungle River Cruise, the skipper needs to present 
a humorous narration as he or she leads on “the adventurous journey through an 
African jungle.”37 When skippers do their job, they expect visitors to feel joyful and 
to laugh. Many local visitors, however, ignore the skippers’ spiel and take photos 
instead, and some visitors loudly declare that the spiel is not funny and that the 
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animatronic scenes look fake.38 Many of my HKDL staff respondents, especially 
those whose work required them to be in contact with customers, told me that they 
had been chastised, offended, or intimidated by local customers to different degrees. 
Some Hong Kong visitors spoke foul language, and some visitors jumped queues. 
One visitor even told one of my respondents to watch her back when she left the 
park. Audrey, who was still working at HKDL and who wanted to quit the job but 
could get no interview, said: 
 
Guests are so important. Initially I wanted to have a happy and smiling face 
to serve them, but then I was greeted with rude responses and foul language. 
I didn’t do anything, so why are you yelling at me? The problems [of 
malfunctioning machines and queue jumping] weren’t my fault. And I can’t 
help you even though you’re yelling at me. I can’t say that I’m disappointed 
with the park because, now, I don’t have much hope for HKDL. 
 
Disneyland demands that customers line up, behave in an orderly manner, enjoy 
themselves, smile, and interact with others in a friendly way; the park design and 
hosts’ guest-service guidelines are ways in which HKDL leads visitors to meet 
these expectations. Without discipline from the visitors, the park can hardly be a 
fantasyland for both visitors and HKDL workers.  
 
Localized services 
Disgruntled workers negotiate with HKDL working conditions and management 
practices in various ways. Some workers voice their grievances directly to 
journalists and some workers established the labor union. The Hong Kong 
Disneyland Cast Members’ Union (HKDLCMU) was established on 29 November 
2005,39 but no respondents in my study had joined the HKDLCMU, and no 
respondents knew any colleagues who had joined the union. According to Elaine 
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Hui, the Organizing Secretary of HKDLCMU, around one hundred junior workers 
out of five thousand HKDL workers had joined HKDLCMU, and Elaine noted that 
more than ninety-five of them worked as Host 2s and that fewer than five union 
members were Host 1s. No Leads, GSMs, or higher-ranking employees had ever 
joined the labor union.  
My respondents provided me with different reasons for their decision not to 
join the union: they said that the union gathered incomprehensive information about 
HKDL employment conditions (that not all divisions treat workers badly40 and that 
there are different work loads among HKDL workers41); they feared that their 
participation in the labor union would negatively affect their careers; and they 
suspected that the union’s negotiation power was weak.42 Besides, although 
workers may see the social relation between HKDL management and themselves as 
a relation of domination and subordination, their attitude toward HKDL 
management is ambivalent. Although some respondents in my study experienced 
management’s unfair practices, HKDL’s management problems such as the semi-
meritocratic system and management’s unfair treatment of workers, the respondents 
said that HKDL’s management problems were, in a general form, common among 
other companies. Some respondents found that the HKDL’s employee benefits 
(such as medical insurance and overtime payment) were superior to those offered 
by local small enterprises; and most of my HKDL staff respondents enjoyed the 
workers’ relationships with one another and the team spirit inside the park. And as I 
mentioned earlier, HKDL management would hold a Cast Forum every quarter and 
a Cast Advisory Council at which junior staff could raise questions, make demands, 
and voice criticisms. Improvements may be small but junior staff members, in 
general, have an impression that the company—through its management—is 
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responding to employees’ needs and demands gradually. The establishment of more 
break rooms, for example, greatly pleased park employees, who praised 
management for the improvement. 
For my respondents, “labor union,” however, implied “resistance,” which in 
turn implied a confrontational stance toward the HKDL management. Workers’ 
ambivalent attitudes, in addition to their limited job alternatives, encouraged 
workers to avoid taking risks and, thus, to avoid challenging authorities. Before the 
establishment of the HKDLCMU, a university-based, student-organized anti-
Disney group, Disney Hunter, helped the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade 
Unions (HKCTU) distribute leaflets to HKDL workers. The leaflets were to 
encourage the workers to establish a labor union. Some HKDL workers told 
HKCTU members that if Disney Hunter involved itself in the establishment of an 
HKDL labor union, the workers would not join it because they were not 
confrontational toward the management even though they disapproved of some 
HKDL-management practices. As a result, workers’ ambivalence toward HKDL 
management, labor unions’ reputation for confrontation, and workers’ fear that 
labor-union membership would negatively affect their careers, all resulted in the 
labor union’s low participation rate. Believing in the free market and free choice, 
some of my HKDL staff respondents did not join the union and, moreover, asked 
dissatisfied workers to resign; some of my respondents also criticized workers’ 
demands for pay raises or for additional employee benefits because, according to 
these respondents, the dissatisfied workers were making demands that lay outside 
the lawful status of the contract.  
Many workers faced physically toilsome work, certain inconsiderate 
management practices, undesirable visitors, and conflicting beliefs concerning 
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social fairness, meritocracy, rule by contract, rule by law, and free choice in a 
market economy. In light of these themes, as well as the workers’ overall hesitation 
toward labor unions, many of the workers chose to leave HKDL. HKDL staff’s 
turnover rate is high,43 especially in the park’s operations, merchandise, and hotel 
services divisions. As one of my respondents noted, during one particular month in 
Adventureland, ten of one hundred hosts left HKDL; in Fantasyland, some workers 
would leave within seven days of starting, and some would leave after completing 
only their three-month work probation.44  
But some choose to stay, with resentment. Because some HKDL workers 
cannot find a better job despite several months of frustrating searching, these 
workers may react to their unsatisfying work in a passive way. According to Elaine 
Hui, the Organizing Secretary of the HKDLCMU, HKDL workers know that the 
labor union cannot solve many management problems in which no violation of 
labor laws has taken place; therefore, some workers do not join the labor union but 
make use of the union forum to voice grievances. Sometimes, workers strategically 
use the forum to retaliate against their supervisors because the workers know that 
senior management, human resources officers, and public affairs officers read the 
forum regularly. For instance, security officers complain in the forum that their 
managers are lazy, unfair, authoritarian, immoral in their private lives, and so on. 
One story was that the managers cut off internet access inside the security room 
after learning about the allegations that workers had raised in the forum.45 
In the work environment, cast members work in their own way to make 
their work life happier. The most common way for HKDL workers to escape from 
physical hardship and emotional distress is to take a two-day official sick leave 
every month. In Fantasyland, for example, almost half of the workers take a two-
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day sick leave every month. There should be about fifty-five workers working 
inside Fantasyland at any given time; however, in the most extreme case, about 
eight to ten of the needed fifty-five workers call in sick on one day. It is generally 
the case that, during the end of the month or on busy days, these workers call in 
sick. During peak times, supervisors (Leads) need to rearrange manpower 
immediately, and as a result, the workers may have fewer breaks and experience an 
even more unpleasant work environment.  
Many Disneyland workers know that “they are part of the product being 
sold,” argued Van Maanen.46 These workers may respond to their various 
grievances by putting on a glum face for customers, as I mentioned. Because the 
four most important keys to Disney quality standards are, as I have mentioned, 
safety, courtesy, show, and efficiency (ordered in decreasing importance), all 
workers know that safety is the most important element in Disneyland. Smiling or 
courtesy is not. From their experience, workers also know that there is a high 
possibility that they will be chastised if they make mistakes relating to safety issues, 
but a low possibility that they will receive even one warning if they fail to return a 
smile or if they pout on the job. One respondent, as a Lead, told me that the stricter 
the managerial discipline, the more frequent the workers’ passive-aggressive 
actions. Once she asked a Host 2 to greet a guest, but as soon as she turned her back, 
the worker would offer visitors a glum face; when another colleague—
exemplifying Disney’s surveillance method—informed my respondent of the 
worker’s passive-aggressive behavior, she could only ask the worker to leave the 
onstage area and to take a break backstage. During busy periods, many HKDL 
workers exhibit indifference so that visitors will be less likely to seek help from 
them. On one busy day during Christmas in 2005, I was queuing up for fastpass 
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tickets for Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters, but the fastpass ticket machine broke 
down. I told an HKDL worker about the problem, and she just said, “How many 
tickets?” I said “five,” and she gave me the tickets and went away immediately. She 
said nothing other than “How many tickets?” In fact, she did not bother even to 
look at my face, and I could find only indifference from her demeanor. No smile. 
No interaction. And it was clear to me, as well, that she wanted to convey 
indifference at that moment. Normally, junior workers do not exhibit such 
indifference in front of the Lead or the manager, whose duties include appraising 
the junior workers’ professionalism: a bad appraisal can negatively affect a pay 
raise.47  
To protect the junior workers or to reduce the turnover rate, some HKDL 
managers (as did a trainer in Disneyland Paris48) would tell the hosts, “If you don’t 
want to smile, don’t. But you must ensure the proper execution of safety 
procedure.” Staff members’ smiles become a bonus instead of a mandate for HKDL 
management. “Hard-core” safety procedures include detailed inspections of 
machines and unerring enforcement of safety-belt rules. Almost all HKDL workers 
strictly adhere to the operation manual’s safety regulations. In addition, workers 
must communicate—out loud—the safety rules to visitors: “Please remain seated” 
or “Please fasten your seatbelt.” These spoken narratives are requisite, even for a 
relatively safe ride like Cinderella Carousel. However, my numerous visits to 
HKDL revealed that even during the slow season, some workers would give the 
safety spiels so fast that I could not make out a single word. When it comes to 
safety, workers act according to instruction and operation guidelines, but their 
performances vary. 
 332 
HKDL workers can also alter or shorten spiels to make their lives easier and 
less disappointing. For HKDL’s ride Jungle River Cruise, the boat skipper should 
finish the ride in about eight minutes. When some skippers notice that the whole 
boat is full of bored visitors who would prefer simply to take photos rather than 
listen to the spiel, the skippers may shorten their humorous narration and ride to 
different scenes, where visitors can witness explosions and an animatronic elephant 
spurting water. The skippers reduce the spiel to simplify their lives—and to save 
their sore throats. Because they are allowed to ad-lib comments to create a funny 
atmosphere, skippers may make use of their self-created spiel to express their work 
conditions. Once, I took the ride, and after the skipper went back to the unloading 
area, we—the audience—applauded, and she said, “Please come back and visit me 
more frequently. I think that I’ll end up working on this ride forever. I never get a 
shot at a promotion.”  
HKDL workers may try to lighten their work life by showing up for work 
without committing to the work: according to one of my respondents, “to do the 
important basic tasks only [to offer spiels about safety and to perform safety checks] 
and to pass the time by waiting for the next break, by talking, by joking around with 
colleagues during a shift, by waiting for the end of a shift, and by going out with 
colleagues after work.” Junior park operators and hotel waiters usually have small-
group gatherings after work twice a week. Talking to each other during shifts and 
outside of shifts seems to be one of the greatest comforts that workers take from 
their work at HKDL. 
 
Global consumer politics and the local anti-Disney movement 
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After 1999, Hong Kong people grew enthusiastic about the establishment of HKDL. 
Basking in this enthusiasm, Disney management perhaps registered surprise when 
they learned that some people in Hong Kong were struggling against some Disney 
business practices and that these people had spread their protest worldwide to stop 
or to intervene in these practices. A case in point: HKDL planned to serve shark’s 
fin soup for wedding banquets and drew fire from environmentalists. In May 2005, 
the conservation organizations Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Greenpeace, 
and Hong Kong Marine Conservation Society requested that Disney reverse its 
decision, but the management rejected the appeal and said “Hong Kong Disneyland 
takes environmental stewardship very seriously and we are equally sensitive to the 
local cultures.”49 Green groups threatened to mount a global boycott of Disneyland 
until Disney reversed the decision.50 WWF Hong Kong intended to organize a 
20,000-person (mostly local students) petition; alongside it would be held a global 
online signature petition targeting its five million members, starting at the end of 
June 2005. WildAid and Peter Hughes Diving also took part in the action; and 
nearly one thousand people from around the world, including Disney shareholders 
and scuba divers, sent e-mail complaints to Disney’s board of directors to protest 
against its decision to serve shark’s fin at HKDL. Under pressure, HKDL said it 
served only that shark’s fin that came from “sustainable” shark fisheries; HKDL 
added that it would still serve shark’s fin soup by request. Because HKDL 
management said that the park’s decision to serve shark’s fin soup at wedding 
banquets was to be “sensitive to the local cultures,” in late June 2005, more than 
five hundred primary and secondary students drew up a petition against Disney’s 
use of Chinese culture as a scapegoat for Disney’s decision in this regard, and the 
students called for a boycott of HKDL until Disney dropped shark’s fin soup from 
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the menu.51 On 24 June 2005, Disney announced its decision to abide by the 
demands.52  
 Another case in point centers on Students and Scholars Against Corporate 
Misbehavior (SACOM), which accused Disney of global outsourcing of 
manufacturing to supplier factories in China, without “independent and 
participatory monitoring and training mechanisms.”53 SACOM went on to argue 
that the outsourcing had resulted in the maltreatment of Mainland workers and a 
flouting of workers’ rights. A local NGO founded in June 2005, SACOM is a 
variation of American human-rights groups and American labor groups that, 
especially in the early 1990s, have exposed and protested sweatshop conditions 
attributable to Nike and Gap, two major companies in the apparel industry; 
SACOM’s activities are similar, also, to American college and university students’ 
anti-sweatshop movement, which took off after 1995. These students demanded 
that “workers who make these goods be paid a living wage, no matter where in the 
world industry operates.”54 On 18 August 2005, SACOM organized a press 
conference and released a report named “Looking for Mickey Mouse’s Conscience: 
A Survey of the Working Conditions of Disney’s Supplier Factories in China.” The 
group studied four of Disney’s supplier factories in Shenzhen, Zhongshan and 
Dongguan in July 2005 and found that workers in Disney’s supplier factories were 
forced to work long hours, were paid below the minimum wage, and were denied 
holiday pay, overtime, and maternity pay. Industrial accidents were common in 
these sweatshops. For instance, crushed fingers were common injuries at Nord Race 
Paper International Limited.55 The group stated that Disney’s “corporate social 
responsibility” overlooked sweatshop conditions and that Disney’s self-monitoring 
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system enabled factories to produce fake pay slips, fake time sheets, and fake 
copies of contracts.  
“Would the American people ever associate this book [Disney’s story book] 
with crushed fingers?” asked Charles Kernaghan, the executive director of the 
National Labor Committee. He posed the question in New York on 19 August 2005, 
just twelve hours after Hong Kong SACOM’s anti-Disney-sweatshop press 
conference. Collaborating with SACOM, the US group held a protest in front of a 
Disney store on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, with three activists dressing as Mickey 
Mouse, Minnie Mouse, and Winnie the Pooh. Owing in large part to the SACOM 
video documentary Those with Justice,56 which brought mainland workers’ voices 
to the front stage of the campaign, the story became globalized and made headlines 
in The International Herald Tribune,57 in The New York Times,58 on Fox News,59 on 
BBC News,60 in The Washington Post,61 in Forbes Magazine,62 in The Guardian,63 
and on CNN,64 among others.65 Disney swung into emergency-response mode and 
pledged investigations. It responded by commissioning Verité [sic], a non-profit 
social auditing and training organization that analyzed and built Gap’s extensive 
system of factory monitoring. Verité issues the detailed annual Social 
Responsibility Report about violations of labor rights in Gap’s supply chain and 
how Verité handles violations. Verité’s objective is to investigate relevant claims 
and to “take the appropriate actions to remediate violations found.”66 According to 
SACOM, although a representative from the Disney Asia Pacific Region Corporate 
Social Responsibility Department contacted SACOM, and although the two parties 
met several times to discuss their views and concrete worker-based monitoring 
systems, Disney refused to provide a public list of contractors and their addresses. 
Disney also declined to provide a detailed report of Verité’s findings, but Disney 
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revealed that two factory owners had refused to cooperate and that Disney had 
subsequently stopped doing business with them.67 Verité helped the remaining 
factories improve safety conditions, deliver training to workers, and set up a worker 
helpline.  
The partial success of these efforts to mitigate or to stop certain Disney 
business practices reflects the convergence of two critical factors: consumption and 
the expanding role of citizenship in consumer societies. Consumption may help big 
business spread “the ideology of choiceoisie”68 in Probyn’s words: consumers may 
believe that we can choose our lifestyle by consumption, but our consumption acts 
maintain the status quo because we lose control over the provision of commodities. 
Politicized consumption activities, however, extend civil activities from organized 
resistance against the state to organized resistance against the marketplace. The 
market gives consumer citizens some chances to say “no” to corporations whose 
behavior clashes with their lifestyles and beliefs in justice, equity, and the 
environment. According to Antony Giddens’ “politics of lifestyle,”69 we consumers 
may turn our everyday private and mundane activities—our consumption—into 
meaningful public acts to stimulate change in corporate policy, and, in Yúdice’s 
words, we do so “to counter alienation in at least one sense: the separation of the 
consumer from the rest of society.”70 
Also critical is the strategy behind the successes of politicized consumption: 
transnational protest and campaigns. Environmentalists’ victory in the shark-fin 
issue is attributable to the threatening global protest targeting, of all things, Disney. 
Supporting this protest was a host of green-group websites, e-mails, and blogs that 
aimed to hit the company’s profits. Also of support were children, who threatened 
to boycott the Disney market. By contrasting different consumer models of 
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different countries, Yúdice argues that a country’s successful and influential 
consumer movement needs to fulfill three objectives: first, the country needs to 
institute affirmative action laws; second, the country’s culture should support and 
promote the reproduction of political identity through consumption; and third, 
markets should be extensive. For example, consider Yúdice’s comments:  
 
… if Latinos can sue Disney World over “English Only” policies, and if 
deaf people have sought recognition not as a handicapped minority but as an 
autonomous culture, it is because there is an imbrication of politics and 
culture that works through the terrain of state, media, and market that has 
been internally structured, so to speak, in radically different ways than in 
Brazil and, for that matter, other developed nations such as Britain, as is 
evident in a comparative study of McDonald’s U.S. and McDonald’s U.K. 
John Gabriel cites not only the existence of affirmative action laws in the 
United States as a fundamental distinguishing feature, accounting for the 
greater number of minority franchises than in Britain, but he also notes that 
the size of minority communities cannot be overlooked when considering 
the bottom line.71 
 
Politicized consumerism alone could not successfully put sweatshops on to the 
world political agenda. The catalyst was the White House’s initiation of the 
Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), which comprises apparel firms, several 
nonprofit organizations, and various trade unions. The AIP released a set of 
monitoring guidelines. Because of the strength of the anti-sweatshop movement 
across the country,72 the AIP helped create the Fair Labor Association, which 
agreed to try to improve working conditions worldwide to a certain extent.73 The 
coalition among student unions, organized labor unions, human rights groups, and 
institutional investors stimulated big companies to be socially and environmentally 
responsible.74 In the case of Hong Kong, there are close ties between university 
students and labor organizations, Christian and Catholic human rights 
organizations,75 and women’s groups. However, since the Handover, the HKSAR 
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government has removed laws to protect collective bargaining and anti-union 
discrimination; organized and influential consumer leagues and institutional 
investors are almost extinct species in Hong Kong.   
In evaluating the success of the US-campus anti-sweatshop movement, an 
anti-sweatshop student activist Rachel Paster commented that the success of the 
movement was due to the moderate character of the student groups, or it would not 
have gained vast support from so many students on the campuses: 
 
One of the biggest reasons why USAS [United Students Against 
Sweatshops] and local student groups opposing sweatshops have been as 
successful as we have been is that opposition to sweatshops isn’t that 
radical…. If we were a “radical” group, university administrations would 
have brushed us off…. The fact that they don’t is a testament to the fact that 
we have support, not just from students on the far left, but from students in 
the middle ground who don’t consider themselves radicals. Without those 
people we would never have gotten as far as we have.76   
 
If the campus anti-sweatshop movement owes its success, in part, to the moderate 
character of the movement, then perhaps we can infer why a confrontational Disney 
Hunter failed to attract the vast support of local Hong Kong university students. 
Given this possible explanation, we can examine Hong Kong culture more widely 
in relation to politicized consumerism.  
When the HKSAR government signed its contract with the Walt Disney 
Company about the establishment of HKDL in 1999, scholars and activists 
published a book called Disney Is Not a Happy Land (written in Chinese)77 arguing 
against Disneyfication of the landscape and striving for alternatives. Concern was 
raised, but no group or organized action objected to HKDL until mid-2005. Around 
this time, university professors initiated a group, the Disney Concern Group, which 
students then wholly organized. During April and June of 2005, the group delivered 
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talks at different universities to raise students’ interests and critical views on 
HKDL’s effects on Hong Kong. On 23 June 2005, eighty days before the opening 
of HKDL, students concerned about Disney’s labor exploitation, environmental 
vandalism, and cultural colonization formed the group Disney Hunter to monitor 
Disneyland’s operation and to organize public-oriented educational campaigns 
about the many facets of this transnational giant. As of this writing, the group 
comprises about twenty students, and I am one of the members.78  
 
 
 
In contrast to the US-campus anti-sweatshop movement, Hong Kong’s 
Disney Hunter lacks mass support. To begin with, the group’s membership is small. 
Its “resistant” image—its logo features a black silhouette of Mickey Mouse, with 
the ears on fire and the silhouette drawn inside a gun’s sight (figure 1)—and its 
adversarial stance toward Disney corporate policy politically, economically, and 
culturally79 may explain the group’s lack of popular support. Starting in June 2005, 
Disney Hunter undertook many activities to communicate their message to the 
public: they held a press conference, conducted university and secondary school 
talks, wrote articles for newspapers, participated in interviews held by the media, 
participated in demonstrations, organized a public forum, joined the Hong Kong 
Fig. 1: Disney Hunter 
logo 
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Confederation of Trade Unions to ask HKDL workers to establish a union, and 
protested at the park entrance twice in 2005. 
Although the group has kept on participating in newspaper interviews, radio 
talks, and school talks, local public support remains limited, as is most evident, 
again, from the group’s membership numbers. On the Disney Hunter internet forum, 
web visitors argued against Disney Hunter’s criticism of HKDL management 
practices. Believing in “professionalism” and free choice, some visitors argued that 
the smile-ready culture and all its offshoots constitute not exploitation but 
professionalism; laborers can quit the job if they do not like wearing heavy 
character costumes and the like at HKDL.80 In our school and university tours, 
when we argued that the private park discriminates against people of the lower 
classes, students argued that a certain degree of material inequality provides 
incentive for economic production. Regarding cultural issues such as gender 
stereotypes, many audience members found the argument strange because they did 
not find stereotypical images problematic. And not a few disagreed that Disney has 
a gradually but extensively expanding influence over our subjectivity, on the 
grounds that such concentrations of power are offset by the entertainment market’s 
and the media market’s provision of extensive choices and “alternatives” to 
consumers.  
On 11 September 2005, Disney Hunter protested at the HKDL park entrance 
and faced a violent response from HKDL security. The security guards used water 
hoses to crush protestors. Disney Hunter members videotaped the whole process, 
broadcasting the footage through the local independent media web publisher 
Inmedia and sent video footage to TVB news, the most popular free TV station in 
Hong Kong, but TVB did not broadcast the video footage,81 nor did it report HKDL 
 341 
securities’ violent acts. Many newspapers sent only photojournalists to cover the 
story, but many of these left before HKDL management reacted to the student 
demonstration violently. News media’s coverage of the demonstration was 
negligible.  
 
Sense and sensibility: contested feelings, compartmentalized acts 
Among members of Disney Hunter, Susanna,82 Billy,83 and I have experienced 
tension between our affection for certain Disney characters and our participation in 
Disney Hunter. We criticize certain Disney practices but sometimes remain silent 
on other issues, especially the cultural ones, because the multi-faceted, contested, 
and contradictory nature of Disney offerings provides us comfort, identification, 
and even empowerment at different times in our lives. That is, we like Disney, as 
well as object to it.  
We three are attracted to the extraordinary characteristics of the ordinary 
characters: Belle in Beauty and the Beast, Winnie the Pooh, and Mickey Mouse. 
Initially, it was Belle’s beauty—and her yellow gown—that attracted Susanna to 
the character; but then she found that Belle differed from other Disney princesses: 
that Belle was born an ordinary village girl but that she transformed into an 
extraordinary queen because of her love, courage, learnedness, and innate 
intelligence. As a middle-class hard-working girls-school student, Susanna 
identified with and aspired to be like Belle. Susanna joined the Disney Concern 
group, the precursor of Disney Hunter, because she both liked Disney and wanted 
to know more about this company. It was out of curiosity, then, that Susanna joined 
the group.  
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Another member, Billy, has been in love with Mickey since he was about 
five. Referring to the time when he was about eight or nine, Billy stated, “I read 
some Mickey books, and Mickey has many roles. He’s a detective and a magician. 
He’s knowledgeable. He’s a smart hero, but he’s not as exaggerated as superman, 
not as aggressive or masculine. He’s ordinary but still a hero.” Mickey became 
Billy’s “hero” and “friend” with whom Billy could identify. Billy joined Disney 
Hunter out of curiosity and out of responsibility. As a Mickey lover, as Acting 
Chairman of the Social Movement Resource Centre of the Hong Kong Federation 
of Students, and as the City University Representative of the Management 
Committee, Billy did not know how to position himself in facing both Disney as a 
company and the establishment of HKDL when many members inside the Hong 
Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee abhorred Disney. The Disney 
Concern Group was to hold a public lecture in the City University of Hong Kong. 
Billy, as a student union representative, considered it his responsibility to make 
contact between the student union and university students. So he went to the talk 
and participated in the first joint-school Disney Concern Group student meeting. In 
his eyes, the first student meeting was chaotic because, perhaps, students were 
unused to being organizers. Soon thereafter, he decided to participate in the group, 
whose name had changed to Disney Hunter in June 2005.   
As was the case with Susanna, I was attracted to Belle because she reads. To 
me, Belle is like Jo in Little Women. Jo has fascinated me since I was about ten. 
Another favorite, Winnie the Pooh, is a figure with which I identify in order to 
resist contemporary lifestyles that promote specific brands of efficiency and of 
competitiveness; Piglet, Pooh’s friend in Disney’s The Many Adventures of Winnie 
the Pooh, is tiny in size and timid in personality but the cleverest of all when it 
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comes to solving problems in the Hundred Acre Wood. Pooh and Piglet are my and 
my husband’s companions, with whom we play and talk everyday, and through 
whom we develop our intimate selves and our relationship with each other. I joined 
Disney Hunter in August 2005, but before the group established itself, a member of 
the Disney Concern Group invited me to give an HKDL-themed talk in April 2005 
to her group members.  
Because of our love of particular Disney characters or Disney movies, 
conflicts are an inevitable outcome of our anti-Disney acts. Both Susanna and Billy 
are active members in Disney Hunter. Susanna explicitly articulated her struggle in 
our anti-Disney action: 
 
I like Disney things, though I don’t consider myself a Disney fan. I think I 
really like Disney products…. I can’t imagine myself hating Disney because 
I consume so much Disney merchandise. Actually, I can’t accept seeing 
myself pitted against Disney. Whenever we have direct confrontations, I get 
all wound up inside and feel conflicted. 
 
To lessen his contested feelings, Billy told Disney Hunter members and the press 
clearly that what he resisted was the Disney Company, not the Mouse. Declaring 
that Mickey Mouse had done no wrong, Billy swore that he would not allow Disney 
Hunter to smear Mickey’s image.84 My own participation in Disney Hunter hinges 
on my research efforts and my related public presentations. My presentations on 
behalf of Disney Hunter focused on Disney’s global media domination, HKDL’s 
unequal deal with the HKSAR government, and HKDL’s simultaneous use of 
public money and refusal to disclose its financial accounts. I did not focus on 
Disney’s homogenizing effect on people’s, especially children’s ideas of imaginary 
and real worlds.  
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We three have not only affection for certain Disney characters but also a 
great deal of Disney merchandise. After joining the group, we changed our 
consumption practices regarding Disney merchandise. Although Susanna felt happy 
whenever she wore clothes featuring her favorite Disney characters, she stopped 
buying Disney merchandise; after learning from the press that Disney might sue 
Disney Hunter for infringement of intellectual property rights, Susanna became 
increasingly hostile to things related to Disney and she stopped using her Disney 
stationery and stopped wearing Disney clothes. Although Billy’s affection for 
Mickey Mouse has not diminished, he hesitates to buy Mickey merchandise 
because he is afraid that its existence owes much to exploited Chinese labor. I try 
my best to buy neither Pooh dolls nor Piglet dolls, but recently, some well-made 
dolls tempted me, and, after joining Disney Hunter, I bought one Pooh doll in Japan, 
wishing that my purchase might not be a sweatshop product. 
If this kind of tension and compartmentalization characterizes Disney 
Hunter members, it is not surprising to see much of the Hong Kong public similarly 
compartmentalize their responses, sometimes criticizing HKDL’s various policies 
and sometimes defending Disney. That is, at times, the Hong Kong public plays the 
role of citizen, critical of unjust practices; at other times, the Hong Kong public 
plays the role of consumer, desirous of attractive goods and pleasing services. 
Although Disney may not be as innocent as the public thought in the past, a survey 
by John Ap shows that the respondents criticized certain HKDL management 
practices but kept on visiting the park.85 Ap conducted a phone survey of 524 
residents between 13 and 16 March 2006. The survey shows that 70% of 
respondents held impressions of HKDL that had turned more negative and that 63% 
thought that the park’s benefits outweighed its costs, down thirteen points from 
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2004. Only 27% of respondents agreed that the Disney-HKSAR government 
HKDL deal was fair, almost half (47%) disagreed with the assertion that Disney is 
a socially responsible company, 93% agreed that HKDL should be accountable to 
the Hong Kong public for the publicly funded project in question, and—in 
contrast—86% supported HKDL’s further development, the highest support for this 
question among related surveys since 2000. Finally, approximately one-third (31%) 
of these respondents, with all their criticisms and disappointments, had already 
visited the park.  
This issue of compartmentalization is critical and merits more attention here. 
HKDL’s performance in its early days further illustrates the Hong Kong public’s 
self-compartmentalization insofar as the public criticized HKDL’s poor public 
image and then, gently placing their dissatisfaction to the side, visited the park. 
Although people’s impression of HKDL grew increasingly negative, over one 
million people, 14,000 people a day on average, visited HKDL between 12 
September and 27 November 2005, seventy-seven days after HKDL’s official 
opening.86 With all the allegations concerning, for instance, chaotic management 
and even Americanism (see chapter Six), Hong Kong people constituted a relative 
majority of the patrons: the projection was that they would account for 40% of 
patrons, but in fact, they accounted for 49%; only 26% were from the Mainland,87 
far below the projected 44%. 
My middle-class-parent respondents’ expression of their consumer identity 
differed from their expression of their citizen identity. Of five mothers whom I 
interviewed, two simply considered themselves consumers and declared that they 
have what Bauman calls “right to enjoy, not a duty to suffer.”88 Their decision 
about whether or not they should visit HKDL rested on a cost-benefit happiness 
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analysis instead of on an ethics deliberation concerning, for example, HKDL’s 
practice of Americanism.89 Cathy, who enjoyed her Anaheim Disneyland and 
Disneyland Paris trip in the past (see chapter Four), said that she, as a consumer, 
cared only about the effect that a day inside the park would have on her happiness. 
If she experienced unhappiness in the park, she would not go there again; but if she 
felt happy in the park, she would visit again even if the park management was 
arrogant and disobeyed local laws. Ada, another mother who had little interest in 
visiting the theme park but who had enjoyed her Tokyo Disneyland trip because her 
daughter had been happy on the trip, said that the negative HKDL image has some 
influence on her interest in visiting the park, but because her child’s many 
classmates had already gone to HKDL, for her child’s sake, she visited the park. 
Lisa, who tried best to struggle against the Disney consumer products but who used 
Disney’s World of English in teaching her two daughters English, shifted between 
her role as consumer and her role as citizen according to the topic at hand. She 
criticized the park’s management practices (commenting that, by asking journalists 
to conduct an interview in the rain, the management had exhibited its arrogance). 
However, Lisa also recounted the story in which she, as a consumer, had joyfully 
experienced the park during her first visit to HKDL around Christmas 2005: 
 
It [the HKDL visit] was a happy trip. Very happy. We saw Buzz. He’s 
funny. We played Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters twice. This was my first 
time [visiting Disney park]. We were so happy. Very happy. We were really 
very happy. Even adults were very happy. I was most happy to see the 
Parade. It’s like every character walks right in front of you. We were so 
happy that once my daughter waved her hands at Chip and Dale, and they 
waved back. Very happy….  
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In briefly recounting her HKDL experiences, Lisa used the word ‘happy’ nine times, 
and of all the features in the park, Disney characters most appealed to her. Again as 
a consumer, Lisa commented that the park was worth the price of admission. In our 
casual talk in September 2006, she said that she and her husband planned to visit 
HKDL again in the coming Christmas in 2006 because she had missed some shows 
the last time. When I asked her whether or not she would support HKDL’s further 
development if the HKSAR government, as the biggest shareholder, needed to 
invest in the park again, Lisa quickly shifted from her role as consumer to her role 
as Hong Kong citizen, declaring “no” and explaining that a government should not 
pour money into a private corporation. On this topic, she and I had the following 
conversation: 
 
Lisa: My husband and I agree that, if the government needs to shell out 
money again, the government should invest in Ocean Park. As for HKDL, 
the management is so bad. Since Ocean Park is not supported by a big 
corporation and its conservation philosophy is good, we agreed that the 
government should support Ocean Park. But HKDL belongs to Disney and 
Disney is a corporation, and of course, we should not support a corporation 
by drawing from the public coffers. 
Kim: But many people have said that if we don’t further develop HKDL, the 
coming Shanghai Disneyland may surmount HKDL and HKDL may need to 
close. 
Lisa: But we can’t just keep on investing in a private company only because 
HKDL can’t compete with others. If that’s the case, HKDL should fold up. 
And it [HKDL] is not the only thing that makes Hong Kong attractive. 
 
Lisa’s consumer-to-citizen shift is evident in the above passage. As 
consumers and as citizens, the remaining two mothers brought the roles together, 
but the mothers differed from each other regarding their comments and their actions. 
Judy, the left-wing feminist mother, politicized her consumption practices by 
boycotting HKDL. In this way, she expressed her anti-Disney attitude. As was the 
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case with Lisa, Judy disagreed with the government’s further investment in the 
park’s further development. Betty, a Disney fan, was not enthusiastic about HKDL 
from the outset (see chapter Four), and she was dissatisfied with HKDL’s 
highhanded and chaotic management. However, she visited the park twice during 
HKDL’s first year in operation. Although Betty was not excited about her HDKL 
trips, she said that she would definitely visit HKDL because she is a Hong Kong 
person. HKDL is a joint venture between the HKSAR government and Disney, and 
HKDL represents Hong Kong; its failure would suggest Hong Kong’s failure. To 
her, HKDL had already settled in Hong Kong, so that the souring image of Disney, 
the boycott of Disney merchandise, and low attendance at HKDL would only bring 
harm instead of benefits to Hong Kong society. To express her love of Hong Kong, 
Betty chose to visit HKDL. 
As a result, of the five middle-class families that I studied in relation to their 
family consumption of Disney products, two families had already visited HKDL 
twice within the first year of the park’s September 2005 opening; one family had 
visited the park during Christmas 2005 and was already planning to stay in one 
HKDL hotel for two nights during Christmas vacation in 2006; one family had not 
visited the park but also was planning to visit HKDL and to stay in a HKDL hotel 
for a night during the 2006 Christmas; only one family (that of Judy) had never 
visited and had no plans to visit HKDL. 
 Because of the organized threat of a global boycott and because of 
shareholders’ pressure, HKDL shifted its policy, both declaring that the park would 
not serve shark’s fin soup and pledging to investigate the China supply chains. 
Participants in the green movement and others see themselves as responsible 
consumers and see consumption as not just an activity expressing individual rights 
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but an ethical and civil responsibility to the environment, to society, and to 
justice.90 Nevertheless, three critical sources of evidence—my discussions with 
Susanna and Billy, my own internal struggles over Disney, and my parent-
respondents’ different reasons for visiting HKDL—show that our consumption 
activities regarding HKDL can equally well be grounded in individual expressions 
of identity (i.e., our civil and our consumer identities), in our emotions over Disney 
characters, or in communal expressions of identity (involving the development of 
family and group bonds).91 Consumer interests are neither coherent nor unified.92 
Hong Kong people may criticize Disney’s highhanded and non-transparent 
management practices and its smallness and lack of rides, but for reasons ranging 
from self gratification to children’s instant enjoyment to the Hong Kong-Disney 
link, many people do not want to see HKDL record low attendance and many 
people, in spite of their qualms, keep on visiting HKDL.  
 
Mass consumption, enjoyment, disruption, and disillusionment 
Not many Hong Kong people politicize their consumption practices and oppose 
Disney by boycotting HKDL for its ecological damage, its labor exploitation, its 
non-transparent accounts, or its highhanded practices. However, this absence of 
politicized opposition does not mean that HKDL visitors either passively submit to 
the Disneyland landscape or actively conform to Disney management wishes. 
Disney and Disneyland sell not just rides but also—in the abstract sense of 
fantasy—good times, communal experiences of togetherness, inter-generational 
bonding, consumer value, spectacle, and pleasure of the product. To create a clean, 
orderly, beautiful, safe, fun, and perfect fantasyland, Disneyland needs patrons’ 
cooperation. Patrons need to follow Disney’s moral regulations—to queue up and 
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wait in line in an orderly and peaceful way, to follow ride instructions, to smile 
back, and to interact with such strangers as cast members, to refrain from smoking 
except in a designated area, to stay clear of cast members’ areas: in short, to respect 
and adhere to the organized and rationalized processes of fun consumption and to 
the spatial practices provided and controlled by the park. In return, patrons can find 
release from everyday life tension inside the organized and controlled park. As Eco 
argues: 
 
An allegory of the consumer society … Disneyland is also a place of total 
passivity. Its visitors must agree to behave like its robots. Access to each 
attraction is regulated by a maze of metal railings which discourages any 
individual initiative. The number of visitors obviously sets the pace of the 
line; the officials of the dream, properly dressed in the uniforms suited to 
each specific attraction, not only admit the visitor to the threshold of the 
chosen sector, but, in successive phases, regulate his every move (“Now 
wait here please, go up now, sit down please, wait before standing up,” 
always in a polite tone, impersonal, imperious, over the microphone). If the 
visitor pays this price, he can have not only “the real thing” but the 
abundance of the reconstructed truth.93 
 
Alan Bryman argues that behind all these controls and regulations is 
Disneyization’s heart: the enhancement of consumption.94 Disneyland’s site design 
asks visitors to immerse themselves in the park’s total themed narrative, wherein 
work cedes place to a merger between entertainment and consumption activities. 
The instructions are simple: treat consumption as fun and have fun—that is, 
consume.  
For different reasons, Hong Kong people have indeed visited HKDL. But if 
one of HKDL’s design aims is to squeeze money from patrons’ pockets, local 
patrons also invent ways to consume Disney fantasy without paying. To ensure 
consumption of Disney food and beverages, the park does not allow patrons to 
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bring in food; nevertheless, patrons bring empty bottles to the park and then fill 
them up with free drinking water. In most rollercoaster rides, Disney Imagineers 
have installed cameras that capture visitors’ enjoyment of the ride. These images 
are purchasable, bringing HKDL considerable profits; yet again, local visitors 
sidestep the expense, this time by using their own cameras to capture the monitor 
image—for free. The money-saving strategies can be ingeniously simple: parents 
place their children next to a balloon seller and then photograph the posed group so 
that the family, having purchased not one single balloon, will have a photo of the 
balloon-framed children.  
Inside the Disney stores, many people buy Disney merchandise, but many 
do not. Many treat HKDL’s stores as a playground. Without buying anything, some 
children play with and touch almost all the displayed toys and dolls before their 
parents insist that they leave; adult visitors, as do child consumers, hold the dolls, 
wear the characters’ wigs, smile, and take photos. During the summer, because of 
the scorching heat and the humid weather and HKDL’s lack of shaded areas, many 
children and adult visitors stay more than thirty minutes in air-conditioned stores to 
browse and to touch merchandise without buying. “Serious” consumers may not 
buy merchandise because of these window-shopping consumers. Several times, I 
witnessed consumers give up buying their favorite soft doll because they saw 
sweaty children holding it tightly and posing for photos with it. These children used 
the doll, itself, to wipe off their sweat. The “serious” consumers asked staff to give 
them a new doll from the storeroom, but all the toys and the dolls were on display; 
in the end, the would-be consumers purchased nothing.  
Casual consumers like to play, to touch, and to try on the Disney 
merchandise without paying, whereas sophisticated and serious consumers do not 
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feel interested in shopping at the HKDL shopping mall because of the ordinary 
quality of the merchandise. Two of my respondents, Agnes95 and Katie,96 who were 
fans of Disney characters, who would bid on limited-edition Disney merchandise 
on the net, and who regularly visited Tokyo Disneyland (TDL) as a shopping 
destination commented that HKDL’s merchandise is ordinary in terms of design 
and quality. The costlier, higher-quality Disney merchandise that HKDL sold—
merchandise such as Swarovski Disney jewelry—was not designed and sold 
exclusively for HKDL. But shoppers can shop for particular Lenox or Wedgwood 
handmade Disney china-bone tableware only at Orlando’s Walt Disney World or 
can shop for Seiko watches only at TDL, for example. The ordinary design and the 
ordinary quality of HKDL merchandise, according to my respondents, lacked 
“sincerity.”   
HKDL faces problems not only in luring consumers to consume as much as 
possible but also in maintaining HKDL’s orderliness and cleanliness, the signature 
of Disneyland, especially during the early days after the park opened. By 
comparing Disneyland and the Centre Georges Pompidou, Baudrillard argues that 
the Pompidou center’s transparent structure (of displaying air conditioning ducts, 
water pipes, and electricity lines, for example) suggests the dream of 
democratization of culture—a transparent structure. When it opened in 1977, the 
public structure incited the fervent masses to flock in and to consume the mass 
culture on display. Baudrillard sees visitors’ passionate behavior as a sign of their 
actual desire to destroy the building and as, in fact, a cultural death:  
 
The masses rush toward Beaubourg as they rush toward disaster sites, with 
the same irresistible elan. Better: they are the disaster of Beaubourg. Their 
number, their stampede, their fascination, their itch to see everything is 
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objectively a deadly and catastrophic behavior for the whole undertaking. 
Not only does their weight put the building in danger, but their adhesion, 
their curiosity annihilates the very contents of this culture of animation. This 
rush can no longer be measured against what was proposed as the cultural 
objective, it is its radical negation, in both its excess and success. It is thus 
the masses who assume the role of catastrophic agent in this structure of 
catastrophe.97 
 
In the early days after the opening, HKDL also found the public’s passionate 
welcome threatening, if not fatal, to the orderly but mass entertainment 
environment in which zealous visitors fancy all things Disney. Before the park 
opened, the HKDL management taught staff ways in which they could ask patrons 
to smoke in a designated area and to avoid squatting when using the restroom 
facilities. However, the staff then realized that Mainland patrons urinate not in 
toilets but in basins or even in lakes. The patrons do this when the park is jam-
packed because they want to avoid squandering their precious time—they want to 
play every HKDL attraction possible—and because they do not care to urinate in 
public restrooms. Once, one of my HKDL staff respondents was riding the boat for 
the ride Jungle Ride Cruise, and she saw a Mainland child urinating at the end of 
the boat. In this way, the child succeeded in attending to bodily functions and in 
seeing the sites—simultaneously. In Baudrillard’s words, “The consumerist man is 
haunted by the fear of ‘missing’ something, some form of enjoyment or other.”98 
Another HKDL staff respondent commented that the destructive power of Mainland 
patrons is so great that they would love to touch and examine every decor, but that 
the act of touching fades the painted surface. Another prominent example is the 
Lunar Year chaos that took place between 1 and 3 February 2006. The angry 
Mainland ticket holders brawled outside the park, rocked the main gates, climbed 
over the high fences, and helped children over them. As was the case during the 
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early days of the Pompidou center, consumers’ enthusiasm for consuming 
everything Disney, the mass culture of Disney, turns into an all-out assault on the 
supposedly fun-filled fantasyland. 
Because some local and Mainland guests aim at playing all HKDL 
attractions within the one-day time limit, queue jumping becomes a necessary trick 
for them. If crowd control is supposedly famous in Disneyland, then HKDL’s 
queue jumping undoubtedly does Disney management a disservice. Queue jumping 
is usual in HKDL. Every time I visited HKDL, I observed visitors (adult 
Mainlanders or Mainland children without accompanying adults) jumping queues. 
Hong Kong patrons, however, were no better, but they broke the rules cunningly. 
One or two patrons enter a queue on behalf of a large group of patrons who are 
elsewhere in the park; then, the remaining members of the group suddenly appear at 
that point in the queue and quibble with other patrons who are behind them in the 
queue that no park rule prohibits the use of queue representatives: that is, no park 
rule prohibits one or two people from holding an advanced place in a queue for a 
large group of people who are enjoying rides elsewhere. Staying in the park as long 
as possible is an option for patrons who do not jump the queue but who want to 
play as many attractions as possible. After nearly twenty dry runs, HKDL 
management found that Hong Kong visitors spend 9.3 to 9.4 hours at the park on 
average, and more than 90% of the visitors remain until 9 p.m. to see the fireworks 
displays. This figure is 30% greater than corresponding figures at Disney’s other 
theme parks.99 Hong Kong visitors also stay longer in restaurants than Americans 
do, and some occupy a table for a whole day, using it as a base camp where they 
can periodically rest. Long queues form in both attractions and restaurants.  
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Clashes between HKDL’s scientific management practices and HKDL 
consumers’ unscientific and sometimes uncontrollable acts result in tremendously 
long queues and in ride suspensions. Under its scientific management, HKDL, just 
like other Disney parks, emphasizes the hourly operational ride capacity to ensure 
efficiency and standards. For attractions labeled as “E” ticket rides100 such as Space 
Mountain and The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, workers need to handle 
two thousand visitors an hour. The management controls not only the duration of 
each ride but also the period of loading and uploading. And patrons also need to get 
on and get off the ride within a certain period. However, HKDL visitors do not 
allow such scientific management practices to govern their ordinary ways of 
consumption. As Hong Kong people like to take pictures, visitors may snap one or 
two before getting off a ride, and this action slows the disembarkation past the 
allotted period of time set for the computerized ride; consequently, the ride is 
automatically suspended.101 In short, the scenario is thus: during the ride, patrons 
get out of their barricaded seats to take pictures, the breach automatically halts the 
ride, and the computer system requires a reboot that further elongates the period of 
suspension. Local visitors’ long stay and their enjoyment in photographing every 
object for posterity both clash with HKDL’s scientific management and result in 
long queues and in ride suspensions. 
When all is said and done, Disneyland sells happiness. While the HKDL 
website promises visitors that the park is “the happiest kingdom of them all,”102 
visitors’ disappointments over crowdedness, queue jumping, and seating disputes 
are typical emotions that interweave with visitors’ joyful encounters with Disney 
characters. One hot spot is the fairytale castle during the “Disney in the Stars” 
Fireworks, because patrons used to sit on the floor to look at the firework display, 
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the laser performance, and Disney character projections on the wall of the Sleeping 
Beauty Castle altogether, but some might stand up and obstruct others’ view. The 
hot-blooded patrons demand that the standing patrons sit down, and the standing 
patrons refuse to do so, and then a fight breaks out. Brawls also take place during 
“Disney on Parade” where floats, dancers, and costumed performers offer 
extravaganzas and excellent photo and video opportunities; zealous patrons jump 
the queue to fight for and to occupy better positions, and assaults ensue. On my 
numerous visits to the park, I observed that passionate mass consumption 
threatened to put an end to many patrons’ desire to journey through Disneyland. For 
instance, people initially lined up properly for the musical Festival of the Lion King, 
but when more than two hundred people wound up having to wait outside the 
official line for the musical, enchanted visitors turned into restive visitors. Once 
operators started to let the disgruntled visitors enter the theater, I heard some Hong 
Kong twenty-something visitors saying, “Let’s squeeze in!” They then squeezed 
through the dense crowd to enter the theater as fast as possible and to get seats with 
better views. I got increasingly frightened while, for more than ten minutes, people 
pushed and plunged into the hut-like theater. And at the firework displays, I was 
one of the many spectators who were booing a pair of lovers blocking our view.  
Because certain visitors conduct themselves—or “perform”—in an 
improper way, the park is the site of frequent frustration, verbal disputes, and even 
physical assaults. My HKDL staff respondents said that there is at least one fight 
inside HKDL every day and that, between January and September 2006, eighty-two 
fights involving the police had broken out inside the park.103 Quarrels and fights 
not only undermine the park’s cheerful and relaxed atmosphere and visitors’ happy 
journey, but also can cause delays and even suspensions of park rides and shows. 
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For example, newspapers widely reported a fight that broke out over seating 
disputes and that led to the delay and the shortening of the live show when families 
were celebrating the Mid-Autumn Festival inside HKDL.104 
To complicate the situation further, these conflicts and fights often take 
place between locals and Mainlanders. Locals lament Mainlanders’ lack of 
etiquette—smoking wherever they like, spitting, littering, talking loudly in public, 
queue jumping, and so on. My visits informed me, however, that both Mainlanders 
and locals perform queue jumping, compete for desirable seats, and speak loudly: at 
the same time, I also met some friendly Mainland and Hong Kong visitors with 
whom I had pleasant chats. I even witnessed a Mainland lady cleaning up a sink 
after she had used it as a toilet. In fact, all my HKDL staff respondents said that 
they found Hong Kong people more difficult to serve than Mainlanders because 
Hong Kong people would criticize everything; they always broke regulations (such 
as queue jumping) but quibbled that their vexatious conduct was proper. Some 
respondents even said that Mainland visitors were “more lovely” than Hong Kong 
visitors because the former immersed themselves in the Disneyland environment 
and listened to cast members’ spiels and even took cast members’ advice. Facing so 
many visitors every day, most of my HKDL staff respondents said that they had 
changed their essentialist views on Mainlanders and on Hong Kong people, 
learning that Mainlanders can be considerate and Hong Kong people can be 
unimaginably unreasonable and troublesome. Because there are so many different 
personalities and characteristics within any one cultural group, the common Hong 
Kong way of thinking about Hong Kong-Mainland cultural differences and about 
Hong Kong cultural superiority is a naïve one.  
 358 
My HKDL staff respondents explained to me that Hong Kong people and 
Mainlanders may simply have different ideas on the proper way of lining up. 
Because the width between railings must be wide enough for a wheelchair to pass 
through, there is always space between people in the line. Whenever there is certain 
amount of space, some Mainland visitors will occupy that space, and because they 
do not push other visitors, they do not consider the act to be “jumping queue.” 
Many Mainlanders stop (although sometimes grudgingly) occupying these spaces 
whenever workers clarify the rules about these spaces. But the workers must, first 
of all, catch the attention of the Mainlanders, speak audibly, and use the Putonghua 
accent, which gives the Mainlanders a sense of zamen, meaning “we.” Conflicts 
always occur between Hong Kong and Mainland visitors because Hong Kong 
people speak in an exceptionally loud voice to express their hostile attitudes, and 
Mainlanders may not understand Putonghua spoken in a Hong Kong accent. 
Tensions rise when the Hong Kong people keep on criticizing Mainlanders but fail 
to realize that the criticized party may not understand the criticizing party’s 
Putonghua; moreover, Mainland visitors sometimes feel that the residents of Hong 
Kong are discriminating against the Mainlanders as outsiders. Once I witnessed a 
quarrel between a Hong Kong visitor and a Mainland visitor. In a loud voice and in 
his Hong Kong-style Putonghua, the Hong Kong visitor accused the Mainlander of 
having jumped the queue. In response, the Mainland visitor yelled back and finally 
exclaimed, “You think that you’re different from us because of your brief colonial 
history, you stupid Hong Kong people!”  
Although both Mainland visitors and Hong Kong visitors break the rules 
(though somewhat differently, in general), it is typically the Mainlanders whom 
Hong Kong media blame when singling out problematic HKDL visitors. Whenever 
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the topic “Disneyland” comes up in my casual talks with my local friends who do 
not work inside HKDL, the subject of Mainlanders automatically comes up, as well: 
the talk strays onto the subjects of Mainlanders’ loud talking, of Mainlanders’ 
queue jumping, and of Hong Kong people’s strategies for escaping from Mainland 
tourists at the park (i.e., entering the park not in the morning but after lunch because 
Mainland visitors always visit the park early but leave the park around 3 or 4 p.m.). 
In fact, these interlocutors often caution me not to visit the park during the peak 
season (because the news reported that some Mainland thieves had bought HKDL 
summer passes and had then stolen visitors’ wallets inside the park105). Most Hong 
Kong-centered conversations about Mainlanders in the park reaffirm the 
Hongkonger identity as “Chineseness plus” (etiquette) or as “Chineseness minus” 
(infractions) and mark the difference between the two parties, whether or not the 
discrimination is accurate. Hong Kong people appropriate “cultural differences” in 
order to legitimize Hong Kong people’s discriminatory attitudes and acts. 
Disneyland’s park design is supposedly a “continuous reproduction of a ‘happy 
present’,”106 a placeless hyper-real fantasy environment offering everything 
timelessly better and brighter, helping visitors “escape their unnatural present day 
cares, ‘drop their defenses,’ and ‘become more like themselves’,”107 and “nurture a 
better human nature.” By fortifying boundaries of cultural particularity, patrons’ 
behaviors in HKDL—laden with real cultural and ethnic supremacist thinking, 
misunderstanding, prejudice, and tension—inject into HKDL a Hong Kong-specific 
anxiety. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I describe several types of resistant acts at HKDL, from formal 
labor-union negotiations and consumer politics (a global boycott) to informal 
mundane everyday work (taking sick leave, replacing smiling faces with sullen 
ones, changing and shortening scripts) and consumer practices (play-but-no-
purchase, disruptive play leading to mechanical breakdowns, confrontational 
behavior sapping environments of their happiness). In the concluding section, I 
would like to review first, the incongruity between formal resistance politics and 
popular sentiments and, second, the political connotations of these acts.  
The lack of labor support and of public support for the HKDLCMU and for 
Disney Hunter, as shown by the two organizations’ small membership size, 
illustrates the limitation of existing local formal politics in addressing the 
ambivalent attitude of HKDL workers and of Hong Kong people in general toward 
HKDL. Moreover, this lack demonstrates the entwined relationship between the 
Hong Kong people and HKDL in relation to their livelihood and their popular 
pleasures. The HKDLCMU may wish to position itself not as a party whose chief 
function is to resist Disney management but as a labor union whose chief function 
is to negotiate with the management for the improvement of laborers’ working 
conditions via union-company negotiation. However, the composition of the 
union’s membership (only junior-grade staffers) together with the media portrayal 
of the union as a confrontational party have colored many HKDL workers’ 
perceptions of the union. Moreover, most of these workers have neither a good 
understanding of the labor union nor easy access to the union. In the end, the 
workers view the union as an organization that either opposes whatever acts the 
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management implements or as a promoter of vexatious workers’ unreasonable 
demands.  
Disney Hunter situates itself as the counter-culture in the “bipolar logic of 
resistance,”108 in Tony Bennett’s words, and criticizes Disney’s labor exploitation, 
environmental vandalism, and cultural domination and colonization in the globe. 
By holding an alternative truth, we, the university students and teachers with better 
access to information, presume to know better and clearer than the public of the 
destructive Disney effects on selves and on society. The varied ways in which 
Disney Hunter resists—through school presentations, public forums, street drama—
demonstrate the limitations that impose themselves on the group’s general notion of 
resistance. Implicitly assuming a dichotomous model of truth versus false 
consciousness, we, the Disney Hunter members, need to educate them, the public, 
to confront critically their “commonsense,” and we need to help them to construct 
critical consciousness by which they might resist Disney’s political, economic, and 
cultural power. The total-resistance approach fails to receive collective support 
from Hong Kong people who, for the most part, find popular culture liberating 
instead of dominating. Also, the total-resistance approach fails to acknowledge 
consumers’ active interpretation of and active appropriation of Disney offerings, 
regardless of whether the offerings are movies, merchandise, or theme parks. Users’ 
appropriations of Disney offerings are often a contingent result of the interplay 
among multiple sets of power networks—and rarely of non-contingent brain-
numbing consumption. It is not surprising to see the public, including the HKDL 
workers, feel skeptical about Disney Hunter’s defensive sermons and annoyed by 
its allegations over Disney power.  
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Michel de Certeau’s idea of tactics provides another way to account for 
people’s everyday creative efforts to adapt the external world “to their own interests 
and their own rules”109 when “individuals [are] already caught in the nets of 
‘discipline’” (p. xv). To develop his idea of tactics, de Certeau contrasts it with 
another idea, “strategy,” which refers to administrative projects and systems based 
on “political, economic, and scientific rationality” (p. xvi). Strategies are able to 
“produce” and “tabulate” places (p. 30) because places are the property of 
institutional power (p. 36). Tactics, in contrast, occur fleetingly in time, and not in 
place. In de Certeau’s words: 
 
I call a “tactic,” … a calculus which cannot count on a “proper” (a spatial or 
institutional localization)…. The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A 
tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it 
over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance…. The 
“proper” is a victory of space over time. On the contrary, because it does not 
have a place, a tactic depends on time—it is always on the watch for 
opportunities that must be seized “on the wing.” Whatever it wins, it does 
not keep. It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into 
“opportunities.” (p. xix)  
 
To illustrate the idea of tactics, de Certeau provides us ample examples that range 
from talking and reading to shopping, cooking, and walking. When we read, we 
turn reading into a silent production where we interpret and improvise meanings; 
when we cannot own a home owing to structural and institutional constraints, we 
rent an apartment that we furnish so that it reflects our goals and our memories (p. 
xxi). In a similar string of thought, HKDL’s size, attractions, and spatial design 
derive from the Walt Disney Company’s “strategic” plans, not from any notable 
participation of either the HKSAR government or the public;110 the aims, the values, 
the workers’ behavior, and the scientific operating procedures all reflect 
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“standards” set by the HKDL management; visitors’ behavior is also under 
surveillance, and only certain “proper” types of behavior—of performance—are 
allowed. Disney created HKDL and imposed its own standards on HKDL by 
relying on structural and institutional domination. HKDL workers and consumers, 
however, appropriate their model of permissible behavior and convert it in time into 
behavior that resists the dominant-subordinate relationship in time. In Japan, lower-
ranking female office workers recognize their poor job prospects and use kawaii to 
justify or to inform their slouching on the job—or simply to face these less-than-
desirable prospects;111 at HKDL, some workers in a similar situation use 
characteristically immature and irresponsible behavior to face their poor job 
prospects and to circumvent HKDL standards: unjustified sick leaves, moody 
interactions with visitors, abbreviated scripts and spiels, and grievance-laden scripts 
and spiels.  
As consumers, we consume, which is most important to corporations, but 
we also appropriate the structural domination through play and creative 
interventions: we take photos, jump queues, and engage in play-but-not-purchase 
behavior. Through consumption practices, we simultaneously confirm and disrupt 
the system’s smooth operation.112 These consumption practices aim not at rejecting 
and transforming113 but at hijacking and disrupting the existing dominant system 
guaranteed by Disney’s spatial, structural, and institutional control. Disney trades in 
signs, but consumption practices re-signify Disneyland’s meaning through 
improvisation and disruption.  
Mass passionate consumption does not always construct passive subjects 
who obey the park’s controlled representation of space; some zealous consumers’ 
uptake can be destructive in breaking the fantasyland’s magic spell; likewise, 
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consumption tactics are not always celebratory. To get their way in a number of 
regards, visitors use a number of tactics inside HKDL: visitors jump queues to play 
all the HKDL attractions within the one-day time limit, and Hong Kong visitors use 
“cultural difference” both to escape from Mainland visitors inside the park and to 
legitimize Hong Kong people’s discriminatory attitudes and acts. These tactics “are 
not intelligibly described as resistive,” in Tony Bennett’s words.114  
De Certeau reminds us also that the populist approach of tactics operates 
fleetingly and has little effect on structural and institutional change. In the case of 
HKDL, the visitors’ tactics seem to have little effect on Disney’s spatial, structural, 
and institutional control. After all, HKDL visitors purchase the tickets, purchase the 
park’s food and drink (one HKDL rule is that visitors cannot bring “food, alcoholic 
beverages, and beverages in cans or bottles” into the park115), and sometimes 
purchase the park’s merchandise. If Hong Kong residents argue that the HKSAR 
government-Disney deal regarding HKDL is unfair and non-transparent, and if the 
residents criticize certain HKDL management practices (including environmental 
damage, the non-accountability of a publicly funded project, labor exploitation) but 
keep on visiting HKDL as shown in Ap’s 2006 survey (p. 354), and if HKDL can 
maximize its bottom line, HKDL management has no need to change its strategy.  
Organized workers’ tactics, however, may have some effects on the 
corporation-worker relationship, and sometimes these tactics could change certain 
Disney-management policies. On 10 April 2006, some HKDL character performers, 
with the help of the labor union, staged a press conference where they railed against 
the working conditions and they demanded a pay raise. Moreover, eighty of the one 
hundred and twenty character performers responsible for the daily parade and the 
meet-and-greet visitors’ sessions had signed a petition demanding that their pay and 
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the pay for character performers hired for the live stage show be equitable.116 In late 
April, some HKDL character performers told journalists that they were considering 
hijacking a daily costumed parade with banners to demand higher pay.117 In June 
2006, HKDL raised character performers’ salaries from HK$9,000 to $10,000 and 
extended the breaks between performances during the summer months.118 Because 
of HKDL character performers’ organized threat of disrupting the park parade, 
HKDL management changed certain management policies. This incident signaled a 
dynamic power relation between HKDL management and HKDL frontline workers, 
although there was no structural or institutional change of the power relation 
between workers and management, and although workers’ tactics and criticisms 
regarding long working hours, occupational hazards, and insufficient compensation 
have not changed the HKSAR government’s labor laws.     
In the absence of profound structural and institutional changes, we should 
not lose sight of the fact that the interactions between Disney and Hong Kong 
people (whether they are journalists, workers, or consumers) produce and 
complicate the images and the meanings of “Disney.” Through journalists’ articles, 
activists’ calls, workers’ on-the-job behavior, and visitors’ consumption behavior, 
local actors have multiplied, expanded, and complicated the meanings of 
‘HKDL’—meanings that range from “the unfair American corporation-HKSAR 
government deal” and “the non-transparent, non-accountable, and sometimes 
exploitative park-management practices” to “the small, chaotic, and insufficient 
attractions and sophisticated merchandise at HKDL.” As argued by Doreen Massey, 
there is “mutual interaction” between local forces and wider processes.119 Local 
actors’ quotidian acts in HKDL may affect the wider process of Disney expansion. 
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The production and the circulation of multiple meanings of “Disney” condition the 
future Disneyland development in Hong Kong.  
In May 2007, in reporting results for the second-quarter revenues of 2007, 
Disney said that its parks-and-resorts division had an operating income of US$254 
million, up 19% from the previous year. However, Disney also said that the 
increases were partially offset by a decline at HKDL during the second quarter, 
which ended 31 March 2007: “Hong Kong Disneyland recognizes the attendance 
and guest spending have fallen short of initial expectations.”120 Besides, the 
California-based Disney said in a filing with the US securities regulator that “Hong 
Kong Disneyland may require alternative sources of financing to meet its operating 
and development needs.”121 Because additional funds from the HKSAR 
government need approval from the Legislative Council, the spokesperson of 
HKDL said that the discussion between the Walt Disney Company and the HKSAR 
government regarding financial options “does not involve seeking additional funds 
from the government,” and the Tourism Commission said that the HKSAR 
government had no plans to use public funds to increase its investment in the Hong 
Kong Disneyland joint venture.122 In other words, in considering whether or not to 
expand the park and to build more attractions as ways to lure visitors, the 
California-based Disney, rather than ask the HKSAR government for public 
funding, has expected to provide HKDL with additional funding as part of HKDL’s 
new financial arrangement with the HKSAR government. It seems that locals’ 
tactics have had some important effects: Hong Kong taxpayers at least are less 
likely to pay the bill for HKDL’s further development because HKDL has acquired 
a relatively bad public image and because the HKSAR government’s huge 
investment in HKDL (HK$23 billion plus a HK$6 billion loan) has created less 
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concrete economic benefits for Hong Kong society than Hong Kong people and the 
government had expected. However, legislator Fred Li wondered whether or not the 
HKSAR government’s reluctance to put money into HKDL development was due 
to the fact that such a government act, requiring approval from the Legislative 
Council, would compel legislators to request HKDL’s disclosure of financial 
records.123 In other words, the HKSAR government’s decision not to put money 
into HKDL development could still maintain the non-transparent and non-
accountable management practices of HKDL. 
If the HKSAR government publicly monitors HKDL’s operations, then the 
government should institutionally and legislatively change some local company 
laws and labor laws. Legislators in the Legislative Council should press the 
government to be more transparent in HKDL management issues; facing a 
transnational company, NGOs need to organize—and have successfully 
organized—global pressure among shareholders, workers, and consumers to 
confront Disney for its labor exploitation and for its degradation of the environment. 
However, in advancing a politics of everyday life, I also assert that an elitist 
pedagogy may not always be effective, especially in the Hong Kong context, in 
which people feel that they can know nothing under non-transparent governance, 
and that they can do nothing under existing institutional and political constraints.124  
Furthermore, my study of actual HKDL happenings shows that we should 
not only study local Disney power dynamics but also problematize the very idea of 
“local.” First, “local” is not a single entity; second, it has no necessary correlation 
with authenticity and empowerment; third, local views can be conservative, 
progressive, ambiguous, egalitarian, or discriminatory. In the case of HKDL, under 
the post-colonial context, some Hong Kong people use HKDL as another stage on 
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which they perform exclusionary acts that target Mainlanders: the foundation of 
these acts goes by the name of “cultural differences.” If “democracy” means more 
than universal suffrage, if “democracy” means transparent governance and 
accountable governance and citizens’ acceptance of pluralistic ideas, then Hong 
Kong people’s exclusionist cultural beliefs and practices are themselves major 
obstacles toward the democratization process. In studying popular culture, if we 
should not reduce locals’ consumption of HKDL to simply mind-numbing activities, 
we should also be, as Nick Stevenson argues, “accepting [of] the legitimacy and 
complexity of popular pleasures while protesting against material and cultural 
exclusion.”125  
In the next and concluding chapter, I argue that although global-local power 
relationships should be viewed and examined as dynamic and as varied, 
domestication or localization does not necessarily translate into empowerment of 
locals. Struggles against increasing corporate power over the landscape must be 
accompanied by the struggle for democratization and for greater transparency and 
accountability of, in this case, the HKSAR government. By using Nick Stevenson’s 
idea of cultural citizenship, I further argue that the entitlement of citizenship rights 
is a necessary condition for the development of democratic society, but that having 
citizenship rights is not sufficient to encourage people either to participate in public 
policy or to embrace pluralistic culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 369 
NOTES 
 
                                                
1
 Disney University, Disney Traditions (Hong Kong: HKDL, 2005), p. 1. 
2
 Nguyen Hoai Anh and Brian H Kleiner, “Effective Human Resource Management 
in the Entertainment Industry,” Management Research News 28, issue 2/3 (2005), p. 
100. 
3
 With its fame, Disney Institute’s clients include Duke University, American 
Express Corporate Services, Hankyu Department Stores, IBM, Illinois Power 
Company, McDonald’s, Phillip Morris Incorporated, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 
Prudential Securities, Sony Electronics, and Volvo. See “Our clients,” Disney 
Institute, http://www.disneyinstitute.com/clients.asp (accessed 31 October 2006). 
4
 Jim Poisant, Creating and Sustaining a Superior Customer Service Organization: 
A Book About Taking Care of the People Who Take Care of the Customers 
(Westport, Connecticut, London: Quorum Books, 2002). 
5
 Jane Kuenz, “Working at the Rat,” in Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney 
World, edited by The Project on Disney (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 
1995), p. 125. 
6
 See Aviad E. Raz, Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1999), chapters Three and Four.  
7
 John Van Maanen, “The Smile Factory: Work at Disneyland,” in Reframing 
Organizational Culture, edited by Frost and others. (Newbury Park, California: 
Sage Publications, 1991), p. 59. 
8
 See Raz, Riding the Black Ship, p. 92. 
9
 There are different versions of the manual Disney Traditions. Of the three manuals 
I have collected, one is for HKDL workers, one is for Orlando Disney parks’ 
workers, and the last one is for the Walt Disney World College Program’s workers. 
I collected the HKDL manual in July 2005 and the two Orlando manuals in October 
2004. No manual states the date of publication, and therefore, it becomes difficult 
to trace the development of the manual. The publication of the Hong Kong version, 
however, should be in 2005. Disney University, Disney Traditions (Hong Kong: 
2005); Disney University, Disney Traditions (Orlando: unknown); Disney 
University, Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program (Orlando: 
unknown). 
10
 Regarding the manuals’ format, the major difference is that the HKDL manual is 
bilingual whereas the Orlando manual is only in English. 
11
 Disney University, Disney Traditions (Hong Kong: 2005), p. 6; Disney 
University, Disney Traditions (Orlando: unknown), p. 4; Disney University, Disney 
Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program (Orlando: unknown), p. 8. 
12
 Disney University, Disney Traditions (Hong Kong: 2005), p. 10; Disney 
University, Disney Traditions (Orlando: unknown), p. 14; Disney University, 
Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program (Orlando: unknown), p. 12. 
 370 
                                                                                                                                   
13
 There are some differences in the selected themes or the wording in different 
Disney Traditions. Disney University, Disney Traditions (Hong Kong: 2005), pp. 
10-13; Disney University, Disney Traditions (Orlando: unknown), pp. 14-17; 
Disney University, Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program 
(Orlando: unknown), pp. 12-16. 
14
 The “7 guidelines for guest service” that I quote here are from the HKDL manual. 
In the Orlando manual, the fifth guideline is “display appropriate body language at 
all times.” The HKDL manual specifies cast members’ tone, but the Orlando 
manual highlights cast members’ need to display appropriate body language “at all 
times.” Disney University, Disney Traditions (Hong Kong: 2005), p. 13. 
15
 Disney University, Disney Traditions (Orlando: unknown), p. 9; Disney 
University, Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program (Orlando: 
unknown), p. 9. 
16
 Disney University, Disney Traditions (Orlando: unknown), p. 10; Disney 
University, Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program (Orlando: 
unknown), p. 10. 
17
 Disney University, Disney Traditions (Orlando: unknown), p. 11; Disney 
University, Disney Traditions: Walt Disney World College Program (Orlando: 
unknown), p. 11. 
18
 Aviad E. Raz, Riding the Black Ship: Japan and Tokyo Disneyland (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard, 1999), pp. 109-10. 
19
 One is Josephine, the ex-accountant who went to Orlando and worked as a 
cultural representative (see chapter Four for details). She feels proud and enjoys 
working at HKDL because of Disneyland’s high standards and the joy of meeting 
different guests. However, Josephine’s degree of pride in working at HKDL 
decreased as she noticed HKDL’s “small size, few attractions, highhanded 
management, and bad press image,” in her words. She told me that if five stood for 
the maximum degree of pride, then her pride had been five before HKDL’s opening; 
she then told me that, following HKDL’s premiere, her pride had dropped from five 
to three. Another respondent, Xavier, enjoyed working at HKDL as a dancer in one 
of the HKDL musicals. His enjoyment stemmed from the opportunities that HKDL 
has offered Hong Kong performers and from HKDL’s salary, which is higher than 
that offered by television stations.  
20
 Many criticisms expressed by my respondents are similar to criticisms expressed 
by workers at other Disneyland parks. Common objections include monotonous 
jobs, the lack of macro views of the park’s operations (that is, the excessive division 
and subdivision of jobs), the internal promotion system’s promotion of an 
excessively competitive atmosphere among workers, and the lack of 
communication among hosts, leads, and managers. John Van Maanen, “The Smile 
Factory: Work at Disneyland,” in Reframing Organizational Culture, edited by 
Frost and others (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 58-76; 
Jane Kuenz, “Working at the Rat,” in Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney 
World, edited by The Project on Disney (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 
1995), pp. 110-62; Raz, Riding the Black Ship, chapters Three and Four. 
21
 HKDL workers officially can have one fifteen-minute break (called “short 
 371 
                                                                                                                                   
breaks”) every four hours, but during the early days after HKDL’s opening, workers 
could not even go to the restroom. The situation, after one-year of operation, was 
improving. The managers would try to arrange more short-breaks for the frontline 
workers, the Host 1s, and the Host 2s—for example, a short break once every two 
hours. In the United States, since the parks were established, workers have normally 
had a short break every two hours, although officially American workers can have a 
fifteen-minute break every four hours in the first eight working hours, and a fifteen-
minute break every two hours after eight hours of working. “「香港迪士尼樂園職
工會」正式成立,” press release http://www.hkdlcmunion.org/?p=12 (accessed 6 
December 2006). 
22
 HKDL’s break rooms are tiny. Although HKDL receives criticism for its 
smallness, the backstage is much bigger than the onstage. In comparison with the 
sheer enormousness of the backstage, staff members’ break rooms are particularly 
small. The lack of space in the cast’s break rooms seems to be a common problem 
for many HKDL operation staffers. In the published “Hong Kong Disneyland Cast 
Forum,” which lists issues that workers raised in the Cast Forum in late March 
2006, five out of eight break rooms—the Royal Banquet Hall, Main Street 
Emporium, Main Street, U.S.A., Tomorrowland, and Fantasyland—came under fire 
for being too small. I conducted a fieldwork visit to the HKDL backstage once in 
October 2006. Inside Tomorrowland, one break room was about 200-300 square 
feet. At about 11:30 a.m., I observed more than ten park operation workers who, 
while having their lunch, were crammed together for lack of space. Because of this 
lack of space, workers also needed to sit in folding chairs. During peak hours, 
workers just did not have enough space to take a break, have their lunch or dinner, 
and catch a snippet of television (luckily, workers can choose TV channels other 
than the Disney channel). Hong Kong Disneyland, “Hong Kong Disneyland Cast 
Forum” Hong Kong: HKDL (2006), p. 12. 
23
 After operating for a year, HKDL still received criticism from workers and the 
work union regarding work-related muscle pains. “迪士尼再爆 3 宗罪 「米老鼠」
指身體勞損被炒,” 8 September 2006, Ming Pao Daily News, A12; 黃勁文, “迪士
尼前員工 控樂園 6 宗罪 戲服重頸勞損 首宗申請法援入稟,” 8 September 
2006, Hong Kong Economic Times, A28.  
24
 Some HKDL workers stated that their employment conditions were worse than 
their American counterparts’ employment conditions. For example, Orlando 
workers receive two times the payment if they work during holidays whereas 
HKDL workers receive normal pay; American colleagues can get double pay if they 
continuously work on the 7th day, whereas HKDL workers get normal pay. On the 
other hand, HKDL management does not adopt the local Hong Kong customs 
wherein workers at catering outlets receive free meals: at HKDL, caterers need to 
pay for their meals. Other workers’ dissatisfaction included both HKDL 
management’s refusal to increase the number of physiotherapists and the unpaid 
forty-five-minute lunch period. See HKDLCMU press statement, “「香港迪士尼
樂園職工會」正式成立,” HKDLCMU website, 
http://www.hkdlcmunion.org/?p=12 (5 November 2006); “迪士尼百四員工投訴做
到殘 ,” 23 September 2005, Oriental Daily, A34; “人手緊絀工時過長編更混亂 
迪士尼員工吐苦水起離心,” 23 September 2005, The Sun, A22; “稱早上 10 時吃
 372 
                                                                                                                                   
午飯一直工作至晚上 迪士尼員工二手飯充飢,” 23 September 2005, Apple 
Daily, A10; “迪士尼苛政恐釀辭工潮,” 23 September 2005, Sing Tao Daily, A25; 
“迪士尼員工投訴工時過長,” 23 September 2005, Wen Wei Po, A22; “樂園員工投
訴逾 140 宗,” 23 September 2005, Hong Kong Daily News, A10; “迪士尼員工投
訴達 140 宗,” 23 September 2005, Sing Pao, A09. 
25
 Hong Kong Disneyland, Hong Kong Disneyland: Join Us and Become Part of 
the Magic! (Hong Kong: HKDL, 2005), p. 8. 
26
 Thomas W. P. Wong, “Personal Experience and Social Ideology: Thematization 
and Theorization in Social Indicators Studies,” in Indicators of Social Development: 
Hong Kong 1990, edited by Lau and others (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990), p. 231. In 
another piece of research, Wong finds that Hong Kong people’s belief in 
meritocracy is quite strong and that the work-is-rewarded theme “is both a 
recognition of, and an impetus to, these success stories.” Thomas W. P. Wong and 
David A. Levin, “The Social Structure,” in The Business Environment in Hong 
Kong (Third Edition), edited by Lethbridge and Ng (New York: Oxford, 1995), p. 
54. 
27
 Hong Kong Disneyland, Hong Kong Disneyland: Join Us and Become Part of 
the Magic! (Hong Kong: HKDL, 2005), p. 8. 
28
 After several months of negotiations, press conferences, and a protest petition 
from character performers, character performers, with the help of the labor union, 
received an 11-percent pay raise, from $9,000 to $10,000, starting in June, 2006. At 
my time of writing, there was still a $1,000 salary difference between character 
performers and show performers. “工會努力爭取改善．迪士尼積極回應,” Hong 
Kong Disneyland Cast Members’ Union press release on 20 May 2006, 
http://www.hkdlcmunion.org/?p=55 (accessed 9 November 2006); “Pay rise for 
Mickey & Co a happy result all round,” 21 May 2006, South China Morning Post, 
EDT10; Simon Parry, “Disney costume workers get $1,000 pay rise,” 21 May 2006, 
South China Morning Post, EDT2. 
29
 In every attraction, the Lead is the one to arrange hosts’ execution of different 
tasks: greetings, monitoring of onstage lines, ensuring that the fastpass machine is 
in order, ushering crowds into ride vehicles or theaters, and spieling. Tomorrowland 
has twelve instead of eight Leads because the managers said they have two new 
attractions, Autopia and Stitch Encounter; popular existing rides were Space 
Mountain and Buzz Lightyear Astro Blasters. However, workers from Fantasyland 
found the management practices unfair because Fantasyland had the most rides in 
the park, and The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh was very popular, too. 
30
 There are three big teams inside “Park Operations”: (1) Guest Relations, Main 
Entrance, and Resort and Transport, (2) Fantasyland and Adventureland, and (3) 
Main Street U.S.A. and Tomorrowland. In total, there are twenty GSMs, but only 
three went to Orlando for training. 
31
 According to my HKDL worker-respondents, in HKDL, management can dismiss 
a staff member after he or she receives two written warnings. However, the 
standards that govern mid-level managers’ issuing of warnings differ from one 
 373 
                                                                                                                                   
manager to the next: some managers are lenient on staff members who are late by 
three to five minutes, whereas some managers can be very strict with a staffer who 
is late by only one minute; and yet again, some managers have double standards for 
the same behavior performed by different staff members: one may receive a pat on 
the back; the other may receive a written warning.   
32
 The sick-leave lists became another source of negative news for HKDL. This 
issue received news coverage in mid-February 2006. Anita Lam, “Sick-leave lists 
could backfire on Disney,” 11 February 2006, South China Morning Post, City 1; 
“迪士尼涉歧視請病假員工,” 11 February 2006, Apple Daily, A12; “工會指迪士
尼涉殘疾歧視,” 11 February 2006, Oriental Daily, A18.  
33
 Workers’ comments on HKDL’s contradictory management practices appear in 
both my interviews and news reports. Wendy Leung, “Disney staff in row with 
supervisors,” 30 November 2005, Hong Kong Standard, A11; “稍有不從厲聲喝
斥 員工投訴：上層要求嚴苛,” 12 October 2005, Sing Tao Daily, A02; “大劈
炮員工插爆迪士尼：遊客屙屎!” Easyfinder, no. 712, 14 September 2005, EF036. 
34
 Annie, as discussed in chapter Four, is another cultural representative whom I 
met in September 2006. I made her acquaintance about six months after Annie had 
quit her HKDL job. After the interview, Annie left Hong Kong, and we wrote each 
other through e-mail to keep in touch. 
35
 James L. Watson, “Introduction: Transnationalism, Localization, and Fast Foods 
in East Asia” in Golden Arches East: McDonald’s in East Asia, edited by Watson 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 27.  
36
 Service management theory emphasizes that if the employee and the customer 
have similar expectations regarding both the order of events and the way in which 
each party should behave, then a “stronger standardized and well-rehearsed script” 
results. If the consumer is unfamiliar with the expected script, interferences may 
ensue. Mary Jo Bitner, Bernard H. Booms, and Lois A. Mohr, “Critical service 
encounters: the employee’s viewpoint,” in Services Marketing: A European 
Perspective, edited by Lovelock, Vandermerwe, and Lewis (London: Prentice Hall, 
1999), p. 80. 
37
 Government Information Centre (HKSAR Government), “Disney and HKSAR 
Government Announce Hong Kong Disneyland Opening Day (Special New Family 
Entertainment Revealed),” press Release, 23 November 2004, 
http://www.hketo.ca/news/pages/Nov-23-2004_dis.html (accessed 6 November 
2006).   
38
 My respondents said that Mainland customers are better than Hong Kong 
customers in the way that Mainlanders listen to a skipper’s spiel and immerse 
themselves in the fantasy world; whereas Hong Kong customers focus only on the 
degree of fakeness. 
39
 “「香港迪士尼樂園職工會」正式成立,” Confederation of Trade Unions press 
release, 29 November 2005, http://www.hkctu.org.hk/contentr.php?orgtopicid=508 
(accessed 4 November 2006). 
40
 One of my interviewees said that her division managers were good and that, 
 374 
                                                                                                                                   
within a few months of HKDL’s opening, the managers’ workers got one fifteen-
minute break for every two hours worked. And she stated that she had not 
experienced chaotic shift duties. However, the labor union representative Elaine 
Hui said that the above problems were endemic throughout HKDL management.   
41
 My fieldwork visit to the HKDL backstage area revealed that not every job inside 
HKDL was toilsome—that some jobs and some environments are worse than others. 
Staff members who are responsible for operating or performing shows such as 
Festival of the Lion King, The Golden Mickeys, and Stitch Encounter do not need to 
work continuously as do operation staffers in other attractions. Because there are 
about four to six shows a day, after finishing the show, frontline operation staff stay 
in their break rooms or control rooms, sleeping, playing computer games, playing 
cards, watching TV, or talking with friends on phones. 
42
 The negotiation power of union representatives in the United States is larger than 
that of HKDLCMU because the US Disney union is an independent panel made up 
of Disney management and the US Disney union, whereas there is only a 
consultation board at HKDL. In Hong Kong, HKSAR labor laws do not grant labor 
unions including HKDLCMU the lawful right of collective negotiation. Staff 
members express their reservations and suspicions regarding the labor union in the 
HKDLCMU forum. “各位 cast member,” in HKDLCMU forum, with send DL. 
Free-Talk, http://www.hkdlcmunion.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3 (accessed 4 
November 2006). 
43
 HKDL management said in its Cast Forum that as recently as March 2006, “90 
percent of Cast Members who worked at HKDL during the Grand Opening are still 
with us.” News reported that the retention rate dropped from 90% to 80% during 
March and August 2006. However, 80 or 90% of the retention rate is not equal to 10 
or 20% of the turnover rate, because an 80% retention rate means that 80% of the 
posts are retained: the remaining 20% of the posts, such as the character performer 
post, the merchandise post, and the park operation post, can experience repeated 
turnover. According to The Hong Kong Economic Times, 80 to 90% of Cultural 
Representatives left HKDL in one year. Hong Kong Disneyland, Hong Kong 
Disneyland Cast Forum (Hong Kong: 2006), p. 4; “不足一年千人離職 迪士尼員
工劈炮率倍增,” 26 August 2006, Apple Daily, A17; 黃勁文, “迪士尼 500 文化大
使 9 成離職 夢想破滅承諾未兌現 樂園：無收投訴,” 12 September 2006, Hong 
Kong Economic Times, A28. 
44
 In Fantasyland, for example, many new frontline workers are graduates from 
vocational schools. They applied for an HKDL job because they thought that 
working inside HKDL would be fun. After experiencing all the physical and mental 
hardship that comes with the job, many frontline service workers decided to leave 
HKDL as soon as another job offer came in.  
45
 “保安部西西主管遂個數,” HKDLCMU forum, 
http://www.hkdlcmunion.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=384&postdays=0&postorder=
asc&start=0 (accessed 8 November 2006). 
46
 John Van Maanen, “The Smile Factory: Work at Disneyland,” in Reframing 
Organizational Culture, edited by Frost and others (Newbury Park, California: Sage 
Publications, 1991), p. 72. 
 375 
                                                                                                                                   
47
 Starting in September 2006, many HKDL workers who work for a year receive a 
2 to 5% pay raise. “開幕前入職員工大部分加薪 2%至 5% 迪士尼留職率約八
成,” 26 August 2006, Sing Pao, A10. 
48
 In the website about secrets and fun facts of Disneyland Paris, a staff member 
who worked in both Orlando and Paris said that in the training session “Disney 
Traditions,” her instructor “told us, ‘If you don’t feel like smiling, don’t’.” 
http://www.oitc.com/Disney/Paris/English/Secrets.html (accessed 7 November 
2006). 
49
 Simon Parry, “Defiant Disneyland puts shark’s fin on the menu,” 23 May 2005, 
South China Morning Post, EDT1. 
50
 “End this ‘barbaric and cruel waste’,” 31 May 2005, Hong Kong Standard, A13. 
51
 Simon Parry, “Student activists first to hear Disney U-turn,” 27 June 2005, South 
China Morning Post, EDT3. 
52
 Chester Yung and Teddy Ng, “Disney ditches shark’s fin,” 25 June 2005, Hong 
Kong Standard, A08; Simon Parry, “Shark’s fin off the menu for Disney,” 25 June 
2005, South China Morning Post, EDT1; Simon Parry, “Student activists first to 
hear Disney U-turn,” 27 June 2005, South China Morning Post, EDT3. 
53
 “Introduction to SACOM,” http://www.sacom.org.hk/ (accessed 11 May 2006). 
54
 Richard Appelbaum and Peter Dreier, “The Campus Anti-sweatshop Movement,” 
in Cultural Studies: From Theory to Action, edited by Leistyna (Malden, Oxford: 
Blackwell publishing, 2005), p. 133. 
55
 Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM), “Looking for 
Mickey Mouse’s Conscience: A Survey of the Working Conditions of Disney 
Factories in China,” (Hong Kong, 12 August 2005), 
http://www.nlcnet.org/news/china/pdfs/SACOM_Report.pdf (accessed 9 November 
2006), p. 9.  
56
 The eleven-minute video footage of Those with Justice has been put on web, 
http://www.nlcnet.org/resources/VIDEO/china_video.shtml (accessed 11 January 
2007). 
57
 Roben Farzad, “Group calls Disney site sweatshop,” 19 August 2005, The 
International Herald Tribune, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/19/business/disney.php (accessed 18 
November 2006). 
58
 Laura M. Holson and Roben Farzad, “Disney Adds a Qualifier for Serving on Its 
Board,” 20 August 2005, The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/19/business/media/19disney.html?ex=114766560
0&en=427df935b5091afe&ei=5070 (accessed 18 November 2006). 
59
 “Disney to Investigate Sweatshop Claims,” 19 August 2005, Fox News 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,166220,00.html (accessed 18 November 
2006). 
60
 “Disney probes China labor claims,” 19 August 2005, BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4165654.stm (accessed 18 November 2006). 
 376 
                                                                                                                                   
61
 Lynne Duke, “The Man Who Made Kathie Lee Cry,” 31 July 2005, Washington 
Post,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/30/AR2005073001413.html (accessed 18 November 
2006). 
62
 “Chinese factories supplying to Hong Kong Disneyland exploiting workers,” 19 
August 2005, 
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/business/feeds/afx/2005/08/19/afx2185802.html 
(accessed 18 November 2006). 
63
 David Teather, “Disney accused of labour abuses in Chinese factories,” 19 
August 2005, The Guardian, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,1552932,00.html (accessed 18 
November 2006). 
64
 “Disney sweatshops alleged,” 18 August 2005, CNN Money, 
(US) http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/18/news/international/disney_china/index.htm
?section=money_latest (accessed 18 November 2006). 
65
 “Disney looking at Chinese labor claims,” 19 August 2005, Bizjournals 
(LA), http://losangeles.bizjournals.com/losangeles/stories/2005/08/15/daily41.html; 
Jego R. Armstrong, “Disney books tagged with sweatshop label,” 19 August 2005, 
New York Daily News,  
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/story/338674p-289201c.html; “Disney 
inquiry on ‘sweatshop’ claims,” 19 August 2005, Evening Standard, 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/article.html?in_article_id=403083&in_page_id
=2 (accessed 6 May 2007).  
66
 Krista-Ann Staley, “Disney investigates Hong Kong labor abuse allegations,” 19 
August 2005, Jurist Legal News and Research, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/08/disney-investigates-hong-kong-
labor.php (accessed 14 May 2006). 
67
 To SACOM, this was a setback because SACOM does not want Disney to stop 
its business with these problematic suppliers: if the business were to cease, so too 
would the livelihood of the suppliers’ most vulnerable workers. After several 
meetings with Disney representative from the regional office, SACOM 
spokesperson Vivien Tze said that these meetings accomplished little afterward. 
68
 Elspeth Probyn, “New Traditionalism and Post-Feminism: TV does the Home,” 
in Feminist Television Criticism: A Reader, edited by Brunsdon, Acci, and Spigel 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 131.  
69
 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 214. 
70
 George Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era 
(Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 169. 
71
 Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture, p. 180. 
72
 Jay R. Mandle, Globalization and the Poor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), chapter 7. Not all scholars believe that the anti-sweatshop movement’s 
 377 
                                                                                                                                   
goal is to alleviate poverty. Mandle argues that the problem of impoverished 
clothing workers in the third world should not be reduced to entrepreneurial greed. 
He further argues that, if a nation allows collective bargaining and if there is an 
enforced international agreement regarding union rights, then the liberalization of 
markets may lead to the creation of jobs instead of to income disparity.    
73
 “Workplace code of conduct,” from Fair Labor Association website, 
http://www.fairlabor.org/all/code/index.html (accessed 13 November 2006). 
Although garment firms control both most of the Apparel Industry Partnership’s 
seats (AIP) and the board’s decision-making, Fair Labor Association member 
companies agreed to ban forced labor, to ban child labor, to prohibit harassment or 
abuse, and to respect employees’ freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
74
 Faith-based institutional investors such as religious communities, pension funds, 
endowments, hospital corporations, economic development funds, asset 
management companies, unions, and colleges group together and press big 
companies to be socially and environmentally responsible. At the 2006 shareholder 
meeting, the New York City Employees Retirement System, acting as shareholders, 
requested that Disney “review and report to shareholders by September 2006, on 
the adherence of Disney’s suppliers in China to Disney’s corporate code of conduct, 
to the provisions of the Chinese government’s Labor Law, and to the core 
conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). This report should be 
prepared at reasonable expense and contain no proprietary information.” New York 
City Employees Retirement System, “Labor Standards – China 2006 – Disney (Aalt) 
Company / ABC,” 
http://www.iccr.org/shareholder/proxy_book06/MEMBER%20INITIATED/LABO
RSTANDCHINA_DISNEYDRAFT.HTM (accessed 16 May 2005). 
75
 There is a long historical involvement of churches in Hong Kong society. The 
Church had a leading role in providing social services such as building schools and 
hospitals for the poor and sick. In the seventies, some churches were involved in 
various social issues, including workers’ rights (Hong Kong Christian Industrial 
Committee was founded in 1968 to promote workers’ rights) and housing issues 
(such as the Yaumatei resettlement movement in 1970s for providing housing for 
boat residents). See Linda Butenhoff, Social Movements and Political Reform in 
Hong Kong (Westport, London: Praeger, 1999), chapter Five.  
76
 Richard Appelbaum and Peter Dreier, “The Campus Anti-sweatshop Movement,” 
in Cultural Studies: From Theory to Action, edited by Leistyna (Malden, Oxford: 
Blackwell publishing, 2005), p. 137. 
77
 葉蔭聰 and 施鵬翔, 迪士尼不是樂園 (香港: 進一步多媒體有限公司, 1999). 
78
 Most members participate in different student organizations and pressure groups: 
some members occupied executive positions in the Hong Kong Federation of 
Catholic Students (which has a long local history as a pressure group demanding 
social justice), the Hong Kong Federation of Students, the People’s Panel on West 
Kowloon, university student unions, university working-class concern groups, and 
university environmental concern groups. 
79
 Disney Hunter resists Disney insofar as Disney is a transnational corporation that 
oppresses workers and that culturally dominates the globe including one’s place in 
 378 
                                                                                                                                   
the natural landscape. Disney Hunter also criticizes the HKSAR government’s 
authoritarian governance and condemns the establishment of Hong Kong 
Disneyland as a sign of cronyism.  
80
 On the Disney Hunter message board, some people ask Disney Hunter to fold 
and argue that the park is very good (#221 message); some argue against HKDL’s 
labor exploitation (#222, #214-7); some found that Disney is not worse than other 
companies (#206), and so on. For details, see the Disney Hunter message board, 
http://personal.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/~clmak4/DISNEY 
HUNTER/guest/index.php?page=23&PHPSESSID=a5092266a2d3370d61444c022
4258f81 (accessed 22 May 2006). 
81
 It was I who sent tapes to TVB News that night. Before I sent them the tapes, 
different reporters or camera persons asked me the same question: “is the conflict 
violent?” And the tape showing Disney security guards using barricades to crush 
students has not been shown.  
82
 Before joining the local anti-Disney group Disney Hunter, which was established 
in June 2005, Susanna was the executive member of the Hong Kong Federation of 
Catholic Students and an active member in a university labor concern group. I 
interviewed Susanna in February 2006. In the interview, I asked Susanna why she 
had joined Disney Hunter and what student and social movements she had 
participated in before joining Disney Hunter. Since Susanna had quite a lot of 
Disney merchandise, in the interview, I asked her which Disney characters were her 
favorites and why she loved them. I also asked her whether or not, since joining 
Disney Hunter, she had changed her views on Disney and her Disney-related 
consumption acts. With permission, I use Susanna’s real name instead of a 
pseudonym in this thesis.  
83
 I interviewed Billy in February 2006. During that year, Billy was an acting 
chairperson of the Hong Kong Federation of Students Resources Committee and a 
university student-union representative. As I did with Susanna, I asked Billy about 
his reasons for joining Disney Hunter, about his social-movement experiences, and 
about whether or not, after joining Disney Hunter, he had changed his views on 
Disney and on Disney characters. With permission, I use Billy’s real name instead 
of a pseudonym in this thesis.  
84
 冼韻姬, “「獵奇行動」七一上街反迪士尼,” 25 June 2005, Hong Kong 
Economic Times, A22.  
85
 John Ap, “Residents have mixed opinions towards Hong Kong Disneyland,” 
press embargo (Hong Kong, 4 April 2006); “七成人對迪士尼印象差 五名市民遊
園一人不滿意,” 5 April 2006, Sing Pao, A11; “市民對迪士尼印象轉差,” 5 April 
2006, Hong Kong Daily News, A07; “九成市民指 迪士尼要增溝通,” 5 April 2006, 
Singtao Daily, A08; “迪士尼開業半年 七成人指形象變差,” 5 April 2006, Ming 
Pao Daily News, A14; May Chan, “Disneyland’s image has soured since its 
opening,” 5 April 2006, South China Morning Post, City 3. 
86
 黃勁文, “迪士尼日 1.4 萬人 遜預期 董事局研加獨立人士 增透明度,” 29 
November 2005, HK Economic Times, A36. 
87
 Disney Parks and Resorts chairman Jay Rasulo announced the figure. See Wendy 
 379 
                                                                                                                                   
Leung, “Disney claims million mark,” 25 November 2005, Hong Kong Standard, 
Front page, A01, A11. “首期工程有餘款：迪士尼擴建毋須再注資,” 28 
November 2005, Ming Pao Daily News, A 12; “羅彬深承認內地客較預期少，故
稍後會再到上海及北京催谷,” 25 November 2005, HK Economic Times, A24.  
88
 Zygmunt Bauman, Work, Consumerism, and the New Poor (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1998), p. 31. 
89
 “Americanism” was mentioned by my respondents—but not by me—in our 
interviews. 
90
 Néstor García Canclini, Consumers and Citizens: Globalization and 
Multicultural Conflicts (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2001); George Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global 
Era (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2003); Nick Stevenson, Cultural 
Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions (Maidenhead, England: Open University 
Press, 2003). 
91
 Eric Arnould, “Daring Consumer-oriented Ethnography,” in Representing 
Consumers: Voices, Views, and Visions, edited by Stern (London, NY: Routledge, 
1998); Daniel Miller, “Consumption and Its Consequences,” in Consumption and 
Everyday Life, edited by Mackay (London: Sage, 1997); Rob Shields, “Spaces for 
the Subject of Consumption,” in Lifestyle Shopping: The Subject of Consumption, 
edited by Shields (London, New York: Routledge, 1992). 
92
 Matthew Hilton and Martin Daunton, “Material Politics: An Introduction,” in The 
Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America, 
edited by Hilton and Daunton (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2001), p. 2. 
93
 Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyper Reality: Essays (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1986), p. 48. 
94
 Alan Bryman, “The Disneyization of Society,” Sociological Review 47, issue 1 
(1999) pp. 25-47; Alan Bryman, The Disneyization of Society (London, Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publishers, 2004), p. 158. I discussed Bryman’s ideas in chapter Two. 
For details, please see pp. 66-9. 
95
 Agnes was twenty-seven years old in 2006 and has been my friend. Among 
Disney characters, Agnes loves Winnie the Pooh the most. Because I knew that 
Agnes was a Winnie the Pooh fan and because every time I saw her, she had some 
new Pooh merchandise around her (a key holder, a cell phone holder, a wallet, a 
watch, a cell phone), I invited her to be my interviewee, and she kindly accepted 
my offer. I made a home visit in March 2006 and found that Agnes’ apartment was 
decorated as a Pooh apartment: I could find Pooh products in every corner of her 
apartment: carpets, curtains, figurines, snowglobes, house utensils, and other 
aspects of the apartment were Pooh-related. The name Agnes is a pseudonym. 
96
 Katie was forty years old in 2006, and I had not known Katie before my research. 
Katie was a Donald Duck fan. Unlike Agnes, Katie did not use all things Donald. 
However, Katie’s Donald collections were so enormous that a local magazine 
interviewed her about her collection. She had many Donald plush dolls, a Donald 
figurine by Armani, Wedgwood handmade Disney china bone tableware, and even a 
fine-art painting of Disney. I interviewed Katie and asked her about her views on 
 380 
                                                                                                                                   
HKDL. The name Katie is a pseudonym.   
97
 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (The Body, in Theory: Histories of 
Cultural Materialism) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 66, 
author’s emphasis. 
98
 Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (London: Sage, 
1998), p. 80. 
99
 Wendy Leung, “Disney ‘yes’ to extended hours drive,” 8 September 2005, The 
Standard, A10.  
100
 Starting in the 1950s, Disneyland and Walt Disney World referred to rides that 
were the most thrilling of all as E ticket ride. E ticket rides were also the most 
expensive and the most popular rides inside Disney parks.  
101
 The loading and the uploading of the ride Space Mountain roller coaster, for 
example, must be completed within twenty-two seconds or the ride will be 
suspended. Dennis Eng, “Disney visitors may face long waiting times,” 9 
September 2005, South China Morning Post, EDT3.  
102
 “Destination of dreams,” Hong Kong Disneyland website, 
http://park.hongkongdisneyland.com/hkdl/en_US/parks/overview?name=ParkOver
viewPage (accessed 21 May 2006). 
103
 “議員憂大嶼山治安惡化,” 28 October 2006, Ming Pao Daily News, L03. 
104
 “迪士尼首個中秋釀打鬥 遊園客指欠節日氣氛睹爭執感掃興,” 19 September 
2005, Ming Pao Daily News, A04; “迪園表演 清場頻惹噓聲 機動遊戲「如常」
故障 爭位推撞累及觀眾,” 19 September 2005, Wen Wei Pao, A05; May Chan and 
Agnes Lam, “Disney in holiday swing but visitors are in short supply,” 19 
September 2005, South China Morning Post, EDT3.   
105
 “「夏日通行證」谷客谷出禍迪士尼變扒手樂園,” 14 August 2006, Sing Pao, 
A01. 
106
 Shunya Yoshimi, “The Politics of Disneyland: Tokyo Disneyland and 
Commercial Culture in Contemporary Japan,” paper read at a conference in Mexico 
(1993), p. 19. 
107
 John Hench, interview by Jay Horan, 3 December 1982, transcript, WDA, p. 39; 
quoted from John M. Findlay, Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American 
Culture after 1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 67.  
108
 Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science (London, Thousand Oaks: Sage 
publications, 1998), p. 177. 
109
 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. xiv. Further references are in parentheses in the text. 
110
 As discussed in chapter Six, Dr Sarah Liao, the Secretary for the environment, 
transport and work, said “TWDC [The Walt Disney Company] undertook the 
planning of all facilities in the HKD [Hong Kong Disneyland].” Hong Kong 
Hansard, 30 November 2005, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-
06/english/counmtg/hansard/cm1130ti-translate-e.pdf (accessed 7 October 2006), p. 
 381 
                                                                                                                                   
62 in PDF file, p. 2505 in Hong Kong Hansard.  
111
 Sharon Kinsella, “Cuties in Japan,” in Women, Media, and Consumption in 
Japan, edited by Skov and Moeran (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), p. 242 and p. 251. 
112
 Mark Poster, Cultural History and Postmodernity: Disciplinary Readings and 
Challenges (NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 125. 
113
 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 32. 
114
 Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science, p. 169. 
115
 Hong Kong Disneyland, “Park Rules & Regulations,” in Guidemap: Autopia, 
Summer (2006). 
116
 Dennis Eng, “Mickey and friends call for a better work environment,” 10 April 
2006, South China Morning Post, CITY3; Simon Parry, “Revolt in the Magic 
Kingdom,” 23 April 2006, South China Morning Post, EDT15. 
117
 Simon Parry, “Disney staff weigh costumed protest,” 23 April 2006, South 
China Monring Post, EDT4. 
118
 During June and September, performers can have a forty-minute break instead of 
a thirty-minute break, in line with the practice in overseas parks. Simon Parry, 
“Disney costume workers get $1,000 pay rise,” 21 May 2006, South China 
Morning Post, EDT2; “Pay rise for Mickey & Co a happy result all round,” 21 May 
2006, South China Morning Post, EDT 10; HKDLCMU press statement on the 
change in working conditions of HKDL character performers, “工會努力爭取改
善．迪士尼積極回應,” 20 May 2006, http://www.hkdlcmunion.org/?p=55 
(accessed 18 November 2006). 
119
 Doreen Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Cambridge: Polity press, 1994), p. 
131. 
120
 Dennis Eng, “Disney chiefs will not ask taxpayers to foot bill for park 
expansion,” 10 May 2007, South China Morning Post, CITY4. 
121
 Benjamin Scent, “Disney facing finance poser,” 10 May 2007, Hong Kong 
Standard, A03. 
122
 Scent, “Disney facing finance poser.” 
123
 吳雋妍, “逾 250 億備用貸款今年九月檢討 迪士尼虧蝕港府無意注資,” 10 
May 2007, Sing Tao Daily, A08. 
124
 It is an improvisation of Baudrillard’s words, “The mass knows that it knows 
nothing, and it does not want to know. The mass knows that it can do nothing, and 
it does not want to achieve anything.” From Jean Baudrillard, “The Masses: The 
Implosion of the Social in the Media,” in Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, 
edited by Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 216. 
125
 Nick Stevenson, Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Questions (Berkshire, 
English: Open University Press, 2003), p. 135. 
 
 382 
Chapter Eight  
Remade in Hong Kong: Our Place, Our Park 
 
When I started this Disney research in October 2001, I was not hostile to Disney 
offerings; rather, my most favorite character was (and still is) Winnie the Pooh, and 
in the 1990s, I enjoyed watching Disney movies (in particular, Beauty and the 
Beast and Pocahontas, as well as the contemporary version of Cinderella, Pretty 
Woman). Believing that every cultural text is polysemic in nature and that 
audiences interpret and use a particular text in their own ways, I started this 
research by studying not Disney’s global media domination but how local parents 
consume and use Disney products in a domestic context. In my first post-graduate 
presentation in January 2003, I discussed how Disney attempted to insert itself into 
local rituals through its Christmas functions (as discussed in chapter Five), and how 
local families’ practices de-commodified Disney commercial culture. In the 
question-and-answer session, one member of the teaching staff in the Department 
of Cultural Studies, Ip Iam Chong (who had co-edited the Chinese book Disney Is 
Not a Happy Land in 1999), asked me why I did not discuss any issues concerning 
the HKDL project. I still remember my answer at that time: “I’m just not prepared 
for it. It’s not the right time for me, but I will examine the HKDL project soon.” 
I must admit that after over one year’s part-time study, I was still “not 
prepared” to examine the HKDL project critically. Although I did not think that 
Disney belonged to my generation (I had grown up with Japanese animated 
cartoons, Japanese comics, and Hong Kong TV dramas and movies), I resisted 
studying how popular culture—including Disneyland, as I had visited Anaheim 
Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, and Tokyo Disneyland before starting this study—
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dumbs down a people (including me). However, cultural studies (in particular, 
studies that attack the “consumption-is-passive-and-disempowering” line) and 
recent globalization studies (emphasizing cultural flows instead of domination and 
homogenization) seemed to provide me with legitimate approaches to Disney: 
approaches that did not deny me my own pleasures and my own agency in using 
popular cultural texts. 
However, the more I studied real world cases (especially the Orlando case) 
about how Disney’s private corporate practices have negatively affected the public 
domain, the more I began to realize that the study of popular culture should not 
restrict itself to the study of the production, the circulation, and the usage of popular 
cultural texts: these studies should also address matters of politics—in this case, 
how corporate practices affect civil society. In my research on Disney, I should 
study not only Disney offerings but also how Disney’s corporate practices, under 
specific Hong Kong conditions and in Hong Kong political and institutional 
contexts, sometimes articulate and sometimes challenge Hong Kong society, and 
how Hong Kong people perceive, interpret, and react to (appropriate, negotiate, and 
challenge) these Disney practices. 
Doreen Massey’s concepts of space-time and of a simultaneous multiplicity 
of spaces affected the way I examined Disney power. Her concept of space-time 
asks researchers to examine the spatial production of social effects and history. 
Accordingly, the Disney space in Hong Kong is not static and researchers should 
study Disney power in process. Furthermore, Massey’s concept of a multiplicity of 
spaces challenged me to look at Disney spaces in a plural sense, because Disney 
has many facets (as entertainment provider, as employer, as cultural marker) and 
because different local actors (as consumers, as workers, as seekers for distinction) 
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occupy different social-spatial relationships with Disney. By integrating 
ethnographic research in my study of how various locals (government, media, 
parents, HKDL cultural-representatives, Disney employees in general) use Disney 
in their specific conditions, I not only challenge the concept of a “global-local” 
dichotomy but also study how locals use Disney and HKDL to develop their own 
notions of self, identity, and place. 
In the following, I once again appropriate Massey’s concepts of space-time 
and of a multiplicity of spaces to conclude my research on three aspects in 
particular. The first aspect is the changing social-spatial relationship between Hong 
Kong people and Disney between 1999 and 2007: between 1999 and mid-2005, 
Disney articulated the HKSAR government’s desire and many Hong Kong people’s 
desire to distinguish Hong Kong from other cities, especially Chinese cities. 
However, since mid-2005, Disney has tended to negotiate with and sometimes to 
live in tension with Hong Kong people. Second, rather than examine the Hong 
Kong-Disney encounter in a general framework of cultural globalization, I examine 
the Hong Kong-Disney relationship in a more specific sense. That is, I review how 
the multiple spaces that Disney occupies in Hong Kong (spaces such as 
entertainment and consumption-goods provider, as media corporation, as global 
employer, and as American cultural babysitter) interact with Hong Kong people’s 
consumption behavior, work-services culture, media practices, and the larger idea 
of local, national, and cosmopolitan culture. These encounters suggest that HKDL, 
to a certain degree, has indeed become a local theme park that reflects Hong Kong’s 
cultural specificity; whereas Hong Kong people’s consumption behavior, work-
service practices, media practices, and larger cultural bearings have not 
correspondingly undergone a significant change. In the third and final section, I 
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evaluate the effects that Hong Kong people’s uses of HKDL have had on Hong 
Kong’s limited development of a more participatory community and on Hong 
Kong’s prospects for a more participatory political culture.  
 
Remade in Hong Kong: The HK-Disney relationship, HKDL, and HK culture 
Over time, changes in the relative power dynamics between Hong Kong and Disney 
have developed within the wider, and also changing, Hong Kong-Disney 
relationship. In 1999, even though many newspapers commented that the HKSAR 
government-Disney deal regarding HKDL was non-transparent, and even though 
some newspapers labeled the deal unfair, HKDL won considerable public support 
in Hong Kong. I have argued that this support resulted from Disneyland’s self-
representation as “the happiest place in the world” and as a boon for Hong Kong’s 
cosmopolitan image and for Hong Kong’s tourist economy. The utopian appeal that 
the HKDL project created for Hong Kong people hinged on a promise of globalness 
plus happiness, a globalness plus cosmopolitan aspirations, and a globalness plus 
economic development. 
 In 1999, the HKSAR government used the Hong Kong people’s fear of 
disappearance and their desire for cosmopolitanism in order to earn public support 
for its HKDL joint-venture with Disney. Hong Kong’s local press supported the 
deal because of the local economic downturn, because Hong Kong and Shanghai 
were competing with each other for the right to host Disneyland, and because Hong 
Kong was competing for economic power, in general, with other Chinese cities, 
with Singapore, and with Taipei. Many of my respondents supported the HKDL 
project not just because of the government’s economic promise but also because 
Disney’s investment in Hong Kong signaled the maintenance and even the re-
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establishment of the city status of Hong Kong as a cosmopolitan city after the Asian 
financial crisis and Hong Kong’s economic downturn. 
 On a more personal level, globalization encourages some Hong Kong 
middle class youth and middle-aged parents to aspire not simply to acquire 
modernized Western consumer products but also Western- and Chinese-language 
skills and cultural sensitivity so that these Hong Kong people might better 
“survive” in their locality, as well as in the world. In my interview process, I found 
that many respondents, in fact, revealed no “Hong Kong supremacist” local 
consciousness; instead, they considered themselves to be victims of a “Hong Kong-
lack”: a lack of English-language skills and of Putonghua-language skills, a lack of 
exposure to foreign culture, a lack of “world” visions, and thus a lack of 
competitiveness and of job opportunities. My respondents tried to acquire and to 
possess different kinds of cosmopolitan sensitivities by participating in exchange 
programs such as Disney’s international program and by undertaking English-
language studies with the aid of such materials as Disney’s World of English 
educational kits. Their perception of the globalization process as inter-city 
competition reinforced their desire to connect with the culturally and economically 
powerful Disney. In other words, the cultural and economic power of Disney 
articulated my respondents’ desires to be cosmopolitan in a global economy.  
 In mid 2005, as the opening date of HKDL was approaching, many Hong 
Kong people realized that their views on Disney were in need of a reality check. 
HKDL, after all, is a theme park for entertainment. However, HKDL is the smallest 
Disney park and provides the fewest rides among all Disney parks in the world. The 
HKSAR government initially expected that the HKDL project would bring Hong 
Kong not only the “hardware,” the actual Disney theme park, but also the 
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“software,” Disney’s famed and branded management philosophy and management 
practices. However, it seems that, to a large extent, HKDL has not “upgraded” 
Hong Kong service standards to the level of Disneyfied services; indeed, the local 
labor union and the media criticized HKDL management as an exploiter of workers. 
Furthermore, despite maintaining Disney Realism, HKDL’s non-transparent media 
policy and HKDL’s slow media response created a tense relationship between 
HKDL management and media practitioners. In 2005, local media turned the local 
millennium Disney dream (globalness plus happiness, globalness plus wealth, and 
globalness plus fame) into “Americanism” and “Hong Kong shame.” In summary, 
HKDL’s settlement process shows that local-Disney power has relied less and less 
on articulation and more and more on negotiation and on domestication, although 
always in tension with each other. 
To delineate the aforementioned multiple local-global encounters, I would 
also like to ask what particular aspects of Hong Kong people’s cultural practices 
may have domesticated particular Disney practices, and whether Disney corporate 
practices have, conversely, Disneyfied some of Hong Kong people’s specific 
cultural practices; and whether, also, some specific Disney corporate practices and 
Hong Kong people’s cultural practices have escaped change and, yet, live in tension 
together. I focus my closing examination here on three levels of analysis: 
consumption, work, and ideology.   
At the level of consumption, I will argue that, on the surface, Disney has 
localized HKDL but that Disney’s main aim for profit maximization has not 
changed. However, while Disney is famous for luring visitors into pronounced 
spending patterns, HKDL has not “Disneyfied” Hong Kong visitors in the sense 
that it has not successfully encouraged them to engage in excessive spending. 
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Moreover, Hong Kong people’s prejudicial and exclusionary practices have also 
changed and remade the park atmosphere. At the level of work (specifically 
service-labor and management practices) I argue that neither has Disney 
successfully Disneyfied HKDL service culture nor have local media accepted 
Disney’s corporate practice of Disney Realism. At the third level, the ideology level, 
I argue that Hong Kong people’s encounter with Disney, the American cultural 
babysitter, has aroused not their national sentiments but their various cosmopolitan 
aspirations.  
Before delving deeper into the discussion, I would like to stress once again 
that, as Massey’s concept of “a multiplicity of spaces” suggests, each level 
(consumption, work, and ideology) involves various particular groups, and because 
of these different social groups’ different structural positions, their responses 
toward the multifaceted Disney are necessarily different. In other words, different 
local respondents direct various and sometimes even contradictory responses 
toward the same global corporation, Disney.         
 
Consumption 
At the level of consumption, I argue that if Disney Imagineers localized the design 
of HKDL, the design’s aim would be to lure park visitors into conspicuous 
spending patterns. However, Disney, despite its dominant position in the children’s 
consumer market, its massive advertising, and its fame, has failed to successfully 
Disneyfy Hong Kong people’s consumption behavior, to turn them into great 
spenders; rather, Hong Kong people “Hong Kongized” Disney offerings by 
practicing both their money-saving strategies and (in the “happiest place in the 
world”) their exclusionary cultural practices toward Mainland visitors. 
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As a global corporation, Disney aims at maximizing profits and making 
consumers consume. Since 2001, Disney has been applying its synergistic 
marketing policies to Hong Kong. To boost its local image and to insert itself into 
local rituals, Disney placed its icons in major local celebrations, including those for 
the Lunar New Year, for Christmas, and for the mid-Autumn festival. As for HKDL, 
in 2001, Disney conducted research whose findings showed that respondents in 
both Hong Kong and Mainland China expressed a strong desire for classic Disney 
characters and themes.1 As a result, Walt Disney Imagineers, on the one hand, 
recreated the “original” version of Walt Disney’s Disneyland and, on the other hand, 
localized the park to signify respect for the local culture. They consulted feng shui 
masters to design HKDL; HKDL has provided visitors with various Asian foods 
and Hong Kong-Western hybrid foods such as char siew pork-burger; HKDL even 
built a certain number of squat toilets to accommodate Mainland tourists’ personal 
hygiene habits. All of these glocal changes, however, have not changed Disney’s 
central aim: to earn as much profit as possible. Beginning in 2007, to increase 
visitors’ spending, HKDL management in fact abandoned the localized carts 
imitating Mong Kok hawkers selling snacks inside the park. This decision pressed 
visitors to purchase and consume food inside HKDL’s restaurants. 
Given Disney’s dominant market position, my parent-respondents 
purchased some Disney merchandise for fun-seeking consumption and for 
pragmatic American-English learning, but they also resisted Disney’s promotion of 
consumerist behavior and Disney’s representation of mischievous characters and 
screen violence. Despite Disney’s global media domination, these parents did not 
accept Disney values as a total cultural package. 
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HKDL has also failed to lure Hong Kong people into making repeated visits 
to the park and into making extravagant purchases inside the park. According to 
HKDL’s park-attendance figures and operating-income figures, HKDL 
management seemed to miscalculate the degree of cosmopolitan-consumerist 
experiences and practices already available to Hong Kong people. Because of Hong 
Kong people’s experienced cosmopolitan consumer behavior (many of them had 
visited other Disneyland parks in the past) as well as because of the HKSAR 
government’s huge investment in HKDL, local media widely reported on the 
smallness of the park only three or four days after HKDL’s official opening.2 The 
media revealed that HKDL had two major distinctions: it was the smallest 
Disneyland park in the world, and it provided the fewest attractions. Regarding the 
operating income that Disney could draw from HKDL, except for big festivals such 
as Christmas and the Lunar New Year, HKDL attendance figures were not 
satisfactory. The figures did not meet HKDL’s first-year target of 5.6 million,3 and 
Disney admitted that a decline at HKDL offset an increase in the operating income 
of Disney’s parks-and-resorts division during the second quarter of 2007.4 
Disney miscalculated not only the attendance projections but the guest 
spending as well. My ethnographic research inside the park revealed that visitors 
have used various ways to consume park “facilities” without paying more than the 
ticket price. Hong Kong visitors bring empty bottles and fill them up with free 
drinking water inside the park; they play with toys inside HKDL’s shops and wear 
characters’ wigs for photos but purchase neither the toys nor the wigs. As a result, 
HKDL’s guest spending also fell short of Disney’s initial expectations.5 In order to 
play all HKDL’s attractions within the one-day time limit, Hong Kong visitors have 
spent more per-day time in HKDL than visitors spend in other Disney parks. Long 
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queues, queue jumping, disputes, and even fights have thus resulted in the “happiest 
place in the world.” These fights often take place between locals and Mainlanders. 
Rather than “nurture a better human nature” through park design and control, 
HKDL is a site where Hong Kong people’s prejudice has remade the park into a 
veneer of Hong Kong-specific cultural tensions. In short, at the consumption level, 
HKDL has been localized on the surface. However, Disney’s profit-driven aim has 
not changed; and neither have Hong Kong people inside HKDL evolved into big 
spenders nor have Hong Kong people’s cultural prejudicial practices toward 
Mainlanders changed—even though Disneyland was designed to control human 
behavior. 
 
Work 
At the level of work, I have examined the encounter between HKDL and Hong 
Kong culture by dividing my discussion into two types of spatial-social relations: 
first, the relationships among HKDL junior workers, mid-level managers, and the 
Disney organization system; second, the relationships between local journalists and 
Disney management. The HKSAR government expected that its import of HKDL 
would also be an import of Disney’s famous human-resource and management 
skills. Disney, too, expected to transplant the general Disneyland work culture in 
Hong Kong, and in late 2004, nine months before HKDL officially opened, Disney 
employed five hundred Hong Kong people so that they would work as HKDL 
cultural representatives in Orlando, would introduce HKDL to the Orlando park 
visitors, would learn about Disney work culture, and would spread their learnt 
Disney culture to Hong Kong. My study, however, finds that Disney management 
has failed, to a large extent, to Disneyfy HKDL workers’ work practices; in fact, 
 392 
some aspects of HKDL’s management and work policies (the service ethos in 
particular) have been Hong Kongized. As for the relationship between journalists 
and HKDL management, Disney media culture and local media culture have 
maintained their relationship in tension. Disney has maintained its non-transparent 
corporate practices, and local journalists have consistently used widespread and 
entrenched Hong Kong attitudes to evaluate the practices of HKDL management. 
HKDL is operated and managed by the Disney company, and the park’s 
service quality supposedly expresses the Disney company’s Disneyfied world-class 
standard of excellence. However, because HKDL senior management employed 
local mid-level managers from Hong Kong businesses, these mid-level managers, 
according to my HKDL cultural representative respondents, neither believed in nor 
performed Disney values. As a result, HKDL workers seldom actually provide 
Disney services, such as Disney’s “magical moments,” to HKDL guests. And 
because the senior management has provided the local mid-level managers with a 
relatively high degree of autonomy in which they can implement team-based 
policies relating to disciplinary actions, some junior workers suffer unfair 
disciplinary actions. Without providing a positive work environment, junior staff 
may indeed fail to provide Disneyfied service.  
Because of physical hardship, toilsome workloads, sometimes unfair 
disciplinary actions, and un-Disneyfied visitors, junior workers may wear a glum 
face rather than convey Disney’s “magical moments” to visitors. And this deviance 
occurs although all workers learn—and many remember— the “4 keys to Disney 
quality standards” (safety, courtesy, show, efficiency) and although a good number 
remember the “7 service guidelines for guest services.” However, I do not mean to 
suggest that HKDL workers have completely escaped being Disneyfied because in 
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my conversations with HKDL staff respondents, they used Disney terms such as 
“guests,” “cast members,” “good show,” and “magical moments” to describe their 
work. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the evidence suggests that HKDL’s 
Disneyfication of HKDL workers has been successful.  
HKDL’s top management recognized that guest services were un-
Disneyfied, and, in late 2006, the management started to ask the mid-level 
managers to train their team members to produce “magical moments.” In early 2007, 
different teams (merchandise, park operations, food and beverages, guest relations, 
hotel operations) appointed twenty representatives in total to study how to improve 
and “Disneyfy” HKDL guest relations. A concrete example of these efforts is 
illuminating here. Starting in November 2006, Fantasyland managers asked each 
team member to perform at least one magical moment once a week. Ironically, the 
managers finally eliminated this practice in February 2007, not simply because of 
workers’ resistance to it but also because of the reduction of the number of 
employees. According to my HKDL worker respondents, Fantasyland had about 
ninety junior staffers in 2006. This number declined to about sixty by May 2007. 
The decline reflects Disney’s efforts to reduce HKDL’s operating costs. Before 
February 2007, there were two shifts among junior workers (Host 2). The first 
batch started at 9:15 a.m. and ended between 4:30 p.m. and 6 p.m.; the second 
batch started between 12 p.m. and 2 p.m. and ended at 9 p.m. The shortest shift in 
the past had been seven hours. Since February 2007, however, there has been only 
one shift, and almost all junior workers start working at 9:15 a.m. and end their 
work between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. 
All of these figures mean that HKDL workers need to work between nine 
and eleven hours a day, without counting the forty-five-minute no-pay lunch break. 
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In an extreme case, workers may work for eleven hours forty-five minutes, without 
counting the forty-five-minute no-pay lunch break. Because HKDL management 
reduced workers’ paid sick leaves from two days per month to six days every six 
months starting in January 2007, some HKDL workers have applied for not fewer 
than four consecutive days of sick leave. This trend stems from the fact that 
workers in Hong Kong are eligible for sickness allowance under the Employment 
Ordinance if the sick leave taken is not less than four consecutive days and if the 
sick leave is supported by an appropriate medical certificate.6 According to my 
respondents, of sixty junior workers at Fantasyland, about five to six workers took 
not fewer than four consecutive days of sick leave between January and May 2007. 
I suspect that HKDL top management can never “Disneyfy” HKDL workers 
so long as HKDL workers need to work even longer hours than in the past. Besides, 
according to my HKDL worker respondents, HKDL started to employ permanent 
part-timers in 2007, and the hourly payment decreased from sixty-three dollars per 
hour at Christmas 2006 to forty-six dollars in May 2007. Given the longer working 
hours, the reduced payment, and the regular low-paid part-timers, I cannot see how 
HKDL management can create a positive team-spirit work environment in which 
workers can meet Disney’s guest-service standards. In summary, at the work level, 
both mid-level managers and junior staffers, to a large extent, have not been 
Disneyfied, and I suspect that no such Disneyfication will occur in the near future 
provided that HKDL management does not improve the work environment. 
Disney’s world-famous media management practices, as well, have met 
challenges in Hong Kong. Most famous among these practices is Disney Realism. I 
argued in chapter Six that, after receiving negative coverage about its early 
operations, which were chaotic, crisis-prone, and disrespectful of local lived 
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experiences and the rule of law, HKDL modified its media policies to some degree. 
For example, after drawing fire from government officials, legislators, and scholars 
regarding HKDL security’s demand that two health inspectors “dress down,” 
HKDL management apologized and said that HKDL would adhere to Hong Kong 
law. After a series of negative press reports discussed HKDL’s smallness, 
highhandedness, Americanism, manipulative acts toward journalists, and 
exploitation of workers, the HKDL management attempted to become more 
“transparent.” For example, a few days before the official first-year anniversary of 
HKDL, the executive vice-president and the managing director of HKDL, Bill 
Ernest, announced that HKDL’s annual attendance was “well over five million 
visitors … and we’re getting close to our attendance target.”7 However, these 
concessions do not suggest to me that HKDL management has abandoned its efforts 
to implement Disney Realism in Hong Kong; in fact, after these press-based 
revelations, HKDL management sought to escape from further questions on 
attendance figures by declining, in 2006, to disclose not only the real attendance 
figures but also the management’s projected figures.8 In this respect, the non-
transparent business practices of HKDL have worsened, not improved.9 
HKDL management has not changed Disney’s major management 
practices, nor have local journalists been so Disneyfied that they report news only 
favorable to HKDL; rather, journalists criticize HKDL management’s 
highhandedness and Americanism, as I have mentioned. However, local 
journalists ask neither general questions about the power of global companies in 
the global economy nowadays, nor more specific questions about, for example, 
private companies’ power in post-colonial Hong Kong; the journalists turn their 
criticisms regarding Disney’s management practices into an over-generalized 
 396 
anti-Americanism. By simply criticizing Disney corporate practices as 
“Americanism,” local journalists neglect general critical issues concerning, for 
example, local laws’ ineffectual monitoring of companies’ acts, and also specific 
critical issues concerning, for example, the dampening effect that the close 
relationship between Hong Kong businesspeople and the HKSAR government 
has had on public monitoring of HKDL’s acts. 
Owing to concern for the public interest, in 2001 the HKSAR 
government-appointed Standing Committee on Company Law Reform proposed 
to amend the law so as to require all private companies in Hong Kong to file their 
financial statements for public inspection, a reform that would lead to “annual 
disclosure in the form of the annual directors’ report, profit and loss account.”10 
Given the significant role that private companies play in the Hong Kong economy, 
the Committee has seen the change of company law as “one of the key elements 
in good corporate governance.”11 The Committee showed that different countries 
vary in their filing requirements for company financial statements. Jurisdictions 
in the United Kingdom and Singapore require private companies to file financial 
statements at the Companies House (the UK) and at the Registry of Companies 
and Business (RCB, Singapore), each of which is equivalent to the Companies 
Registry in Hong Kong. The Committee proposed that “private companies with 
limited liability should file their financial statements with the Companies Registry 
(CR) for public inspection.”12 The government, however, has not amended the 
Company Law. In other words, Hong Kong law does not require the Hong Kong 
International Theme Park (HKITP) company, a joint-venture of the HKSAR 
government and Disney, to disclose its financial statements related to HKDL 
because the HKITP company is private.  
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While severely limiting the public’s access to Hong Kong private 
companies’ financial records, current Hong Kong laws also fail to guarantee 
workers’ economic and union rights.13 In May 2001, the United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights commented on the HKSAR government’s 
neglect of citizens’ economic rights:  
 
The Committee also raised questions regarding policies in relation to 
unfair dismissal, rest breaks, maximum hours of work, equal pay for equal 
work and overtime pay rates. The HKSAR was asked to review its policy 
and legislation in relation to these areas, and to ensure that they are in line 
with its obligations under the Covenant.14 
 
Before the Handover, the colonial Legislative Council passed laws guaranteeing 
that workers would have collective-bargaining rights and that workers whose 
employer had dismissed them for union activities would be reinstated. On 30 June 
1997, the Chinese government dissolved Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, 
which had been elected in 1995, and replaced it with the pro-Beijing provisional 
Legislative Council. In July 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council suspended 
the above-mentioned laws that the late colonial Legislative Council had passed; in 
October 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council repealed the above laws under 
the Employment and Labour Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance. 
Without a legal-institutional framework for either collective bargaining or union 
recognition, the current legislation renders both employees and labor unions weak 
in relation to management. And because current Hong Kong labor law sets neither 
maximum working hours nor minimum wages, HKDL management breaks no 
laws when it requires staff to work long hours. Because the current Occupational 
Safety and Health Ordinance does not categorize the physical pain suffered by 
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many HKDL employees as an occupational injury, those suffering employees 
who need hospital treatment cannot obtain compensation from HKDL 
management under the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance.15  
However, local journalists have failed to grasp the major factors that allow 
HKDL’s management practices to be non-transparent and sometimes exploitative: 
these practices are not “Americanism,” as many journalists have argued, but are 
rather reflective of local company practices and local labor laws: the practices 
undermine citizenship rights tenaciously, and the laws protect those same rights 
ineffectively. Local laws’ failure to protect citizens’ rights is due largely to the 
partnership between local government and businesspeople—a partnership that 
maintains the “corporatist democracy” model, in Alvin So’s term.16 Hong Kong 
people under current laws cannot influence the policies of either Disney or the 
HKSAR government. Rather than ask the HKSAR government to intervene in the 
non-transparent and exploitative market, local journalists’ criticism regarding 
HKDL’s “Americanism” is, to a certain extent, merely an expression of “Hong 
Kongism.” Their generalized cultural criticisms reinforce a widespread belief in 
Hong Kong about Hong Kong’s self-fashioned success: small government, big 
markets, and a culture of self-reliance. For example, in criticizing HKDL’s slow 
response to the Lunar New Year chaos, Apple Daily’s editorial criticized HKDL as 
a government enterprise, the idea being that the government aspects of the 
enterprise resulted in a highhanded and slow-to-respond attitude: 
 
Any Hong Kong people who traveled in the Mainland in the 1980s must 
remember the [Mainlanders’] non-merit-pay service attitude. These 
uncivilized phenomena, which follow from state-run enterprises, should 
have been eliminated through competition. However, in Hong Kong, highly 
acclaimed as “the world’s freest economy,” the government dug up this 
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hangover, the state-run enterprise, from socialism’s garbage dump … and 
once again exposed to visitors the state-run service attitude, which should be 
found only in history books. Hong Kong people, in fact, experienced 
HKDL’s chaos and humiliation during its rehearsal days … during HKDL’s 
two days of Lunar New Year chaos, HKDL fully displayed its deeply rooted 
tendency to operate as would a state-run business: it sits on its laurels and 
has no desire to improve itself…. If private enterprise cannot or is not 
willing to run a business, state-run enterprise will only make things worse!17   
 
Local media actors seldom reflect upon their own Hong Kong cultural bearings, but 
criticize Disney management on the basis of a general belief widespread in Hong 
Kong, that small government and big markets generate efficiency, profit, and thus 
the Hong Kong success story. The commentator who authored the above-cited 
passage saw markets as the only legitimate platform for the distribution of 
resources, and he argued that governments’ intervention in markets will lead only 
to degeneracy. 
 
Ideology  
At the third level, that of ideology, I argue that my respondents’ encounters with 
Disney offerings (including HKDL) have not aroused the respondents’ national 
sentiments; rather, the respondents’ particular approaches to Disney demonstrate 
the respondents’ different cosmopolitan aspirations. 
In my study, two respondents (a couple) raised concerns about the spread 
of Disney’s Americanized notions of combat and of heroism. My parent 
respondents also raised concerns about screen violence in general, consumerism, 
and mischief. However, no respondents in my study ever voiced any worry or 
concern to me that Disney culture was invading Chinese culture or that Disney 
offerings were Disneyfying Chinese culture.  
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These findings contrast vividly with others that I came across while 
teaching a graduate class in 2007. The class had twenty students and about half of 
them came from the Mainland. In one student presentation, a Mainland student 
discussed the Disney animated cartoon Mulan. She pointed out more than twenty 
“mistakes” that Disney made about Chinese culture. For example, in the film, the 
manner in which Chinese folklore heroine Mulan writes Chinese characters is 
inaccurate; the side character dragon Mushu has a snake tongue; and in a match-
making scene, Mulan and other girls wear geisha makeup. When I asked how my 
students felt about these “misrepresentations,” the Hong Kong students did not 
say much but one Mainland student expressed anger over the “mistakes” that 
Disney had made, especially the inaccurate conflation of Japanese culture with 
Chinese culture—always an issue that triggers fierce resentment insofar as 
imperial Japan militarily invaded China in the 1930s. Compared with the 
Mainland students, the Hong Kong students and I exhibited a lower national 
cultural sensitivity in our examination of the Disneyfication of Chinese folktales, 
although all the Hong Kong students and all the Mainland students in my class 
knew well the Mulan poem and the story. In my class, the Hong Kong students 
also displayed less upset about the Disneyfication of Mulan than did the Mainland 
students. I would finally note here that, among my respondents, very few 
expressed upset over Disney animated cartoons’ Disneyfied representations of 
different ethnic groups. Such cultural conflict, whether isolated or writ large at the 
national level, is not expressly discernable in my study.    
Whereas my respondents’ Disney consumption has not aroused their 
national identification, their varied use of Disney (its merchandise and its symbolic 
power culturally and economically) demonstrates their varied cosmopolitan 
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aspirations. My research suggests that after experiencing a few years of local 
economic doldrums, Hong Kong people’s widely held view that the globalization 
process fuels the ferocity of competition among cities and individuals has 
intensified Hong Kong people’s desire to become cosmopolitan. At the same time, 
however, some local scholars, university students, and activists attempted to use 
HKDL’s settlement to induce Hong Kong people to think about global 
corporations’ exploitative acts in other places. 
My HKDL cultural representative respondents and my middle-class parent 
respondents aspired to possess cosmopolitan language skills and cosmopolitan 
cultural skills in order to survive in Hong Kong and in the world. Perceiving the 
globalization process as an intensification of competition among workers and cities 
around the world, these two types of respondents tended to possess and to develop 
relatively high levels of cosmopolitan cultural skills and of sensitivity to earning 
potential, whether in Hong Kong or in another part of the world. 
Affirming their pragmatic mindset and self-reliance ethic, the parents used 
Disney merchandise specifically to improve their children’s English-language 
skills, their children’s competitiveness, and their children’s future career choices. 
In fact, parents’ pragmatic use of “cosmopolitan” cultural goods (that is, of 
English-language learning kits and of English- and Putonghua-language classes) 
may broaden the children’s cosmopolitan horizon, but I suspect that these 
“cosmopolitan” encounters have nurtured in neither the children nor even in their 
parents an elevated concern for humanity at large. For example, Lisa’s use of the 
products helps her critically examine neither the values promoted by those 
products nor, indeed, her own cultural values (such as her cultural prejudice 
toward Mainlanders). Her mode of Disney usage reinforces Hong Kong 
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pragmatic values, authoritarian parenting methods, and the family-based self-
reliance ethic. I call this type of cosmopolitan aspiration “pragmatist 
cosmopolitanism,” because the chief purpose underlying Hong Kong people’s 
acquisition of cosmopolitan cultural skills is capital accumulation. 
Whereas the respondent parents’ use of Disney learning kits helped the 
parents’ children acquire economically viable cultural skills, the six-month 
Orlando work experiences that my HKDL cultural-representative respondents had 
brought them positive pragmatic returns (confidence and living skills) and 
positive cultural returns (a wider vision of their surroundings and self reflections 
on how Hong Kong culture bears on their actions). In the case of Olivia, cultural 
clashes between her Hong Kong-style work-hard-play-hard behavior and what she 
perceived as her US colleagues’ laid-back behavior created certain unhappy 
incidents between her and her colleagues. After six months’ American training, 
Olivia felt that she not only had acquired certain cosmopolitan cultural capital 
(such as better oral English), but also had broadened and deepened her self-
reflections on her own cultural bearings and had become more accepting toward 
different cultures. I call this “reflexive cosmopolitanism.” Although the Orlando 
experiences of none of my HKDL cultural representative respondents led the 
respondents to question Disney Realism or to encourage them to think about the 
effects of private and corporate governance over the public domain, some 
respondents rethought Hong Kong culture’s emphasis on efficiency, instrumental 
rationality, and the self-reliance ethic. This, too, exemplifies what I would call a 
“reflexive” cosmopolitanism.       
These two kinds of cosmopolitanism, in my view, have long existed in 
Hong Kong, so that HKDL’s points of reference complement—rather than 
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corrupt—Hong Kong people’s existing belief systems. However, because of the 
settlement of HKDL, some university teachers, students, and activists grasped the 
chance to strengthen the Hong Kong public’s concerns about global companies’ 
sometimes exploitative acts around the world. These people’s protests have been 
transnational, and the orientation of their concerns has been cosmopolitan in a 
third and different sense. Related activities include petitions and even threats to 
mount a global boycott against Disney because HKDL planned to serve shark’s 
fin soup for wedding banquets and because Disney’s global-outsourcing practices 
resulted in mistreatment of Mainland workers, in violation of their rights. In my 
view, these transnational activist campaigns have functioned in three ways. First, 
they have pressed Disney to change its corporate acts. Second, their campaigns 
strengthened the Hong Kong public’s concerns about certain global issues. Third, 
these anti-global companies’ global exploitative acts encouraged Hong Kong 
people to question their common-sense beliefs: namely, the widely held assertion 
that a free-market economy yields social benefits that outweigh social drawbacks.  
Besides, environmentalists’ and SACOM’s resistant acts against Disney 
constitute recent acts by local activists who use globally networked tactics in the 
struggle against transnational corporate acts; and Disney Hunter is the first local 
activist movement to struggle against a particular transnational company. The 
establishment of HKDL has prompted local movements to embrace an even greater 
cosmopolitan orientation. I call the practices of these recent local, globally 
networked activist campaigns that possess a cosmopolitan orientation “activist 
cosmopolitanism.” However, activist cosmopolitanism has not yet achieved 
significant popularity in Hong Kong. For example, in 2005, the Disney Hunter 
group could boast only about twenty members, a number that did not significantly 
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increase after one year of school and street campaigns. In fact, as I mentioned in 
chapter Seven, some HKDL workers told the labor-union workers that if Disney 
Hunter had involved itself in setting up the HKDL labor union, they would not have 
joined it because they themselves were not confrontational toward HKDL 
management. 
In summary, then, since the opening of HKDL in 2005, the local-Disney 
power has relied less and less on articulation (Disney’s cultural and economic 
power articulated with Hong Kong people’s desires for cultural distinction and 
economic revitalization) and more and more on negotiation (Disney Realism and 
HKDL management’s relatively slow media practices in conflict with Hong Kong 
media’s expectations) and on domestication (HKDL junior workers’ localized 
services). Nevertheless, Disney and various local actors always remain in tension 
with each other. At the consumption level, although HKDL management localized 
certain HKDL practices, Disney’s global profit-making goal of course remains 
unaltered; HKDL’s park design also fails to change local cultural prejudice against 
Mainland visitors. At the work level, although HKDL workers have been 
Disneyfied to a certain extent, their managerial practices and guest-service 
standards are still local. At the ideological level, Disneyfied representations of 
Chinese folklore neither aroused nor agitated my respondents’ national 
identification; rather, my respondents’ cosmopolitan aspirations, because of the 
globalization process, manifested themselves through the respondents’ use of 
Disney merchandise and the respondents’ US work experiences. Their 
cosmopolitan aspirations varied (from pragmatic to reflexive to activist), but only a 
handful of the respondents stated that their “allegiance is to the worldwide 
community of human beings.”18  
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Hong Kong people use HKDL for entertainment, for an income source, for 
acquiring cosmopolitan cultural skills, or for exposing global companies’ profit-
driven and sometimes exploitative corporate acts. And, indeed, not a few Hong 
Kong people use HKDL for a combination of these reasons. These various uses are 
expressions of Hong Kong culture; many of these cultural practices are not cultures 
Disneyfied by Disney. Nevertheless, HKDL has remade and has complicated Hong 
Kong people’s perception of Disney itself. No longer just about “happy” 
entertainment, Disney is now a quasi-public enterprise that has brought to Hong 
Kong both the fewest Disneyland attractions of any park and disappointing 
economic returns. 
 
Hong Kong culture and the development of a democratic pluralistic society 
The settlement of HKDL in Hong Kong reveals that a global corporate power such 
as that of Disney may be so enormous that its possessor could ask the local 
government to grant it financial subsidies, to support infrastructural setup, to 
surrender management control, and to consider future changes in legislation. 
However, we should note that, except for the above mentioned “special” rights, the 
HKSAR government-Disney joint venture concerning the HKITP company enjoys 
certain other “rights” which include the right of non-transparency and which have 
their justification in Hong Kong laws. Local company laws and local labor laws 
contain no requirements either that Disney disclose HKDL’s annual financial 
statements or that Disney reduce HKDL workers’ working hours and provide the 
workers with more breaks. It is difficult to change these practices in the absence of 
both legislative reform and intermediary quasi-public watchdog bodies. I turn here, 
then, to the wider implications of my research. 
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The struggles for citizenship rights and for legislative reforms are 
important in the democratization process of Hong Kong society generally, and 
culture plays a vital role in the way in which citizens may push government for 
various reforms. According to T. H. Marshall,19 societies that grant their people a 
modicum of political rights, civil rights, and social rights are, in effect, entitling 
the people to full and equal participation via legal frameworks. However, the 
people’s entitlement to rights does not automatically transform the people into 
actively engaged citizens who exercise their rights; a society enjoying the 
possession of these rights does not necessarily become a community of openness 
and communication. As Nick Stevenson argues, the definition of ‘citizenship’ 
should not rest exclusively on political meanings because culture strongly 
influences the meaning of citizenship in different contexts and in shaping the 
ways in which people exercise their rights: 
 
Whether we define citizenship through questions of rights, notions of 
obligation and duty, membership of overlapping communities or 
normalization, questions of culture are not far away.20 
 
Stevenson argues that citizenship should denote not only entitlements and 
obligations but also “questions of imagination, identity, recognition and 
belonging” (p. 36). He argues that societies, in order to strengthen global 
conceptions of cultural citizenship, address “the need to create and revive a 
radical model of the public sphere” (p. 152), and he makes it clear that his model 
does not emphasize rationality and “consensus” alone, because civil society “is 
not merely an institutional realm, but is constructed through symbolic codes of 
inclusion and exclusion” (p. 23). Therefore, cultural citizenship concerns the 
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symbolic dimension of inclusion and marginalization. Stevenson further 
emphasizes the role that affect plays in constructing an active civil society. The 
term ‘cultural’ in Stevenson’s “cultural citizenship” refers to Raymond Williams’ 
model of cultural democracy, in particular the latter’s idea that popular 
participation should be encouraged through new democratic institutions and 
communicative channels to develop a common culture capable of promoting 
reflexivity and pluralism (pp. 19-20) as well as community and belonging (pp. 
32-3). For the context of globalization, Stevenson fleshes out this model to make 
an important point: rather than limit itself to the national level, civic solidarity 
should strive for a cosmopolitan civil society based on human rights. However, 
Pedro Nunes notes the important point that Stevenson provides “no systematic 
account of what, in practical terms, constitutes cultural citizenship.”21 
When I bring the idea of cultural citizenship to bear on my study of my 
respondents’ various uses of and responses to HKDL, the majority of their cultural 
practices seem to have little relationship with cultural citizenship in Stevenson’s 
sense. First, my respondents, in general, believed in market individualism and the 
culture of (family-based) self-reliance. The culture of community belonging and of 
organized collective action (such as industrial action) was not popular among the 
respondents. This observation is consistent with some surveys on Hong Kong 
values.22 Second, their responses suggest that the respondents prioritized material 
values (such as “economic and physical security”) over other post-materialist 
enjoyments (the “self expression and the quality of life”23). Perhaps for this reason, 
organized and politicized consumption activities have had a difficult time taking 
root in Hong Kong. Third, my study of HKDL shows that some of my respondents 
had a relatively low level of tolerance toward people of different cultures, 
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especially toward Mainlanders. Possibly consistent with my finding, a survey 
reveals that a majority of Hong Kong people do not accept different lifestyles (such 
as homosexuality) either.24 These Hong Kong attitudes may negatively affect the 
development of a democratic society that embraces pluralistic cultures. 
First, as discussed in chapter Seven, my HKDL staff respondents were 
reluctant to join a labor union to negotiate either pay raises or additional employee 
benefits, and I would argue that underlying their reluctance in this instance was 
their own ambivalent attitude toward HKDL management. Although my 
respondents admitted that some HKDL workers, especially the character performers, 
might face undesirable work conditions (long working hours, chaotic shifts, and 
occupational injuries or diseases without company compensation), these same 
respondents also insisted that not every division treats its staff poorly and that they 
themselves felt no compelling need to join the labor union: why give voice to other 
workers’ problems, challenge authorities, and risk a backlash that would negatively 
affect their own careers? Believing in market individualism and self-reliance, some 
of my respondents preferred to ask those dissatisfied workers to resign rather than 
organize protests against the company. In other words, it seems unlikely that, in the 
near future, HKDL workers will concertedly undertake negotiations with the 
management. 
The middle class parents whom I interviewed emphasized that individuals 
should rely on themselves to negotiate their own economic value. Some of the 
parents relied on Disney’s World of English, private English lessons, Putonghua 
lessons, piano lessons, and sometimes their own child-rearing disciplinary actions 
in order to shape their children into competitive market agents, to solidify their 
class position, or just “to earn a living” in the globalized economy. Because some 
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parents in my study saw local culture as “non-educational” (i.e., local popular 
culture is mind-numbing and it lacks cultural capital for economic viability), they 
tried to distance their children from Hong Kong local popular culture. Middle-
class-parent respondents demonstrated an instrumental mindset according to 
which they would train and mold their children to be cosmopolitan—that is, to 
“survive” in the globalized world. If this training were to be successful, it is likely 
that the children would rarely consider themselves as exponents of Hong Kong 
culture. If democratic civil order depends not only on citizens’ rational consensus 
regarding civic values but also on “the possibility of passionate encounter” as 
Nick Stevenson argues,25 I wonder whether or not the decrease in children’s 
encounters with local popular culture will reduce the potential means by which 
the children will relate their popular-culture affect to a local identity and a place-
based sense of community. 
Second, because Hong Kong people, according to Ho and Leung, “tend to 
focus on economic stability, economic growth and maintaining order,” and because 
Hong Kong’s economic affluence has not yet fostered in Hong Kong people a 
strong sense of environmental awareness,26 I argue that politicized consumption 
activities are not popular among the Hong Kong people when their embrace of 
material values is stronger than their embrace of post-material priorities.  
Facing HKDL’s non-transparent corporate practices, sometimes exploitative 
management practices, and as yet unfulfilled economic promises, the Hong Kong 
people to whom I spoke generally exhibited little eagerness to say “no” to HKDL. 
Although my parent respondents criticized certain HKDL corporate practices (such 
as HKDL’s violation of the rule of law and HKDL’s long working hours), only 
Judy’s family had decided to boycott HKDL; indeed, Judy had been actively 
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participating in a local feminist movement for more than thirteen years. All the 
parents—except Judy’s family—agreed that HKDL should expand, despite 
HKDL’s environmental damage and the non-transparent quasi-public nature of the 
enterprise. This finding parallels the findings from John Ap’s March 2006 survey 
(as I discussed in chapter Seven). Many respondents (70%) indicated that their 
“opinions toward HK Disneyland have become more negative due to the problems 
that have been experienced since its opening,”27 but 86% of the respondents still 
expressed “support for the development of Hong Kong Disneyland,” and this 
percentage of support was actually the highest recorded when he compared it with 
his previous surveys since 2000. 
Third, my study of HKDL respondents’ aspirations to become cosmopolitan 
shows that their life-strategy changes (the acquisition of Putonghua and English, as 
well as of Mainland and cosmopolitan sensitivity) did not necessarily change the 
respondents’ conception of what Hong Kong is and should be, nor did the life-style 
changes necessarily change how the respondents perceived Hong Kong and the 
Other, especially the Mainlanders. The exclusionary cultural practices of many 
Hong Kong people extend to the people’s vast support for the HKSAR 
government’s limits on family-reunion immigration.28 In 2005, the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “urged the Government to 
extend the protection afforded by a proposed racial discrimination law to internal 
migrants from the mainland.”29 In fact, Hong Kong people perform exclusionary 
practices against not only Mainlanders but also non-Chinese ethnic minorities such 
as Nepalese, Filipinos, and Indonesians. Barry Sautman characterizes Hong Kong 
people’s exclusionary practices as “Hong Kong semi-ethnocracy.”30  
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Given Hong Kong people’s exclusionary everyday practices, I find it 
difficult to imagine a Hong Kong society that can turn away from discrimination 
and toward a functioning inclusive community: one where people embrace critical 
dialogues and “accept the ‘other’ without expecting them to conform,” in 
Stevenson’s words.31 A Hong Kong whose culture fails to embrace critical 
dialogues with people of different cultures, especially those of the marginalized, is 
a Hong Kong where the idea and the practice of human rights and of cultural 
democracy will find unfertile soil. I argue, further, that without such an open 
environment, Hong Kong society will find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
transgress its cultural boundaries and broaden its cosmopolitan sensitivity.  
 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this concluding chapter, I confessed that, during the initial 
stage of my PhD study, I resisted examining Disney in a critical way. I was 
narrowly characterizing cultural studies as a field of inquiry whose exclusive 
focus is on people’s agency in regulating their own cultural consumption. 
Through this narrow characterization, I placed myself over a metaphorical safety 
net because cultural practices usually do entail a certain degree of agency. 
However, at that time, I missed the point that an active cultural practice is not a 
necessarily socially progressive and subversive practice.  
At the consumption level, as I have argued in chapter Five, parents’ 
consumption acts and parents’ use of Disney offerings can be seen as acceptance, 
an uptake, or resistance, depending on what aspects of power researchers address. 
If we view these acts in terms of “agency,” all these acts display a certain degree 
of consumer agency. In other words, “agency” as a concept is not subversive by 
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nature. Furthermore, even though my parent respondents resisted Disney’s 
promotion of consumerist behavior, screen violence, and mischievous acts, the 
resistance was not political resistance. Disney is famous as family entertainment, 
and parents’ uses of Disney or parents’ resistance to Disney derives usually from 
this established idea—the idea of Disney’s fame as a manufacturer of fun. The 
parents resist certain Disney products because these offerings, in the parents’ 
view, create a bad learning environment for their children’s personality 
development. The parents’ resistance has little relation to such larger and political 
questions as Disney’s global media domination, Disney’s private governance over 
public land, and the potential harmful effects of Disney Realism. Certainly, the 
parents’ resistance is real and helps us understand that Disney’s media 
domination in children’s entertainment does not necessarily lead to cultural 
homogenization. However, it is quite futile to argue that this media-consumption 
resistance can evolve into political resistance, which would, in turn, challenge 
Disney’s dominant position as a media outlet—rather than challenge, here and 
there, simply a few of the outlet’s offerings. In other words, consumer agency and 
consumer resistance do not necessarily lead to political resistance.  
I have noticed that this chasm between consumer resistance and political 
resistance surfaces in other HKDL-related settings. My HKDL worker 
respondents’ local resistance against management did not evolve into political 
resistance. I have observed many HKDL visitors flout and disrupt Disney’s 
orderly park rules, but I have neither observed nor interviewed nor, for that matter, 
read about even marginal numbers of Hong Kong visitors who transformed their 
on-site resistance into political resistance. And although it is true that many local 
media practitioners set out to change the meaning of “Disney” from “Hong Kong 
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dream” to “Hong Kong shame” and to “Americanism,” it is also true—and quite 
telling—that these media practitioners never united to extend their critique from 
HKDL’s operations to the political context that made HKDL possible. In short, 
all these acts and assertions of resistance seem to have little relationship to the 
development of human rights, democracy, and pluralistic culture, which Hong 
Kong people lack under the present regime.  
Here, I am not suggesting that Hong Kong people possess consumption-
related agency, work-related agency, or speech-related agency but that they 
simultaneously lack political agency. Rather, I argue that the concept of the 
relationship between agency and resistance—a concept that cultural studies 
scholars such as John Fiske32 highlight—in fact fails to address people’s 
resistance to resistant activities. As consumers, my respondents resisted 
performing or supporting any politicized consumption activity; none of my 
HKDL-worker respondents stated that they had ever thought of joining the HKDL 
labor union; and the anti-Disney group of which I am a member received precious 
little popular support, as demonstrated by the group’s small membership. In fact, 
the long, winding course of my research has convinced me that many of my 
respondents resist adopting a citizen-based political identity and that the concept 
of the relationship between agency and resistance cannot, by itself, help us to 
address, in comprehensive or rigorous ways, my respondents’ overt refusal to 
politicize their everyday acts, transforming or extending these into political acts. 
Here, therefore, I reject the paradigm of resistance, which can easily 
evolve into a paradigm of “populist” resistance. To conduct and frame my 
research, I have preferred to use Massey’s concept of a multiplicity of spaces and 
Paula Saukko’s dialogic-research strategy.33 As I stated in the introductory 
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section, my own initial resistance to studying Disney’s real power in Hong Kong 
may have been due to my fear that this type of study would require me to deny 
my popular-culture pleasures and thus my identity. Both Massey’s concept of a 
multiplicity of spaces and Saukko’s emphasis on polyvocality, however, have 
helped me live with my internal tension: I sometimes enjoy Disney offerings but I 
also detest Disney’s non-transparent and sometimes inhumane corporate practices. 
The concept of a multiplicity of spaces points to not only diverse local actors who 
occupy, interpret, and respond diversely among diverse spatial social relations, 
but also the possibility that each actor may occupy more than one space. Thus, 
just as Disney can be entertainment, a global corporation, and a local employer, 
so too can an individual person occupy several diverse spaces in relation to 
Disney. Therefore, it is possible that I love Winnie the Pooh and detest Disney’s 
policies at the same time. In fact, it is possible for me both to love Pooh and to 
question Pooh. My critical study of Disney, in the end, results not in self-denial 
but in self-affirmation: I understand more about how I, by using different 
perspectives, differently perceive and differently respond to different issues in 
relation to Disney. This is not an ambivalent attitude but a multiplicity of attitudes 
grounded on a multiplicity of spaces. 
As a cultural studies student, I have learned from my study of HKDL that 
engaged cultural research means personal involvement in a particular site (real, 
symbolic, and imaginary). The goal should be, through communication, to get 
different voices heard, recognized, and accepted in a culture of openness; 
engaged cultural research means neither that views should submit to 
homogenization within an overly consensual framework nor that the researcher 
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should impose his or her own political or theoretical agenda onto people’s 
behavior. This is the openness of cultural studies that enables researchers to act.  
The Hong Kong people’s contradictory views about HKDL’s development 
(development leads to environmental damage, but park improvements should stem 
from park development) show that Hong Kong people commonly negotiate among 
different discourses. The contestation of various discourses poses a challenging 
question for cultural studies scholars who examine the role that culture plays in 
shaping particular social events and in intersecting power with culture in a variety 
of social contexts. If cultural studies is not simply about the study of culture but 
about the politics of cultures, then we should study “how power works where 
people live their lives,” in Meaghan Morris’ words.34 In several chapters, I 
attempted to situate concrete concerns in the materiality of peoples’ lives, 
limitations, and aspirations, especially as these people responded to economic 
arrangements, emotional structures, and cultural discourses35 within the broad, 
complex webs of power relations forming the domestic, national, and international 
spheres.  
If we only keep on criticizing certain government policies or certain 
corporate acts in a particular way without understanding people’s diverse opinions, 
as in Disney-focused criticism that polarizes without accounting for the majority of 
Hong Kong people’s ambivalence toward HKDL, then our characterization of 
“reality” does an injustice to these different views and to itself. In short, by 
dismissing views as irrelevant or as misled, our struggle may also tarnish our ideal 
for an open and pluralistic society. 
 My study on the establishment, the operation, and the consumption 
activities of Hong Kong Disneyland constitutes only a starting point from which 
 416 
researchers (1) can integrate cultural perspectives into any number of allegedly 
revitalizing projects such as HKDL, (2) can understand people’s different views 
and uses of Disney’s Hong Kong offerings in relation to the local-global 
framework of Hong Kong’s political handover, and (3) can examine the HKDL 
project’s cultural and political effects on Hong Kong people’s citizenship rights 
and on Hong Kong people’s encounters with diverse cultures.  
My study is far from exhaustive in that many of my respondents—be they 
reporters, media producers, Disney and HKDL consumers, or HKDL workers—
had attained a tertiary education: strong contrasts may characterize the opinions 
held by people of different classes. In my examination of HKDL as a work place, 
I did not collect information from managers or from senior-ranking officers. In 
this regard, I do not—and indeed cannot—assert that my study offers a 
comprehensive understanding of HKDL management policy. Also, the lack of 
information supplied from HKDL public relations officers and from higher-
ranking HKDL staff means that my study lacks sufficient pluralism, although this 
“lack” is simultaneously a structural feature of Disney’s operations in Hong Kong.  
One of my study’s strengths is another setback: my focus on respondents’ 
diverse cultural understandings both of Hong Kong as a city and of some Hong 
Kong people’s behavior. My research opens little space in which respondents 
could creatively imagine what Hong Kong society and Hong Kong people should 
be like or become in the future. In the case of Disneyland, I seldom conducted 
research on people’s diverse visions of what an ideal park should be. Yet as I 
have been working on the final draft of this thesis, workers have been dredging 
mud and sand every day at the Phase II reclamation site of Penny’s Bay: sixty 
new hectares of land will be in existence by 2009.36 If the Hong Kong 
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government is going to build another park on this land, then the government-
Disney joint-venture company (the Hong Kong International Theme Park 
Company, HKITP) has the right to buy the Phase II site at any time during the 
twenty years following HKDL’s 2005 opening.37 The government also expects 
that upon completion of Phases I and II, Penny’s Bay will have two private theme 
parks, five resort hotels, and 74,400 square meters of rentable retail, dining, and 
entertainment complexes.38  
Is the above-mentioned development our ideal development of Penny’s 
Bay? Do we still want to spend millions from the public coffers to build a private 
park for some vague economic promise whose proclaimed future effects are 
speculative at best? Can we foresee no project better than a private park that has 
no obligation to address community needs and concerns? Do we still want to 
struggle with Disney’s non-transparent management practice, which hides from 
us—the common shareholders—the park’s profits and the park’s losses? Do we 
want to build another park over whose master-planning neither the people nor the 
biggest shareholder—the government—exercises respectable power? To answer 
these questions, we should not rely chiefly on opinion surveys, which cannot 
promote critical pluralistic culture or participatory democracy; Hong Kong 
Disneyland cannot be called the people’s park, not because of its foreign or 
American characteristics but because of the publicly funded park’s reinforcement 
of the HKSAR government’s undemocratic governance and because of the 
publicly funded park’s private operation, which excludes public participation. In 
the midst of urban redevelopment and suburban development, scholars should 
conduct further research to work out different plans for building up a place-
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based39 inclusive park that respects citizens’ rights, voices, and differences. 
People’s participation, after all, is the basis of cultural citizenship and democracy.  
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Glendy Chu 
Director, Media Relations 
Hong Kong Disneyland 
Penny’s Bay, Lantau Island, HK 
 
Wing Yee Choi 
Kwan Fong Cultural Research & Development Programme (KFCRD) 
Room 320, B. Y. Lam Building 
Lingnan University 
8 Castle Peak Rd 
Tuen Mun NT 
 
2 October 2006  
 
Dear Ms Chu: 
Subject: Invitation for an Interview 
 
I am a Junior Research Associate at Lingnan University. My research is about the 
development of  Hong Kong Disneyland and its localization process. 
 
There is a consensus that Disneyland theme park has been unique in popular culture 
phenomenon. The Disney Magic has been wide-reaching for over 50 years and it 
continues to attract audience not only in America but also worldwide. Disney’s 
transnational success has made it a global model for service and management culture. 
Terms such as “Disneyfied” and “Disney version” are invented to describe Disney’s 
enormous influence.  
 
My research is concerned with cultural globalization – how transnational companies 
localize their offerings by adapting to local tastes and how local consumers appropriate 
transnational offerings for their own use. In my thesis I investigate how local families 
interpret Disney characters and movies, using Disney merchandise in their daily lives to 
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realize a particular type of  good life. Further, I try to examine how Hong Kong 
Disneyland adapts to local tastes by modifying its park design; for example, by consulting 
feng shui, establishing Fantasy Gardens for photo-taking, and providing a wide variety of  
Asian cuisine inside the park. 
 
It is bound to be challenging to plant a US cultural and corporate institution in 
Chinese territory, especially when it is a theme park project involving Hong Kong $23 
billion. As a new organization in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Disneyland anticipated and 
experienced cultural challenges from locals, visitors and the media, yet the park continually 
makes itself  attractive and culturally sensitive. Therefore, to present a balanced view of  
these issues in my dissertation, I would like to interview Hong Kong Disneyland about 
how the park has adapted to local play culture, work culture and media culture. Since my 
research is exclusively about how global culture localizes, an interview with the company 
would be indispensable and invaluable to my understanding of  the complicated decisions 
that global companies face. 
 
My research is the first serious, academic project on the localization of  Disney culture 
in Hong Kong. I sincerely wish and hope that the company might grant me an interview 
chance. 
 
My correspondence address, phone number, fax number and email address are as 
follows: 
 
Address:  Kwan Fong Cultural Research & Development Programme 
(KFCRD), Room 320, B. Y. Lam Building, 8 Castle Peak Road, Fu 
Tei, Tun Mun, Hong Kong. 
Phone number:  91XX 44XX 
Fax number:  25XX 51XX 
Email address:  choiwy@ln.edu.hk 
 
 
Best regards, 
Wing Yee Choi 
Junior Research Associate 
KFCRD, LU 
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June 10, 2005 
 
Major Ian Swan, 
Educational Services Secretary, 
Educational Services Department, 
The Salvation Army Hong Kong and Macau Command. 
 
 
Dear Major Swan, 
 
I am an instructor working in the City University of Hong Kong and a PhD 
candidate doing research at the Lingnan University of Hong Kong.  I sincerely 
hope that you can grant me a visit of your school, to observe students’ behavior 
when they play, and to talk to them about their favorite leisure activities. 
 
My research is about the about the intricate relation between globalization process 
and local appropriations.  My focus is on the setup of Disneyland Hong Kong and 
the cultural effects of the global circulation of Disney merchandize in our local 
lives, especially in the domestic sphere.  There is always a strong association 
between Disney, childhood, and family.  Part of my research is about how Disney 
and its transmedia products insert into our lives and how parents make use of 
Disney toys and edutainment merchandize to build up intimate relationship with 
their children and to develop children’s personality.   
 
Since peer groups have great influence on children’s favorites and personality 
development, I would very much like to go to a kindergarten school to observe and 
experience how children play with each other in a school setting, to talk to them to 
see how their favorites (toys, characters, TV programs) have been influenced by 
their peers, and how they interpret their favorite Disney movies and characters. 
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I have already done several case studies and the findings have been presented in an 
international conference “Crossroads 2004 in Cultural Studies” held in the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, titled “Disney, Hong Kong families, 
and the formation of children’s subjectivities.”  My research focus on the local 
appropriation of the global offerings receives major academic attention in the UK 
and USA, but has been relatively neglected in Hong Kong until recently.  My 
research is indeed the first of its kind locally.  The substance of the study would be 
tremendously enhanced if you can grant me a chance to visit your school and to talk 
to your students. 
 
My correspondence address and phone number are as follows: 
 
Address:  Department of Cultural Studies, 
   Lingnan University, 
   Tuen Mun, Hong Kong. 
Phone no.:  91XX 44XX 
 
Attached please find a copy of the Crossroads 2004 conference abstract for your 
reference.  If you have any questions on the research, please feel free to contact 
me. 
  
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Kimburley Choi  
 
 
